Pacific School of
Religion
Berkeley, Calif.

THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. XXIII.

List of Contributors to Volume XXIII

Rev. E. H. Askwith, D.D.
Rev. Professor B. W. Bacon, D.D.
Professor J. B. Baillie, M.A., D.Phil.
Rev. Professor Vernon Bartlet, D.D.
Rev. Professor C. J. Cadoux, M.A., B.D.
Rev. Principal W. M. Clow, D.D.
Rev. W. J. Ferrar, M.A.
Rev. Principal A. E. Garvie, D.D.
Professor Frank Granger, Litt.D.
Professor Rendel Harris, Litt.D., LL.D.
Rev. John A. Hutton, D.D.
Rev. Maurice Jones, D.D.
Rev. Professor Ed. König, D.D.
Rev. J. H. Leckie, D.D.
Rev. J. G. McKenzie, M.A., B.D.
Rev. Professor H. R. Mackintosh, D.D.
Professor J. R. Mantey, Th.D.
Professor D. S. Margoliouth, Litt.D.
Rev. Professor James Moffatt, D.D., Litt.D.
Rev. J. K. Mozley, M.A., B.D.
John B. Naish, B.Litt., B.D.
Rev. J. E. Roberts, M.A., D.D.
Rev. Professor A. T. Robertson, Litt.D., D.D.
Rev. Professor J. M. Shaw, D.D.
Professor A. Souter, Litt.D.
Rev. Professor James Stalker, D.D.
Rev. W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D.
Rev. G. H. Whitaker, M.A.
Rev. Professor Newport J. D. White, D.D.
Rev. Canon R. Winterbotham, M.A.
Rev. W. Spicer Wood, M.A.

THE EXPOSITOR

EDITED BY THE REV.

SIR W. ROBERTSON NICOLL,
C.H., D.D., LL.D.

EIGHTH SERIES

Volume XXIII

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C.

MCMXXII

ser. 8
v. 23
19211

Printed in Great Britain
by Butler & Tanner,
Frome and London

THE STORY OF THE FARMER AND HIS MAN.

THE sayings of Jesus which Luke has grouped in xvii. 1–10 are generally regarded as unrelated. That is, their arrangement is held to be editorial; Luke simply adapted them from his source or sources, without caring for their original setting. At first sight there is apparently a real lack of connexion between the four parts (*a*) 1–2, (*b*) 3–4, (*c*) 5–6, and (*d*) 7–10. Elsewhere in Luke's Gospel there are traces of sayings being put together, without any vital connexion between them. In chapter xvi. 16–18 there is a pretty clear case of this. And most editors are content to treat xvii. 1–10 in the same way. Even Godet declares that the section is heterogeneous; it "contains four brief lessons, placed here without introduction, and it is impossible to establish any connexion between them." But there is one possible way of finding a sequence of thought in the passage. It was first suggested, so far as I know, by Bernhard Weiss,[1] although there are partial anticipations of it in patristic exegesis and in Wesley's *Explanatory Notes upon the New Testament*. The Story of the Farmer and his Man, which forms the fourth part of the passage, is strikingly elucidated by it, and it is worth while to work it out, in order to see if it will account naturally for the sayings as they stand. The weakest link in the chain, I admit, is the connexion of thought between (*b*) and (*c*). As for (*a*), whether it was drawn from Q or from the separate sources underlying this so-called "Perean" section in Luke (ix. 51–xviii. 14), it marks a new

[1] In *Die Quellen des Lukasevangeliums* (1907), pp. 252, 253, 254.

departure. It does not seem likely that it originally formed a pendant to xvi. 18, as if the *σκάνδαλα* were pre-eminently matters of divorce and marriage.[1] The setting of the warning, in any of its extant forms (e.g. Mark ix. 32, Matt. xviii. 6–7), is the circle of disciples with their responsibilities for the immature in age or in experience. (*b*) in an expanded form is the introduction to a special parable in Matthew (xviii. 21, 22), but fits in naturally here as a sequel to (*a*), even though we choose (less aptly, I think) to trace the thread of connexion as, first a warning against doing evil to others, and then a reminder that Christian duty is not exhausted by any negative quality. The first part of the saying (verse 3), with its ethical stress on the duty of reproof,[2] appears in a slightly more general setting in Matthew xviii. 15. (*c*) is the real difficulty, not so much on account of its meaning as on account of its relevance here, though the connexion with prayer and the unforgiving spirit reappears in Mark's setting (xi. 22 f.), But, in order to test the accuracy of our hypothesis, we need to approach it from a study of what precedes. Only thus can we hope to see how (*d*) forms an appropriate sequel to it.

(*a*) The opening word is unambiguous. *To his disciples*[3] *he said, "It is inevitable* (*ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστιν*, a negative form of *δεῖ*, like *οὐκ ἐνδέχεται* in xiii. 33) *that hindrances should come* in human intercourse (i.e. hindrances to faith, things that upset confidence in God and break the peaceful trust of a religious community), *but woe to the man by whom they come; it would be well for him to have a millstone hung round his neck, and be flung into the sea, rather than prove a*

[1] Dr. D. R. Wickes, *The Sources of Luke's Perean Section* (1912), pp. 21, 22. This had been already suggested by J. F. Blair, *The Apostolic Gospel* (1896), p. 267.

[2] This is as marked as the protest against too stringent treatment of offenders.

[3] Resuming the standpoint of xvi. 1–13, which had been interrupted by xvi. 14–31 (apparently all spoken to the sneering Pharisees).

hindrance to one of these little ones." Better be drowned than make a poor Christian lose his faith! The *little ones* are disciples who are only beginners, immature souls easily driven back from their faith by bad example or inconsistent conduct on the part of their fellow-members. Jesus champions them with passionate indignation. His voice quivers as He denounces those who seduce them from their loyalty or wreck their tender faith. There is a warmth of chivalrous feeling in the words which proves how deeply He resented any injury done to people who were inexperienced.

Even the metaphor He uses is startling in its severity. The punishment He refers to was Phœnician and Syrian. But the peasants of Palestine might have actually seen it in the lake of Galilee, for it was practised by the Romans; Suetonius tells how Augustus, for example, punished some unscrupulous criminals in this way. "Since the 'pedagogus' and attendants of his son Gaius took advantage of their master's sickness and death to act arrogantly and avariciously within his province [Lycia], he had them loaded with heavy weights round their necks and flung into a river."[1] The saying is a vehement expression for, "Better dead than alive to wreck another's faith!" From His own experience He knew how human intercourse could furnish *σκάνδαλα* for faith and obedience, even although a man offended inadvertently. He had called Peter himself a devil for attempting to divert Him from the path of suffering. *Get behind Me, you Satan! you are a σκάνδαλον to Me* (by your insidious, well-meaning advice).[2] And He knew not only that such seductions were often deliberate, but that many weaker souls might be induced to give way before them. Some are always ready to take their cue from

[1] *Vita Augusti*, 67. The rebellious Galileans in the war, according to Josephus (*Antiq.* xiv. 450), drowned the adherents of Herod in the Lake of Galilee.

[2] Matt. xvi. 23.

others, or apt to be disconcerted and driven from belief in God by what older and responsible people do either to them or in view of them. As human lives cross one another, all sorts of harmful possibilities arise. Irresponsible talk or selfish behaviour may inflict deadly injury upon the faith of others. Ibsen's Brand cries :

> " Barely one in thousands sees
> How mere life is one immense
> Towering mountain of offence ! "

Human intercourse does open up endless ways in which one life may deflect and injure another by carelessness, inconsistent conduct, or self-indulgence in some form or another. As Jesus hints, not even a religious group is exempt from this temptation. We have no proper English equivalent for *σκάνδαλα*. They meant far more than our modern " offences," and even " hindrances " or " stumblingblocks " is too weak a rendering. What Jesus meant by *σκάνδαλα* was pitfalls for the unwary, impediments to religion, conduct that enticed unwary souls into backsliding or apostasy. He spoke of this with passionate indignation, thinking of the weaker members whose faith was thereby endangered. No sin of the circle or group seemed to Him more terrible. He speaks of it with appalling seriousness, just because men often fail to take it with sufficient gravity.

But, observe, He does not imply that the " weaker " members are invariably innocent. One cause of *σκάνδαλα* is furnished by their own wrong-doing. Unless older and more experienced Christians deal with them faithfully and kindly in their moral delinquencies, harm may ensue. This is what gives the inner connexion with (*b*) verses 3–4. One of the main stumblingblocks is when the injured party acts or fails to act, when he shows pride or a harsh, unforgiving spirit. Weak Christians are apt to injure others. Therefore, Jesus at once goes on to say to the senior members,

Never make such a situation a source of harm to them. *Take heed to yourselves* (ἑαυτοῖς). *If your brother sins, check him, and if he repents forgive him. Even if he sins against you seven times in one day and turns to you seven times saying, "I repent," you must forgive him.* Otherwise, Jesus implies, you will prove a σκάνδαλον to him; your mishandling of the situation, above all, your unforgiving temper, will upset his faith altogether. It is bad enough for him to sin; it is worse for him to be left with his sin, unreproved or, if confessed, unforgiven.

Take heed to yourselves. Even if ἑαυτοῖς is taken as an equivalent for ἀλλήλοις, this merely sharpens the point of the warning. When a fellow-member goes wrong, he is not to be ignored and left coldly to himself. You are not, says Jesus, to break off all relations with him in a sharp, hard-hearted way, as if he were to be shunned. You owe him still a duty. If you wash your hands of all responsibility for him, if you think merely of the injury he has done to you and stand stiffly on your own rights, that will damage him irreparably; it will prove a σκάνδαλον to him. Elsewhere Jesus speaks of the injury that the unforgiving man does to himself; the merciless temper cuts him off from God's forgiveness. Here he is concerned about the bad effects in the case of the man who has really done wrong.

On the extremely trying and delicate duty of dealing with people who have injured us, unintentionally or deliberately, Jesus is quite explicit. First of all, you must *check* or rebuke the offender. How many people shrink from this primary duty of making the offender realise what he has done to them! They are too proud to let it be seen how much they have suffered. They would do almost anything except go and remonstrate with the person who has injured them. Like the man in George Eliot's poem, they are

"Ready in all service save rebuke,"

sometimes because they feel it is so easy to lose one's temper in rebuking another person, or to be officious or to drop into scolding. It is a difficult duty. To check an offender is not to rage at him ; it is to make him sensible as a Christian of how he has not only injured ourselves but sinned against God. But resentment and bitterness are so apt to break out in a personal interview that some good people evade it altogether, and are content to wait until some apology is offered, without taking any steps to deal with the offender. Jesus presses upon His followers the duty of quietly but firmly bringing the injury home to the conscience of the guilty man. That is primary. The Christian is not to remain passive ; he must expostulate and remonstrate with the wrongdoer, endeavouring to create a state of shame in him, by showing him how his sin is condemned and disapproved. This duty of discipleship may be embarrassing, but it is not to be evaded or postponed. When discipline of this affectionate and thorough kind produces penitence, then the second duty emerges, viz. forgiveness. Some find it harder to forgive than to rebuke. Some, again, would rather rebuke than forgive. But Jesus insists that every one must be prepared to pardon an offender, once he repents and confesses. Instead of weighing his apology critically or coldly, suspicious of its sincerity, let him forgive, warmly and heartily.[1] More than that, forgive, Jesus says, and go on forgiving, no matter how aggravating the offender may be.

Men have seriously doubted whether it is wise to practise this without qualification. It may be kind, they argue, but it is blind to the facts of life. In a number of cases penitence is little more than an attempt to work upon the

[1] Marcus Aurelius, i. 7, *παρὰ Ρουστίκου . . τὸ πρὸς τοὺς χαλεπήναντας καὶ πλημμελήσαντας εὐανακλήτως καὶ εὐδιαλλάκτως, ἐπειδὰν τάχιστα αὐτοὶ ἐπανελθεῖν ἐθελήσωσι, διακεῖσθαι.*

feelings of good-natured people in order to escape or mitigate punishment. And it is possible for unscrupulous natures to feign remorse for the sake of what it brings to them outwardly. It is in the interest of the offender, in many cases, to profess penitence, and to trade upon the generous confidence of those who have been injured, as well as upon their sentimental dislike of prolonging an unpleasant situation.

> "The world will not believe a man repents:
> And this wise world of ours is mainly right."

Nevertheless there is such a thing as genuine repentance, and when we meet it, Jesus teaches, we must at once welcome it. He recognises the need of moral severity and also the need of generous charity. Both are essential. Forgiveness, in His teaching, is not letting our ill-feeling die out by lapse of time, it is an active moral relation to the offender, and one which is never tired. Any one can give offence; any one can forgive offence, if he chooses, and—Jesus argues—he must choose, if he belongs to My society. Any member of it is bound to take the duty of generous forgiveness as a matter of course, treating the offender without undue laxity and undue harshness.

The saying therefore makes a triple demand upon human nature. (i.) There is the claim that the wronged person must rebuke the offender, however distasteful and hard this may be. (ii.) He must be ready to forgive him, if and when he is truly penitent. (iii.) Also, he must be prepared to repeat his forgiveness, even although his patience is sorely tried, even although the man, like a child, says, "I am sorry," and does it over again. Each item in this counsel has its own element of strain. Together, they amount to a most searching test of the Christian spirit which must neither condone sin nor be vindictive, especially the second. The words of Jesus about the offence, as Martineau puts it,

do not mean "that you are to interpose and cut off, if you can, its entail of natural penalty: to promise, for instance, to trust him as much in the future as if he had been always faithful; if you did, he would be the first to decline your confidence as misplaced, for in his repentance he knows that he cannot trust himself. He has, in fact, come round to your feeling, so far as it is purely moral, about his act; and you are to accept and welcome it with entire sympathy, to be angry with him only as he is angry with himself, to be sorry with him simply as he is sorry for himself. But if your feeling towards his past conduct is more than a hurt moral sense, if it has the heat of anger and resentment, because the wrong has been against you in particular rather than against the law of right individualised in another, this personal element must be utterly and instantly blotted out." [1] To eliminate this personal element is no easy task. It involves a real exercise of self-control and a steady recognition of the divine ends which the handling of so difficult a situation is intended to promote.

The disciples were startled and dismayed by this demand. That explains their next question and prayer. Bengel, it is true, thinks that what they felt was an impulse to a more fruitful and blessed life. "Moti suavitate sermonis optabant uberius fruit benignitate divina." But this fails to account for their petition. It was the uncompromising character of the demand for generosity which took them aback. "Who is sufficient for these things? Surely it requires a special endowment of faith to carry out such orders! What we need is a fresh power of faith, if we are to perform this miracle of goodness in treating one another. It is only highly equipped souls who are competent for this superb exercise of charity and forbearance." We must assume some such feeling in their minds, if we are to appre-

[1] *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, pp. 613, 614.

ciate the meaning of their appeal to Jesus. Hitherto they had listened to His warnings and counsels. But now with a pious sigh they spoke, not to ask any explanation of what He had said—He had been only too explicit—but, as it were, to suggest that this kind of behaviour was out of reach. What Jesus had said was a "hard saying," not because it was unintelligible, but because it was difficult to carry out in practice. "Ah!" they implied, "but that demand is only for an advanced class. Equip us with the particular, rare powers required for so exacting a method of intercourse with faulty human nature." Only on some such assumption can we discover any sequence between verse 5 and verses 3–4. But, read in this light, they fit in to the course of thought. In one sense we may admit that it was small wonder that the disciples felt unequal to this height of Christian forbearance. Since this extraordinary pitch of generous conduct seemed to them to require a special measure of divine aid, (c) *the apostles said to the Lord*, "*Give us more faith—πρόσθες ἡμῖν πίστιν.*" By "faith" they mean the sense of God's support which enables men to be faithful in action. It is fidelity as the outcome of a vivid reliance upon God's help, in view of difficult duties and responsibilities. Jesus inspired His followers with this confidence. They caught it from His own serene, undaunted reliance upon God. The result was that whenever a fresh demand seemed to be made upon them, it at once made them conscious of their human inability and also of their resources in fellowship with Him. They knew, in this particular case, their own limitations. The standard of forgiveness set to them by Jesus seemed too high for their present powers. It meant a strain which they honestly felt themselves unequal to bear, even while they recognised that it was binding. "We might have expected," as Dora Greenwell says, "that the words would have been 'In-

crease our charity '." [1] But the disciples were right, so far, in realising that faith is the root of charity, and that God's aid must underlie any successful attempt to be absolutely generous to other people. Only, there was something wrong about their petition. It sounds pious and appropriate. But evidently Jesus did not regard it as such. Why? Well, to understand this, we need to study what He said.

The reply of Jesus, at first sight, does not look like a reply at all. It seems as though He was thinking about something quite different from what was in their minds. But His answer is in reality quite relevant to the situation, if we consider that He did not regard their petition as a proper prayer at all. He did not look upon it as worthy of them. To His mind it suggested that they were under a double misapprehension, and in two graphic little sayings He corrects them. (i.) You plead for some supernatural endowment? He cries. Why you have faith already and faith enough, if you would only use it. However little faith you have, you can obey this demand of Mine, though it seems to be unnatural. (ii.) You imagine that this achievement is something remarkable, which entitles you to distinction? On the contrary, it is part and parcel of the normal life you are engaged to lead as servants of God.

The former correction comes out in the saying about faith (ver. 6). *The Lord said, If you had* [2] *faith the size of a grain of mustard-seed*, if you had the least grain of faith in you,

[1] *A Covenant of Life*, p. 10.

[2] Implying, "Have you no faith at all?" The word is intended to throw them back upon themselves; it conveys a reproach. Mr. J. F. Blair (*The Apostolic Gospel*, p. 284) ingeniously gives it another sense Jesus, he says, first commends their desire for more faith "by assuring them that all things are possible to the man who truly believes in the Father," and then corrects their mistake about faith; faith comes as the result of service, and if they want God to supply them with rich blessings of faith they must first devote themselves to Him.

you would say to this mulberry-tree, "Be uprooted and planted in the sea," and it would obey you. He means that nothing would be too difficult for them. With a wave of His hand to some mulberry tree near them, perhaps, He tells them that they could do what seems beyond nature, if they only had faith. What they need is no special endowment, no extra measure of faith. The least grain of real faith is capable of overcoming the obstacles of pride and wounded feelings which prevent forgiveness from being exercised to an erring brother. Difficult to go and deal with a man who has injured you? Difficult to bring yourself to point out his fault, without losing your temper? Difficult to pardon him, if he acknowledges his misdeed? Difficult to go on pardoning him, if he repeats the offence and exasperates you by doing it over and over again? Yes, but surely not difficult for anyone who understands the elementary spirit of the gospel! All this may appear to go against natural feeling, but the smallest sense of confidence in God's power will enable you to achieve even what seems to ordinary people a sheer impossibility. Don't sit down before the difficulties of pride and contempt and hard thought, as if no power on earth could eradicate these from your nature. No power on earth can, but you have already a power of God, you have all some faith, as you are members of My society. Your duty is to use the faith you have instead of wistfully crying out for some fresh supernatural endowment.

This reading of the passage shows that the answer of Jesus is a real answer to the thought that underlay the words of the disciples. His words mean, as Wesley says, "If you had the least measure of true faith, no instance of duty would be too hard for you." He is putting them on their mettle. Surely they had sufficient faith already for such an exercise of charitable forbearance. Any faith was enough for that! Jesus had not qualified or compromised

His demand for a faithful, patient handling of offenders. He had insisted that His disciples must not hold coldly aloof from some one who had injured them, but must make him feel how he had wounded a loving heart as well as broken a moral law; also, that they must set no limit to their forbearance. But He steadily refused to consider that this was anything more than could be expected from the rank and file of His followers. To be inside His society at all was to incur such an obligation, and the responsibility implied the power of meeting it. To carry out His injunctions meant a great soul, and a great faith. The disciples were right so far. But this faith was elementary, and they must realise that at once.

Then He comes to the second point. There is really nothing remarkable about this exercise of a large forgiveness, nothing that would single it out as exceptionally meritorious. *Which of you* (τίς δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν, as He had said in the earlier parables of xi. 5 and xv. 4), *with a servant out ploughing or shepherding, will say to him when he comes in from the field, "Come at once* (εὐθέως)[1] *and take your place at table"? Will the man not rather say to him, "Get something ready for my supper: gird yourself and wait on me till I eat and drink: then you can eat and drink yourself"? Does he thank the servant for doing his bidding? Well, it is the same with you; when you have done all you are bidden, say, "We are but*[2] *servants; we have only done our duty."*

The story of this farmer and his man is another illustration from humble peasant life. Just as Jesus implied, in the parable of the lost sheep, that the owner had no one to help him on his small farm, so here the peasant proprietor has only a single servant. The farm-hand comes home at

[1] The εὐθέως goes with the following word παρελθών, not (Erasmus and Calvin) with the preceding ἐρεῖ.

[2] The Sinaitic version rightly leaves out ἀχρεῖοι (=useless, good-for-nothing), which is a scribal addition due to an excessive sense of humility.

night, tired and hungry. "A man longs for his supper," as Homer says,[1] "when all day long he has had two dark oxen dragging the plough over the fallow field; sunset is a glad sight to him, for it lets him get away to his supper." But this labourer has to do cooking indoors as well as field work for his master. It is all in the day's work. He knows the conditions of life and labour in this small establishment, and never dreams that he is doing anything out of the way when he starts to prepare his master's supper before he takes his own. No small farmer, as Jesus says, would dream of recognising anything specially meritorious or creditable in such behaviour. *So with you.* I claim from you an unbounded forgiveness towards the faulty in your society. But this is not a feat which only some highly trained souls can be expected to achieve, and for which they may expect some particular commendation. It is all in the terms of your engagement to God. Why dwell upon it as if it were anything out of the way?

Taken as the climax to the foregoing sequence of sayings, the story has obvious force. The request of the disciples implied that as unlimited forgiveness was extremely difficult, it must be specially meritorious. Such generous dealing with a fellow-member of the Christian group, as it required special incentives, surely deserved special recognition from God. If it demanded an extra measure of "faith" to treat an offender as Jesus insisted, the inference was that those who were heroic enough to attain such a height of excellence were entitled to a particular meed of praise. "Not at all," Jesus warns them. To forgive one another is simply one of your standing duties in the household of God. It is part of God's bidding for those who are in His service. Often it may be hard, but we never have the right to plume ourselves upon our conduct in this

[1] *Odyssey*, xiii. 31–34.

regard, as if it were a piece of distinguished service ; it is merely one of the duties we undertook when we entered His employment.

Thus the idea of the story, taken in this special connexion, is that God ought to be able to take such forgiveness for granted ; He has the right to expect it from us, and we have no business to think highly of ourselves for having managed to practise it. This is part of the heroic ethical demand of Jesus, and the paradox is that He declines to regard it as heroic at all. Like the disciples, we may feel, after we have dealt generously and patiently with some offender, that we have earned a special word of commendation from God. It has cost us so much to keep our temper, to forgive repeated acts of treachery or dishonesty or cruelty, to ignore malice, or to pardon personal injuries, that we are apt to dwell upon the cost. We say to ourselves, " Now, that was really very good of me ! " And we may secretly expect to have a distinct recognition of our merit from God. But Jesus teaches that this habit of generous pardon is not an extra, it is the commonplace of genuine Christianity. Anyone in the Christian group, who has the very rudiments of faith, should be able for it. Should this sound very high and heroic, it is probably because we have slipped into a way of tacitly modifying the ethical demand of Jesus, with the result that we consider ourselves rather distinguished and exceptional persons whenever we manage to do what He really enjoins as the common duty of His followers. This is in no sense to depreciate the magnanimous life, with its courage and self-control. It is simply to point out that " the rarity of Christian charity " is a phrase that ought to be antiquated in the Christian group. Charitable dealing is rare. Why ? Because it requires an heroic effort to rise to the level of Christ's ethical and spiritual demands. And because it is

unfortunately a rare attainment, it has become all the more notable. There is no harm in admiring others for their magnanimity under provocation and injury. It stands out as a real mark of God's presence in their lives. But the story of the Farmer and his Man is a reminder that we had better not admire it in ourselves.

It may be argued that this thread of connexion which has been suggested in the passage is rather fanciful; Mr. Montefiore, for example, pronounces it subtle and strained. But even apart from this sequence, the story of the Farmer and his Man retains its point, as a vivid illustration of what Jesus inculcated as the healthy relation between man and God. The real servant of God makes no claim upon God for special reward. He does not allow himself to become self-conscious; he thinks of God's bidding, does it without any fuss, and never dreams that God owes him anything for it. Historically, the teaching of Jesus on this matter meant an advance upon many current ideas in Judaism, which tended to establish a *quid pro quo* relation between God and His servants, as if the latter could lay up special merit and expect special reward. "There is no doubt that the excessive emphasis and elaboration of the doctrine of retribution was one of the weak spots in Rabbinic Judaism. In no other point is Jesus's antagonism to, and reaction against, certain tendencies in that teaching more justified and more wholesome than here!"[1] There were certainly Pharisees who were above such tendencies, men of the spirit of Jochanan ben Zakkai, who taught, "If thou hast practised Torah a great deal, claim no merit for thyself, since thou wast created for this end."[2] Indeed the error which Jesus opposes is not Pharisaic; it is ingrained in human nature. In this dry, pointed story He seeks to remind His

[1] C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, vol. ii. p. 1,009.
[2] *Pirke Aboth*, ii. 9.

followers of their high calling, far above any self-conscious thought of what they are to get for serving God. The servant who is genuine will not only do his exacting tasks without murmuring, but never dream of expecting any special reward for what he does. Why, says Jesus, reminding them of ordinary farm-life, does a farmer go into raptures over a servant who simply does a hard day's work? No indeed. It is not that Jesus denies a hearty approval of good service at the hands of God. He had already told the disciples, in another parable, how God would reward honest service. *Blessed are those servants whom the lord and master finds awake when he comes! I tell you truly, he will gird himself, make them recline at table, and come forward and wait on them.*[1] A parable is never a complete representation of truth; it is the illustration of a single aspect. So, in this story of the Farmer and his Man, Jesus is merely criticising one erroneous idea of human duty towards God, and presenting a trenchant conception of what men ought to feel in their service of God. It is one point of view, extremely wholesome for certain natures, but merely one aspect of the relation. The controlling idea of life ought to be that we can never do enough for God. "We owe Him our entire service. It is exacting, but the honest servant never thinks of that; he never expects praise for doing what is after all his duty."

JAMES MOFFATT.

[1] Luke xii. 37.

THE PLACE OF FORGIVENESS IN CHRISTIANITY.

No one who does not propose to drop confession out of Christian prayer—and with the Lord's Prayer in view this is for the most part regarded as an extreme step—can fail to recognise the centrality of the topic of Forgiveness amid the interests of the theologian. Of the possible short formulas expressive of the specific nature of our religion one certainly would be : Christian faith is faith in God who forgives sins through Jesus Christ. Söderblom has remarked with point that you can drag the idea of Love down to the partially immoral plane of natural religions ; you cannot so drag the idea of forgiveness. In the latter notion there lies a preserving salt which can usually be trusted to defy corruption. Forgiveness undoubtedly is one of the *foci* from which it is possible to survey the whole circumference of Christian truth. It involves a distinctive view of God, of man, of sin, of the universe as supernaturally constituted, of Jesus. The theologian finds, as he reflects upon other doctrines, that of them all none can keep its uniquely Christian tone which has lost touch with this one.

The theological importance of the subject flows of course from its importance for Christian life. No one can intelligently take rank as a Christian, in the New Testament sense, who has not received the pardon of sin, and who is not conscious that in its impartation something has happened of decisive moment for his relations with God. Missionaries have often tended to gauge the maturity of the religious life of their converts by the earnestness and sincerity of their interest in forgiveness.

To crown all, the forgiveness of sins has a quite fundamental position in the teaching of Jesus. History exhibits no prophet or founder of religion who came forward,

as He did, with the claim to have power from God to remit sin. His contemporaries were clearly aware that in taking up this attitude His aim was not merely to announce the objective general truth or principle that forgiveness is possible, but also to present Himself as the medium and guarantee of its reality. In His person the Kingdom of God is here, and by all higher minds of Jewish religion forgiveness had invariably been regarded as amongst the chief blessings which the Kingdom would include.

Further, the place occupied by this topic in the history both of religious experience and of theology is proved by the close tie, if not indeed identity, existing between the ideas of Forgiveness and Justification. How these ideas really differ, if rightly interpreted, it is hard to see. Doubtless it may be argued that forgiveness is exclusively negative in meaning, signifying no more than that past sin is blotted out, the slate being so to speak wiped clean, whereas Justification has positive implications and lays down that God puts the sinner in right relations to Himself, not merely obliterating sin but taking the penitent into fellowship. Every student of Protestant theology knows that volumes formerly were written, and once had to be read, in which this distinction, or something like it, was upheld. The distinction may not be impossible in theory: it has not the faintest bearing on experience. Whether it might be urged consistently enough on a lower spiritual level than Christianity, we need not ask; what is quite certain is that the God and Father of Jesus Christ cannot be thought of as doing the merely negative thing of cancelling the sinner's guilt except as in and by that very act He takes him to His heart as a returning child. To be justified is simply to be forgiven and accepted by God. Much or most of the famous debate on Justification, therefore, has really been about forgiveness. Good reasons, it is true, can be

given for keeping the term Justification in hand for purposes of exact statement at this or that point; it usefully suggests, for example, that the pardoned can raise no claim, as of right, to God's acceptance. At the same time, the term forgiveness is obviously far closer to human life; and to retain it as the normal word might help some people to believe, what seems too good to be true, that theology is nothing else than a persistent attempt to clarify the convictions we stand up to preach. When the older divines wrote on Justification, then, whatever else was in their minds, they were at all events absorbed in the question of Divine forgiveness. We may not use their terminology or imitate their love of infinitesimal distinctions; but at least they were toiling at a problem about which every preacher of Christ has got to make up his mind.

Is forgiveness the chief boon conferred in Christ? In the preface to the first edition of his great monograph Ritschl says it is: justification and reconciliation, he affirms, is the central doctrine of Christianity, and to make it intelligible a virtually complete outline of the theological system is required. Others have taken the chief gift in Christianity to be sonship in Christ, or the sacraments, or moral inspiration; to Tennyson, one remembers, it was the assurance of immortality. Possibly the savagest expression ever given to the view that justification is *not* of supreme importance comes from Paul de Lagarde, who had a trick of blurting out what many thought but scarcely cared to put in plain words. "The doctrine of justification," he wrote in 1890, "is not the Gospel, but a Pauline eccentricity. Even in Paul it is not the only or the deepest way of solving the problem of a man's relation to his guilt. It was not the basal principle of the Reformation, and now, to crown all, in Protestant churches it is dead. And rightly. The doctrines of justification and reconciliation are mythology

believed by nobody except those who take ancient Trinitarianism seriously—which to-day means nobody at all." [1]

But to ask what is best or second-best in the Gospel is not usually very profitable. After all the Christian message offers not a number of things but the one comprehensive and infinitely precious boon of salvation, i.e., fellowship with God; and while this no doubt embraces a variety of aspects, it is still more deeply a spiritual unity. And unless we are to break every link with New Testament religion, forgiveness comes into this, and vitally. As Lincoln said, "no man can escape history." We cannot by this time make Christianity over again; facts have fixed its nature; and in every age it has had such forgiveness at its heart. There is no need to quote the New Testament; we should have to write out whole pages. But there is the Apostles' Creed, which enumerates forgiveness in its place among the other supernatural things—for everything in the Creed is supernatural—like the creation of the world and the resurrection of Christ and the gift of life everlasting—"I believe in . . . the forgiveness of sins." There is the Epistle of Barnabas, at the close of the first century, declaring in spite of its Alexandrian mysticism: "To this end the Lord endured to deliver His flesh unto corruption, that by the remission of sins we might be cleansed." There is St. Ambrose in the fourth century, with his passionate tones: "I have nothing whereof I may glory in my works; I will therefore glory in Christ. I will not glory because I am righteous, but because I am redeemed; not because I am clear of sin, but because my sins are forgiven." In the Middle Ages there is St. Bernard of Clairvaux with the admonition: "See that thou believe this also, that it is through Himself thy sins are pardoned: this is the witness of the Holy Spirit speaking in thy heart, Thy sins are for-

[1] *Deutsche Schriften.*

given thee." [1] There are the great words of Luther: "Where forgiveness of sins is, there is life and blessedness." The doctrine of justification by faith, not necessarily under that title, has a way of turning up in new majesty and power in every time of revival; but when religion sinks in apathy, it is one of the first convictions to lose elasticity and vigour.

St. Paul in the first instance, Luther as his disciple, have done more than any others to lead the Church into full self-consciousness with regard to pardon. Each attained to clear insight respecting the terms on which sin is taken away as the outcome not of quiet or scholarly development, but of a desperate fight for his soul. Under new conditions, Luther was compelled to repeat St. Paul's conflict in order to regain St. Paul's truth. Water passes into steam only at a certain heat, and it looks as if there had to be a life-and-death struggle, a violent spiritual fermentation and disturbance, liberating great religious forces, before the free unbought grace of a forgiving God could be newly seized and uttered greatly. Everything in Christianity was then apt to group itself around this point. Harnack has said of Luther that "for him the certainty of forgiveness in Christ was the sum of religion."

But although forgiveness may be the keystone of the arch, it is none the less an idea which creates vast difficulties for the modern mind. Partly these are intellectual or what may be called æsthetic difficulties which face the Christian view of things as a whole; partly they relate specially to the evangelical notion of Divine pardon. In various recent engagements with negative thought, that notion has had to bear the brunt of some of the hardest fighting. To the most grave among these modern objections let us now turn.

[1] See article "Rechtfertigung" in Hauck's *Real-Encyclopädie* (3rd edition).

(1) The question of Divine forgiveness is occasionally put aside as perfectly unreal, because concerned merely with a moral puzzle of our own making. To ask how forgiveness comes about, it is said, assumes its necessity, but in fact it is not necessary at all. Now it is of course evident that the idea of forgiveness is only relevant to the pained or heavy-laden conscience; and in order that conscience should be pained, or at least that its pain should be confessed, certain presuppositions must in principle be accepted. One of these is the reality of sin, flowing from a consciousness of God in His being as Holy Love, and of the obligation resulting for us also to live in love and holiness. These are great ideas, with great implications; but they are by no means universally received. Apart from human tendencies familiar in every age, the materialistic or mechanistic monism which has darkened the sky for more than a generation renders it difficult for a good many people to take moral distinctions as in any sense absolute, or as more than useful and provisional social conventions. Guilt has no meaning for men and women who regard themselves as victims of heredity, education and environment, with no more accountability for character than barometer for cyclone.

Whether this mood can be dispelled by reasoning is more than doubtful. The man who pleads it in his own case, professing to need no forgiveness because everything in his life which religious people call sin can justly be put down to his parents' account, or his schoolmaster's, or his employer's, is commonly a humbug, and is invariably without a sense of humour. But the plea might conceivably be urged by an upright mind on behalf of others. "I am responsible," he might say, "but I know people who have had no real chance of goodness and in regard to whom one cannot use the word responsibility without a sense of sheer

irrelevance." In reply to this estimate, superficially kind but actually merciless, since it proposes to treat human beings as no better than animals, it must first be pointed out that the great literature of the world is dead against it. Æschylus, Virgil, Shakespeare—you take a vital element out of their atmosphere so that the very lungs refuse to work if you eliminate the truth of man's responsibility. Deny the weight on a man's conscience of the evil things he has done, and the tragic dramatist cannot get a beginning made. Besides, if the habit of penitence, or the capacity for it, might in one respect be thought to have vanished from the modern mind, in another it is keener and more searching than ever. Thus at the present hour more people, probably, than ever before in human history have a painfully keen impression of social responsibility, of themselves as being art and part in "man's inhumanity to man." Even before the war, acute observers pointed out that this is the old sense of sin under a new guise. "Men," Mr. Holland said, "are aghast at their own indifference to and acquiescence in the social wrongs by which they are surrounded. Men are appalled by their powerlessness to modify or remedy the iniquity and the suffering inherent in the modern industrial system. They are stung by a sense of guilt, they are overwhelmed by the feeling of impotence, they are distracted for a remedy. Social responsibility has become, like the law of old, a schoolmaster to bring them to Christ. It may be more the sense of paralysis than of leprosy, but it drives them to God."

If we have got so far, the question whether our failure to treat each other as we ought needs to be forgiven, will depend solely on whether we believe in God. To hear a man who believed in the moral being of God deny that he had any need of forgiveness would affect us like being told by a friend, in a picture-gallery, that for him the works of

the great masters have no beauty. At once we should recognise that we cannot make him see. But, if we ventured on advice, we should counsel him to contemplate some great picture, to look and look again, at intervals, with the conviction that something would happen. New perceptions would stir. The beauty spread before him would slowly grow visible. In like manner, let the insensitive man take pains to understand Jesus, let him not withdraw his attention from that Figure ; and he will learn the truth about himself. It is not alone through the realisation of Jesus that God touches the springs of penitence in men ; He may do it through many an experience ; but the experience is always that of beholding a goodness that shames us.

(2) A second objection to forgiveness is the fear, possibly even the conviction, that the thing is impossible, because contrary to the nature of the world. Is not spiritual law, if anything, more rigid than physical, as being absolute for thought, not contingent ; and what can this mean except that the consequences of sin cling to us for ever and ever ? We no doubt reject the Oriental doctrine of Karma, binding this life to past lives by chains of inflexible causation, but is not Karma a reality within our present existence ? Surely it is nature's last word that the results of sin are irreversible, that our future is only an inescapable conclusion drawn from the fixed premises of the past. If, then, the universe re-acts against sin with an inexorability of which the stedfast procession of the stars is only a faint emblem, let us submit to fate. Let us consent to be what we have become. With resignation, but with no whining, let us live out our life at the level to which sin has brought it.

In this contention, it will be felt, there is an element of nobleness ; if it errs, it does not err meanly. There speaks in it the instinct that nothing in earth or heaven can tamper with the sanctions of moral law. In the language of the

army, you cannot " wangle " exemption from the effects of wrong : being is emphatically such that our sin finds us out. Nothing in talk about forgiveness can be so unconvincing, so subtly distressing to a man's better self as hints about a poor and feeble remission of sin. The man who has begun to face moral realities will not be persuaded that there is no price to pay. He knows well that life is not like that. If the preacher does not keep him right on the point, the novelist will.

But while the objection is far from being ignoble, it is nevertheless mistaken. In the first place, although the past plainly is unalterable in the sense that it has happened and to all eternity will have happened, yet its value, its meaning for life, is still an open question. Only the future can decide on that. It is in the future that its significance will not merely appear but will actually be fixed. From later experience there may come to rest a new and beneficent meaning on what seemed at the time to be unrelieved disaster, just as a musical chord constantly is qualified in force and tone by succeeding chords and phrases, or a dreary stretch of landscape may from a more advanced point reveal itself as an exquisite element in a beautiful scene. Something like that can happen to our sins. Their significance, though not their occurrence, can be changed. As it has been put, " they may become the occasions of some spiritual state of great value which could not have been reached without them. Till the power is known that can so transform them, they remain mere blots : and the man, in whose experience they are, feels the weight of an irremovable burden. But if there is known to him some transforming power his despair vanishes." [1] I am not arguing, just at the moment, that evil is an element of good, or even that it is a necessary means to good, both

[1] Temple, *Mens Creatrix*, pp. 173–4.

which positions seem to me more than doubtful, since it is at least possible that a *greater* good might have been realised if the sin had not been done ; I am arguing that in a spiritually constituted world we are not shut up to the notion that sin must entail final and hopeless fatalities of evil. And this because life is perpetually betraying the presence within it of a power able so to deal with past events, which as events it cannot obliterate, as to transmute their significance. Everything depends on how under God a man reacts to his own history, how he takes it, what he does with it. It depends, supremely, on whether his attitude to what lies behind him—its wickedness, its soiling, its legacy of frailty—is simply moral, or also religious and believing.

In the second place, it is wrong to say that forgiveness is impossible, that a man has made his bed and must lie on it, because there is a living God. For certain purposes, it is simpler, when we try to interpret life, to leave God out. Even human personality is an unmanageable nuisance to the system-maker, scientific or metaphysical. This wild element in the universe puts him out, like a small child asking odd questions in the drawing-room. But if man as person troubles the doctrinaire theorist, still more does God. Fatalistic ideas which might be plausible and even menacing if He were not there, become incredible since He is there. It is because the Bible was written by men whose eyes were uninterruptedly on God, to whom fellowship with God was the datum from which they started, that it has no fatalism in it, and no pessimism. Instead, it is full of an element which both fatalist and pessimist have parted with ; it is full of wonder. How we can often in Scripture divine the marvelling spirit that lies behind the speaker's voice, and gives it a note of exhilaration and triumph ! And it is worth noticing that some of the most remarkable passages of the kind concern our present subject, the for-

giveness of sins. The announcement rings out: "I have blotted out, as a thick cloud, thy transgressions, and as a cloud thy sins: return unto Me, for I have redeemed thee." Something incalculable has occurred; something that can be known yet passes knowledge; and it can have no source but the creative love of God. Then in exultation the prophet summons Nature to his aid in celebrating the height and depth of pardon: "Sing, O ye heavens, for the Lord hath done it. Break forth into singing, ye mountains, O forest, and every tree therein" (Isa. xliv. 22–23). This is a strain which Jesus prolongs and deepens. He more than any is sure there is such a thing as forgiveness, not because it is small, but because it is great and fatherlike. When He told the parable of the prodigal, He meant His audience to perceive that the chief character in the story is not the younger son but the father. Had the father died, the wanderer would have come back to find the door shut and his chance of personal reconciliation gone for ever. But the father lived and waited for him. If, then, Christ is trustworthy, if there is a living God who loves and acts, the forgiveness of sins is the most stupendous and tragic and blessed possibility of life.

(3) Thirdly, it may be argued that forgiveness is essentially immoral, and that by its proclamation of Divine pardon the Christian religion betrays an obvious ethical inferiority to other, though perhaps more sombre, faiths. This, by the way, is an objection of special interest; for though I cannot allow it to be sound, it does call attention to the fact that the doctrine of forgiveness, indicating as it does our dependence rather than our freedom, is one which in an eminent degree distinguishes the religious from the purely moral standpoint. For it is characteristic of religion to take a graver view of sin than is taken by morality, while at the same time affirming, as the other does not, the possibility

of its being removed. Accordingly, when it is held that forgiveness is contrary to morality, that is in itself a dim and confused testimony to the truth that Divine pardon is a thought transcending ethics, because it is a thought wholly and peculiarly religious. It is not immoral, but its origin lies beyond morality, just as poetry has a way of being above or beyond logic.

When St. Paul, accused of encouraging laxity by his gospel of free gracious pardon, had to meet this very charge of demoralising believers, he replied in effect that no one could suggest this who knew what his gospel was or had observed its influence in human lives. He points out that faith makes men one with Christ, i.e., attaches them by bonds of choice to One in whom God's holy love is personally present; and that while faith is not itself finished goodness of character, it is a condition out of which goodness naturally springs. In other words, he denied that God accepts us because we are good, but he taught that the terms on which He accepts us ensure our becoming good. That is a point of argument which, though very old, is not in the least obsolete. Forgiveness, as a matter of fact, does not do what it must do if it is immoral; it does not demoralise. This does not mean that the gospel of forgiveness cannot be twisted into antinomianism; St. Paul admits that, and deals with it in its own place. But no instance can be brought forward in which the man freely pardoned for Christ's sake and on the ground of his self-identification with the sinless Son of God has been thereby reduced to a state of moral degeneracy, enfeebled in character, or impoverished in ethical ideals.

Further, what is a demoralised mind? It is a mind which is increasingly losing its former horror of sin; which has come to acquiesce in sin more lightly and make terms with it as a recognised part of life. Can it be seriously argued

that a practised psychologist, if invited to report on what went on in the mind of a man who at the moment was receiving Divine forgiveness, would conclude that the total outcome and meaning of the experience was to induce a more lenient view of moral evil? Surely the question is its own answer. No true case of pardoning and being pardoned, whether between man and man or between God and man, could ever in the moral nature of things be or be conceived, which did not involve in the pardoned self an intensified awareness of the sin done, its hatefulness and its stain. If we assume levity on the one side or the other, instantly the ethical conditions of the experience itself cease to exist. What remains may be defiance faced by mere weak connivance, or some other equally melancholy distribution of parts; but forgiveness, in the profound, subduing and cleansing import of that great word, it cannot be.

Other difficulties about forgiveness are in all likelihood the unrecognised legacy of old controversies. It has been held, for example, that a man can only have fellowship with God after a definite series of prescribed experiences—so much torturing contrition, so much exultant joy; and this may have contributed to an impression in some minds that forgiveness demands from the penitent a working up of morbid and artificial emotion. Again, others probably are repelled and mystified by the confession they think is looked for from the pardoned man that he himself—his character, will, life—is worthless in God's sight. How can this be, if God is Father; and why should we be expected to feel it? In short, the precise meaning of the humility implied in seeking or taking pardon is a difficulty. Or once more, many think it incredible that God, the Infinite and Absolute One, can enter into such relations of intimacy with the individual life as pardon must denote, or act toward him and upon him with such distinct and particularis-

ing love. With these difficulties we may well feel unfeigned sympathy ; they are real, not fictitious ; and it is doubtful whether the mind that cannot in some degree enter into them and view them on the inner side has itself discovered the all but unbelievable wonder of Divine pardon, or understood the cumulative effect which present-day education, with its impressive conceptions of natural law and inviolable sequence, is bound to have on the modern intelligence. After all, we are sure of forgiveness only in faith. To reach and grasp it demands a leap of the soul. The pardon of God is a thing so great that no one rightly believes it save he who feels—in view of God's self-disclosure—that he has no other choice.

It is true, not all objections to the idea of Divine pardon can reckon upon sympathy. There is, for example, the attitude of those who are too clever to be humble, and encounter the thought of forgiveness with an indulgent smile. "I, who have a cultivated mind," says Renan, "find no evil in myself, and in all things turn spontaneously to what seems to me most beautiful. Were all men's minds as cultivated as my own, all, like myself, would be in the happy case of finding it impossible to do wrong. An *educated* man has but to follow the delightful bent of his inner impulse." Either this is pride meant quite seriously, or it is the persiflage of jesting irony. If a jest, we are probably entitled to read it by the light of another dictum from the same great scholar's pen : "God ! Providence ! soul ! Good old words, rather heavy, but expressive and respectable." If pride, then we may reflect that even to Renan the words of Jesus are applicable : "I came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance." But it is somehow hard to praise oneself in Jesus' presence. And if we want to raise a laugh about the forgiveness of sins, we must go elsewhere.

It is possible that to some whose sympathy with Christian religion is sincere and active the importance which, in the preceding argument, has been attached to the forgiveness of sins may seem so exaggerated as to be indefensible. Of that we need not complain. It is perhaps a hasty view that all beliefs are of equal value at all periods of life. True faith may co-exist with temporary colour-blindness in regard to this or that aspect of the Gospel. But such blindness to one of the great thoughts of Christianity cannot last, where faith is real ; a day comes when the real meaning of the thought peals through us for the first time, and everything has to re-crystallise about it. In the Great War men not irreligious woke up abruptly in many instances to the Sovereignty of God—the intense reality of Some One Unseen in whose protection they could lose themselves, like the eaglets nestling under the outstretched pinions of the mother bird. Till this discovery had been made, sanity itself was in peril. So, too, all religious men who keep a living conscience must waken some time, whether slowly or in a flash, to the fact that unless they can reach pardoned fellowship with God, all is over with their inward life. Up to that point they may have been Christians of the half-fledged order, with a faith markedly indecisive or embryonic. But now into their twilit religion there breaks some fall into gross sin, or contact with a saint, or a new awareness that Jesus Christ is present and is looking them through and through and making them ashamed. Character, even on the best interpretation, begins to look very drab and seedy in the light shining from Him ; and they then know once for all, without reasoning, that the one thing needful is to be forgiven less for what they have done than for what they are.

H. R. Mackintosh.

THE CITY OF REFUGE.

NUMBERS XXXV. 9–32.

THE appointment of these Cities of Refuge was a very characteristic, and certainly a very interesting, part of the Mosaic legislation. Unlike much that lies beside it in the sacred record, it is picturesque and lends itself pleasantly to the imaginative detail which we find in Josephus and other authorities. Moreover, the "spiritual" application of it to the facts of Christian life and probation is obvious and familiar. Probably no earnest and convinced Christian reader has ever altogether missed it. But before we look for any moral or spiritual lessons, there are various preliminary matters to be considered which arise out of the legislation itself. 1st. It leaves unexplained—it takes for granted—the institution of the "goêl," the Avenger of blood. It takes him for granted, because he was common to all the surrounding tribes, great or small, which were more or less on the same level of culture, of civilisation, as Israel. The Avenger of blood, or something similar, is everywhere to be found where society is organising itself, or wanting to organise itself, against murderers, bandits, and other high-handed criminals; but has not yet succeeded in overawing them. Wherever there is a sense of public justice, but the arm of the law is not long enough, or is not strong enough, to deal "faithfully" with violent criminals, or criminals of some particular kind, there you will find private or semi-private vengeance sanctioned by public opinion. It really is not any use to quarrel with this fact. It is the very first necessity of civilised life that high-handed crime be tackled surely and swiftly, that murderers and suchlike pests of society do not go scotfree, but be made

an end of. Neither justice, nor peace, nor progress, nor mercy itself can have any assurance until this primary need is secured. That is the real defence of what is called "Lynch law," as administered from time to time in the western States of the American Union. For certain reasons which we need not go into public justice was unable to deal successfully with violent criminals whose impunity seriously threatened the very existence of society. The gap was filled, therefore—the painful duty was discharged—by private citizens who held an extra-legal mandate from their fellows. It is indeed to the eternal credit of the British communities overseas that they did not have to pass through this stage—thanks to the law-abiding instincts of their people, and the much greater efficiency of their central Governments. All the same, the commonly expressed British horror of Lynch law in America is largely founded on ignorance of the facts. At a certain stage in the growth of a nation private vengeance has to be allowed. The Mosaic legislation did not attempt to exclude the Avenger of blood : it only supplemented his activities in the interests of the innocent manslayer.

2nd. The institution thus recognised as legitimate did not rest altogether upon that primary necessity of a semi-civilised society noted above : it rested also upon a religious feeling, profound and widespread, anent the sanctity of human life. That the shedding of blood (in time of peace) was not only a crime but a sacrilege ; that the blood so shed desecrated the neighbouring earth, and made it unfit for decent people to live on ; was a feeling practically universal, except where it was superseded by the more or less artificial "sanctions" of an advanced civilisation like that of Egypt. In these countries the old feeling about the sanctity of human life tended gradually to decay—especially where the Law set up a table of money compensations—

practically "fines"—for different kinds of homicide. Israel was specially warned against taking any ransom for a man's life (Num. xxxv. 32), and the Mosaic legislation generally was concerned to keep alive the more primitive sentiment on the subject (see Deut. xix. 1–13, and xxi. 1–9). I do not think that, as a rule, we appreciate the Avenger of blood as we ought, or sympathise with him as we should. He had to neglect his business, to leave his farm untilled, to give up (to a great extent) his family life, in order to devote himself with unsleeping vigilance to his duties as goêl. He was not necessarily the next of kin to the slain man: he was the nearest relative who was able and willing to kill the manslayer when he found him. Thus the goêl came to be looked upon as the champion of the family, who stood for it at his own cost and charges; thus he became quite naturally the "Redeemer," of Job xix. 25, even that Son of Man who came not to destroy men's lives but to save them. The evolution of thought connoted by the word "goêl" is quite normal, quite intelligible. Nay, far as it might seem to have travelled from its original, there are fragments of that original adhering to it still in its New Testament phase (see St. Luke xviii. 7; Rev. vi. 10–11).

3rd. The Mosaic legislation, fully recognising (as it did) the sanctity of human life, and also the necessity (at that stage) of utilising private vengeance and the offices of the goêl, was nevertheless quite alive to the evils of the traditional system, and concerned to mitigate those evils as far as possible. For, however admirable the goêl might be, and however welcome his unselfish assistance in the punishment and discouragement of crime, it was impossible to overlook the fact that he struck blindly and in fury, not discerning, e.g., between a murder and an accidental killing of a man: much more not discerning between murder and manslaughter—as modern law discerns. All he knew

was that his brother (of whose cause he was the champion) lay weltering in his blood. Until that blood was avenged he could have no pleasure in the day, no rest by night. That was his one pre-occupation, nor did the Mosaic legislation seek to interfere with it. Indeed, it did not attempt to introduce the subtler distinctions of modern law between murder and manslaughter, for that would only have opened the door to far worse evils than it would have cured. What it did was to safeguard the interests of the unintentional homicide by providing him with a safe refuge, and a fair trial by his countrymen. It did this by an arrangement peculiarly Jewish, admirably devised and ordered, which served its purpose without diminishing anything from the sanctity of human life, and without discouraging the activities of the Avenger of blood.

4th. "The death of the High Priest," mentioned as a *terminus ad quem* in verses 25 and 28 of our chapter, seems at first sight not only to lend itself to a "spiritual" interpretation (as of the death of Christ), but even to invite it. A little consideration, however, will show that its importance is purely *historical*. It fixes the date of the legislation in question at a period when the Jews reckoned their years by and from one High Priest to another. All the time that the Davidic monarchy lasted, they counted—as did other nations—by the years of the reigning sov'ran, so that a new era commenced with his decease. There was a time *before* the monarchy when the High Priest was the leading figure in Israel: there was another time, after the monarchy pettered out in Zerub-babel, when the High Priest became once more the recognised Head of Israel. The legislation about the Cities of Refuge must, therefore, have belonged to one or other of these periods. If we accept the statements made in Deut. iv. 41–43, in Deut. xix. 2–13, in Joshua xx., at the foot of the letter, we shall embrace the former

alternative: if not, we shall probably refer this piece of legislation to the age of Ezra. There is, indeed, no notice in the historical books of these cities ever having been used for purposes of refuge, nor is there any allusion to them in the Prophets. It may well be that the institution of the Cities of Refuge has only an *ideal* significance, which was never realised in fact, perhaps never intended to be—like so much of the legislation in Ezekiel xl.–xlviii. It does not really matter. If it stood in the sacred record only, it did its real work just as well. The moral and spiritual meanings of it have wholly (we may say) swallowed up the literal. Supposing that it *was* only an ideal bit of legislation concerned with principles rather than with facts—with eternal principles expressed in terms of every-day facts—it only serves to throw up into clearer relief the Divine inspiration of the record. For it is, indeed, a wonderful bit of legislation, altogether worthy of its Heavenly origin.

5th. The details of the institution, as given by Josephus and other imaginative writers, are wholly apocryphal. There is (as noted above) no certainty that the six cities mentioned were ever actually used for the purpose of refuge. Those enlargements of the legislation which are still to be found in Christian writings and sermons have no authority whatever. They were invented by authors who had no sense of veracity, but *had* a considerable feeling for the picturesque. They *may* be harmless—or they may *not*.

What, then, are the moral and spiritual lessons which men were meant to learn from this legislation? Let us take them in order.

In the first place, they learnt—they could not fail to learn—the supreme moral lesson, the most important of all for the training of mankind—that God loves judgment and mercy; not judgment without mercy, still less mercy without judgment. There is always a tendency in human

opinion to overestimate the importance either of punishing crime, or of being kind to the criminal. Either extreme does harm, but it is only experience of the harm done that serves to correct the balance. This being so, it was of the greatest value to the Jews that they had so striking an object lesson before their eyes of what God Himself loves and chooses in the way of judgment and mercy. Judgment first : the Avenger of blood is not to be hindered, not to be discountenanced. But mercy, too : the City of Refuge open to all, guilty as well as innocent : a fair trial for all, and permanent safety for the innocent. It would not have been easy to conceive of any other device, suitable to the times then present, which would have safeguarded the interests of those really guiltless without diminishing anything from the awful sanctity of human life, or from the heinousness of bloodshed. Admirable it was—admirable in its restraint, in its total avoidance of that sentimental concern for the culprit which is so dangerous in its influence on criminal jurisprudence.

In the second place the spiritual lesson which concerns *us* as Christians is almost equally obvious, almost equally familiar. And this in spite of the fact that the City of Refuge is not once alluded to in the New Testament—unless indeed it lie behind that great saying of the Writer to the Hebrews (vi. 18). It would be hard to find any intelligent Christian who did not understand what this bit of Mosaic legislation meant for him. It means for the soul which has incurred guilt and death, that if it be wise in time it need not and shall not die. There lies within its reach a City of Refuge, and this City is in the death and passion, the merits and mediation, of Christ our Lord. We are quite safe there. As it is written, " there is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus " (Rom. viii. 1) : or again, " Being justified by faith, we have peace

with God" (Rom. v. 1). We might not all of us use the same language about it: we might consider certain ways of expressing it exaggerated and misleading; but none of us fails to recognise the blessed fact that the soul in Refuge *is* safe: that nothing in life or death, nothing in Heaven or earth or under the earth *can* do it any real harm. If death came to us to-night to call us away, we should look up at him quietly and say, "We know thee, who thou art: thou art called the last enemy, but thou art in truth God's good angel come to open the door for us into His nearer presence: we will go with thee, and gladly." Now that is a very blessed state of mind to be in: it is quite distinctly worth a great deal more than all the gifts of fortune—than all the riches of the world. To be able to say every morning, "We have a strong city; salvation will God appoint for walls and bulwarks": and every evening, "The Lord is my light and my salvation; of whom then shall I be afraid?"—that is cheaply earned by any amount of toils and tribulations.

But the Mosaic legislation which we are considering carries us a step further in the spiritual interpretation thereof, for it distinctly contemplates the case of a man leaving his City of Refuge prematurely. And that is very singular, because at first sight it would seem impossible that any one who had escaped thither should be willing to risk the same dread danger a second time. But it is only necessary to have some little knowledge of human nature, and to give some little heed to the circumstances, in order to perceive how needful the warning was—and is. We must consider that the man was not born in that City, nor was he brought up there. His own companionships, and his own associations, were very different. With the deep, but very narrow, local "patriotism" of the Jews, he must always have felt himself more or less a

stranger. Moreover all these Cities were "Levitical" cities, and had (presumably) a character, a manner of speech, a view of things, of their own. The refugee would find the society around him dull, narrow, limited. It would, as people say, bore him to extinction. As he walked about the "suburbs" of his city (for all Levitical cities had suburbs attached to them) he would be thinking of his former home, and of the life he had led there. Yonder, on the horizon, stood the blue hills which marked the direction in which lay his old home, and the dear faces of his familiar friends, and all the things which had appealed to him so much. Or it might be that all these were much nearer still. It was, after all, only human nature that he should want to go back: that he should ask himself "why not?" that he should try to persuade himself that the Avenger of blood had given up looking for him, or that anyhow he would never know about it, if he slipped out quietly. So one evening when the gates of the City were shut, he remained without, and made off quickly without saying anything to anybody. And it may be that he found his old life again, and took it up once more, and lived it for years. But at last there came a day when the inevitable happened, when the Avenger lighted upon him, and he was slain without mercy and without hope "because he should have remained in his city of refuge" —and he did *not*. Absolutely true to the experience of life is the spiritual counterpart! How religion of any sort irks the natural man; how intolerably tedious and limited he finds the customary expression of it; while at the same time he raves against anything *not* customary—in that way, to him—as if it were a personal wrong done to himself; let the popular novelist of to-day testify. It is only human nature after all, and that nature is our own. It is more than likely that we too shall weary of our City of Refuge.

Ah, but let us not leave it. Let us not even *want* to leave it. And if we *do* want to, because human nature is too strong for us, and because it is fickle and wayward at the best, let us think again how foolish it would be, how fatal it might be, if we forsook our Refuge.

As for the things of this world, let them come or let them go, as it pleases God. Above all, let us not repine at anything we may lose or suffer through a brave and open acknowledgment of our Christian faith. Even the world will wonder and look askance that "souls in refuge, clinging to the Cross, should wince and fret at this world's little loss."

RAYNER WINTERBOTHAM.

JESUS' "NATIVE PLACE" IN JOHN.

Canon V. H. Stanton, in the recently published third volume of his admirable *Gospels as Historical Documents*, undoubtedly gives to the English-speaking world its best presentation from the conservative standpoint of the present state of critical opinion regarding the origin and nature of the Fourth Gospel. A textual emendation, when proposed by so thorough a scholar, so exceptionally cautious and conservative in judgment, invites a consideration which might not be accorded to less responsible critics. The proposal in this case is not only reasonable in itself but affects a passage so conspicuously perplexing that even in the absence of documentary support scholars will not be disposed to ignore the conjecture. Were it not for the fact that it is proposed in somewhat indefinite form, and (with characteristic modesty) consigned to an inconspicuous footnote (p. 236), students of the Fourth Gospel might perhaps be trusted to discover its importance for themselves. As it is one may venture to call it to the attention of readers of the Expositor with some further suggestions which it is hoped will not be unacceptable to Canon Stanton.

In speaking of "The Galilean Ministry," which in the Fourth Gospel is covered by the sections iv. 43–54 and vi. 1–vii. 9, Canon Stanton purposely avoids committing himself to any interpretation of "the very difficult verse John iv. 44 : *αὐτὸς γὰρ Ἰησοῦς ἐμαρτύρησεν, ὅτι προφήτης ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ πατρίδι τιμὴν οὐκ ἔχει.*" He subjoins however in a footnote the following lucid statement of the difficulty, together with a proposal whose significance we shall endeavour to bring out still more clearly.

The evangelist's intention in these words must be either to justify Jesus for leaving Judæa or for not going to Nazareth. The difficulty

in the actual context is to apply πατρίδα to either. πατρίς may be used in the larger sense of one's country as at Hebrews xi. 14, or in the narrower sense of the town, or other local division, where one has been born, or where one's family is settled. It is used of Nazareth in this sense at Mark vi. 4 and parallels. But at John iv. 44 Jesus was on His way to Galilee, within which Nazareth was. On the other hand, if the word is applied to Jerusalem, or Judæa, it must be in a broader sense, for He had not been near Bethlehem, and His connexion with Bethlehem could not determine that with Jerusalem and Judæa. But it may be doubted whether Jerusalem could be called His πατρίς in contrast with Galilee, which was Jews' country, a part of the ancient inheritance of Israel. One is tempted, therefore, to think that there must be some words missing here or some slight transposition. If πατρίς could be contrasted with Cana of Galilee, mentioned in *v.* 46, the application to Nazareth would be clear. I do not therefore think that the fourth evangelist can here, with the use made of the saying by St. Mark known to him, have wished to put forward a different view of the πατρίς of Jesus.

Canon Stanton does not specify the precise words which would have fallen out, nor does he offer an explanation of their disappearance. But to supply them is easy: the words would be ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσῆλθεν εἰς Ναζαρέτ prefixed to verse 44. And the moment we insert the words the reason for their omission from the text becomes self-evident: they appeared to contradict the Synoptic story of Jesus' preaching in His native place, if not the story of His birth in Bethlehem as well.

As Canon Stanton so clearly sets forth, the requirement of the context is almost irresistible. The sense demands that we read:

> And after the two days He went forth thence into Galilee. *But He entered not into Nazareth*, for Jesus Himself testified that a prophet hath no honour in his own native place. So then, when He was come into Galilee, the Galileans received Him, having seen all the things which He did at Jerusalem at the feast; for they too had gone to the feast.

We can hardly anticipate Canon Stanton's approval for

a third and final suggestion. It is made in answer to the question, Why have we no surviving evidence in manuscripts, versions, or patristic quotations of the text as it originally stood ? In reality the phenomenon stands by no means alone in this Gospel. The school of " revisionists " who maintain that the Appendix (chapter xxi.) is only one element in a process of " revision, recasting, cancellation and supplementation " by which this Gospel has been editorially adapted for circulation among churches accustomed to the Synoptic form of the tradition, may congratulate itself on a certain degree of concession even from so conservative a writer as Canon Stanton. He sums up the result of his inquiry into the question of " Interpolations and Dislocations in the Fourth Gospel " by stating (p. 73) that to him its structure seems to be

> somewhat looser than was commonly supposed before the analytical critics urged their views ; that in a few instances editorial remarks have been introduced and sayings added in a manner that was inappropriate to the context ; and that there has been at least one considerable insertion (chapter vi.) after the Gospel was first put forth.

Since Canon Stanton is " on the whole disposed to think that the contents of chapter vi., or a portion thereof, may have been interpolated in the original Gospel " (p. 69), he may be willing to look upon the disappearance of the name of the " feast of the Jews " to which Jesus goes up in v. 1 as a case in some measure parallel to the disappearance of the clause " But He entered not into Nazareth " from iv. 44. Certainly both are alike in the amount of perplexity caused to interpreters.

The contents of chapter v., which forms a Johannine parallel to Mark ii. 1–3, 6, vindicating the authority of Jesus as Son of man over that of Moses and the Law, indicate by analogy with the other great discourses of this Gospel, related as they invariably are to the significance of the

feast at which they are uttered, that the feast here in question can only be that of Pentecost, the Feast of the Giving of the Law. But the great discourse of chapter vi., on The Bread of Life, is given according to vi. 4 at Passover, the Feast of Unleavened Bread. Whether by dislocation, or (as Canon Stanton prefers to hold) by interpolation, chapter vi. thus puts chapter v. out of its proper order, one often noted result being to cut off the section vii. 15–24 (properly the sequel to the discourse of chapter v.) from its true connexion. For we have not only the cross-references in this Gospel to prove it, but the parallel of the plot against Jesus' life which in Mark iii. 1–6 forms the close of the corresponding section. The reason, then, for the perplexing disappearance of the words ἡ πεντηκοστή from v. 1 is self-evident. Between Passover (vi. 4) and Tabernacles (vii. 2) a discourse at Pentecost would be in place. Removed to a position *before* Passover it would introduce intolerable confusion into the sequence of events. The cancellation, then, is not due to transcribers of the text. In this instance, on the contrary, transcribers have done their best in various ways to supply the obvious gap. The cancellation is due to the hand which brought in the intervening chapter on the Passover in Galilee; in other words, the editor of the Gospel in the form in which it has come down to us.

According to the view set forth in the present writer's volume *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate* (1910), this Gospel affords a series of instances which to the critic's eye point to editorial revision having a kindred purpose, the adaptation of the material to circulation concurrently with the other Gospels, or what, from its principal authority, we may call the Petrine tradition. Supplements and changes need not here be mentioned, since they fall into a somewhat different category; but we may venture to refer again to the curious hiatus before i. 43, where the analogy of the

Synoptic story would lead us to expect some account of the call of the two sons of Zebedee. The omission of any reference to these in the Gospel (the only mention is the phrase *οἱ τοῦ Ζεβεδαίου* in the Appendix, xxi. 2) calls for explanation, especially in the context of i. 29–51. But it is practically certain that portions of this narrative have been omitted by the editor. The reference in Jesus' saying to Nathanael " Before Philip called thee, when thou wast sitting under the fig-tree, I saw thee " is undeniably a reference to something intentionally or unintentionally withheld from the reader. And it is almost equally apparent that something is missing before verse 43. We are left at a loss to know who it is that was " intending on the morrow to go forth into Galilee," but who first " findeth Philip." Contrary to most interpreters, this cannot be Jesus, of whom it is impossible to imagine the evangelist relating an unfulfilled intention. Moreover Jesus does not go in search of disciples, they are brought to Him—at least in this Gospel. It must be some third person, and for this reason the sentence continues not " *He* saith unto him," but " *Jesus* saith unto him." It cannot well be Peter who departs to Galilee, for the leading Apostle can hardly be supposed absent from the scenes which follow. We should naturally infer that it was one of the sons of Zebedee, who in Synoptic tradition appear at this point, and who are already suggested to the reader's mind in verse 41, where in speaking of the other pair of brothers, Andrew and Peter, the narrator had said of the former, " He findeth first (*πρῶτον*, or, as other authorities read, *πρῶτος*) his own brother Simon." We are obliged either to suppose that the original narrative went on to speak of the nameless companion of Andrew (John ?) finding also *his* brother, or to hold that the disciple who finds Philip in verse 43 and then departs to Galilee is Andrew. In either case some part of the narrative would

seem to have disappeared. The disappearance need not necessarily be due to difficulties of harmonisation, but at all events the hiatus appears at the point of contact with Synoptic story. Such is also the case with many of the alleged supplements and changes.

The recognition now so general even among the most conservative critics that the Fourth Gospel is not "all of one casting" marks a great step in advance. Conjectural emendation such as that suggested by Canon Stanton in "the difficult verse iv. 44" cannot of course be admitted to the text without documentary attestation. But in combination with other phenomena of the kind such *veri-similia* may help us to a better working hypothesis in the difficult problem of the origin and early history of the greatest of the Gospels.

B. W. Bacon.

THEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL GOSPEL.

Lord Morley has quoted a writer to the effect that "the opinion of Parliament is the opinion of yesterday; the opinion of Judges, that of the day before yesterday." In other words Judges interpret the law by precedent, while Parliament legislates in response to movements outside, i.e., Public Opinion.

Our theologians, like our legislators, are always a day behind; our theology comes in response to movements of thought quite outside the theological mind. Indeed, Professor Armitage, in an article in an early *Hibbert* on "Who Makes Our Theology?" argues "that it is the preacher who has proved the progressive and constructive theologian." The preacher is prior to the theologian; it is the Gospel that sets theology its tasks; and, as the implications of the Gospel are unbared in response to the new

needs of each age, it is the preacher who first senses the new implications and applications of his message.

Whether the generalisation of Professor Armitage is right or wrong, it is certainly true in regard to what is now familiarly known as the Social Gospel, that the preacher is proving the progressive if not very constructive theologian. The theologian is studying one set of problems, the preacher is dealing with a wholly different set. We have a Social Gospel in the pulpit; an individualistic theology in the study. Thus we get a Social Gospel, but not a Social theology. Our theology is purely individualistic in its outlook. It may be possible to find social implications in the creeds, but we very much doubt it. True, the more recent books on Systematic Theology bring out the Social implications of New Testament teaching; but not one does more than scratch the surface of a Social Theology.

The consequence of this lack is evident in books dealing with the Social Gospel, in the making of which there is no end. It is difficult to ascertain what the Social Gospel is. Most of the writers see clearly enough that the "salvage" idea of Salvation is failing in its appeal; that we ought to be as much concerned with making the individual safe as salving him when he has got lost. The implication is that "the basis of society has to be changed"; that salvation does not find its end in a purely individualistic interpretation. Indeed, what meaning has our Public Worship, our prayers, our preaching if not the regeneration of the Social Whole within which the individual lives and moves and has his being? What value has the divine drama of Creation, Incarnation, Atonement and Resurrection if not in mastering civilisation, and in fitting men to dwell together in organic unity? Translate the Gospel in terms of individual salvation and you dwarf it till it becomes ridiculous. Give that message its social, national and international significance

and the divine drama becomes man's profoundest inspiration. But of these implications of the Social Gospel we are all painfully conscious. Our problem is to make the Social Gospel effective.

Now, that is just the function of theology; and the Social Gospel will continue to be vague, undefined and, consequently, ineffective, until it has a theology of its own. (And one might add that theology will continue to lose the respect of the preacher until it becomes revitalised by its new task.) Theology is not prior to the Gospel; it must needs wait on our experience of the Gospel; but the preacher cannot be effective until theology has provided an intellectual background for his social message.

Let us take one or two examples. Theology has provided no doctrine of social sin; yet it is our social sins with which the Social Gospel is concerned. Is the seat of social sin wholly in the individual? Is sin only transmitted from individual to individual like scarlet fever; or is it a microbe in the social atmosphere we breathe? Are not the sins notably characteristic of to-day sins of groups, communities, socially organised movements? The sins from which mankind has to be saved cannot be laid to the charge of any particular individual. They are the sins of super-individual entities. No doubt an ultimate analysis will show that social sins originate in the individual, and are abstractions apart from individuals; but when a sin becomes socialised, its location is moved from the individual to the group, and individual responsibility for it becomes too feeble to be felt. Our theologians have made little or no use of the fine work of recent political philosophy and social psychology, yet the Social Gospel deals with the same set of facts and depends on their conclusions. It is the corporate individual with which the Social Gospel must deal. Indeed, there is no individual who is not a corporate individual in some

sense. We are all members of some group or other. And it is in *the Group, the Corporation*, the *organised social force* that our social sins have their seat and through these are transmitted.

The doctrine of sin implicit in all our preaching was formulated when the potent forces in Society were individuals. The evils from which man suffered were the outcome of the tyranny, ambition, or ruthlessness of individuals. The Saviours of society were likewise individuals. But the whole structure of society has changed. Power to inflict evil is located in organised social groups. Our economic, our industrial, our political life has passed from the control of the individual and is in the hands of super-individual entities. And for the Social Gospel to be effective it must have a doctrine that makes concrete the super-individual nature of sin.

We are not without material for this in the New Testament. Paul realised something of the super-individual nature of sin; the Book of Revelation assumes it. Paul speaks thus: "We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." Put that into modern terms and you have: "Ours is not a conflict with mere flesh and blood, but with the despotisms, the empires, the social forces that control and govern this dark world." It is this fact of which the Social Gospel is conscious. But, having no theology, the preacher does not realise the nature of the sin he is confronting; he cannot surround his foe and disarm him. Take any half dozen books dealing with one or other aspect of the Social Gospel, and the outlook is at bottom individualistic; the appeal and aim is simply to make individuals feel their social obligations; they are not made to feel a deep sense of responsibility for sins they

do actually commit as corporate individuals. A Social Theology would make us conscious of the social seat of sin: that groups have to be converted, not merely the individuals—for the corporate individual acts very differently from the individual alone—the Social Whole has to be redeemed. Whole movements have to be mastered by the Gospel. The ethos of a nation is not the ethos of the individual citizens; no more than Public Opinion is the opinion of individuals corrected by that of other individuals. Both the ethos of a group—e.g. the Labour Group, Coalition Group, or Church Group—and Public Opinion are real entities; and it is the ethos we must change; the Public Opinion we must modify and make Christian. The real end of the Gospel is a Social Group—the Kingdom of God—and it cannot be achieved by converting individuals merely. *Indeed, the Kingdom of God is more truly defined in terms of an Ethos, a Public Opinion, than in terms of redeemed individuals.*

Again, a theology for the Social Gospel is badly needed in order that the Social Gospel may realise the nature of the great super-individuals, the organic groups that it has to master for Christ, and the function of these in bringing in the Kingdom of God. Political Philosophy and Social Psychology can do the same work for a Social Theology here as Philosophy and Psychology have done for theology as we have it to-day. Psychology does not explain the nature of grace, but it does help us to realise the mind into which grace flows; it does not convert men, but it does lay bare the channels along which grace enters and regenerates the whole man. It is not too much to say that the contribution of psychology to the explanation of religious experience has revitalised our preaching, and where used has given freshness and depth to theology. Is it not time our theologians made the same use of social psychology in relation to the Social

Gospel? What theological inferences can be drawn from the psychological nature of the group? Theology has been defined as that science that deals with the "abiding convictions regarding the relations between God, man and the world." A Social Theology will deal with the relations of Groups to the individual's religious life; the influence of the individual on the Group, and the relation of the Groups to the Kingdom of God. If the Social Gospel is correct in its assumptions, then the relation is vital. Our institutions, our Labour Movement, our various organised social forces are the strategic points for the Kingdom. The whole organised religious forces to-day are merely engaged in a skirmish, the individuals our theology recognises are only the outposts. The real battle between good and evil will begin when we attempt to master institutions, movements, nations. We shall get to grips when theology gives the preacher the knowledge he is in need of; when it gives us the religious significance of the new orientation of the society.

Above all, a Social Theology will give the Church a new significance. It will make us realise that a religious community, a thoroughly organised force for social righteousness —that is the social definition of the Church—is a fundamental necessity. With all her faults the Church is still the one universally organised force for righteousness. These are wise words from a well-known philosopher: "Many of us may wish the Church to be in certain respects different from what it is; but that should not make us ignore the necessity of a religious community. A religious community is indispensable if ever we are to establish the new life in the human sphere, and bring it within the reach of the individual; it is indispensable if the struggle is to be maintained to great issues, and is not to degenerate into small skirmishes. At the present time when the State is engrossed in economic and other constantly changing problems of the day, we

need a community which attaches paramount importance to the inner problems of humanity, and which directs our life towards eternal aims and values." That is a word that the preacher of the Social Gospel, impatient of the theologians' slowness to perceive the great issues, needs to keep in mind. The Social Gospel needs a doctrine of the Church that will bring out its nature as a social force without which social salvation cannot be achieved. "Nulla salus extra ecclesiam" gains here a new meaning.

Enough has been said to show that the Social Gospel must have a theology. The task before our theologians is to show the social seat of sin; its social nature; its transmission by social groups. They must bring to light the nature of the organised social forces against which we fight; yea, which we may win and make allies of the Kingdom; they must fill out the doctrine of original sin by showing that it does not lie in Adam, nor in any individual, but in Society; the Social Whole. They must correct the false doctrine of biological transmission; and, finally, they must show how the Kingdom of God is hindered or realised through the super-individual groups and institutions. Till then the Social Gospel must continue to be ineffective.

J. G. McKenzie.

THE FOURTH GOSPEL AND THE SACRAMENTS.

The gospel of John has been acclaimed in the past by mystics and philosophers as the complete and perfect presentation of Christianity. In it, it has been thought and said, Christianity avoids, as Swāmi Vivekānanda puts it, shipwreck 'on the rock of historicality.' To Hegel it was the Golden Gospel in which Our Lord becomes, not a man, or a god, but the symbol and incarnation of divine humanity. Unfortunately for the philosophers, modern historical research is proving more completely every day the fact that the early Church lived in a dualist, not a monist, world. For the modern conception of world-unity is a product of modern science, and is utterly foreign to the *religious* atmosphere of the first and second centuries.[1]

The fourth gospel can no longer be interpreted as a philosophical inspiration, equally valid for all time. It was composed in a definite area and at a definite period and it bears unmistakable marks of both. Its birthplace was either Ephesus or one of the neighbouring cities, and it was written between 100 and 110 A.D. What then, we have to ask ourselves, were the prevailing tendencies, as far as can be discovered, in that region at that time? In what atmosphere of thought and creed and ritual practice did the gospel of John first see the light? It is obvious that these questions are of primary importance to those who would understand what the writer really intended to convey, what *he* actually meant, rather than read into his words *their own* religious experience. That the author was a

[1] The Stoics of course were monists after a fashion. But it was not among the Stoics that Christianity found its first Gentile converts. To a Seneca or a Gallio, who conducted his life κατὰ λόγον (Acts xviii. 14) οὐδὲν τούτων . . . ἔμελεν—'he wasn't interested.'

mystic is of course plain. But what sort of mystic? Had he the serene Olympian temper of the subjectivist who floats securely in his self-made heaven, unconscious or disdainful of the world? Or was he rather of the Pauline type, a man of affairs, steeped to the eyes in the controversies and the practical needs of his own community, an ecclesiastical statesman, a polemical theologian, a prophet of denunciation and correction? If we study such a passage as the latter portion of the sixth chapter, it will become clearer than ever that he belonged to the second class. And this being so, we must glance at the environment of the Church during the period in order to understand who are the opponents of 'John's' teaching and what shape their opposition took.

Let us briefly remind ourselves of the literary sources which remain to us from the area which was destined to produce our gospel. That area comprised the coast cities of Asia Minor and the towns of the Lycus, Meander, and neighbouring valleys; Ephesus, Miletus, Smyrna, Colosse, Laodicea, Sardis, Tralles, Magnesia, Philadelphia, Thyatira, Pergamum. It is in short the milieu of the Apocalypse and of the Ignatian letters. Behind stand Syria and Syrian Antioch,[1] from which the area was evangelised and with which there was constant contact, as the Ignatian letters show, themselves written only a few years after our gospel. The sources then will include the epistle to the Hebrews, written between 70 and 80 A.D. in Ephesus, by Priscilla, or one of the Apollos school; the correspondence of Paul with Colosse (and 'Ephesians'—or the expansion of this second letter by a local writer), and the letters to the seven

[1] The thesis that Antioch, with its Syrian hinterland, was a purely and exclusively Greek city, seems to me impossible to maintain. That it "was a centre, not of Syriac-speaking culture, but of Greek culture," (Dr. Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 45), everyone must agree. But there was plenty of Syriac spoken in the streets.

churches. Another source not hitherto applied in this connexion may turn out to be the Odes of Solomon. For if Dr. Rendel Harris is right in placing these poems in the first century, then, if their original be in Syriac, they afford us a glimpse into church life in Syria and Northern Mesopotamia just prior to the composition of the fourth gospel. Or if, as a good deal of evidence tends to show, their original be Greek, then it is exceedingly likely that they emanate from the Ephesian area, and represent the same group which later produced the fourth gospel itself, thus furnishing a most valuable source-book for its study.

Now a very slight acquaintance with these documents makes it quite clear that the Church developed between 70 and 100 A.D. in an atmosphere of heated controversy, of life and death conflict, not only or so much, with the secular government, as with theological opponents within and without its borders. Of these opponents there were two main camps. The first was that of the Jews. A very large number of the first Christians were Jews or Jewish proselytes. In the coast cities such as Ephesus and Smyrna, and in the great commercial centres in general, this was especially true. And the immediate effect was to arouse the fiercest antagonism against the new heresy in all the local synagogues. Not only so. The Judæo-Christians themselves were very cautious and slow in coming over to the point of view of a Paul. Each step taken was contested almost as bitterly inside the Church as it was outside. The 'Galatian' epistle is a *locus classicus*, but the epistle to the Hebrews is even more significant. For the Galatian conflict was already a thing of the past for the Johannine atmosphere. We have constantly to remind ourselves that the Gospel of John was written more than two generations after the crucifixion, and at least thirty-five years after the death of Paul. But though the memory of Paul's conflicts in

Lycaonia was no longer a living one, though the actual combatants were long dead and the controversy was a mere tradition, yet the same struggle continued in a different form, just as the modern Englishman finds himself in the midst of a sacramentarian conflict just as real as that of Newman's days, though the ground has shifted and both the arguments used, and the methods of attack, and the temper of the personnel, are different. The epistle to the Hebrews, dry and difficult as it seems to a modern reader, bristled with living arguments to the public for whom it was written. It is, in short, an attempt to show that the Christian Church, as she existed in Asia Minor in the last quarter of the first century, was the one and only true development of the old Jewish Church. Her theology and *sacraments*, properly viewed, were those foretold by the great teachers of Israel. Her ritual runs back to Melchisedec and antedates Abraham. Her Messiah is the second Moses foretold by the first. She is the fully developed plant, which came from the true seed, of which contemporary Judaism is therefore the empty husk. We may be sure that such an argument arose in a living controversy against very real opponents. It was not a mere academic *tour de force*, an arrow shot into the air. We have the same opponents in Ephesians ii. 11, iii. 13, in Colossians ii. 16, 17, in Apoc. iii. 9, and in many places in the Odes of Solomon, as also of course in the Johannine Epistle, which, if not actually the work of our author, certainly comes from his school. Thus it is evident that, during the generation which preceded the appearance of our book, the Christian Church was engaged in a constant struggle with the Jewish synagogues, from which many of its older members had come, and from amongst which it still gained occasional recruits. We shall find this struggle mirrored in the fourth gospel. Let us now briefly touch on the other element of contemporary

religious life against which the Church had to fight. This was, of course, Hellenist religion. The group of more or less amorphous mystery-cults, sometimes known as the Hermetic, had many devotees in this region. In particular Pessinont was the home and sanctuary of the Phrygian Attis-worship, that worship of the local nature god and goddess which developed into a cosmopolitan esoteric mystery-religion. It is unnecessary nowadays to dwell on the essential elements of the "mystery" theology. Enough to remind ourselves that the basis was a dualist world. God is entirely transcendent. He is light, life and goodness. The world is darkness, death and evil. The problem of religion is to *bring* God *down* to men so that being inoculated with divinity, man may *ascend up* to God —in short to raise human beings from the fleshly to the spiritual nature, to "bring life and immortality to light." This was effected, illogically, of course, by the descent of a sub-deity or emanation of the divine, who clothes himself with flesh. The flesh in which he clothes himself is purified in the very act. The divinity in flesh becomes a symbol of redeemed humanity, and in order to obtain immortality and share in the divine nature, it is necessary to wash away, and become cleansed from, the fleshly nature of death, and to absorb into one's body a portion of the divine body of the descending god, so that being now inoculated with his divinity, the devotee may share in the qualities which attach to it.

Ritually this is accomplished by means of initiation rites, which include a baptism to get rid of the old nature, and an actual eating of the flesh and drinking of the blood of the incarnation, or of a sacrificial victim, or consecrated elements, which represented him. That these ideas are very early paralleled in Christian ritual there can be no doubt. Not only have we a complete baptismal theory in Paul, only a generation after the crucifixion, but also

a communion rite which is something much more than a mere agapé. It is difficult to pare down the plain meaning of such a passage as Romans vi. 8–11, or 1 Corinthians xi. 24–29. *τοῦτό μού ἐστιν τὸ σῶμα*, whosoever shall eat the bread or drink the cup unworthily *ἔνοχος ἔσται τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ κυρίου*. In Hebrews the Christian ritual in our region about 80 A.D. is clearly and definitely described. The essential *elements* of admission to membership (*θεμέλιον*), '*τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον*,' are laid down as (1) repentance *from* dead works, (2) faith *toward* God, (3) the doctrine of *baptisms*, (4) the laying-on of hands, (5) resurrection from the dead, and (6) 'eternal' judgment. Here the ritual is placed side by side with its theological explanation, and having passed on from this 'foundation,' laid in the performance and comprehension of the initiatory baptism, the author proceeds at great length to explain the unique value and genuineness of the Christian sacrament as an essential part of the weekly (or daily) service. (Heb. x. 19–25) *ἔχοντες οὖν, ἀδελφοί, παρρησίαν εἰς τὴν εἴσοδον τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰησοῦ, ἣν ἐνεκαίνισεν ἡμῖν ὁδὸν πρόσφατον καὶ ζῶσαν διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*.

How then did this conception of the Christian sacrament arise? What was the origin of the Christian ritual itself? Surely the answer must be that it was a natural and inevitable continuation and development of the Jewish sacrament in Judæo-Christian circles. As these widened to take in Jews of the Diaspora, proselytes, and finally pure Gentiles—and this was a very gradual process—so the doctrine and practice of the sacraments developed *pari passu*. It was in Asia Minor that the complete 'high' doctrine formulated itself fully, in an atmosphere of conflict with Jews on the one hand, and with Hellenists on the other. Continual contact with initiates and teachers of the various Greek mysteries stimulated

and moulded the growth of Christian sacramental theory and practice.[1] By the time that the school from which the fourth gospel came had become articulate, the question was a burning one, fiercely debated. And it was essentially inseparable from Christological theory. By this time many of the members of the Church were of Gentile origin, and partook thoroughly the Hellenist view of life. Their dualism was far more absolute than that of the Jewish converts, and they laid emphasis on the metaphysical nature rather than the ethical or moral power of Christ. To such persons the humanity of Jesus was a philosophical stumblingblock. Yet they were strongly attracted to Christianity. How did they overcome their scruples ? The answer is that they found a way out in the teaching known as Docetism. It was clearly impossible that πνεῦμα and σάρξ should really mix. For the very touch of the earthly would defile the divine, which would become less than divine in the contact. The body of Christ was therefore thought of as an illusion, simply a phantom appearance, and thus the purity and reality of divinity were saved. But as the leaders of the Church were quick to see, this solution involved more difficulties than it solved. For if the human body of Christ were unreal, then there had been no real incarnation, and consequently the sacrament itself became a mockery and a fraud. If Christ's flesh be not real material substance of this world, then this world has never really been impregnated with divinity, and salvation is only an empty sham.

The Jewish opponents on the one side maintained that Jesus was mere man ; they depreciated and explained away miracles in order to prove their point. On the other

[1] The phraseology of 'John' is often borrowed from that of the mystery-cults. Thus Prof. A. Deissmann speaks of " . . . the solemn formula 'I am,' ἐγὼ εἰμί, which occurs in the Gospel of St. John, and in inscriptions relating to the cult of Isis." (*Phil. of the Greek Bible*, p. 73.)

side, Hellenists suggested that He was mere God and that His contact with humanity was unreal; thinking to glorify Him, they unconsciously destroyed, from the point of view of the time, any real possibility of salvation. For salvation depended upon the fact that a historical contact between divine and earthly had been made by Jesus, and that by feeding on Him, we could attain immortality.

That such a spiritually minded mystic as the author of John should have held such an apparently crude view of the sacrament ought not to surprise us, and would not do so if we had accustomed ourselves more to think of the first century under *its own* categories, rather than under *our own*.

It is probable that the author of the fourth gospel had been himself previously an initiate of one of the Greek mystery-cults. His book consists of bits of genuine tradition[1] used as a framework for a most vigorous polemic against both Jewish opponents and Docetic puritans, whether within or without the Church. Moreover the polemic is constructive. The author has very definite ideas of both church and

[1] After writing the above my attention was drawn to an article by Dr. Burney in the Expositor, Nov. 1920, in which an Aramaic original seems proved for at least one Johannine saying. An Aramaic tradition behind parts of the Gospel would not, however, in the least affect the validity of the theory here outlined, as to the sacramentarian character of its teaching, for the Aramaic-speaking Churches were quite as sacramentarian as those of the Greek areas, as we see both in the Acts of Thomas and the Odes of Solomon, assuming a Syriac original for these documents.

Cf. the frequent mention of ephphatha, eucharist and baptism, e.g. in Acta Thomæ:

(p. ܟܕ) ܟܦܬܐ . . . ܐܟܟ . . . ܟܦܬ
ܟܦ ܐܠܗ ܕܒܝܫܘܥ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܗܘ
(p. ܟܓ) ܕܒ ܒܝܫܐ ܗܘܐ ܠܥܠܡ ܥܠܡܝܢ.
ܐܝ ܐܒܗܬܐ ܕܥܠܟ ܐܡ ܟܪܝܣܛܘܢ ܒܦܬܐ

Cf. also the idea of the Church as mother of many mercies, viz. dispenser of the sacraments, in Odes of Solomon xix. 6:

ܗܘܬ ܐܡ ܟܪܝܣܛܐ ܕܪܚܡܐ ܣܓܝܐ

sacraments. And he develops these with great force and clarity. Both hang together with his Christology—a Christology which he has summed up in semi-philosophical form in the prologue.[1] But "John" is not really a philosopher—he is something much greater—a teacher and preacher of experimental religion. Like many such persons he gathers fragments from contemporary philosophical systems and composes an eclectic scheme of metaphysics which satisfies himself. But it is not in the prologue that we must search if we wish to understand his view of church and of sacraments, i.e., of what were to him the realities of religion. He was no proto-neo-Platonist, no philosophic mystic, but rather one of those terrible red-blooded enthusiasts who have done so much good and (sometimes) so much harm in the world.

His plan was to write a series of discourses each of which begins with a genuine piece of tradition about Jesus. After a few verses the story merges into a discourse, often interrupted by objections on the part of Jews or of doubting disciples. Who are these interpellators? Are they Galilean Jews of Jesus' own time? Or are they actually the opponents of the orthodox Church in Asia Minor at the end of the first century? Our thesis is that they are the second. Surely it is the apotheosised Christ of the Aegean seaboard rather than the Galilean prophet, who speaks of Himself as the καταβαίνων and the ἀναβαίνων. ὑμεῖς ἐκ τῶν κάτω ἐστε, ἐγὼ ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰμί. ὑμεῖς ἐκ τούτου τοῦ κόσμου ἐστέ, ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου (John viii. 23).

If then we are to put the argument in its correct

[1] Philosophically considered, the prologue, which the author intended as a summing up of his theory of the world, is an impossible eclectic patchwork and by no means the best part of the gospel. Here, even more than elsewhere, the pulsing and throbbing religious life of the writer is too big to be contained in his thought-forms.

perspective, we shall see that the Church was engaged in a desperate battle which centred round the real humanity of Christ, and His real presence in the sacraments, on the one hand, and on the unique genuineness and unique existence of the Church which administered these sacraments, on the other. When the Jews—the Jews, of course, of Asia Minor, not of Galilee—accuse Jesus of being a mere man, whose origin is known to them, He answers by declaring Himself an emanation of the divine, and explains their incapability for belief in Him by the fact that they are still 'of this world,' whereas He is 'not of this world.' He Himself is the food of the elect, 'the bread which came down from heaven' prefigured in the type of the Jewish manna. The Jewish opponents contested the realist view of the sacrament as a sheer impossibility on physical grounds. This again is only a proof of their own unregenerate nature. "How can this man give us his own flesh to eat?" As opposed to this superficial and 'earthly' view the author of our gospel declares uncompromisingly for the actual presence. The initiates must not only take part in the eucharist, but they must hold quite clearly and firmly that they are actually partaking of the real body and blood of the Lord. Without such a sacrament, so understood, there is no salvation, no inoculation with the divine substance, no immortality. *ἐὰν μὴ φάγητε τὴν σάρκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πίητε αὐτοῦ τὸ αἷμα οὐκ ἔχετε ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. ὁ τρώγων μου τὴν σάρκα καὶ πίνων μου τὸ αἷμα ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον* (John vi. 53–54). The substitution of *τρώγω*—devour, for the milder *φάγω*—eat, adds an almost savage force to the insistence on the reality of the sacrament and the denial of anything short of the actual physical consumption of the divine substance.[1]

[1] So Dr. Baldensperger in a recent lecture. But Geldart: *The Modern Greek Language*, p. 182, says that John in this place 'deliberately preferred

It is thus that in this great formative work issuing from the very city in which the apostle John had just closed his long life, and put forth under the apostolic and almost magic authority of his name, Jesus Himself is made to declare His own divine origin, His own real humanity, and the importance, nay the indispensability, of the full sacrament administered by the one authoritative Church. The gospel was intended to combat attempts to break away from that Church and to adopt a less 'high' view of the sacrament.

What a vivid light is thrown on the Church of the period when we are told that "many of his disciples, when they heard (this discourse insisting on the real presence), said, 'This is a hard saying (σκληρός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος οὗτος); who can hear it?'" Jesus had dealt with this same difficulty among His early disciples in Galilee; that at least is what we are intended by our author to understand. Out of His own divine mouth the disbelievers and schismatics of 100 A.D. are to be confounded. Those who in the Johannine period are finding the high doctrine too hard—those who are leaving the Church because of the teaching summed up in the fourth gospel—are struck at mightily in this passage. The very words of Jesus Himself, reported by the last of the apostles, the venerable white-haired survivor from another age whom many of the readers may have actually seen in their childhood; these are used with powerful effect to smite to the earth those who oppose the full sacramental doctrine. "Upon this many of his disciples went back and walked no more with him. Jesus said therefore unto the twelve, 'Would ye also go away?' Simon Peter answered him, 'Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast

τρώγω to ἐσθίω as more familiar and more intelligible' (i.e. as a simple equivalent). For this criticism I am indebted to the kindness of Prof. C. H. Dodd.

the words of eternal life. And we *have believed and know* that thou art the Holy One of God.' Jesus answered them, 'Did not I choose you, the twelve, and one of you is a devil?' Now he spoke of Judas, son of Simon Iscariot, for he it was that should betray him, one of the twelve" (John vi. 66–71).

At first sight this passage may seem disconnected and suggest a composite authorship. We are urging that with slight exceptions the fourth gospel is a unity, although it uses older historical matter, and on looking more closely at these verses this will become apparent. We have here a direct historically-presented attack upon the Puritans and Docetists, every word of which is meant to tell. The apostate disciples are, of course, these contemporary opponents, rejectors of the real presence together with the real humanity, and would-be schismatics. For a plurality of churches is to our author an impossible idea. There can be but *one* Church, *one* Sacrament, *one* Lord. καὶ γενήσονται μία ποίμνη, εἷς ποιμήν (John x. 16); and again, 'that they may be one, even as we are one.' Those who imagine that they can form a second church fall into a dangerous error. The scattered flock is doomed to destruction—ὁ λύκος ἁρπάζει αὐτὰ καὶ σκορπίζει (John x. 13). Not only was this an inevitable deduction from the 'Johannine' theory of the sacraments and of Christ's nature. It was also sound ecclesiastical statesmanship, and the Church owed her survival in large part to such teaching. Who then is the wolf who scatters the flock? It is the spirit of heresy, the spirit of the devil himself. And so it becomes plain that those who are teaching heresy and schism are in the service of the devil, and possessed by him. They are the spiritual descendants of that Judas who in this passage is condemned by our Lord Himself. Nothing could well be more effectively staged than this confronting of Peter and Judas. What

lies behind it? The solution suggested by Dr. Baldensperger becomes obvious when we examine the full name given to Judas. He is called Judas, son of *Simon* Iscariot. We have here an accommodation of the real tradition recorded in Mark viii. 33. "He turning about and seeing his disciples, rebuked Peter and saith, 'Get thee behind me, Satan!'" Already at the end of the first century this tradition was a scandal and a stumblingblock, of which opponents did not fail to take advantage. That Peter, the great head of the Church, the rock upon whom she was built, he who held the keys of heaven and hell, should have been identified with the devil by the Lord Himself! It was felt that there must have been some mistake. Not Simon *Peter*—surely—but some other Simon, some other disciple. Judas, however, was the only possible figure, and so Judas is transformed into Judas son of Simon, in defiance of tradition, and then the obnoxious appellation is transferred to him.

Now at once the stage is clear. It is Peter, the unblemished leader, type of the orthodox Christian, who refuses to be offended by the doctrine of the real presence, and who in his very reply emphasises the unique character of Church, Saviour, and salvation. "Does this scandalise you?" says Jesus as He concludes His discourse on the mystic sacrament, "then what if you should behold the Son of Man ascending (*ἀναβαίνοντα*) where He was before? *τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν τὸ ζωοποιοῦν, ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ὠφελεῖ οὐδέν· τὰ ῥήματα ἃ ἐγὼ λελάληκα ὑμῖν πνεῦμά ἐστιν καὶ ζωή ἐστιν.* And Peter's reply a moment later fits the thread to the needle's eye. "Would ye also go away?" says the Lord to the twelve, and Peter answers promptly: *Κύριε, πρὸς τίνα ἀπελευσόμεθα; ῥήματα ζωῆς αἰωνίου ἔχεις . . .*

Peter, then, is the orthodox leader, the writer of our gospel himself or another; the eleven are the faithful who confess the one Church and partake the one real sacrament; while

Judas typifies the fate in store for those who wander from the true way and to whom the command in the mind of both our author and his readers applies : " Get thee behind me, Satan ! "

How is it that whilst Jesus calls Himself the Son of Man, His disciples confess Him, not Christ, as at Cæsarea Philippi —not the Jewish Messiah—but ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ. The answer again is not far to seek. We have no accident here. Messianic and mystery titles have the magic value of all names and are not used loosely. Our Lord is made to call himself the Son of Man in the technical sense—a heavenly apocalyptic being in *the form of humanity*, i.e., the real humanity is vindicated in this title. The disciples have thus no need to confess his Humanity. He Himself has declared it. It is too late in 100 A.D. for a mere confession that He is the Jewish Messiah. The apotheosis is complete and it is to the *divine being* who descends and re-ascends that Peter is made to bear witness—the Holy One of God.[1]

And even so the other words which we have italicised in

[1] The use of ἅγιος and ὅσιος for the initiate is frequent in the mystery-cults, as also in Paul. Cf. Reitzenstein, *H.M.R.* p. 27. Here our Lord seems to be presented as the supreme and representative initiate, the firstborn of many brethren, the true μονογενής, not A ἅγιος but ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ.

In 1 John ii. 20, which comes from the Ephesian circle, we have a remarkable use of the title as indicating the dispenser of sacraments. We are there told that we have a chrisma—the sacred oil of baptism—from the Holy One. Χρῖσμα ἔχετε ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἁγίου καὶ οἴδατε πάντες. There can be no doubt from a comparison with this passage that ὁ Ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ is a technical term for the mystery-incarnation whose flesh and blood are to be eaten and drunk in order to attain salvation.

The use of the same title in Mk. i. 24 is extremely interesting. It would seem to be redactional here, and is far from being the only " mystery " word in the Synoptics. After all, we have to bear in mind that the בר אנש had become ὁ Κύριος Ἰησοῦς long before even Mark assumed its final form.

I am indebted to my friend Mr. K. A. Saunders, of Mansfield College, for calling my attention to these last two passages.

our quotation are equally significant of the double fight which packs every phrase of the passage with pregnant meaning. "We have believed and know," πεπιστεύκαμεν καὶ ἐγνώκαμεν. πίστις is the key-word of our gospel as opposed to the ἔργα of Jewish opponents and the γνῶσις of the Docetists. And here it is the latter against whom the shaft is aimed. You seek salvation by understanding —rejecting the mystery of loving faith (the real presence) on rational grounds. Hear then the truth. The only true knowledge is that which is gained by the practice of faith in loving obedience. By feeding on the divine substance, and only thus, can true inner illumination be obtained. You have a superficial knowledge, but we, although our watchword is faith, possess in virtue of that faith the true enlightenment. *You* know. *We* have believed and know, for πίστις is itself the only real γνῶσις.[1]

It is on this fine and deeply religious note that we finish our study. The fact that the Church became, nay was almost from the beginning, catholic and sacramental, does not seem to be any reason why it should necessarily take either form in our own day. As we began by remarking, we live in a monist age, dominated by the idea of unity in what we call the Universe. The *forms* which fitted a dualist age can no longer be of use to us. The message of the fourth gospel is neither ritualist nor Platonist. In the opinion of the writer we are as little justified in basing on this gospel an utterly false interpretation of Christianity as a weak neo-Hegelian mysticism, as we are in using it to back up in the twentieth century a romanticist attempt to regalvanise into life a material initiation rite which belongs to a different epoch and another universe of ideas than ours.

[1] Cf. the three paths of Indian theology: those of bhăktī (devotion), jnănă = γνῶσις (knowledge), and kărmmă (works). Here 'John' declares with deep religious insight that bhăktī is itself the true jnănă.

We look to historical study to peel off the ephemeral form and help us to gain inspiration from the vital religious experience which pulses through every chapter of our gospel. May it not yet be possible for us to gain for ourselves the strength and inspiration which the author possessed, and which our modern life so desperately needs—something individual, yet something to be lived out and experienced in communion with others, something warm and living and real, and productive of progressive moral development both of the individual and of society ?

JOHN NAISH.

THE SONGS OF ASCENTS.

HEBREW poetry does not conform to any strict syllabic metre. But metre it unquestionably has, in that it has its recurring rhythms, which are dependent on the accent. Prose and poetry are alike rhythmical, but there is this distinction, that the rhythm of poetry is recurring, and that of prose not so.

In the Revised Version the rhythmical phrases of some of the poetical portions of the Old Testament are indicated by the printing of the translations of them in separate lines. But the translations do not always conform to the rhythm. It is the advantage of a non-syllabic metre that it can be fairly reproduced in translation, and some of the finest passages in our English Bible owe their beauty to the fact that the rhythm of them is a reproduction of that of the Hebrew.

I offer here a translation of those Psalms which are entitled Songs of Ascents, preserving as nearly as I can the rhythm of the original. It will be obvious to the reader that I am indebted to the existing translations. My object is not to be original, but to give a translation with a rhythm conforming to that of the Hebrew.

PSALM CXX.

1. I called on the LORD in my distress,
   (And he answered me)—
2. Deliver my soul, O LORD, from lying lips,
   And from the tongue of deceit.

3. What shall be given to thee,
   And what to thee added, thou tongue of deceit ?
4. Sharp arrows of one who is mighty,
   And with them juniper coals.

5. Alas ! that I sojourn in Mesech,
   And dwell among Kedar's tents.

6. My soul hath long had her dwelling
With him that hateth peace.
7. I am for peace, but when I speak,
They are ready for war.

Psalm cxxi.

1. I will lift up mine eyes to the hills:
Whence shall come my help?
2. My help cometh from the Lord,
Who made heaven and earth.

3. He will not suffer thy foot to be moved,
He that keepeth thee will not slumber.
4. Behold, he neither slumbers nor sleeps,
Who keepeth Israel.

5. The Lord, he is thy keeper,
The Lord is thy shade on thy right hand.
6. The sun shall smite thee not by day,
Neither the moon by night.

7. The Lord shall keep thee from all evil,
He shall keep thy soul.
8. The Lord shall keep thy going and coming
From this time forth for ever.

Psalm cxxii.

1. I was glad when they said unto me,
Let us go to the house of the Lord.
2. And now our feet are standing
In thy gates, O Jerusalem;
3. Thine, Jerusalem, that art built
As a city at unity with itself.

4. Thither go up the tribes,
Even the tribes of the Lord,
A testimony to Israel,
To give thanks to the name of the Lord.
5. For there are set the judgement thrones,
The thrones of David's house.

6. O pray for the peace of Jerusalem:
They shall prosper that love thee.
7. Peace be within thy walls,
Prosperity within thy palaces.

8. For my brethren and companions' sakes
I say, Let peace be in thee.
9. For the sake of the house of the LORD our God
I seek for thee what is good.

PSALM CXXIII.

1. Unto thee lift I up mine eyes,
O thou that dwellest in the heavens.
2. Behold, as the eyes of servants
Are unto their master's hand,
And like as the eyes of a maiden
Are unto the hand of her mistress,
So are our eyes unto the LORD our God,
Until he have mercy upon us.
3. Have mercy on us, LORD, have mercy,
For we are exceedingly filled with contempt.
4. Our souls are exceedingly filled
With the scorning of those at ease,
And the contempt of them that are proud.

PSALM CXXIV.

1. Had it not been the LORD who was with us,
Let Israel now say ;
2. Had it not been the LORD who was with us,
When men rose up against us,
3. Then had they swallowed us quick,
When their wrath was kindled against us.
4. Then had the waters drowned us,
The stream had gone over our soul.
5. Then indeed the proud waters
Had gone even over our soul.
6. But blessèd the LORD
Who gave us not up, a prey to their teeth.
7. Our soul is escaped as a bird from the fowlers' snare,
The snare was broken, and we are escaped.
8. Our help is in the name of the LORD,
Who made heaven and earth.

PSALM CXXV.

1. They who trust in the LORD
Are like to the mount of Zion,
Unmoved and abiding for ever.
2. The hills are around Jerusalem,
And the LORD is around his people
From this time forth for ever.

3. For the sceptre of evil shall not rest
On the lot of them that be righteous,
That so the righteous put not forth
Their hands unto wickedness.

4. Do good, O LORD, to the good,
And to them that are upright in heart.
5. But those that turn to their crooked ways,
The LORD shall lead them forth with workers of iniquity,
And peace shall be upon Israel.

PSALM CXXVI.

1. When the LORD brought back the captivity of Zion,
We were like them that dream.
2. Then was our mouth filled with laughter,
And our tongue with joy.
3. Then said they among the nations,
The LORD hath done great things for these.
4. The LORD hath done great things for us,
Whereóf wé are glád.

5. Bring again our captivity, O LORD,
Like as the streams in the south.
6. They who sow in tears
Shall reap in joy.
7. Who goeth his way weeping,
Bearing the measure of seed,
Shall surely come with joy,
Bringing his sheaves with him.

PSALM CXXVII.

1. Except the LORD build the house,
Vain is their labour who build it.
2. Except the LORD keep the city,
Vain is the wakeman's watch.
3. 'Tis vain for you who early rise, and late take rest,
Eating the bread of carefulness,
Seeing he giveth his beloved sleep.

4. Behold how children are an heritage of the LORD,
And the fruit of the womb is his reward.
5. As arrows in the hand of the mighty,
So are the children of youth.
6. Blessed the man shall be
Who hath his quiver full of them:
They shall not be put to shame, when they speak
With enemies in the gate.

Psalm cxxviii.

1. Blessed is every one that feareth the Lord,
   That walketh in his ways.
2. Thou shalt surely eat of the toil of thy hands,
   Thou art háppy, and wéll is thee.
3. Thy wife shall be as a fruitful vine
   In the sanctuary of thy dwelling:
   Thy children like to olive plants
   Round about thy table.
4. Behold, how thus is blessed
   The man that feareth the Lord.
5. The Lord bless thee out of Zion,
   And see thou the good of Jerusalem
   All the days of thy life.
6. See too thy children's children
   And peace upon Israel.

Psalm cxxix.

1. Oft from my youth have they afflicted me,
   Let Israel now say,
2. Oft from my youth have they afflicted me,
   Yet have they not prevailed.
3. The plowers plowed upon my back,
   And drew their furrows long.
4. The Lord is righteous,
   He cut the cords of the wicked.
5. Let all be ashamed, and turned backward,
   As many as hate Zion.
6. Let them be as the grass on the housetops,
   Which withereth afore it be plucked;
7. Wherewith no reaper filleth his hand,
   Nor the binder of sheaves his bosom.
8. And none of those who pass shall say,
   The blessing of the Lord be with you,
   We give you a blessing in the name of the Lord.

Psalm cxxx.

1. Out of the depths have I called thee, O Lord:
2. Lord, hear my voice.
   Let thine ears attentive be
   To the voice of my supplication.
3. If thou, Lord, markedst iniquity,
   Who, O Lord, could stand?
4. But with thee is forgiveness,
   That so thou mayest be feared.

5. I wait for the LORD : my soul doth wait ;
And in his word do I hope.
6. My soul waiteth for the Lord
Móre than watchmen for the morning
Whén they watch for the morning.

7. O Israel, hope in the LORD,
For with the LORD is mercy,
And with him is plenteous redemption.
8. And hé shall redeem Israel
From all his iniquities.

PSALM CXXXI.

1. LORD, not haughty my heart, nor lofty mine eyes,
Neither engage I in things that are great,
And in things too wonderful for me.
2. Nay rather, I still and silence my soul,
Like a weaned child with his mother :
My soul is with me as the weanèd child.

3. O Israel, hope in the LORD
From this time forth for ever.

PSALM CXXXII.

1. Remember, LORD, unto David
All his anxiety ;
2. How that he sware to the LORD,
And vowed to the Mighty One of Jacob :—
3. I will not enter the tent of my house,
Nor go up into my bed ;
4. I will give to mine eyes no sleep,
Nor to mine eyelids slumber,
5. Till I find out a place for the LORD,
An habitation for the Mighty One of Jacob.

6. Lo, we heard of it in Ephrathah,
We found it in the field of the wood.
7. We will enter into his tabernacles,
We will fall down low at his footstool.

8. Arise, O LORD, into thy resting place,
Thou, and the ark of thy strength.
9. Let thy priests be clothed with righteousness,
And let thy saints be glad.
10. For the sake of thy servant David,
Turn not away the presence of thine anointed.

11. The LORD hath sworn unto David,
(And he will not fail in faithfulness):
Of the fruit of thine own body
Will I set upon thy throne.
12. If thy children will keep my covenant
And my testimony that I shall teach them,
Their children also for ever
Shall sit upon thy throne.
13. For the LORD hath chosen Zion,
He hath desired it for his dwelling:—
14. This is my resting place for ever,
Here will I dwell, because I desire it.
15. I will surely bless her provision,
And will satisfy her needy with bread.
16. Her priests will I clothe with salvation,
And her saints shall rejoice and be glad.
17. I will there make bud a horn for David.
I have ordained a lamp for mine anointed.
18. His enemies will I clothe with shame,
But on himself shall his crown flourish.

PSALM CXXXIII.

1. Behold, how good and pleasant it is
For brethren to dwell in unity!
2. Like precious oil on the head,
And that cometh down on the beard,
On Aaron's beard,
Which came down to the skirt of his robes.
3. Like to the dew of Hermon
Coming down on to Zion's hills,
For there the LORD commanded his blessing,
Life for evermore.

PSALM CXXXIV.

1. Behold now bless the LORD,
All ye servants of the LORD,
Who stand in the house of the LORD by night.
2. Lift up your hands to the sanctuary,
And bless the LORD.

3. The LORD, the Maker of heaven and earth,
Bless thee out of Zion.

E. H. ASKWITH.

"OF THE HOUSEHOLD": IS THE RENDERING CORRECT?

THREE times in the New Testament the Greek adjective οἰκεῖος occurs, and is rendered "of the household." The rendering is due to Tindale. In Galatians vi. 10 Wiclif, with the Latin *domesticos fidei* before him, translated it *them that ben homeliche of faith*: in Ephesians ii. 19 for *domestici Dei* he gives *houshold men of God*; and in 1 Timothy v. 8 for *domesticorum his houshold men*, using the adjective *household*, it would seem, for "familiar," "intimate," "homely" (N.E.D., which quotes "growing into some houshold familiaritie," 1592), and taking Jerome to have used *domesticus* as Cicero does in a letter of introduction for one Lucius Valerius—*est ex meis domesticis atque intimis familiaribus* (Ad Familiares, 3, 1, 3). Cp. Rosc., Am. 6 *domesticus usus et consuetudo cum aliquo*, of not only meeting in public, but going to each other's houses.

By altering Wiclif's renderings in all three places into "of the household" Tindale has missed, or led us to miss, the meaning which Jerome probably attached to *domesticus*, and has certainly missed the ordinary sense of the Greek οἰκεῖος. It is an extremely common word, and it would be difficult to find an instance of its use in the sense which we give to "of the household," the Greek for which is ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας as in Philippians iv. 22 ("of Cæsar's household") or οἰκιακὸς as in Matthew x. 25 and 36.

It may be added that the derivatives of οἰκεῖος have nothing to do with a household; οἰκειότης does not mean "membership of a household," nor does οἰκειοῦν mean to confer such membership. The assertion of Liddell and Scott (1861) that τὰ οἰκεῖα means "a household" will not bear investigation. It means "private property." Like

" domesticus " and " familiaris," οἰκεῖος almost left the " house " or " family." Indeed it did so even more completely than the Latin words, for while " domesticus " and " familiaris " had sometimes the sense of a " household servant," the Greek " οἰκέτης " saved " οἰκεῖος " from being called upon to discharge this duty. The meaning of οἰκεῖος will come out through an examination of the three New Testament passages in which it occurs.

In 1 Timothy v. 8 we read εἰ δέ τις τῶν ἰδίων καὶ μάλιστα οἰκείων οὐ προνοεῖ (or προνοεῖται), τὴν πίστιν ἤρνηται, καὶ ἔστιν ἀπίστου χείρων. Here Chrysostom's exposition helps us much, shewing as it does that his MS. had not a second τῶν before οἰκείων, and how he understood τῶν (ἰδίων καὶ) μάλιστα οἰκείων. We cannot be sure whether his words " τουτέστι, τῶν πρὸς γένος διαφερόντων " refer to the whole phrase (including ἰδίων) or only to τῶν . . . μάλιστα οἰκείων. In either case they shew that he took these last words as equivalent to τῶν οἰκειοτάτων. He goes on to quote from Isaiah (lviii. 7) τοὺς οἰκείους τοῦ σπέρματός σου οὐχ ὑπερόψει, adding the question Εἰ γάρ τις τοὺς γένει προσήκοντας καὶ ἡνωμένους ὑπὸ ἀγχιστείας περιίδοι, πῶς ἔσται περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλόστοργος ; " Those who pertain to him by race or have been united with him by affinity " is Chrysostom's synonym for τοῦς οἰκείους τοῦ σπέρματος and for τοὺς ἰδίους καὶ μάλιστα οἰκείους.

We may perhaps without presumption attempt to be a little more precise. Ἴδιος is opposed to κοινός, so that οἱ ἴδιοι are those the possession of whom I do not share with any other, that is to say, wife and children. Οἰκεῖος is opposed to ξένος and ἀλλότριος, so that οἱ μάλιστα οἰκεῖοι are those, in the wider circle of kinsmen, intimate friends, and associates, who are bound to me by specially strong ties.

We have next to notice τοῦς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως in Galatians vi. 10. The use of ὁ οἶκος τοῦ Θεοῦ of the Church

in 1 Timothy iii. 15 and 1 Peter iv. 17 seems to Bishop Lightfoot to shew that "we need not hesitate to assign" to *οἰκεῖοι τῆς πίστεως* the meaning "the members of the household of the faith." Yet he does half hesitate, influenced by the use of *οἰκεῖος* with a genitive in profane writers. Instancing among such genitives *φιλοσοφίας, γεωγραφίας, ὀλιγαρχίας, τυραννίδος, τρυφῆς*, and giving to *οἰκεῖος* when joined with them the sense of "acquainted with," he dismisses the matter with the remark that "this sense would be insipid here." It would indeed; and not less so in the "profane" writers referred to. In Diodorus Siculus, Book xix. ch. 70, we should be guilty of worse than insipidity were we, in rendering *τοὺς γὰρ πολιτικοὺς ὑπώπτευον ὡς ὄντας οἰκείους τυραννίδος*, to make "acquainted with," represent *οἰκείους*. It was something more than *acquaintance* with despotism that made the statesmen objects of suspicion. In the same writer (xiii. 91) we read *συγκατηγόρησε δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπισημοτάτων πολιτῶν, συνιστὰς αὐτοὺς οἰκείους ὄντας ὀλιγαρχίας*. The cause of oligarchy had made them *its own*. We say in English, "Lord Robert Cecil has made the cause of the League of Nations his own." A Greek goes nearer the heart of things by saying that "the cause of the League has made Lord Robert its own." Need we doubt that by *τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως* St. Paul meant those whom Faith (or the Faith) had gripped, and drawn to itself, whose devotion it had won, whom it had made its own?[1]

So we come to the most interesting passage of all. In the great summons to the Gentile Christians to remember the grandeur of their position in the Israel of God in Ephesians ii., they are told (*v.* 19), *Ἄρα οὖν οὐκέτι ἐστὲ ξένοι καὶ πάροικοι, ἀλλὰ ἐστὲ συνπολῖται τῶν ἁγίων καὶ οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ*. As

[1] Bretschneider in his Lexicon takes *οἰκεῖος* to be equivalent to Latin *prôprius* or *addictus* in Gal. vi. 10 and Eph. ii. 19.

has already been noticed, the standing antithesis to *οἰκεῖος* in Greek writers is *ἀλλότριος* or *ξένος*. In *v.* 12 these Gentiles have been reminded that they were once *χωρὶς Χριστοῦ, ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ καὶ ξένοι τῶν διαθηκῶν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. In *v.* 19 comes *οὐκέτι ἐστὲ ξένοι*. In iv. 18 the old Gentile condition is portrayed in the words *ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ θεοῦ*. And in keeping with this contrast of *οἰκεῖοι* and *ξένοι* or *ἀλλότριοι* are the words of ii. 13 *οἳ ποτὲ ὄντες μακρὰν ἐγενήθητε ἐγγύς*. Thus the diction of the Epistle, and in particular of this paragraph, strongly suggests that *οἰκεῖος* has here its ordinary sense of *proprius* like the Latin *familiaris*. Moreover in a passage setting forth the admission of Gentile Christians to the full dignity of the Israel of God, we are almost bound to assign its usual and proper meaning to a word which gives clear expression to the relation which is the very core of that dignity, the relation uttered in the claim " O Israel . . . thou art Mine " (Isaiah xliii. 1). *God's own* is probably the rendering of *οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ* to be preferred, though St. Paul may have meant the words to suggest " members of the kin (or ' family ') of God," " family " bearing its larger sense. And possibly Tindale used " household " in this sense.

G. H. Whitaker.

FROM MEMBERS OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY.

The Editor has received with much gratitude the following Address:

To the Rev. Sir W. Robertson Nicoll, C.H., D.D., LL.D., etc. etc.

Oxford, *Oct.* 17, 1921.

We, the undersigned members of Oxford University who have at various times enjoyed the hospitality of the pages of *The Expositor*, desire on the occasion of your seventieth birthday to express our appreciation of the mode wherein you have conducted that magazine, and of the services which you thereby have rendered to the causes of religion and theology. While seeing to the maintenance of the reverential attitude which the subjects demand and the standard of scholarship which our time has set up, you have accepted contributions from all schools of thought, and in the belief that the attainment of truth should be the goal of research have enabled seekers after truth to communicate their results to the public, regardless of the favour with which they are likely to be received by any of the circles whom your magazine reaches. You have frequently helped to popularise the discoveries of archæology and criticism, and familiarised your readers, with eminent theologians by the biographical essays which you have inserted. We cordially hope and pray that you may for many years be able to continue the excellent work which we both as writers and readers have found so helpful.

Signed: Vernon Bartlet. D. S. Margoliouth.
C. H. Dodd. W. B. Selbie.
G. A. Cooke. J. M. Thompson.
G. Buchanan Gray.

Forwarded by D. S. Margoliouth, 88 Woodstock Road.

THE THEOLOGY OF DR. FORSYTH.

THE death of the Principal of Hackney College has bereft English Christianity of its most powerful, its most challenging, and, perhaps, its actually greatest theologian in the sphere of dogmatics. During the last fifteen years he had come more and more to be recognised as occupying a position of almost solitary eminence. That is not to say that he has at any time been appreciated at his true worth. His mind and the *Zeitgeist* have never marched in sympathy. What he said of the theological passages in his *Religion in Recent Art*[1] may be applied much more widely. He lived not only in an age when serious theology was always handicapped owing to the general trend of the popular taste, but in an age which, in so far as it was interested in theology at all, liked something very different from what Forsyth could or would give it. The public has tastes and likings in theology. Forsyth had neither (though one must admit that he had their negatives), and to speak of "liking" a book of his has almost an absurd sound. An American once put it in that downright way which seems to come natural to the Far Western mind—"You either swear with Peter Taylor Forsyth or you swear at him." But even to swear at him it was necessary to understand him more adequately than was common. I noticed that in one or two notices of him, after his death, *The Christian Ethic of War*[2] was picked out for particular comment. In that book his mind did move in

[1] Hodder & Stoughton, 1905, p. xi. f.
[2] Longmans, 1916.

agreement with the general opinion of the time. But one may question whether readers or reviewers who delighted in his belabouring of the pacificists had much appreciation of the theological ethic which armed him in what, without doubt, he regarded as part of the Lord's controversy. Some at least probably fell within the criticism of the note on page 140 of the book :—" It is odd that some of the most 'tender' exponents of a sentimental religion are among the most belligerent critics of the pacifists they have been making for many years."

Nor was it only the theology, such as it was, of the popular level which had little in common with Forsyth's faith, and with his dogmatic construction grounded in faith's certainty and apprehension of the distinctive thing in God, and therefore in all religion and all life. Scientific theology, as a whole, was immersed in other interests and pursued other ends than his. This may be witnessed in three respects. First, there was and is the immense concentration of first-rate ability upon the critical issues raised in connexion with the New Testament. Of the value of the Higher Criticism Forsyth always wrote with great respect : " The service rendered to Christianity by the great critical movement is almost beyond words "[1]; but the special interest he had in it was due to his feeling that it had cleared the ground for the erection of a dogmatic edifice in which the component materials could be selected according to their real strength. Now this valuation of criticism in respect of the theological possibilities which it opens up, though not absent from the mind of the critics, is not habitually used as it was by Forsyth. The great critic is often far from being a great theologian : unfortunately, the distinction is not always well understood. It is much

[1] *The Person of Jesus Christ*, p. viii. (Congregational Union and Hodder & Stoughton, 1909.)

easier to be and to be recognised as a good critic than to gain well-merited fame as a good theologian. Had Forsyth done anything nearly as remarkable in critical work as he did in theology he would have made a name for himself far more easily and widely. Secondly, the one dogma (hardly indeed regarded as such) which had, partly as a result of one great phase of criticism, partly owing to other causes, come to the front and laid some real hold on the public mind, was that of the Fatherhood of God. Now against this dogma *in the way in which it was held* Forsyth was in continual opposition. He must have seemed to be, and to some extent he was, unsympathetic and even harsh. Yet all the time a most profound sense of the reality of God's Fatherhood underlay his reaction from the popular conception. But for him it was no solitary and easily accessible dogma but a triumph of faith, working on its grasp of moral realities and steadying itself by its still stronger grasp of Christ. The impression left is very different from that made in Harnack's famous lectures on *Das Wesen des Christentums*, and prolonged in those who gave Harnack a ready welcome. Theological liberalism and popular sympathies found themselves in close alliance; the same fire cheered them with its pleasant warmth; and Forsyth was out in the cold. And then, finally, the theology which had passed further along and put Christ in the centre, with a firm belief that in Christ Himself was to be found the key to true theology, so that Christology could not be treated as a matter of subordinate moment, was greatly inclined to throw the emphasis on the Incarnation itself in such a way as to lessen the importance of the Atonement and to leave soteriology outside the centre of religious interests. This was certainly the case in the Church of England; both High Church and Broad Church tended in this direction. I do not suppose that the case was exactly similar in the Free

Churches, where the particular Catholic interest in the Incarnation was not to be looked for, but Forsyth's constant references to the perplexity which resulted from his characteristic soteriological emphases point to an analogous situation.

The fact is that Forsyth was eminently what the mind of his time, not least the Christian mind, needed, but not what it wanted. Dr. Hamilton in a review of *Lectures on the Church and the Sacraments*[1] in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, and I think it was Dr. Andrews, in one of the tributes to Forsyth published in the *British Weekly*, both spoke of him as a prophet. And so he was; but he was always a theological prophet, or, better still, a prophetic theologian, a fact which Dr. Hamilton failed to realise. It was as a theologian, with all the theologian's apparatus and the standards of judgment which the theologian is bound to employ, that he challenged contemporary tendencies. At a time when there was much talk of revised theologies, new theologies and so forth, he was concerned to point out that a real knowledge of theology was indispensable for a revision of theology. Here is a passage from *Positive Preaching and Modern Mind*,[2] which gives his mind on this point and will show why he was never likely to have a great popular following :—" A man speaking his genuine experience in the experimental region of religion is always worth listening to. But if a man takes leave to assault the great doctrines, or to raise the great questions as if they had occurred to him first, if he knows nothing of what has been done in them by experts, or where thinkers have left the question, he is out of place. No man is entitled to discuss theology in public who has not studied theology. It is like any other weighty subject. Still more is this requisite if he set out to challenge

[1] Longmans, 1917.
[2] Hodder & Stoughton, 1907, p. 102.

and reform theology. He ought to be a trained theologian." It will always be necessary for someone to speak like this, bluntly and decisively; in so doing he renders a service both to the cause of truth and to his own generation. But he will have to pay for it in the absence of the applause and the fame which can be the lot of those whose theology is sometimes suggestive of more lack than surplus.[1] Dr. Forsyth was careless of popular enthusiasm, and did not court it. Before his life's work closed his reputation among those best qualified to judge was firmly established; and yet I am convinced that even in favourable quarters his greatness as a theologian is not duly recognised.

Here is the place to say a word concerning his style. It has been severely criticised, and without doubt it was an additional barrier to the ordinary mind which wished to come in touch with him. The Free Church scholar who contributes to the *Manchester Guardian* over the letters "G. J." was particularly severe. Yet there is another side to the question. There was a challenging note about the style as there was about the thought, and there was a certain fitness in the sheer difficulties, sometimes amounting almost to antinomies, of what Forsyth had to say, being reflected in the literary instrument. What Forsyth said of St. Paul may not unfairly be reapplied to Forsyth himself:—"To express a reality so unspeakable he strained language and tortured ideas, which he enlisted from any quarter where he could lay hands on them." [2] I can believe that he felt of almost every one of his books that it was a battle in which he had to use every means available for arresting his reader's mind and compelling him to attend. Even as tactics that may often have been a mistake, for beyond a certain point epigram and antithesis weary and do not

[1] *ὑστέρημα—περίσσευμα*, see 2 Cor. viii. 14.
[2] *Positive Preaching*, p. 18.

stimulate. But the real and final truth is that his style became part of himself and was not detachable at will. Forsyth was not a man with a bad (or brilliant, or remarkable) style; but the style was Forsyth on paper.

In passing to some description of Dr. Forsyth's theology, a certain difficulty confronts the writer from the fact that any sort of organised treatment purporting to represent Dr. Forsyth's positions as so many points in a dogmatic system is almost sure to introduce an impression of logical coherence and orderly advance more formal than the writings themselves warrant. It is true that every one of the great problems of theology proper, and many which arise in connexion with its presuppositions and premisses, are faced and handled in those writings; but there is something almost incidental in the way in which such a doctrine as that of the Trinity now and then appears, while the Atonement itself which, as viewed by him in its relation to the moral world, forms the background of the thought, and never a mere scenic background of (is it an exaggeration to say?) every page he wrote, was never the subject of a formal theological treatise. That character belongs to not more than three of his books, and to them not completely, to *The Principle of Authority*,[1] in which Forsyth's theory of knowledge and philosophy of religion are set forth; to *The Justification of God*[2] which contains his treatment of the great and pressing theme of Theodicy; and to *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, the most orderly and the greatest of all his works. What I propose to do is to subdivide the general subject of Forsyth's theology into five sections, to try to do some justice to the main lines of his thought in each one, and to show how the controlling ideas of one section lead on naturally to the dogmatic conclusions of the next.

[1] Hodder & Stoughton, 1912. [2] Duckworth, 1916.

I.

Let us start with his theory of knowledge, which involves his philosophy of religion and the idea of God. Here Forsyth stands on the side of the voluntarists as against the intellectualists. But his voluntarism was of the Kantian and not of the later pragmatic kind. He was immensely concerned with the real as something given, and he found it given in the ethical. Where there is action there is ethic, and man cannot help acting. "The last reality, and that with which every man willy-nilly has to do, is not a reality of thought, but of life, and of conscience, and of judgment. We are in the world to act and take the consequences. Action means and matters everything in the world."[1] Accordingly Kant was on the right lines when he started the movement as a result of which "the ethical took the place that had been held by the intellectual. The notion of reality replaced that of truth. Religion placed us not in line with the rationality of the world but in rapport with the reality of it. And the ethical was the real."[2] Where Modernism has gone far wrong is in the weakness of its ethical knowledge.[3] Of the existence of forms of thought and rational ideas latent in the mind in abstraction from concrete, historical experiences he is entirely sceptical: "the fact is, as I say, we have no forms of knowledge which are not produced by particular contacts and experiences in ourselves or the race."[4]

But how do we know what experiences we may rely upon as giving us the key to the final meaning and character of the universe? How are we to escape subjectivism, and come by a reality universally valid, in which the intellect as well as the will may find itself at home? How are we

[1] *The Cruciality of the Cross*, p. 121, Hodder & Stoughton, 1909.
[2] *Principle of Authority*, p. 5.
[3] Ib., p. 78 f.
[4] Ib., p. 107.

to be sure about the content of experience? Forsyth's answer is that such certainty is unattainable out of our natural selves. Certainty can come only through an invasive authority which lifts us on to a higher level. Certainty can exist only if there is such a thing as revelation, and that which answers to revelation is faith. Faith is "an organ of real knowledge," [1] but faith is itself "the gift and creation of God." [2] His thought at this point might be taken as exegetical of Irenaeus' saying *impossibile est sine Deo discere Deum*. A saying of St. Paul's to which he more than once recurs as putting us on the right lines for the understanding of the principle of religious knowledge is Galatians iv. 9, "but now that ye have come to know God or rather to be known of God." So in religion "our knowledge relates not to an object but to a subject who takes the initiative, not to what we reach but to what reaches us, not to something we know but to some one who knows us. It is knowledge not of a known thing but of a knowing God." [3] And the seat of the relationship set up in this knowledge of man by God and man's answering knowledge of God is to be looked for in the region of the will and conscience. And in that region, being known by God means being saved and re-created by God, since the man who finds himself faced by the demands of a moral universe with which his sin brings him into collision can find no sure footing for his soul except as he finds it in a redemption "commensurate with the Sanctity, the Majesty, the rock Reality of things." [4]

Knowledge, then, is the apprehension of the real. And the real is primarily the ethical and finally the redemptive. It is in redemption that we become certain of revelation and of authority. "Revelation would be impossible, it

[1] *Positive Preaching*, p. 250. [2] *Principle of Authority*, p. 30.
[3] Ib., p. 102. [4] Ib., p. 206.

would be mere exhibition, it would not get home, were it not also, in the same act, Redemption and Regeneration." [1] And that which is absolutely authoritative is that which is absolutely holy. Such authority is "the new-creative action of the perfectly holy conscience of God on the helplessly guilty conscience of man." [2]

Two obvious objections can be made to this line of thought. The first is that whatever the individual experiences for himself there is no valid reason why he should ascribe to that experience a more than subjective value, no means whereby he can universalise it as something expressive of a relationship with God, which is the most real relationship in which the whole world can stand to God. With this objection Forsyth twice deals, drawing a distinction which takes us some way between experience and the content of experience.[3] The second objection is that if knowledge is bound up with redemption, and redemption is the act of God, "natural" knowledge of God is impossible and argument is useless. Forsyth frankly allows, indeed insists, that "a real objective, the certainty of a transcendent reality, we reach only by something in the nature of miracle, something donated and invasive from the living God. Only so do we reach the conviction, so essential for religion, of a reality totally independent of ourselves," [4] and he appeals to Troeltsch and Eucken in support. And I do not see how we either can or can want to evade this conclusion. If the knowledge of God is a religious act we cannot keep God out of the act of our knowing Him. That kind of Pelagianism, like every other, is inadmissible. But we are not therefore compelled to think of God's revelation of Himself in redeeming action as partial and magical, nor of men as mere passive instru-

[1] *Principle of Authority*, p. 30. [2] Ib., p. 65.
[3] Ib., pp. 29–31, 91–93. [4] Ib., p. 171 f.

ments. Dr. Forsyth, like Dr. Oman, never looks for any other relationships between God and man except personal relationships. God does not and cannot treat persons as things. Accordingly if in revelation and redemption he sees, as he does see, miracle, it is not miracle coercive of the soul's natural freedom. "Faith is the soul believing. Its creation can only be some action appropriate to soul—i.e. to freedom. Redemption is recreating a free soul through its freedom. It is converting its freedom, and not its substance." [1]

What we secure in religious knowledge (and though the action of the will is emphasised, the place of the intellect, though secondary, is not denied—even if "many have so learned Kant" [2]) is the certainty of a God able to bring the human conscience and will into harmony with a universe of which the last reality is moral, a God able to deal with that profoundly ethical and tragic side of life which realists like Ibsen and Carlyle force us to face.[3] Such is the God given to us in the Gospel, and in the Gospel we have God's method of dealing with the situation created by the clash between good and evil, by that subversion of the moral order which results from sin and by mankind's need of a salvation which it cannot effect by its own resources. The Gospel answers to the situation by being concrete, historic and ethical. It deals, of necessity, with humanity as a whole. "Humanity is not a mere mass of units. It is an organism with a history. And revelation therefore is God's treatment of us *in a history*, in a Humanity . . . If God's treatment of us be redemptive, it is a historic redemption. Its content is the living, loving, saving God; its compass is cosmic; its sphere is human history, actual

[1] *Principle of Authority*, p. 179. [2] Ib., p. 116.

[3] See the remarkable pages specially devoted to Ibsen's moral insight and blindness in *Positive Preaching*, pp. 150–2.

history." [1] In the Gospel we see the interaction of those two truths which Forsyth used to assert, Butler's "Morality is the nature of things," and Augustine's *Bonitas est substantia Dei*. The Gospel, then, as Forsyth understood and expressed it, claims our attention in the second section.

II.

But the problem of authority is still with us. For what is the Gospel, and what is the source of our certitude as to it? Here we come into sight of positions from which, at least from the year 1905, Forsyth never varied, and which belong to the very essence of his theology. On the one hand he had to reckon with the Catholic insistence on the authority of the Church, on the other on the Protestant assertion of the infallibility of the Bible. He rejected both these solutions of the problem. The critical movement had destroyed the doctrine of verbal inerrancy; while greatly as he exalted the idea of the Church, the Church was not for him the extension of the Incarnation, it could not be identified with any one existing society, and the letter of the Creeds was no more final than the letter of Scripture. But he did not, in breaking with what had come to be regarded as Protestant orthodoxy at this point, and in refusing the Catholic alternative, go over to the Liberals with their reduction of the whole authoritarian idea and constant vagueness as to what the really fundamental thing in Christianity is. Forsyth went behind both Bible and Church to that which was the soul and the creator of them both, to the Gospel of God's redeeming grace in Christ. "Remember," he says, "that Christ did not come to bring a Bible but to bring a Gospel. The Bible arose afterwards from the Gospel to serve the Gospel.

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, x. 1 (October, 1911), art. "Revelation and Bible," p. 241.

. . . The Bible, the preacher and the Church are all made by the same thing—the Gospel." [1] This Gospel was pre-eminently God's action, His treatment in Christ of the world's moral tragedy, God's revelation of Himself breaking in upon the world as redemption. It is this which runs through the New Testament *κήρυγμα* and forms its great content, and it is this which the Church is concerned with in its dogma: "Dogma is final revelation in germinal statement. It is God's act put as truth. It is the expression of the original and supernatural *datum* of the purely given which creates religion. It is truth about that in God which the Church stands upon. It is primary theology, or the Church's *footing*—as in John iii. 16." [2]

But how can we know that this account of the Gospel, this interpretation of it in terms of God's gracious and saving action in Christ, is the true one? For other accounts have been given. There is Hegel's conception of Christianity as the most perfect unfolding of the true and absolute Idea, of Christian dogmatic as the religious expression of abstract truth, especially in connexion with the doctrine of the Trinity. There is the attempt, often associated with the name of Harnack, to find a residual Gospel in the teaching of Jesus about the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man. Can we not be content with something like the latter, and sit loose to anything more "dogmatic"? To answer such questions, Forsyth pointed to the New Testament as a whole. He insisted that a common Gospel of God's saving work in Christ dominates the New Testament writers, and that no other Gospel can be found there, and he appealed to the conclusions of recent competent New Testament scholarship—"Schlatter on the right, Feine in the centre, or Weinel on the left. The whole work, also,

[1] *Positive Preaching*, p. 15.

[2] *Theology in Church and State*, Hodder & Stoughton, 1915, p. 12 f.

of the brilliant religious-historical school in the last dozen years has gone to show a substantial dogmatic unity in the Gospel of the first Church. . . . There was, of course, no universal theological formula, there was not an orthodoxy ; but certainly there was a common Apostolic Gospel, a *κήρυγμα*." [1] But, supposing this is allowed, was this Gospel the true one ; ought the Apostles to have preached it ; may they not have misinterpreted and misrepresented Jesus ? In answering this objection Forsyth does what I believe to be not only some of his most important work, but work badly needed and surprisingly neglected. The question of apostolic authority is a pressing one : it comes up in connexion with controversies of an institutional character, concerning the Church and the ministry, but it does not seem to emerge when the theological issue is raised, or, at least, it is not handled with due sense of its importance. Forsyth realised its immense importance, and not only with reference to St. Paul. He was no latter-day Marcion distinguishing between an inspired Paul and a mistaken Twelve ; but he did face as regards the whole Apostolic body the question which Marcion faced as regards St. Paul—have we here a true interpretation of Christ ? There is a relevant section in *Theology in Church and State* [2] where the treatment is of that incisive, challenging character whereby Forsyth, whatever defects of style otherwise embarrassed his work, was able to make great issues plain :—

" The Epistles are more inspired than the Gospels. We are in more direct contact with Christ. We are at one remove only. We hear the man who had Christ's own interpretation of His work. . . . The Gospels, with their unspeakable value, are yet but propaedeutic to the Epistles ; and most of the higher pains and troubles of the Church

[1] *Principle of Authority*, p. 141.
[2] Pp. 30–2.

to-day arise from the displacement of its centre of gravity to the Gospels." But for his fullest mind on the matter one must go to the fifth and sixth lectures in *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ.* There the inspiration of the Apostles is viewed as the power which they possessed through charisma of the Spirit for the interpretation of the fact of Christ. "Apostolic inspiration, therefore, is a certain action stirred by the heavenly Christ in the soul, by which His first elect were enabled to see the moral, spiritual, and theological nature of the manifestation with a unique clearness, a clearness and explicitness perhaps not always present to Christ's own mind in doing the act." [1]

There is then a New Testament Gospel, and its centre is the Cross. So we approach the consideration of Forsyth's soteriology, wherein lies the greatest service he has done for the Church. But let us be clear about one thing at the start: Forsyth did not just reassert, with whatever power and insight, any one historic form of the doctrine of the Atonement. To understand him thus is to misunderstand him. He was no more wedded to the old categories in this respect than in any other. He asserts with great clearness and on more than one occasion the need for rejections and modifications. We must not speak about grace as procured by the Atonement, nor about the value of equivalent suffering, or even of suffering taken by itself, nor about a change in God from wrath to grace, and we must be careful when we talk about substitution and penalty.[2] On the right and necessity of the progressive ethicising of soteriological doctrine he is emphatic: "The whole great move-

[1] *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 176. Elsewhere Dr. Forsyth asks how, if the apostolic interpretation was wrong, it came about that Jesus had been unable to save them from so vast an error: does it not reflect on Him as a Teacher?

[2] See *The Cruciality of the Cross*, p. 78 f., pp. 191–3; *The Work of Christ*, Hodder & Stoughton, 1910, pp. 180–2.

ment of thought on that question has been on an ascending moral scale. The more we modernise it the more we moralise it. And the modifications called for to-day are in the same direction."[1] But whereas some theologians, the more they ethicise, the less they seem to leave of anything that can be called Atonement at all, the very reverse is true of Forsyth, and that is no small part of the secret of his greatness in soteriology. The connexion stands out in words that follow almost immediately upon the previous quotation : " and it appears *en route* that we cannot ethicise Christianity without pursuing a doctrine of Atonement ever more positive. The more ethical we become the more exigent is holiness ; and therefore the more necessary is Atonement as the action of love and grace at the instance of holiness and in its interests." Two words above all others lie at the heart of Forsyth's Atonement doctrine. They are " holiness " and " judgment." How often he recurs to the thought that the full truth is not that God is love, but that God is holy love. The whole moral crisis of things comes to a head in the opposition between God's holiness and the sin of the world. That we have to do with a God of holy love, that is the final truth of man's position. And where there is holiness, there must be judgment : " Do not think of God's judgment as an arbitrary infliction, but as the necessary reaction to sin in a holy God. There alone do you have the *divine* necessity of the Cross in a sinful world—the moral necessity of judgment."[2] It was this sense of the place of judgment and its sanctity which inspired the character of much of his treatment of the problem presented by the war, and ranged him so far on the other side from the pacificists.

But how was God's holiness honoured and His judgment

[1] *Positive Preaching*, p. 294.
[2] *The Cruciality of the Cross*, p. 52 f.

delivered in the Cross ? That is the question which many, I expect, are puzzled to find the answer to in Forsyth's writings. Especially when taken along with his rendering of the sacrificial idea, which also occupies an important place in his thought, that " the sacrifice is the result of God's grace and not its cause. It is given *by* God before it is given *to* Him,"[1] that " the real meaning of an objective atonement is that God Himself made the complete sacrifice. The real objectivity of the atonement is not that it was made to God, but by God. It was atonement made by God, not by man."[2] Well, I think it must be said that Forsyth never cleared up his meaning as fully as he would have done had he written one great book on the Atonement. The emphasis on the value of Christ's holy obedience unto death, on His adequate confession of God's holiness, on His complete willingness to come within the sphere of that judgment which follows upon sin and to let that judgment break over Him, takes us some way. The stress laid on the active obedience of Christ in His sufferings is certainly of great value. And Forsyth's use of the representative idea which he employed with the necessary care, while some writers are inclined to let it run away with them, helps us to understand the relationship of humanity to Christ in the Cross. This is noticeable in *The Work of Christ.* We are removed from the circle of ideas of external transactions and the like by such a passage as " whatever we mean, therefore, by substitution, it is something more than merely vicarious. It is certainly not something done over our heads. It is representative. Yet not by the will of man choosing Christ, but by the will of Christ choosing man, and freely identifying Himself with man. It is a matter not so much of substitutionary expiation (which, as these words are commonly understood, leaves us too little committed), but of solidary

[1] *The Cruciality of the Cross*, p. 185. [2] *The Work of Christ*, p. 92.

confession and praise from amid the judgment fires, where the Son of God walks with the creative sympathy of the holy among the sinful sons of men."[1] But that in and by the Cross itself sin was judged and condemned, that there the final judgment was passed upon sin—it is certainly not easy to penetrate to the heart of these ideas which yet meant so much to Forsyth. I would suggest that anyone who desires to probe into this deep yet baffling conviction of his should read pages 81–87 and 145–148 of *The Work of Christ*, paying attention to the distinction between " although Christ was not punished by God " and " He bore God's penalty upon sin. That penalty was not lifted even when the Son of God passed through " ; then he might take pages 151–155 of *The Justification of God*, and concentrate on the idea of the judgment of sin by holiness in the Cross through the conversion of " death itself from the destructive service of sin to His own redeeming service." And along with these he should read the second section of the sermon entitled, " The Fatherhood in Death " in *Missions in State and Church*,[2] where, perhaps, the view is put at its simplest and clearest—" the holiness of Christ was the one thing damnatory to the Satanic power. And it was His death which consummated that holiness. It was His death, therefore, that was Satan's fatal doom. . . . And what we call the last judgment is only the completion of the deadly judgment passed on collective evil in the Cross."

No one in modern times has penetrated nearly so far as has Forsyth into the moral reality of the Cross. And the moral reality of the Cross is the moral action of Christ on the Cross, " the Christ who Himself was driven by His experience to recognise that the crowning thing He came for was to die."[3] Forsyth was never in danger of finding

[1] P. 225 f. [2] Hodder & Stoughton, 1908.
[3] *The Cruciality of the Cross*, p. 83.

himself in trouble as to the relations between the ethical and the theological. For him the theology of the Atonement meant (not only this, but certainly this) ethic at its very intensest and most commanding, while, conversely, ethic was, when traced back to its final source, theological. "The source of Christian ethic, when we go to the very root of the matter, is theological. . . . In the last radicalism it is the Cross of Christ."[1] For him the Cross was the world's both moral and religious centre: if it was the one it could not but be the other. There he found the one real unity of the world, the teleological unity of moral purpose in "a foregone redemption, a redemption that has not now to be achieved but only actualised."[2] No one was more sure that Christ's work was a finished work. No one had a keener eye for its prolongation in the new creation of which Christ was the Head. In a sense different from and far truer than that in which the phrase is sometimes used, for Forsyth the Cross was the Eternal Cross.

J. K. Mozley.

(To be continued.)

[1] *The Christian Ethic of War*, p. 85.
[2] *The Principle of Authority*, p. 207.

MATTHEW THE BUSINESS MAN IN THE MINISTRY.

It is now a live question in many of the churches how to obtain suitable preachers. In some sections the supply of ministers seems to be keeping up with the increasing demand, while in others there is a distressing shortage of young preachers in the schools. The reasons for the decrease on the whole are varied. The Y.M.C.A. now makes a strong pull for many of the finest young men. The foreign field has an increasing appeal for the noblest spirits in the colleges. Some young men find difficulty in reconciling the old faith with the new learning and drift into other callings. Some of the men with the new knowledge lack the conviction and the loyalty to Jesus as Lord and Saviour, and so find themselves without a message and soon without an audience. There are always a certain number of failures in the ministry as in everything else. Quite a number break down under the stress and strain of the modern minister's life. Meanwhile the churches are growing and clamour for more ministers of the highest type of character and efficiency.

It is always profitable to go back to the beginning of things. In our organised Christianity we have naturally come to look to the schools for the training of the ministry. But it is actually true in some instances that the educated preacher comes out unfitted for the active ministry. At any rate, it is well to understand that the churches are not wholly dependent on the schools for ministers, necessary as the schools are. God raises up men to meet special emergencies. Jesus taught the disciples to pray for more labourers to enter the harvest. Certainly there has not been enough prayer in the churches for God-sent men.

God is the real source of supply for preaching of the gospel of grace. All else is secondary.

It is always possible for business men to enter the ministry. England has a large and useful number of lay-preachers who carry on their business during the week and preach on Sundays. Some of these give their whole time to preaching, and at their own charges if necessary. D. L. Moody always considered himself a layman, because he was not ordained, though one of the greatest evangelists of the ages. He was a successful business man. He gave up the shoe-business to go into the soul-saving business. He carried his business attitude and habits into the service of winning souls to Christ. Successful business men need not be overlooked as a source of ministerial supply.

Jesus did not overlook them. He called a whole firm of fishermen to leave their business and follow Him. James and John were partners with Simon and Andrew (Luke v. 7, 10). At the call of Christ these men all left their business and devoted the rest of their lives to work for Christ (Mark i. 17–20, Luke v. 11).

But the most striking instance of the business man who entered the ministry is Matthew (Matt. ix. 9), the publican, who sat at the place of toll on the road that led from Damascus to Acre by the north end of the Sea of Galilee, at the border between the territory of Herod Philip and of Herod Antipas. Mark (ii. 14) terms this man "Levi the son of Alpheus," while Luke (v. 27) calls him "a publican by name Levi." Evidently the man had two Jewish names, Levi and Matthew, like Simon Cephas (Peter). Probably Levi was his original name, and Matthew (Aramaic "Gift of Jehovah," like the Greek "Theodore") may have been a later name (nickname as a term of endearment or appreciation) after he entered the ministry. At any rate, in the lists of the Twelve Apostles he is always called Matthew

and "Matthew the publican" in Matthew x. 3. He stands seventh in Mark and Luke, and eighth in Matthew and Acts.

His business was perfectly legitimate in itself; in fact, necessary. Customs officers and tax collectors are proverbially unpopular and arouse a certain amount of prejudice because of the business. The Jews resented the payment of tribute to Rome, and disliked any Jew who undertook to collect the duty for Rome. Matthew was technically an officer under Herod Antipas, but he incurred the dislike for his class. "Publicans and sinners" had come to be grouped together as of a piece. In many cases the publicans were guilty of graft and oppression as John the Baptist charged (Luke iii. 13). Matthew was not a chief publican like Zacchæus (Luke xix. 2), who farmed out a district with other publicans employed under him. Matthew simply had his customs office near Capernaum, and examined the goods of those who passed along the highway and collected the dues.

To do this work he had to know both Greek and Aramaic, and he needed a certain amount of business ability, a quick and ready turn for financial exchange and accurate accounts. Matthew would receive the scorn of Pharisees because of his constant association with the Gentiles and the common run of the Jews. Besides, he would be compelled to violate the rules of the Pharisees concerning Sabbath observance. Jesus Himself spoke of the publicans and harlots as social outcasts (Matt. xxi. 31). Matthew would not seem to be very promising material for a preacher, least of all for one of the Twelve Apostles. It would be like looking for a saloon-keeper to become a minister.

And yet one day in the midst of a great crowd coming and going, while Jesus was teaching them (Mark ii. 13–14), and while Matthew was very busy collecting the toll from

the passing throng, the Master suddenly said to the publican : " Follow me " (Mark ii. 14). The tense used (present imperative, and so linear action) means to keep on following forever. Matthew understood at once that it was a call to quit the customs office to go on the road with Jesus. Why did the demand of Jesus make an appeal to Matthew ? It is quite probable that Matthew had already heard of the fame of Jesus who now made Capernaum His headquarters (Mark i. 21, ii. 1). The sabbath in Capernaum, when the mother-in-law of Peter was healed, closed with a great crowd. " All the city was gathered together at the door " (Mark i. 33). It is possible that Matthew was in that throng. The quick decision of Matthew argues for the conclusion that he had previously faced the problem of Jesus. Now he took the great stand in the open and made that tremendous decision. As a rule, in conversion the final step is taken after a great deal of consideration in one way or another. Sermons, conversations, reading the Bible, sorrow, joy, sickness, death may all have contributed to the moment of decision. But even so the step is usually taken under the pressure of urgent invitation. When Jesus said to Philip : " Follow me " (John i. 43), Philip instantly obeyed because he " was from Bethsaida, of the city of Andrew and Peter " (i. 44). We follow the example of others whom we know and love.

It was not easy for Matthew to yield to the command of Jesus in spite of the charm of the Master for men. Matthew had no other means of livelihood so far as we know. Jesus was an itinerant rabbi with no fixed income. For the moment He was the popular idol, but one could not know how long it would continue to be so. Matthew himself came from a class that was taboo with the religious leaders of the time. His coming would apparently embarrass Jesus and not help Him. But he took his stand for Jesus

openly and boldly. He rose up and followed Jesus then and there (aorist tense in Mark ii. 14 and Matt. ix. 9), and he kept on following him (imperfect tense in Luke v. 28). Matthew was not a quitter. He had counted the cost. He "left all," Luke adds. Jesus does not demand that every business man give up his business and enter the ministry. But He does ask that of some. A successful business man cannot assume that he is not to receive a call to become a preacher. His very success in business may be one of his qualifications for the ministry. It used to be said that preachers were not good business men, but, if the average business man had to support his family on the income of the average preacher, he would be slow to make that statement. And certainly modern business men feel as never before the need of preachers to help them apply the teaching of Jesus to the economic problems of the world. The *Wall Street Journal* openly affirms that the greatest need of the business world to-day is more religion and righteousness. Business men in the ministry would help greatly in making a bond of contact between Christianity and business.

Matthew not only took a public stand for Jesus before the business men of his day. He made a strong appeal to his business associates to become disciples of Jesus. "And Levi made a great reception for him in his house: and there was a great multitude of publicans and of others who were reclining at meat with them" (Luke v. 29). Luke makes it plain that it was the house of Levi and not of Jesus, as the language of Mark ii. 15 and Matthew ix. 10 allows. But Mark and Matthew note that the crowd of "others" were "sinners." Mark explains that many sinners "were following" Jesus. Matthew asserts that "many publicans and sinners came and reclined with Jesus and His disciples." But Luke makes it clear that Matthew invited the crowd of

" publicans and sinners," social outcasts like himself, his own friends and associates. Some of these " sinners " may have come uninvited. It is possible that Matthew may have accumulated a little money. At any rate, he was anxious to show his colours. The only people who would accept an invitation to a reception were his own acquaintances and associates. The courage of Matthew is beyond all praise. So often Christian business men are shy in their testimony for Christ when they make a loud noise in business circles. Matthew wanted his old friends to meet Jesus. He was sure that they also would like Him. It is plain also that Jesus was already known as willing to mingle with these social outcasts for they eagerly gathered round Jesus and gladly accepted Levi's invitation.

Matthew was willing to incur ridicule for Jesus. The scribes and the Pharisees noticed the big crowd at the house of Levi the publican. They were already showing an interest in the teachings of Jesus as a rival for popular favour (Mark i. 22). They were not themselves invited by Levi, and they would have spurned his invitation if it had been extended. But they had no hesitation in standing outside his house and making remarks about the conduct of Jesus in eating with publicans and sinners. " Why does your teacher eat with publicans and sinners ? " (Matt. ix. 11). They clearly mean to imply that their teachers would be ashamed to eat with such people. Take notice that " they were murmuring " (Luke v. 30). It was like the buzz of bees. This pointed criticism in public was embarrassing to Matthew who had given the feast. There was nothing that he could say, for the crowd of publicans and sinners were his invited guests. The disciples did not feel like speaking, though the question was addressed to them. Jesus took up the criticism and made a pointed rejoinder that is given verbatim by all the Synoptic Gospels : " The well have no

need of a physician, but the unwell." It is not hard to imagine the electric effect of this piercing saying of Jesus. Jesus was already the great Physician of body and soul. Surely the publicans and sinners needed the physician of souls. The Pharisees and scribes posed as physicians of souls, but they dodged the very people most in need of their services. Jesus had a further word for them: "But go and learn what *this* means: I desire mercy and not sacrifice" (Matt. ix. 13). This was a thrust at the whole fabric of Pharisaism. The sarcasm of Christ appears in His closing word: "For I have not come to call righteous folks, but sinners to repentance" (Luke v. 32). He took them at their own estimate as "righteous" and brushed them aside. They were intermeddlers at Levi's reception and in the work of Christ. Certainly Matthew would appreciate the powerful word of defence from his new Friend and Lord. Matthew was getting his first experience of that public criticism that every preacher must endure who does anything worth while. The preacher has to learn how to take criticism, to profit by it, to throw off much of it, to go on with his work in spite of Madame Grundy. "They say?" "Let them say."

We have no reason to think that Matthew was a man of unusual gifts. Certainly he had not spectacular gifts that made him an outstanding figure in the new circle of Christ's disciples. He was not called on this occasion to be one of the Twelve Apostles, but to join the group of four fishermen who were already following Jesus (Andrew and Simon, James and John). Two others (Philip and Nathanael = Bartholomew) had already cast in their lot with Christ and the four. Five of these seven had been business men, and that may have been true also of Philip and Nathanael. But the absence of any particular mention of Matthew apart from the rest in the later story in the Gospels

indicates that he was on a level with the group as a whole, and not a genius and not a distinctive leader. He was not clamorous for the first place in the Twelve as were James and John, Peter, and Judas Iscariot. But Matthew can at any rate be credited with the quality of steadiness and steadfastness. He apparently had not been a follower of the Baptist as the six first had been. He was then a newcomer in the circle, and would not be likely to claim any particular honours or expect any special favours. The great feast that he gave in honour of Jesus was a hearty expression of his gratitude to the great Teacher, and perhaps also, in some sense, a jubilation or celebration of the new departure in his own career. Matthew had certainly made a daring leap from the post of publican to that of preacher of righteousness. But Jesus knew that Matthew was a publican when He called him. He knew the cleavage between the Pharisees, the ceremonial separatists of the day, and the publicans and sinners who outraged all the social and religious conventions of the Pharisees. Jesus deliberately took His stand by the side of " sinners " who repented as against the pride of the self-righteous whose hearts were full of hate for the downtrodden among men.

It is not certain that Matthew comprehended fully the significance of the spiritual, moral and social revolution of which he was a part. He was called upon to play a not ignoble part in the great drama of all time. For one thing he had to prove the wisdom of Christ in calling a publican instead of a Pharisee. He had to " make good " as a disciple in the teeth of the sharpest and bluntest criticism. His own life, in all probability, had not been above reproach. He had most likely lived up to the reputation of his class as an oppressor of the poor and as a grafter. This he had to overcome by a clean and straight life in the open. Jesus tested Matthew by some months of constant fellowship and

service with the other six. Matthew came to understand better what lay ahead of him. So it came to pass that after a night of prayer in the mountain Jesus came down to a lower plateau and chose the twelve men, whom He named apostles, who were to be his cabinet of co-workers for the kingdom of God. He chose "Matthew the publican" in that fateful number of men on whom so much depended. As a general rule, it is wise for any man to have some testing or trial before he fully launches into the ministry of Christ. It is not always an easy thing to manage, for the churches are usually shy of a novice in the ministry. A man cannot learn to preach without preaching. He must practise on somebody. In the case of young men who have to spend years of preparation for the work the decision usually has to be made on the basis of promise and faith. It is a chance in futures from the human standpoint. My own experience as a theological teacher for some thirty-five years may be worth something. Probably over five thousand young ministers have been in my various classes during these years. I am often asked what percentage of these students fail to enter the ministry. I have kept no accurate data, but my general impression is that the actual loss is less than two per cent. of the whole. To be sure, those that come to the theological seminary have usually had high school and college training. Most of them have already had student pastorates or regular pastoral work. The love of preaching has already gripped them. The work in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary has deepened their love for souls and for soul-winning. I am glad to be able to bear this witness to the loyalty of the great host of the noblest of men whom my life has touched by the grace and goodness of God. These men have become good ministers of Christ, in varying measure, to be sure, but still with honourable fidelity and with a measure of the favour of God upon their

work. They have girdled the earth with lives of consecrated toil for Christ. I thank God to-day for the holy and happy memories connected with them. So Matthew, the former publican, took his place with the elect group of choice spirits chosen by Jesus for fellowship in service, His earthly body-guard in the midst of misunderstanding and relentless and increasing hostility.

One other thing can be affirmed with confidence concerning Matthew. Papias, in the well-known passage in Eusebius, is quoted as saying that Matthew wrote Logia of Jesus in Hebrew (Aramaic), which each one interpreted as he was able. Tradition credits him with the authorship of our First Gospel, the canonical Gospel according to Matthew. The present Gospel according to Matthew bears little mark of being a translation from Aramaic. It seems to be a free composition in Greek; free, at least, in the same sense that the Gospel according to Luke is free, with the evident use of materials such as Luke mentions (Luke i. 1–4). It is not my purpose here to enter into a discussion of the Synoptic Problem, the broad outlines of which are now pretty generally accepted. My own views are fully stated in my books (Commentary on Matthew in the *Bible for Home and School*, *Studies in Mark's Gospel*, *Luke the Historian in the Light of Research*). Both Matthew and Luke make use of Mark's Gospel and a non-Markan source, commonly called Logia or Q (German *Quelle*, Source). This non-Markan source may very well have been the Logia of Matthew mentioned by Papias. Since Matthew was bilingual as a publican at his post near Capernaum on the great West Road, it is quite possible that he may have written the Logia in Aramaic and the Gospel in Greek. But, leaving that point to one side, there is every reason to think of him as one of the very earliest narrators of the things of Jesus Christ. Some scholars even hold that

Matthew began to take notes of the sayings of Jesus during the Master's ministry. If so, the Logia of Jesus by Matthew took shape some twenty years before the Gospel of Mark which reflects so faithfully the vivid pictures seen by Peter. The point is made that Matthew's habits as a customs officer led him to jot down, perhaps at first in shorthand, notes of the wonderful words that fell from the lips of the great Teacher. If there is anything at all in this hypothesis, we find in Matthew an illustration of one's business habits bearing fruit in the ministry. The Gospel according to Matthew has been termed the most useful book in the world, for it is the book about Jesus that has been most read. It has given most people their conception of Christ. Even if Matthew did not write the Greek Gospel bearing his name, his Aramaic Logia made a great contribution to the picture of Jesus. It is likely that the Logia was much larger in content than the non-Markan element in both Matthew and Luke as we can judge by the use made of Mark's Gospel. And, in the absence of definite proof against the Matthæan authorship of the First Gospel, his connexion with it must be considered possible, some would say probable.

There are many legends concerning the preaching of Matthew, some of them certainly confused with Matthias. These may all be passed by in our estimate of the work of Matthew for Christ. If he had done nothing else but write the Logia of which Papias spoke and which modern criticism finds in large measure preserved in our canonical Matthew and Luke, he would be entitled to the rank of one of the benefactors of humanity. The group of twelve men whom Jesus gathered round Him challenge our interest from every standpoint. Each had his own gifts. The veil of silence rests upon the work of most of them. We are able to form a fairly clear picture of Peter, John, Judas, and Matthew, with a fainter outline of Philip, Andrew and James. Perhaps

few in the circle would have thought of the solid and more or less stolid Matthew as one who would win immortal fame. But work counts in the end of the day fully as much as genius. The greatest men have both genius and the capacity for work. In fact, genius is largely a capacity for work. But the less brilliant minister can do an honest day's work with the gifts that he has in the place where God has placed him. These are the men who must meet the demands of the new world. Every man must plow his own furrow to the end and must make it as straight as he can and make it fit in with the work of others. Christ calls upon business men to-day either to enter the ministry or to back up the ministry with personal service and with money to make Christianity effective in the life of the world.

A. T. Robertson.

THE STOIC AND THE CHRISTIAN.

The question of the debt of Christianity to Stoicism has always been a fascinating one. The legend of St. Paul's acquaintance with Seneca is one outcome of it; only that rather expressed the debt of a Stoic to Christianity. We are accustomed to hear that Christianity, transported into Hellenistic surroundings, borrowed and adapted for its own use beliefs of Greek philosophy, and forms of mystery-cults. That some borrowing took place, who would deny? It was inevitable for the new religion to express itself in a religious language that was understood by those to whom it addressed itself, where of course the ideas were similar or practically identical. So St. Paul speaks naturally in Stoic language of the Christian's heavenly πολιτεία; so the Fourth Gospel expresses the Christ as the *Logos*; again it was not unnatural that the ritual embellishments of Pagan

sacrifice should be drawn into the orbit of Christian worship. We are accustomed to accept all this; we talk of the "syncretism" of Christianity. But it is desirable to aim at a clear idea of the essential distinctions between Christianity and the many cults and systems of thought amid which its infancy was passed.

For in comparing religions we cannot add up likenesses and differences, and proceed to strike a balance between them. The important question concerns differences more than resemblances. This is abundantly true in the study of the relation of Christianity to Stoicism. They have so much common ground. So much of Marcus Aurelius or Seneca appeals to the best in us. So much of Epictetus might be read as a Lenten homily. But as we read the Stoic writers we miss something—a temper, a tone, an atmosphere; we are brought suddenly and unexpectedly up against something alien that hurts; we find ourselves in an unnatural and unpleasant air. We realise the difference between the two, and begin to understand that the supreme value of Christianity lies not in the things wherein it resembles Stoicism, but in the things wherein it differs from it. It was syncretistic, but its syncretism had bounds, it could not absorb what was alien to its own spirit. So to-day we have adopted the language of Evolution as a formula for the interpretation of Scripture. We could do this because the doctrine of Evolution is not alien to our spirit. We cannot say that we have borrowed a theory of gradual revelation from the science of our day, for the theory was implicit in Christianity from the first. We have merely adopted a living and vivid phraseology with which the minds of men are at home, that is not out of harmony with our beliefs.

When we find in Stoicism, in spite of its grandeur, these alien elements we have to ask, why did not Christianity

absorb these? It was syncretistic. It clothed its bare Eastern nakedness with some of the garments of Paganism; it adopted the tones of Plato and Zeno; it reproduced the very language of the Porch and quoted Cleanthes on Mars' Hill. Why then did it not swallow Stoicism whole? The question is an absurd one, absurd because it unveils the absurdity of withdrawing in imagination one particle of the essential originality of Christianity, and regarding it as a mere passive sponge soaking itself with what was already in the world. Like all creative human forces, Shakespeare for instance, it absorbed just what its spirit tended to absorb, it rejected what its spirit impelled it to reject. That which is common to the Stoic Creed and Christianity, verbally at least, includes much teaching that is popularly considered to be peculiar to the latter, the indwelling of God, His Fatherhood, the brotherhood of man, human freedom, the Divine Purpose a dark and mysterious reality, the need for patience, self-discipline, self-examination, the duty to forgive injuries; these are the common-places of Roman Stoicism; they are also the pillars of Christian teaching. Sometimes Christianity has its own account of them flashed out in a word of insight, sometimes it adopts the finished expression of Hellenic wisdom, the result of ages of labour in the schools—but always as an expression of its own truth, never as the adoption of an alien formula.

That wherein Stoicism differs from Christianity, verbally again, though the difference goes down infinitely deeper than words, may not appear so widespread or so apparent, yet in reality it is fundamental. It is a matter of spirit and temper, as well as of moral contradictions, and eternal outlook. It goes as deep as difference can go.

You may cap every article in the famous description of the early Christians in the *Epistle to Diognetus* with a saying from Epictetus or Seneca, and yet find that something

remains behind—the spirit of joy and delight in the clear revelation of the love of God, and the power to reflect it in all human circumstances. The ethics of that life are new and sublimely confident because they spring straight from new and satisfying truth.

"For it is no earthly discovery which was committed to them, neither do they care to guard so carefully any human invention, nor have they entrusted to them the dispensation of human mysteries. But truly the Almighty God of the Universe, the Invisible God Himself, planted among men the truth. . . . For what man at all had any knowledge what God was, before He came?" (*Ep. Diog.* 7 and 8).

The Stoic's "Acceptance of the Universe" is a clearly-defined temper. It springs confessedly from intellectual effort. Read the passage in Marcus Aurelius, which gives the two reasons for contentment (iv. 40, cf. v. 8).

"Just as we must understand it, when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or going without shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of the Universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation, or anything else of the kind."

We are to believe, that is, as an intellectual proposition, that our troubles in some way contribute to the harmony of the universe, and to the satisfaction of its Maker: "Accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the universe, and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus" (*ib.*).

The highest expression of this Stoic attitude is, after all, not confidence in the "philanthropic" Father of the Christian Epistle, but the sheerest fatalism. "The fates guide us," writes Seneca, "and the length of every man's days is determined at his birth . . . wherefore, everything must be patiently endured, because events do not *fall in our way*, as we imagine, but come by a regular law. It has long ago been settled at what you should rejoice, and at what you should weep, and although the lives of individual men

appear to differ in a great variety of particulars, yet the sum total comes to one and the same thing. Why, then, should we be angry? Why should we lament?"

And this dreary chain of inevitable law binds the gods as well: "The Creator and Ruler of the Universe himself, though he has given laws to the fates, yet is guided by them: he always obeys, he only once commanded" (Seneca, *de prov.* v.).

The Stoic temper of gloomy and dignified resignation to an unsatisfactory world was the same from the beginning. It was not developed and accentuated by the Romans. Its lines were laid down in their noblest expression by Cleanthes in familiar words.

"Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,
The way that I am bid by you to go:
To follow I am ready. If I choose not,
I make myself a wretch, and still must follow" (Epict. *En.* 52).

But it is when the Stoic has to consider his attitude to the sorrows and misfortunes of other people that humane, not to say Christian, feeling is revolted. There is a famous passage in Epictetus [1] which illustrates how philosophy can set out to disregard and even play with human nature. The sight of some one weeping for a child dead or gone abroad, or for the loss of his property, is but "an appearance" after all. The poor suffering father is not suffering from the event that has happened, but from his own "opinion" about it, and opinion is quite delusive. You must not be led away to similar delusion. You may shew outward sympathy "so far as words go." "And even if it happens so lament with him. But take care that you do not lament *within* also." It is doubtful whether any philosopher has in so few words unveiled so completely the failure of his system to deal with life.

[1] Epict. *Enc.* xvi.

We remember too the very natural picture of the master lamenting for his household slave: "But he used to set my food before me!" "Because he was alive, you fool, but now he cannot: but Automedon will set it before you, and if Automedon dies also, you will find another. So, if the pot in which your meat was cooked should be broken, must you die of hunger, because you have not the pot to which you are accustomed? Do you not send and buy a new pot?" (Epict. *Diss.* iv. 10).

This is sufficiently shocking to Christian ears, but what of Seneca *On the firmness of the Wise Man*? "Amid the flash of swords on all sides, and the riot of the plundering soldiery, amid the flames and blood and ruin of the fallen city, amid the crash of temples falling upon their gods, one man was at peace." "I have just crept," he cries, "from amid the ruins of my house, and with conflagrations blazing all around I have escaped from the flames through blood. What fate has befallen my daughters, whether a worse one than that of their country, I know not. . . . I have, I hold whatever of mine I have ever had!" Such is the noble attitude of "a well-established mind," the choice flower of Stoicism, verily in its ideal a religion of heartless fanaticism.

The Stoic was no doubt on the side of purity amid a welter of sensualism. It was his claim to deliver men from "desire." He discountenanced quite firmly the worst evils of Pagan society, and evolved systems of self-examination and self-discipline to enable the dissolute to escape from themselves. Seneca tells us of his own rigorous self-examination, how when the lamp was taken away, and his wife silent, he passed the whole day in review, and repeated all that he had said or done (*De Ira.* xxxvii.). Epictetus has sound teaching on the weakening result of immoral indulgence: "Do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also nurtured and increased your

incontinence," and is psychologically correct when he goes on to urge that we should oppose evil suggestions with "some other beautiful and noble appearance, and cast out this base one: and if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have." (*Diss.* ii. xviii.) Marcus Aurelius, too, quotes Theophrastus approvingly when he says that offences committed through desire are worse than those committed through anger—the first implying pleasure, the second pain and an involuntary wrench away from rationality (ii. 10). And yet in spite of so much that corresponds with Christian ideals we have such a passage as this in the *Encheiridion* of Epictetus: "As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage: but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom (ὡς νόμιμον). Do not, however, be disagreeable to those who indulge in such pleasures, or reprove them; and do not often boast that you do not indulge in them yourself" (*Enc.* xxxiii.). It may at least be said that such frankness is exceedingly rare in Stoic writers: but one such passage is enough to give a true impression of Stoic opinion. It is impossible to conceive such advice finding a place in the New Testament, or any early Christian Apology.

The root-difference that accounts for outward differences lies in the conception of sin. To the Greek philosopher it must ever be something of an intellectual error, and even Stoicism with its doctrine of the Will inherited the paradox that vice was simply a mistake, and worthy of all the tolerance accorded to mistakes. "Ought not this thief, or this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things and blinded, not in the faculty of vision, which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad,

should we not destroy him? If you speak thus you will see how inhuman this is which you say, equivalent indeed to saying, Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf man?" (Epict. *Diss.* i. 18.)

Sin to the Stoic is on a par with "the lion's gaping jaws," part of the shavings of Nature's workshop, a by-product of the factory of the great and noble furniture of the Universe. After all it is part of the destined; it mysteriously contributes its dark background to the grand universal harmony: it is part of the design, and worked into the piece. "And how do things happen?" asks Epictetus, and he answers thus: "As the disposer has disposed them; and he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, and *virtue and vice*, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole" (*Diss.* i. 12). Such Greek views filtered, as we know, into Jewish Wisdom Books, but we do not find sin regarded as natural in the New Testament.

Seneca sometimes reveals a more Christian sense of sin. Once he reflects what a desolate waste the streets of Rome, choked with ceaseless raging torrents of people, "in which the people streaming to three theatres demand the road at the same time," would become if all had their trial before a strict judge. "We have all sinned, we have all lost our innocence, nor have we only sinned, but to the very end of our lives shall continue to sin." It sounds a very pious *Peccavimus*, but its importance is vitiated by the lack of a sense of God's holiness. He is only a magnified Cæsar after all. He, like any other great king, will deal with his subjects, and especially the great ones of the earth, with clemency (*de Clementia*, cc. vi. viii.). And that takes the sting from penitence.

The Stoic's attitude to suicide was quite characteristic: as we know, the philosopher's advice was not unfrequently acted upon in the stormy days of the Early Empire. Marcus

Aurelius teaches that if circumstances prevent one living the true life of a man it is better to quit life voluntarily, "The house is smoky, and I quit it." "Take thy departure then from life contentedly." "Depart at once from this life, not in passion, but with simplicity and freedom and modesty, after doing this one thing at least in thy life, to have gone out of it thus" (v. 29, viii. 47 and x. 8). If God does not supply necessities it is to Epictetus a signal of retreat, a hand that opens the door, a voice that says to you, Go (*Diss.* iii. 13). Seneca views the problem from all sides, and concludes that it is wise playing of the game of life to depart when the body is worn out: "Since the danger of living in wretchedness is greater than the danger of dying soon, he is a fool who refuses to stake a little time and win a hazard of great gain" (*Ad Lucilium*, lviii.). This quite familiarly to his friend Lucilius.

There seems to be no authoritative doctrine in the school about Death. It is the teaching of Epictetus that man is resolved into the physical elements whence he came: "No Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyriphlegethon, but all is full of Gods and Dæmons" (*Diss.* iii. 13).

In comforting a mourner Seneca can paint a picture of the soul tarrying a little while to be purified from the "vices and rust which all mortal lives must contract," and then rising to the souls of the blessed, "a saintly company of Scipios and Catos." There his grandfather will embrace him and teach him the secrets of nature. Like a stranger in a strange city he will greedily learn. "He will delight in gazing deep down upon the earth, for it is a delight to look from aloft at what one has left below" (*De Consolatione*, xxv.). But how much of this was conventional poetry? one asks, when one comes upon what rings more true in a letter to Lucilius. Seneca tells us that even when his breath tries him, he says to himself cheerfully, "Does death

so often test me ? Let it do so : I myself have for a long time tested death." If we ask, when ? he answers, " Before I was born. Death is non-existence, and I know already what that means." There was no discomfort then, neither will there be after death. A lamp is no worse off when it is extinguished than before it was lighted. " We mortals are like lamps, we are lighted and extinguished ; the period of suffering comes in between, but on either side there is a deep peace " (*ad Lucilium*, liv.). And so the real Seneca, shorn of his poetic consolations, agrees with Epictetus after all.

Such are some of the differences between Stoic and Christian writings. They are enough to shew that a great gulf divides them, a gulf that goes right down to the foundations. One could probably marshal equally striking resemblances and trace much that St. Paul said to Stoic roots. That would not be surprising, for all great religions have much in common, since the human spirit is one. Still less surprising, if we think of the young Saul brought up in Tarsus, as young Jews are brought up in London or Oxford to-day, for Tarsus, Strabo tells us, excelled Athens, Alexandria and all other schools of learning in his day, and the streets of Rome swarmed with her graduates (xiv., p. 673).

But how much more important are the differences. It is they that count. In spite of all his greatness of character and intellect the Stoic pales before the Christian. The least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.

W. J. Ferrar.

THE FIRST TATIAN READING IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

It is thirty-five years since I published in the *Journal of Biblical Literature and Exegesis*[1] an account of a MS. of the New Testament, containing a reading of which I could find no trace anywhere else, but which later discoveries show to have stood in the text of Tatian the Harmonist, in the latter part of the second century. As the matter is an important one and yet seems to have been overlooked, I am going to make a brief summary of the evidence which I then brought forward and of the subsequent literature bearing upon the supposed extract from the Tatian Harmony.

The MS. to which I refer was originally described by Scrivener as Cod. Ev. 561, and by me with the longer title of Codex Algerinae Peckover, after the owner of the MS., who had derived it by inheritance from her brother, Mr. Jonathan Peckover, of Wisbech. He, on his part, obtained it by purchase from Quaritch, the London bookseller. By the grace of the owner, it has now passed into my own possession, so that I have had the opportunity of examining it *de novo*, and of verifying or correcting my former impressions. It will always be associated with Miss Peckover's name, whatever its ultimate destiny may be in the matter of ownership.

When I first examined the MS. I assigned it to the eleventh century; the date was challenged by Gregory in his *Prolegomena to Tischendorf*. He said that it is of the twelfth or even the thirteenth. On looking at my first statement in the *Journal*, I see that I described its date in the following terms :—

[1] For December, 1886, pp. 79–89. But I see that I had also described it in the Philadelphia *Sunday School Times* for Nov. 6, 1886.

"The handwriting may be referred to the eleventh century, *or a little later*."

It appears, therefore, that Dr. Gregory's correction was already latent in my first description; I do not think that the MS. should be regarded as a thirteenth-century product. My first description is, I think, nearly accurate. On referring to my first notes, I see that I had said twelfth or thirteenth century, and added a query. Gregory also noted that the MS., according to a suggestion of Quaritch, had formerly been at Athens; but this observation is quite useless, as I showed from internal evidence on the margins that it was a Constantinople MS., probably in use at an early date in S. Sophia. Gregory saw the MS. in 1883. I think this gives him the priority in the description of the MS. for my first notes are dated in 1884. But both of us had been anticipated by Dean Burgon in 1882. It was he who in a letter to Scrivener (the fifth of a series published in the *Guardian* in 1882) announced the existence and location of the MS. and gave it a number amongst the catalogued MSS. of the New Testament. The only thing that Burgon says about the text of the MS. is that "the codex contains the troubling of the pool, but is without the *pericope*" (sc. *de adultera*).

So it appears that neither Burgon nor Gregory knew of the unique reading which the MS. contains, or they would certainly have drawn attention to it. It is surprising that Gregory, who refers to my article on the MS. in the *American Journal*, does not allude to the reading, but only to the possible connexion of the MS. with what is known as the Ferrar group.

Before leaving this question (a very stupid one) of the order in which scholars have examined Miss Peckover's MS., I may note that there seems to be a mistake in another direction in Kenyon's *Handbook to New Testament Criticism*,

where I am credited with having examined the MS. as far back as 1877 ; his statement is as follows :—

" Evan. 561 [Greg. 713] : eleventh to twelfth century ; in the possession of Miss A. Peckover, of Wisbech. Identified in 1877 by Mr. Rendel Harris as akin to the Ferrar Group ; but in his recent study of the group he makes no mention of it."

I am afraid this is an impossible date ; I do not think that I had begun my studies in the New Testament text by that year ; and certainly I could not at that time have known anything of Ferrar and his group of texts. However, I collated the text twice as soon as I found out that it contained a jewel of the first water ; first, by comparison with the received text, and next, in order to see if it really was a Ferrar MS. with the text of that group as edited by Ferrar and Abbott.

The next stage in the study of the text was, I suppose, when a young German scholar, named Pott, came to England to investigate under Prof. v. Soden's scheme for a new edition of the text of the Greek New Testament. Prof. v. Soden's ambassador was very glad to have the loan of one of my collations, and on his return to Germany he made a careful study of the text for his doctor's dissertation, with the object of showing that where the MS. diverged from the common tradition, it was under Syriac influence, and might be compared with the Syriac text as published by Cureton. Prof. v. Soden in his textual apparatus added the Tatian reading to his notes ; but, although he was bent on proving that most of the variation in the text of the New Testament was due to Tatian, he does not seem to have given any special attention to the reading ; of course, as in other cases, he added to our existing confusion by giving the MS. a new name ; it was now denoted by the sign ε 351.

Returning now to the precious MS. itself and its unique

reading it will be interesting to recall briefly the steps by which we arrived at the conclusion that we had discovered a genuine Tatianism, the first that had really been recognisable in Greek. The passage in Matthew xvii. runs as follows :—

25. " Of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or tribute ? Of their own children or of the aliens ?

26. " Peter saith to him : Of the aliens. Jesus said to him : *Then are the children free ? Simon said : Yea. Jesus saith : Then do thou also give, as being an alien to them.*

27. " But that we do not offend them, go to the sea and cast a hook, etc."

The peculiar features of the Greek text are (i) the turning of the remark of our Lord about the freedom of the children into a question, and (ii) the necessary addition of Peter's reply, accompanied by Christ's rejoinder, in the words :—

ἄραγε ἐλεύθεροί εἰσιν οἱ υἱοί ; ἔφη Σίμων· ναί. λέγει ὁ Ἰησοῦς. δὸς οὖν καὶ σύ, ὡς ἀλλότριος αὐτῶν.

All that I was able to say, at the first publication of this passage was, that there were some signs of agreement with the Curetonian Syriac (e.g., in the introduction of the name *Simon* for Peter, etc.) ; but I contented myself with the observation that " the passage, if a gloss, is one of the most remarkable I have ever seen ; and it deserves very careful consideration." How then does one attach the name of Tatian to the words which here appear under the suspicion of a gloss ? It is evident that I was not familiar in 1886 with the Armenian commentary of Ephrem upon the text of Tatian, to which I shall refer presently as containing the famous reading ; and the Arabic text of the *Harmony of Tatian* did not appear until the year 1888, when it was brought out by Ciasca, with a Latin translation, in honour of the Pope's Jubilee. When, however, I examined the Arabic text in question, I found the desiderated gloss ; and

two years later I published a preliminary dissertation upon the Tatian Harmony (an early piece of work, long since out of print) in which I drew attention to the existence of the passage answering to our Greek text as follows :—" Matthew xvii. 25, ' Simon saith to him : From aliens. Jesus said to him : Then the children are free. *Simon saith to him, Yea. Jesus said to him : Then do thou also give to them as being an alien.* But lest they should be offended, go to the sea, and cast a hook, and, having opened the mouth of the first fish that comes up, thou shalt find a stater.' "

On comparing this Arabic text with that of the Peckover MS. it was clear that they had a common origin. Accordingly I said,[1] " That which is eccentric in the modern Harmony must certainly be taken from the primitive Harmony, the Arabic from the early Syriac : that which is eccentric in the Greek looks as if it had a Syriac origin ; the abrupt change from Peter to Simon is sufficient to suggest this " ; and I drew the conclusion, with proper caution and due modesty, that " it is within the bounds of possibility that the Peckover Codex has been affected by the text of a Diatessaron, possibly a Syriac Diatessaron." No one will think that an over-statement. But now we come to the verification furnished by Ephrem's *Commentary on the Diatessaron*, in which successive passages from the *Harmony* were transcribed in their Syriac text, and accompanied by a Syriac commentary. To get at this Syriac text and comments we have to work from an Armenian translation ; the editor does the whole for us into Latin (as being the working language of scholars), and indicates by spaced type which is the text and which is commentary. We shall find our singular reading already in print, but it has been mistaken for commentary and consequently not spaced out as belonging to the text. Here is the whole passage

[1] *Diatessaron*, p. 43.

done into English.[1] We shall see the importance of it in a little while :—

"And that it saith, *That thou set not a stumblingblock before them*, that is, that thou appear not vile unto them, since thou makest manifest that they wish to contrive occasions of contention ; *Go thou to the sea and cast there the net ;* because they thought me a stranger, the sea shall teach them that I am not only a priest but also a king : so then go, *give thou also as one of the strangers.*"

It is quite clear that the words which we are studying were a part of Ephrem's text, and not of his own commentary upon the text. It is a mere lapse on the part of a transcriber or editor that they have not been recognised as Biblical matter. So, if any doubt remained in our minds as to the propriety of referring to Tatian something in Ciasca's Arabic which does not correspond with the Syriac Vulgate, our hesitation is finally overruled, and we are obliged to register our gloss, if it be a gloss, as Tatian's own text.

But this raises another question, nay ! several questions. Did the text occur in the copies of the Gospel that he was harmonising, i.e., in Tatian's copy of Matthew, since there is no Synoptic parallel ? Are there any possible traces of the reading or of comments upon it elsewhere ? And, in any case, Tatian or pre-Tatian, what does it all mean ? Why should an expansion have occurred, or an omission have been made ?

The comment of Ephrem upon the question addressed to Peter as to our Lord's payment of tribute is not easy to disentangle. It is not evident, on the surface, whether the tribute is temple-tax (supposed to be involved in the term *didrachma*), or general tribute and custom (such as kings levy on subjects and especially on foreigners). Whichever

[1] With the assistance of Dr. Armitage Robinson.

is the right explanation, Ephrem thinks that a trap was being laid for our Lord by way of dilemma. Does He pay or not pay? If He does not pay, He is a rebel, that is, if the payment is to king or Cæsar. Or perhaps He does not pay to the temple; then He claims to be either priest or Levite or superior to both, or else He is no true Israelite. But suppose He does pay: then we have His own admission that He is *alienus* and not *filius*. Ephrem seems to have a royal tax in his mind, for he explains that the king did not tax the priesthood. On that supposition our Lord would be held to have claimed priestly rank. As we have said, the argument is not very lucid. From this point it changes from the tax-collector's question to our Lord's explanation. Jesus has introduced into the dialogue a curious word; He speaks of the sons of the king (i.e., his subjects proper) as distinct from the alien or ἀλλότριος. They think, says the Lord, that I am an alien; the sea shall teach them that I am both priest and king; I need not pay tribute or tax; the sea will own my priesthood and my lordship and pay it for me. And you also, Simon, shall be one of the royal and priestly caste, though, like me, you pay as an alien. The fishes of the sea shall bear testimony to my rank, for one of them will come up with a stater in its mouth, which is a sign of lordship, and has the king's head upon it.

Ephrem then makes a general statement that all created things had recognised the advent of the great High Priest, and had come to pay him their tribute, angels, prophets, magi and the like; and had it not been foretold that the obedience of the sea should be turned towards that just alien? [1]

The concurrence of the two terms, *just* and *alien*, shows that Ephrem has his eye on the Marcionites, whom his soul

[1] Apparently a reference to Isaiah lx. 5, with a misprint of *obedientia* for *abundantia*.

hates ; and he is taking the opportunity of proving that the *Stranger*, with whom Marcion identified Jesus as the emissary of the unknown God, is at the same time the Demiurge, or Creator, whom Marcion admitted to be just, for do not all created things obey him and do him homage ?

At this point it is possible that Ephrem's discourse, in spite of its obscurity, may throw a light upon the fortunes of the text itself. For here we have the very word which the Marcionites desiderated used by our Lord of Himself and His disciples. He admits, the Marcionites will say, that he is the *Stranger*, who has come to rescue men from their allegiance and servitude to the Creator; he is the Good One, who will pluck us out of the toils of the Just One.

If then the text, as we read it in an expanded form, had existed before Marcion, or if, at a later date, it had been accessible to Marcion's followers, they would have been tempted to use it against their Catholic opponents ; and then the Catholic party might have resorted to excision of the passage in self-defence. This argument is not invalidated by the fact that Marcion and his followers accept Luke's Gospel only ; for Marcion himself sometimes borrowed from other Gospels, and his followers need not have hesitated to borrow a shaft from them also. Thus we see that it is not necessary to assume that the gloss is Tatian's own composition ; we have proved it to be a part of his text, but it might have had a previous history. On the other hand it can hardly have been a Marcionite invention ; for it is well known that Marcion does not invent ; in his own Gospel of Luke he subtracts, but does not add ; the expansions are practically *nil* ; he used the sponge but not the stylus.

Then we must leave it an open question whether the gloss is a gloss at all. It may be a bit of true text which Tatian preserved, and which zealous anti-Marcionites have removed. This possible explanation must be reserved ; but whether

it be correct or not, we remark in passing that the sudden elevation of a twelfth century reading to second century rank should be carefully noted; for it shows that the readings in the Gospels which seem to be the earliest may sometimes be challenged from what looks, at first sight, to be a much later source.

We have been obliged to admit, from Ephrem's own language, that the *Stranger* is the *Just One*, whom all created things obey; Ephrem tells us that Christ is the Creator, and that Marcion's description of the Creator as the Just One may be accepted. This is quite in the manner of Tertullian; but it has conceded to the Marcionites that ἀλλότριος, the *Alien* or *Stranger*, is a proper title of Christ.

Now for the other alternative; let us say that the gloss is Tatian's own. Against this the argument does not hold that Tatian makes no additions, in the way that it holds for Marcion. Tatian is not free from a tendency and a willingness to expand. Moreover, he is a very acute mind, and would naturally have asked why Christ's concession to the demands of the tribute-collector should have involved Peter, as in the injunction to give them the stater for "thee and me."

This involves Peter in the same inquisition for taxes as well as our Lord Himself; and it is not impossible that Tatian might have noticed this, and that our gloss is his added explanation. On the whole this seems to be the more likely solution of the problem. Why should we go beyond Tatian, when, by a reference to him and to his *Harmony*, we can explain all the textual phenomena?

From the secure vantage-ground of a proved Tatianism, we can now return to the study of our precious MS. and begin, with Dr. Pott's assistance, a search for any further influences coming from the same quarter. As a general rule, the Peckover text is of the usual Byzantine type; but there are some divergences which look like Syriasms or Tatianisms,

which must be carefully collected, and referred, tentatively, to the *Harmony*. In conclusion we remark that the enquiry upon which we have been engaged, in which the first Greek reading from Tatian's lost work has been brought to light, must not be taken as a proof that the *Harmony* itself ever existed in Greek. We have shown that this gloss, if it be a gloss, is probably Syriac in origin; if so, it is the Syriac of Tatian, and not a hypothetical Greek. If any one should persist that it is not a gloss at all, the reply would be that in that case, neither is it Tatian's handiwork. We must not, however, press further at the present time into the debateable regions of New Testament criticism.

RENDEL HARRIS.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LATIN VERSIONS FOR THE TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

SUCH Latin versions of parts of Scripture as were made in the earlier centuries of the Church's history in the interests of the less educated members of congregations, were made to suit their comprehension (probably by Greeks rather than Latins) in a rather colloquial style. The fragments of them which remain have been recognized ever since Rönsch's investigations [1] as among the most valuable of the scanty relics of the ancient colloquial Latin, the study of which is important, not only because it sets in bolder relief the intense artificiality of the classical Latin, but also because of the light thereby thrown on the Romance languages. For the New Testament textual critic their interest lies rather in the fact that they are valuable witnesses to a Western type of text of which surviving Greek specimens are very scanty. It is well known that about

[1] *Itala und Vulgata*, 2te Ausgabe (Marburg, 1875).

A.D. 383 Jerome, at the instance of Pope Damasus, revised some current form of the Old-Latin Gospels in two directions. First he took a Greek MS., which he regarded as having the highest attainable authority, and compared it with the Old-Latin text in front of him. Where this Old-Latin form was based on a defective original, he substituted a translation of what he found in his good Greek MS. Wordsworth and White, the Oxford editors of the Vulgate New Testament, have shown that this Greek MS. was rather like our ℵ (Codex Sinaiticus).[1] It is rather significant that Jerome, depositary of the great tradition from Origen and Eusebius, should arrive at substantially the same conclusion as Westcott and Hort many centuries later. But Jerome, as a pupil of the great rhetorician and grammarian Donatus, was also a purist in matters of Latin, and he removed a number of the vulgarisms and crudities of his Old-Latin original in the interests of a more polished Latinity.

These facts are beyond dispute, but when we come outside the Gospels to the rest of the New Testament we at once enter a field of controversy. The Vulgate Gospels can be identified in two ways, first by the presence of the preface addressed by Jerome to Damasus, second by the table of Eusebian canons which he borrowed from a Greek copy. In strange contrast with this we find that no genuine Hieronymian preface exists for any other section of the New Testament. Prefaces do exist, but they are of alien origin. For instance, almost every manuscript of the Vulgate Epistles of St. Paul, beginning with the oldest, the sixth century *Codex Fuldensis*, contains a prologue beginning with the words *Primum quæritur*, which is the undoubted work of the arch-heretic Pelagius, and must have been borrowed from his commentary on the Epistles! Yet

[1] Vol. i., pp. 655 ff. of their great edition.

Jerome thrice says he revised the whole New Testament. If he is speaking the truth, does his complete revision survive, and if so, how are we to identify it ?

These are difficult questions, and they have been the subject of a great deal of controversy in French learned periodicals during the last seven years. Assuming that Jerome's revision of the Epistles, Acts and Apocalypse really survives, we seem to have no certain means of identifying it among existing texts. No doubt what the Church believes to be Jerome's revision is the text furnished by the great bulk of our Latin MSS. But is the Church right in this belief ? The strange thing is that we can get no help from Jerome's citations of Scripture made subsequent to the date of the supposed revision. As a whole they bear little or no relation to the type of text which we call Vulgate. The question will never be satisfactorily solved until we have reliable critical editions of all the Christian Latin literature of the period between 380 and 550. Meantime we must accept the text as reconstructed by Wordsworth and White (editio minor) as Jerome's Vulgate, just as it is accepted by Harnack in two important investigations which have recently appeared, one on the Catholic Epistles (1916) and the other on the Epistle to the Hebrews (1920). The conditions caused by the war have rendered these works difficult of access, and this must be my excuse for calling attention to the conclusions of the latter in this place.

Studien zur Vulgata des Hebräerbriefs is a paper of twenty-three large pages in the Reports of the Prussian Academy of Sciences for 1920. In it Harnack tells how he has endeavoured to reconstruct the Greek text which lies behind the Vulgate text of the Epistle, with a critical apparatus of selected variants and the readings of Tischendorf, Westcott and Hort, Weiss and von Soden. This work meantime

remains in manuscript, but he has very properly published now some conclusions that result from the investigation. These I will proceed to set forth, at least in so far as I can agree with them, appending at the same time criticisms which I trust are not useless.

The four recent critical editions of the Greek New Testament, leaving out of account the marginal readings of Westcott and Hort and the bracketed readings in von Soden, differ only in fifty-four places throughout the 302 verses, and these variations are quite insignificant. The text of the letter seems essentially fixed. Harnack, however, instances the following passages as not yet correctly restored: ii. 9 f.; iv. 2; v. 7; x. 1, 29; xi. 4, 37; xii. 7. It is very striking to find that the Vulgate differs from the resultant text of these four editors in forty places only. There are, however, two passages, not instanced by Harnack, where all these editors are in my opinion wrong: they are iii. 2 and iii. 6. At iii. 2 *ὅλῳ*, which is bracketed by Westcott and Hort, should be omitted altogether, as a harmonisation with iii. 5. Westcott and Hort bracketed the word because it is absent from "B sah cop ar^{e} Cyr cat 169 Amb fid 3, 512" (I quote from Tischendorf). But since their day the omission has been reinforced by the authority of papyrus no. 13, an important and early document whose evidence is generally ignored by modern editors, though it is the oldest surviving Greek attestation the verse has. Again, at iii. 6, *μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν*, a harmonisation with iii. 14, is bracketed by Westcott and Hort on the basis of Tischendorf's statement that the words are omitted by "B aeth^{ro} Lcif^{215} Amb^{ios}." But since their time, not only has papyrus no. 13 been discovered to omit these words, but also the Sahidic version, as edited by Horner in 1920.

Almost all of the forty variations of the Vulgate from the accepted modern Greek text are without significance. Some

are slight transpositions, not unsupported by other witnesses, others are trifling, eight are in Old-Testament citations, where there is always room for variation. Of the remaining variants only three have significance, iii. 14 (*αὐτοῦ*), ix. 14 (*ἁγίου*), xi. 11 (*ἡ στεῖρα*): in the first and second cases the Vulgate is wrong, in the third it may be right.

Harnack thinks the Greek MS. behind the Vulgate to be the best of all our authorities because "all the interpolations that have found entrance into the tradition are wanting from it." This position seems to me, in view of what has been said above about iii. 2 and 6, to be not quite sound. Harnack does not seem ever to have heard of papyrus 13, though its more important readings are given in my edition, published in 1910, and reviewed in German periodicals at the time. The conclusion that the Vulgate does not contribute one valuable reading absent from the rest of the tradition is not to be disputed, and Harnack himself gives the explanation: the Epistle was not translated into Latin till the third century. He next proceeds to discuss what type of MS. Jerome chose as the basis of his revision, and this is, I think, the most valuable part of his paper.

Before Jerome's time there existed at least two Latin translations of the Epistle to the Hebrews, one represented by the bilingual Codex Claromontanus of the sixth century (d), and one which was used by Augustine and the Carthaginian bishop Capreolus, of which considerable fragments exist in the Freising codex (r).[1] His proof that there were two translations, follows the method inaugurated by Sanday, and since applied with such success by Burkitt, Hans von Soden, Capelle and Vogels to other parts of the Bible. He takes the six verses, vi. 7–12, and points out

[1] Since Harnack's paper was published De Bruyne has re-edited these fragments in greater fullness than before (*Collectanea Biblica Latina*, vol. v.; Rome, 1921).

thirty-nine differences of Latin rendering between the two forms. The two translations differ almost everywhere where difference is possible. Both texts, further, are sometimes unintelligible, and they occasionally break down at the same points.

He then prints what he calls "*the* (italics mine) two pre-Hieronymian Latin quotations from the Epistle, namely in Tertullian and Lucifer." I must object to this, and point out that there are several quotations from the Epistle in Hilary of Poitiers on the Psalms and several also in the 109th *Quaestio* of Ambrosiaster.[1] Yet no doubt the two given by Harnack are the most important. He points out that there is no connexion between the Tertullian and d or r, though Tertullian is closer to r than to d. He compares the Lucifer quotation with d only, as r is not extant at that point, and concludes that they represent the same Latin translation. He might have mentioned, however, that the relationship is not here so close as it is in the other Pauline Epistles. He does show that d is in some ways secondary, providing among other things a number of readings not otherwise attested. This text is of course in a decidedly corrupt state, whereas the one manuscript in which Lucifer is preserved, is of wonderful accuracy. Further, d has been influenced by D, the Greek side of the same MS. It is too strong to say, as Harnack does (p. 188), that the older text is to be found almost throughout in Lucifer. His view that *μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν* (iii. 6) is the true text has already been demonstrated to be wrong.

He then asks the relation of the Vulgate to d and to r, which latter MS. is fortunately extant for more than a quarter of the Epistle. His statistics are these :

In 223 places d and Vulg. agree against r.

[1] Harnack himself remembers Ambrose later (pp. 192 f.). Ambrose uses the d text.

In 96 places r and Vulg. agree against d.

In 139 places Vulg. disagrees both with d and r.

He then selects eleven verses arbitrarily, and studies the renderings of the three Latin authorities. The conclusion is what one might expect, that the Vulgate depends directly on d. But he draws a further interesting conclusion that Jerome was acquainted with the r type, and in the interests of greater accuracy as well as the improvement of the style made use of it, side by side with the other. Next he shows cases where Jerome himself has improved on the Latinity of both d and r.

Both the d and the r type he assigns conjecturally to the early part of the third century. In one place r alone appears to give us the true text. This MS. and Capreolus read at x. 29 *qui sanguinem noui testamenti inmundum aestimauit :* all other authorities known to Harnack have or render *ὁ τὸ αἷμα τῆς διαθήκης κοινὸν ἡγησάμενος*. But, as he points out, *καινῆς* could easily fall out before *κοινὸν*, and, a fact he does not know, the Armenian also has "new covenant" [1] (cf. viii. 8, ix. 15). If Harnack's conclusion be admitted—and I hope it will be—there is here a salutary lesson for all those who neglect the early versions. *A reading may be right, even if no single extant Greek MS. contains it.*

On the question whether Jerome consulted a Greek MS. of Hebrews to aid him in his task, Harnack comes to the same conclusion as he did in the case of the Epistle of James, that he did not.

A. Souter.

[1] I learn this from Horner's critical apparatus to the Sahidic, published in 1920. Horner, one of the very few living Western scholars who can read Armenian, frequently gives Armenian evidence not accessible elsewhere.

THE OXYRHYNCHUS "SAYINGS OF JESUS" IN A NEW LIGHT.

HAVING recently had occasion [1] to study anew the Sayings of Jesus published in two instalments (in 1897 and 1909) by Drs. Grenfell and Hunt, I wish to submit my findings to others for testing and appraising. The indirect effects of my theory, if well grounded, will be far-reaching; and I hope to draw them out more fully one day. But the first of them is to add to our knowledge of the scope of the Collection, and even to the number of its Sayings which we can recover; and with this, the central aspect of the matter, we can best begin.

I.

Our starting-point is the earliest known sermon from the ancient Church, the so-called Second Epistle of Clement. "Its date," says Lightfoot, "may with some confidence be assigned to the first half of the second century, probably *c.* A.D. 120–140." Its place of delivery he was inclined to regard as Corinth. But his reasons for this are inconclusive and seem overruled by certain intrinsic features of the homily. One of these is the Platonising mystical exposition (ch. xiv.) of "the first Church, which is spiritual, which was created before the sun and moon," and of its relation to Christ as of female to male in the unity of manhood in God's creative idea (Gen. i. 27). This suits Alexandria [2] rather than Corinth. Another argument of moment is the nature of its Gospel references, the point we have now to consider in particular.

The gist of the sermon is the obligation due to Christ

[1] In connexion with the edition by H. G. Evelyn White (Cambridge, 1920, 12*s.* 6*d.*), the first really complete edition with notes.

[2] As argued at length in the *Zeitsch. für N.T. Wissenschaft*, vii. 123 ff.

as its hearers' Saviour and future Judge, of confessing Him in *deed*, and not only in word, through a life of obedience to His commandments and a brave facing of the consequences of such Christian witness in an alien world. In bringing this home the preacher expresses himself as follows :—

"Seeing, then, that He wrought such mercy towards us that we . . . through Him have come to know the Father of truth (reality), what is knowledge in relation to Him other than not to deny Him through whom we have come to know Him ? Yea, He too saith, '*He that confesseth Me before men, him will I confess before My Father*. . . .' But wherein do we confess Him ? In doing the things which He saith and not disobeying His commandments, and not honouring Him only with our lips (Isa. xxix. 13) . . . (Chap. iii.).

"Let us, then, not only call Him Lord, for this will not save us: for He saith, *Not every one that saith unto Me, Lord, Lord, shall be* saved, *but he that doeth* righteousness. So then, brethren, let us confess Him in our works—in loving one another, in not committing adultery, nor yet speaking evil against each other, nor yet envying, but being self-controlled, merciful, kindly ; and we ought to have fellow-feeling with each other and not love money . . . ; and we should not the rather fear men but God. For this cause . . . the Lord said, *Though ye be gathered together with Me, in My bosom, and do not My commandments, I will cast you forth and will say unto you, Depart from Me, I know you not whence ye are, works of lawlessness* (chap. iv.).

"Accordingly, brethren, let us forsake the life of this alien world we dwell in and do the will of Him that called us. And let us not fear to depart out of this world : for the Lord saith, *Ye shall be as lambs in the midst of wolves. But Peter answering saith unto Him, What, then, if the wolves tear the lambs ? Jesus said unto Peter, Let not the lambs fear the wolves, after they* (*themselves*) *are dead ; and ye, fear not them that kill you and are not able to do anything to you ; but fear Him that after ye are dead hath power over soul and body, to cast them into a Gehenna of fire.* And ye know, brethren, that the sojourn of this flesh in this world is trifling and for a short time, but the promise of Christ is great and wonderful, even the Rest of the Kingdom soon to be and of age-long Life (cf. Saying I.). What then can we do to obtain them but behave dutifully and righteously, and consider these worldly things as alien and not desire them ? For when we desire to possess these things we fall away from the way that is righteous (chap. v.).

"But the Lord saith, *No domestic* (οἰκέτης) *can serve two masters.* If we wish to serve both God and mammon, it is of no profit to us: *For what advantage is it if any one gain the whole world and forfeit his soul?* Now this age and the coming one are two enemies. The one speaketh of adultery and corruption and love of money and deceit; but the other biddeth farewell to these. We cannot then be friends of the two, but must bid farewell to the one and have commerce with the other. Let us deem it better to hate the things that are here, because they are trifling and for a short time and corruptible, and to love the things which are there, the good things that are incorruptible. For in doing the will of Christ we shall find rest. Otherwise, nothing shall rescue us from the eternal punishment, if we should disobey His commandments" (chap. vi.).

The preacher then refers to "the incorruptible contest" and the conditions of being crowned (ch. vii.), and utters an earnest call to Repentance (ch. viii.), "while we have yet a season of repentance." He continues as follows (viii. 4, 5):—

"Accordingly, brethren, if we shall have done the will of the Father and kept the flesh pure and guarded the commandments of the Lord, we shall receive age-long life. For the Lord saith in the Gospel, *If ye kept not that which is little, who shall give you that which is great? For I say unto you that he who is faithful in the least is faithful also in much.* So then He means this, Keep the flesh pure and the seal (baptism) unstained, to the end that we may receive life." A little lower he describes the like result as 'that He may receive us as sons. For the Lord also said, *These are My brethren, who do the will of My Father*' (ix. 11).

This will let us ever obey. We must not falter. "The prophetic word[1] saith, Wretched are the double-souled, who doubt in heart . . . (chaps. x.–xi.). Let us, then, await betimes the Kingdom of God in love and righteousness . . . (chap. xii.). Let us repent forthwith: let us be sober unto that which is good (cf. Saying VII.). . . . And let us not be found men-pleasers. Neither let us wish to please one another only, but also men outside on the score of righteousness, that the Name be not blasphemed by reason of us. . . . For the heathen, when they hear from our mouth the Oracles of God, wonder at their beauty and grandeur; then, when they discover that our works are not worthy of the words which we speak, forthwith they turn to blasphemy, saying that it is an idle story and delusion. For when they hear from us

[1] "Some apocryphal source, perhaps *Eldad and Modad*" (Lightfoot).

that God saith, *No thanks unto you, if ye love them that love you ; but there are thanks to you, if ye love your enemies and them that hate you*—when they hear these things, I say, they wonder at the exceeding kindness, but when they see that we not only do not love them that hate us ; but not even them that love us, they laugh us to scorn, and the Name is blasphemed" (chap. xiii.).

After more exhortation and warning, the preacher concludes with these words :—

"To the only God, invisible, Father of Truth, who sent forth to us the Saviour and Leader of incorruption, through whom also He manifested to us the Truth and the heavenly Life, to Him be the glory for ever and ever. Amen."

It is, I believe, in this sermon's atmosphere of thought and feeling, and in the moral setting of its practical concern for reality in Christian profession, and so for witness to the Gospel of the Kingdom of God, the Father of awakened souls, that the Oxyrhynchus Sayings attain their true, because their historic, place and meaning.

In all the Evangelic citations, indicated by italics in the above extracts, there are divergences more or less considerable from the wording, sometimes even from the substance, of such parallels as occur in our Synoptic Gospels. Some of those divergences are of the sort which meet us also in the Oxyrhynchus Sayings ; while there is a marked affinity between the way in which both sets describe the effect of Jesus' Sayings or Commandments, "the Oracles of God" as the preacher once calls them, upon those who hear. This effect is the burden of the first of the Sayings proper (as distinct from the Prelude to the Collection), which seems to have a summary significance, as bearing on the reader's experience as an inquirer into the inner meaning of Jesus' words.

The Prelude having cited the claim of Jesus, the Living One, that His words have power to exempt the true hearer from "tasting death," the First Saying contains a promise touching the psychological aspect of the seeker's experience

of them. "Let not the seeker cease [from seeking] until he hath found; and when he hath found, he shall be amazed; and having been amazed, he shall reign (i.e. enter on the life of Divine power over the world, cf. Saying vii.); and having reigned he shall rest." In the Homily we catch echoes of this conception of the Christian experience, both in its general language and in one allusion in particular. Men, when first they hear "the Oracles of God," "wonder at their beauty and grandeur" (xiii.); and again (v. 5), "the promise of Christ is great and wonderful, even the Rest of the Kingdom soon to be and of age-long Life." Here we seem to have a paraphrase of the two Sayings just cited; and as our preacher is not an original mind, it is most natural to infer that he is echoing what he *and his hearers* were familiar with, as it stood in the Oxyrhynchus Sayings of Jesus. Further, the very Sayings of "Jesus" or "the Lord" which he weaves into his discourse, or rather uses largely as its basis, agree in type with the more straightforward and less mystical of those in that Collection.

It is true, there is no actual saying common to the two sets of Sayings. But both are probably only fragments of what their source in each case contained; and critical opinion generally regards 2 *Clement* as citing a single Gospel source in all the passages above quoted.[1] And this source we may suppose to have been that most representative of local tradition, that is, the form in which local Christian thought appreciated the Evangelic Sayings, which had come to it originally in Palestinian type of presentation. A preacher about A.D. 120–140 might still cite the Sayings of the Lord which he wished to use in support of his message as they occurred in a local adaptation of Christ's teaching *for practical purposes*, although he knew it also as it lay

[1] For another quotation, usually traced to the *Gospel of the Egyptians*, see below.

in more purely historical contexts in our Gospels. Yet only on one condition : that it was the form most familiar alike to his readers and himself. This means that it originated in the church in and to which he was preaching. And that, we have argued, was Alexandria.

II.

But before going farther into the *provenance,* name, and nature of the Gospel-source used in 2 *Clement,* it will be well to see how its Sayings and those in the Oxyrhynchus papyri suit each other when read as one series, arranged in the most natural order of which the case seems to admit. For the sake of convenience, however, we will so far anticipate our whole reconstruction of the original Oxyrhynchan Gospel as to include also a few Sayings which we have some other warrant for tracing to it. Here Clement of Alexandria is our chief evidence, as is natural not only from his position in time and space but also from his spiritual affinities with the distinctive standpoint of the Collection, judged especially by its opening Sayings.

We begin with a passage in which he seems to cast light on the way in which the peculiar paraphrased form of the sayings common to our Collection and the Synoptics may be conceived to have arisen. In *Stromateis,* IV. vi. 41 (Stählin's ed.) we read :

"And by way of sum of every virtue, the Lord, instructing us in the necessity of despising death with full insight, on account of love to God, says, 'Blessed are the persecuted for righteousness' sake, *for they shall be called the sons of God*' ; or according to some of those who paraphrase (μετατιθέντων) the Gospels, 'Blessed,' says He,[1] 'are the persecuted for righteousness' sake, for *they shall be perfect,* and blessed are the persecuted *for my sake,* for they shall *have a place where they shall not be persecuted.*'"

[1] In the sense of "He means," as in *Barn.* vii. 11. "Thus, means He, they who wish to see Me and lay hold of My Kingdom must lay hold on Me through tribulation and suffering."

This is a remarkable statement, as showing that there were in the Alexandrine church of Clement's day glossing versions of Jesus' Sayings—as here of the saying which reads in our Gospels (Matt. v. 10), "Blessed are the persecuted for righteousness' sake, *for theirs is the Kingdom of the heavens*" (not as Clement here cites the saying). Whether such glosses were all oral, or not, their genesis is suggested by the way Clement describes their ultimate source, namely the paraphrastic activity of certain persons who interpreted the Lord's words in terms of the thought most expressive to themselves and their circle. Such an interpretative activity had, we know, its recognised place in Church life, not only in the work of the catechist or teacher who instructed catechumens under preparation for membership in the Church by baptism, but also in the public ministry in church of the Reader. This minister, of whom a few suggestive traces have come down to us, is best characterised in the so-called *Church Ordinances*, the basis of which perhaps belongs to about Clement's own day. He is to be "easily audible" when he reads the Scriptures, but also "good in exposition, knowing that he is fulfilling the place of an evangelist"; and this our present text further defines as one "who filleth the ears of him who does not understand" (xix.). The need for such interpretative paraphrase would be very real when people of average Greek or Egyptian mentality, in a city like Alexandria, tried to *make their own* truths which reached them in the Semitic or Palestinian forms which mark much in the Synoptic tradition of Jesus' teaching. There would be, too, a tendency for the latter to be replaced *for practical purposes* by the former in general use. Hence in course of time a body of what were felt to be the most important of their Lord's Sayings, for disciples viewing life from the standpoint of Alexandrine culture, would naturally take

shape out of existing materials, both written and oral—the latter even being more or less fixed already in their "transposed" forms. It is some such life-history that we may imagine lie behind the Oxyrhynchus Sayings.

But further, this very Saying as cited by Clement himself (perhaps under the influence, direct or indirect, of our Collection), in which "blessedness" is described in terms of sonship to God, instead of "the Kingdom of the heavens," illustrates in another way not only the genesis of our Collection, but also certain of its Sayings in particular. For these too suggest that the conception of "the Kingdom" of God as something to be "entered" by the disciple, was rather strange to many Gentiles; and so a saying arose which seemed more expressive of the mind of the Master, what we should call "the spirit of His teaching," on the point. "Who," the Twelve are made to ask (from the standpoint of non-Jewish inquirers of another place and time), are they who draw us [into the Kingdom, if] the Kingdom is in heaven?" Jesus' answer is mystical in character, turning on the Lucan idea of the Kingdom as "within" men, but couched in terms of the Greek principle "Know thyself"—treated as the key to knowledge of things Divine, sonship to God in particular. This form next came to be regarded and treated as equally genuine with those already embodied in written "Gospels," and so could be ranked as among His utterances on the occasion when, as was now believed in certain circles (on the probability of the case), Jesus as the Risen Lord "gave commandment through Holy Spirit (i.e. by a fresh and more spiritually efficient mode of operation on their minds) to the Apostles" (Acts i. 2). The occasion on which this re-enunciation of the essence of His teaching "touching the Kingdom of God" (*ib.* 3) was thought by the author of the Oxyrhynchus Collection to have taken place, is defined in his Prelude to

the whole in terms both of Luke xxiv. 44 f. ("These (were) My sayings which I spoke to you, while I was yet with you. . . . Then opened He their mind . . . "), and also of John xx. 26. For there only "his disciples . . . and Thomas" are specified as the recipients of His instruction, and a saying follows bearing on the spiritual situation of later disciples "who have not seen and yet have believed."

The same sort of transformation of ideas the germs of which may be found in Jesus' historical teaching, is visible in the preceding Saying, out of which the other grows. It too shows the need felt for transposition of the idea of "the Kingdom" out of the setting of Jewish Messianism into that of present spiritual experience. Here it is conceived in forms of thought connected with the Platonic doctrine of "Wonder" as the source of true "knowledge," the philosophic apprehension of Truth or Reality. Thus the Hebraic notion of entrance into the Kingdom or Reign of God appears in this Saying as "reigning" in a psychological sense [1]; it shows too a spiritualising of the notion of "rest" in the Messianic Kingdom similar to that in the New Testament in the *Epistle to Hebrews* (perhaps by Apollos, cf. the note below for the possible effect of his teaching on certain Greek Christians at Corinth). There we get the doctrine of "rest" as a state open to Faith here and now, a "Sabbatism" of the soul proper to God's People, where the believer "is at rest from his works, even as God from His own" (see Heb. iv. 1–11, especially 1, 9–11). This notion of spiritual "Sabbatism" illustrates another Saying, viz., "Except ye sabbatise the Sabbath,[1] ye shall not see the Father." Here the sabbath rest which God desires is much the same as in Hebrews. Only there

[1] For this Greek notion of "reigning," by consciousness of insight into the secret of things, compare the uplifted spirit of certain of Paul's converts at Corinth, who gloried that they were "reigning" without his aid (1 Cor. iv. 6, 8).

the "rest" is from one's own works, as sinful because self-motived; now it is rather from action savouring of "the world," towards which the Christian's attitude is to be one of "fasting"—as the first half of the Saying has it. But all this is thoroughly in the Alexandrine[1] manner, a fact which has an important bearing on the ultimate *provenance* of the Second Saying, and so on the question from what "Gospel according to Hebrews" Clement cites it, as he does.

Meantime let us continue our study of Clement's chief citations of non-canonical Sayings of Jesus,[2] to see whether they have such affinity to each other as to point to a single source; and if so, of what kind and probable origin. In *Strom.* V. vi. 63 he cites *Barn.* vi. 5–10, adding that, "it is within the ability of few to receive these things. For it was not as grudging, he (Barnabas) means, that the Lord laid it down *in a certain gospel*, 'My secret ("mystery") is for Me and for *the sons of My house*.'" This Saying is a New Testament form of a glossing rendering of words in Isaiah xxiv. 16 of which we have trace in certain LXX MSS., as also in the versions of Symmachus and Theodotion, the words in italics replacing "mine" in the older text. In the *Pseudo-Clementine Homilies* (xix. 20), which belong to Syria, the same saying is cited in a seemingly secondary form, viz., "We (says Peter) remember our Lord and Teacher, how in His injunctions He said to us, 'The secret *things* ("mysteries") *ye shall guard*[3] for Me and the sons

[1] We may note here that even the *Epistle of Barnabas*, largely Alexandrine as it is in many ways, does not regard the Sabbatism of God's people as possible in the present "age" or order.

[2] The findings which follow agree in the main with those of J. H. Ropes, in his thorough discussion of the subject in *Die Sprüche Jesu* (*Texte u. Untersuchungen*, 1896), where details will be seen.

[3] Here the variations point to knowledge of the Saying in a wording further removed from its Old Testament form (and nearer to the language

of My house.' Wherefore also He used to explain to His disciples privately the secrets of the Kingdom of the heavens." This points to the Saying being a gloss on Matthew vii. 6, 'give not that which is holy to the dogs.'

Another saying which Clement cites as Scripture, and others (Apelles, a generation earlier than Clement, Origen, and *Clem. Hom.* ii. 51) assign to Jesus "in the Gospel," to "the precept of Jesus," or to "our Teacher" is the famous "But become (ye) approved bankers" (*Strom.* I. xxviii. 177, II. iv. 15, VI. x. 81, VII. xv. 90). This alludes to the function of bankers in discriminating good coin from counterfeit; and applies it to Christians as responsible for preserving Christ's teaching in its purity, where spurious interpretations are offered of it. The sort of Gospel context out of which such a warning could easily grow might be "Take heed how ("what," Mark) ye hear," in Luke. Ropes (*op. cit.* 142) suggests that "we may here have a trace of the catechetical instruction at Alexandria."

Yet another saying found in Clement, and more fully in Origen, is assigned explicitly by Eusebius to the teaching of Jesus. "Ask the great things, and the little shall be added to you"; to which Origen (*De Oratione* 2, and in 14 more clearly as part of the same saying) adds, "And ask the heavenly things, and the earthly shall be added to you." Ropes (*op. cit.*, p. 140) notes that Origen cites it several times, "and knew it in any case by heart; and it may perhaps have belonged to the catechetical instruction at Alexandria."[1] It is a development of the thought of Mat-

of Matthew xiii. 11) than that known to Clement, and so to a source later than, if related to, the Gospel on which he draws. This has a bearing on the problem of the relation of the "Gospel according to the Hebrews" known by Clement (if it be the gospel cited here also) to the Ebionite Gospel with that title.

[1] But may well have come to it from the Palestinian *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which would help to explain Origen's confident citation of it.

thew vi. 33 [= Luke xii. 31], "But seek [first] the Kingdom [and His righteousness], and [all] these things (earthly wants) shall be added to you."

Now with this still in mind, let us look at another fragment, No. 655, in the Oxyrhynchus series, which has certainly close affinities with the other two, though their discoverers doubt its being part of the same Collection. It begins thus:—

"(Take no anxious care) from morn till eve, nor from eve to morn, either for your food, what ye shall eat, nor for your raiment, what garments ye shall put on. Ye are far better than the lilies, which card not nor yet spin; [but] having one garment, what lack they? And ye, who could add to your stature? He Himself (God) will give you your garment.

"His disciples say unto Him, When wilt Thou be manifest to us, and when shall we see Thee? He [or Jesus][1] saith, Whensoe'er ye shall lay aside your garments and not feel shame. . . ."

I have quoted the passage to the end of this portion of the fragment, in order to bring out the connexion of thought between what precedes and follows the disciples' query. It lies in the idea of clothing as relatively necessary to human life as it is now, but as not essential to true humanity: for when man conforms to God's ideal of manhood, as when Jesus shall be fully manifest, and with Him the final "Rest" of God's sons in "Paradise restored," then, as at the first (when "naked and not ashamed," Gen. ii. 25), no earthly garments will be needed by those now on a higher and securer plane of innocence.[2] Reversal of the effects of the Fall into Sin (see Gen. iii. 7) is the essential notion of Salvation which appears in Barnabas vi. 13, "Lo, I make the last things as the first"; and no doubt it prevailed in the

[1] There is a hole in the payrus here, where $\overline{\text{IC}}$ may have stood.

[2] Comp. Gal. iii. 28 (which Clement cites in this connexion): for those who "have put on Christ as a garment" "there cannot be male and female."

Alexandrian Church of the early second century. Thus the nature of Jesus' reply is quite in keeping with the standpoint of our Collection, and has nothing of the Encratite or extreme ascetic attitude to sex implied in the similar saying quoted by Clement Alexandria, as it stood in the *Gospel according to the Egyptians* (as cited by Cassian the Docetist), viz., "Whensoe'er ye trample under foot the garment of shame." That puts a new *animus* into the idea.

Now 2 *Clement* xii. 2 quotes the words which immediately follow this clause in the quotation in Clement, viz. "Whensoe'er the two shall be one, and the male with the female, neither male nor female"; but it describes the question which elicited the reply rather differently. In the "Gospel according to the Egyptians" Salome, says Clement, asks "When the things about which she inquired shall become known"; whereas in 2 *Clement* we read that the Lord was "questioned by someone, when *His Kingdom* shall *arrive*." There too the reply has not any part of the saying in Clement of Alexandria about "the garment of shame," but has *another clause* between the two which follow, viz., "and[1] the outside as the inside." This gives quite a different effect to the saying as a whole, to wit, that Christ's Kingdom will coincide with the doing away of all false dualism in life, or between the outer and inner aspects of things and as between the sexes. By this seems to be meant, as in Galatians iii. 28, simply the spiritualising of life through and through, so that even the distinction between the sexes is raised to a higher plane and disappears in its present contrasted form.[2]

[1] Or perhaps "both . . . and," what follows being the two chief forms of dualism.

[2] 2 *Clem.* itself uses this idea in xiv. 2 ff. in another way—"The male is Christ, the female the Church." But this only increases the likelihood that it knew the idea in the form here assigned to our Collection, not in that of the Egyptian Gospel.

Hence it is doubtful if even 2 *Clement* and Cassian were citing the same source. But if so, 2 *Clement* may here be using the same Gospel as he uses elsewhere, viz., one prior to and used by the *Gospel according to the Egyptians*, probably in order to supersede it, if that Gospel be the " Gospel of the Twelve " to which Origen alludes as a non-canonical Gospel of the same rank as the other. In that case, in the source cited by 2 Clement the saying about being " unclothed, yet unashamed," in answer to a question of " the disciples," was distinct from the question and answer in reply to " some one " (presumably Salome) as to " When His Kingdom [1] shall have arrived " : and the latter may well have followed at a later point in the dialogue as we find it in Pap. 655 (where the traces of the next line imply a different topic), the two being later combined and given a fresh and more Gnostic sense in *The Gospel according to the Egyptians*. Accordingly it is open to us to see in the " Gospel of the Twelve " the writing to which our papyrus Gospel-fragment belongs ; and this leaves open the further possibility that *all the Oxyrhynchus fragments are parts of that one Gospel*. " Gospel," we say advisedly : for such, and no mere Collection of unrelated sayings, it would then be, seeing that it has been shown [2] that there is real sequence of thought, that of a dialogue, in the matter contained in Pap. 655, so far as yet considered ; and there is more of it which follows.

Meantime we return to the opening of this fragment, just to point out how well it would follow on the sayings quoted from 2 Clement and Clement of Alexandria. These deprecate concern about earthly goods, as safely to be left to

[1] This primitive and Hebrew term, which certainly was used in our Collection of Sayings, was alien to the genius of *The Gospel according to the Egyptians*.

[2] As Dr. Taylor also proved in the *Oxyrhynchus Sayings of Jesus* (p. 22).

God to add to the goods of the soul, vouchsafed in response to faithful seeking. And it lies near to hand to infer that both sets of sayings once stood in the same source.

There is one other saying apparently assigned to Jesus by Clement. "For Thou hast seen, saith He, thy brother; thou hast seen thy God" (similarly Tertullian, *De Orat.* 26). The passage continues thus:

"The divine apostle, however, writes in our regard, 'For now we see as by means of a mirror,' recognising ourselves in it by reflexion, and from the Divine in us contemplating coincidently, as far as may be, its efficient Cause." [1]

How closely this line of thought, the spiritual vision of God as latent in the human soul, is in accord with that of the opening Sayings of our Collection, hardly needs dwelling on.

Finally, there is a Saying of the Lord cited by Origen which may well have been used by Clement also (if indeed Origen did not "read" it in some writing of his great predecessor), or at any rate have come from that Gospel which we have seen reason to think that he cited more than the once when he described it as "According to the Hebrews" (of Alexandria). Origen writes (see Ropes, *op. cit.*, p. 122):—"I have read somewhere, as though the Saviour were speaking—and I am not clear whether it be that some one personated the Saviour or quoted Him personally, or whether this which was spoken was truly His. In any case He Himself says, 'He who is near me, is near fire (trial); he who is far from me, is far from the Kingdom.' It is probable that this was an outgrowth from Luke xii. 49 ("I came to cast fire upon the earth") in the Alexandrian tradition.

[1] *Strom.* I. xix. 94; so also II. xv. 70. "And the saying 'know thyself' has been taken ere now in a more mystical sense in the light of this, 'Thou hast seen thy brother, thou hast seen thy God.'"

III.

We will attempt now to exhibit consecutively the Sayings above traced to the Collection of Sayings of which the Oxyrhynchus fragments affords us clear evidence, using the letter as framework into which the others may be fitted with some probability, even as regards relative sequence.

"These are the sayings, the [wonderful[1] sayings, which] spake Jesus the Living [Lord to the ten disciples] and Thomas: and He said to them, Whosoever heareth these Sayings shall not taste of death.

Saith Jesus: Let not the seeker cease [from the search] until he hath found[2]; and when he hath found, he shall be amazed; and having been amazed, *he shall reign*, and having reigned, he shall rest.

Saith J[esus: Say not, Who, then, are] they that draw us [up into heaven, if] *the reign* (Kingdom) is in heaven? For I say, the birds of the heaven, and of the beasts whatsoe'er is under the earth or upon the earth, and the fishes of the sea, these are they that draw you: and the Kingdom of heaven is within you, and whosoe'er shall know himself shall find it. [And having found it], ye shall know [that sons and heirs] are ye of the Father [Almighty], and ye shall know yourselves as in [the Kingdom of God], and *ye are* the Ci[ty of God].

Saith Jesus: A man shall not hesitate to *ask ques-*

[1] Preferable to "life-giving," as more in line with the reference to "wonder" in Saying I. Brackets will be used only where the reading is in doubt.

[2] For the idea compare Matt. vii. 7 f., 11, Luke xi. 9 f., 12, "Seek . . for every one that seeketh findeth."

tions [about the Fath]ers,[1] bo[ldly inquir]ing as to the place of [glory: and] ye shall [find] that many first shall be [last and] the last first, and [they shall inherit life].

Saith Jesus: [Everything that is not befo]re thy face, and that which is hidden from thee, *shall be revealed* to thee.
For there is not anything hidden which shall not become manifest, and buried which shall not be raised up.

His disciples *interrogate Him* and say[2]: *How* shall we fast, [and how pray], and how [do alms], and what shall we observe [of the traditions]?

Saith Jesus: [Ye shall not be as the hypocr]ites. Do not [these things openly, but hold] fast to reality (lit. truth), [and let your righteousness] be hidden. [For I say,] Blessed is [he who doeth these things in secret, for he shall be rewarded openly by the Father who] is [in heaven].

. . . . . .

Saith Jesus: Thou hast seen *thy brother*; thou hast seen thy God.[3]

[1] I.e. in relation to this Kingdom of God. "The Fathers" would be the Old Testament worthies in particular, "the Elders" of Heb. xi. 2: see above, p. .

[2] The lines of this reconstruction depend upon the clue to the whole being in Matt. vi., which deals with Almsgiving, Prayer and Fasting (cf. Didaché, viii. xv. 4; 2 Clem. xvi. 4, for these three as current interests), as forms of Righteousness apt to be marred by ostentation and so lack "truth" or reality. Possibly Sabbath observance was among the other religious traditions apparently referred to also; and if so, was probably dealt with in what followed (cf. Saying VII. for an allusion to it spiritually). The last sentence, "Blessed . . ." is more uncertain than the rest, but has some support in Matt. vi. 18.

[3] For the meaning of this, viz., the Heavenly Father is revealed in His human sons, see above, p. 150. This saying might well occur in the free reproduction of the Great Sermon in Matt. v.–vii., Luke vi. 20 ff., cf. xii. 22 ff., which probably followed here, to judge from the references in 2 Clem. (iv. 2 in particular), as well as from the beginning of the second instalment of Oxyrhynchus Sayings (VI.). In 2 Clem. iv. 3 the confession of Christ by deeds is described as mutual love; freedom from adultery,

[Saith Jesus :] No thanks to you if ye love those who love you, but thanks to you if ye love your enemies and those that hate you.[1]

. . . . . .

[Saith Jesus: Cast out first the beam out of thine own eye,]
And *then* shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote that is in *thy brother's* eye.

Saith Jesus: *Except* ye *fast* (as to) the *world*,[2] *ye shall not* find the Kingdom of God: And unless ye truly keep (sabbatise) the Sabbath, ye shall not see the Father.

Saith Jesus: I stood in the midst of *the world*, and in flesh was I seen of them. And I *found all men drunken*, and none found I athirst among them. And my soul grieveth over the sons of men, for that they are *blind* in their heart and see [not with their understanding].

. . . . . .

[Saith Jesus :] . . . their *poverty*.

Saith Jesus: Wherever there are two, they are not without God; and *where* there is *one* alone, I say, *I am with him*. Raise

evil-speaking and envy, self-control, mercy, kindliness, fellow-feeling and freedom from love of money—a list which answers roughly to the Sermon, but with a certain change of order or emphasis which may well have been present also in our Sayings.

[1] The Saying quoted in 2 Clem. xiii. 4 as most characteristic of the Christian ideal for conduct contained in "the Oracles of God," that which makes outsiders "wonder at its exceeding goodness" (kindness).

[2] "The world" of men, as it is, is alien to "the Kingdom" (cf. 2 Clem. cited above, p. 138), and this thought links together the next two Sayings. The next group grows naturally out of this implied spiritual dualism of the present era (cf. the last Saying of all, to Salome), which makes Christians feel lonely in the world and in need of Divine support, and lays on them individually (as "prophets" or witnesses for God) and corporately (as "city" of God) a hard duty of testimony to the world, yet one which will tell in the end. But this involves *full* obedience to the Divine message, even when demanding the confession of deeds and self-denial, from which human nature shrinks.

		the stone, and there thou shalt find Me; cleave the wood, and there I am.
	Saith Jesus:	A *prophet* is *not acceptable* in his own country, neither doth a physician work cures upon them that know him.
	Saith Jesus:	A *city*[1] built on the top of a high mountain, and set firm, *can neither fall* nor be *hid*.
Mt. vii. 26. Lk. vi. 49.	Saith Jesus:	Thou hearest into thy one *ear*, [but the other thou hast *closed*].
Mt. vii. 21. Lk. vi. 46, cf. xiii. 25.	[Saith Jesus:]	Not every one that *saith* unto Me, Lord, Lord, shall [be saved], but he that *doeth* [righteousness].[2]
Lk. xiii. 26 f.	[Saith Jesus:]	Though ye be with Me, gathered in My bosom, and do not My commandments, I will cast you away and will say unto you, Depart from Me, I know you not whence ye are, workers of lawlessness.
Lk. viii. 21. Mt. xii. 50.	[Saith Jesus:]	My brethren are these, they who do the will of My Father.
Lk. xvi. 13*a*. 13*c*.	[Saith Jesus:]	No servant can serve two masters. [Ye cannot serve God and mammon.]
Mt. xvi. 26.		For what is the profit, if any one gain the whole world and forfeit his soul?
Lk. xvi. 12 f.	[Saith Jesus:]	If ye kept not safe that which is a little thing (i.e., worldly wealth), who shall give you that which is great (true wealth)?
Lk. xvi. 10.		For I say unto you that he who is faithful in the least, is faithful also in much.
Lk. xii. 31. Mt. vi. 33.	[Saith Jesus:]	Ask the great things, and the little shall be added to you,[3]

[1] Compare Saying II., "Ye are the Ci[ty of God]."

[2] This turn of thought, the responsibility for letting the light in them *shine out* to others in conduct, so that Christians shall be "the light of the world," is present in Matt. v. 13–16, in connexion with the saying about them as "the City" of God. 2 Clem. iii. 4 may have this saying in mind in exclaiming, "But wherein shall we confess Him? In doing what he saith and not failing to heed His commands": then "Not every one," etc.

Here begin Sayings in 2 *Clem.* The words in brackets may be due to the homilist's adaptation of the quotation to his own use. Cf. "save" in the line before.

[3] Clem. Alex., Origen (and Eusebius).

And ask the heavenly, and the earthly shall be added to you.[1]

Mt. vi. 23–34. Lk. xii. 22–31. [Saith Jesus [2]: Be not anxious] from morn to eve, nor from eve to morn, for your food, what ye shall eat, nor for your raiment, what garments ye shall put on. Ye are far better than the lilies, which card not, nor yet spin; and having one garment what do they lack? And ye, who could add to your stature? He himself will give you your raiment.

His disciples say unto Him: When wilt Thou be manifest to us, and when shall we see Thee?[3]

Saith [Jesus:] Whensoe'er ye shall put off your garments and not be ashamed.

[The few letters of what followed after a gap, so far as can be made out, seem to describe the unearthly brightness of the raiment of light which is to clothe the redeemed (cf. 2 Cor. v. 1–4) in the Divine Renewal of all things (Acts iii. 21), on the lines of the *Apoc. of Peter*. Then we get traces of]

[His disciples] say[4] [unto Him].....

Lk. xi. 52. He began to say: The key of knowledge they hid: they themselves entered not in, and those entering in they suffered not to enter. But ye, become prudent as serpents and harmless as doves.

Mt. x. 16*b*.

Mt. vii. 6. [Saith Jesus:] My secret ("mystery") is for me and

[1] Origen, especially in *De Orat.* 14, where he describes "the Divine Logos" as thereby "challenging us to imitate the prayers of the Saints," and so obtaining true goods as 'heavenly things' "inherit the kingdom of the heavens and enjoy as 'great' things the very greatest goods."

[2] The group of Sayings which come next are in Pap. 655.

[3] Compare 2 Clem. xvii. 4.

[4] This much is fairly assured by the trace of "we" a few lines below. Their question may be inferred from Jesus' reply to have been as to the teaching of the scribes and their own attitude to it.

		for the sons of my house.
Lk. viii. 18.		But become ye approved testers of
Mk. iv. 24.		the currency ("bankers").[1]
Mt. x. 16*a*.	[Saith Jesus :]	Ye shall be as lambs in the midst of wolves.[2] Peter answering saith to Him : What, then, if the wolves tear the lambs ? Jesus said to Peter : Let not the lambs fear the wolves after they themselves have died ; and ye also, fear ye not them that kill you and are (then) not able to do anything to you ; but fear Him that after ye have died hath authority over soul and body, to cast into a Gehenna of fire.
Mt. v. 10, 9.	[Saith Jesus :]	Blessed are the persecuted for righteousness' sake, for they shall be called sons of God.[3]
Mt. x. 32.	[Saith Jesus :]	He that has confessed Me before men,
Lk. xii. 8.		I will confess him before My Father.
Lk. xiii. 49 f.	[Saith Jesus :]	He that is near Me, is near fire : he that is far from Me, is far from the Kingdom.
	[Salome inquired of Him :]	When shall thy Kingdom actually be here ?
	Saith Jesus :	Whensoe'er (the) two things shall be one, both the outside as the inside, and the male with the female—neither male nor female.[4]

As one looks back over this body of Sayings, particularly those in the papyri (where points of connexion are picked out by italics), it really seems hard to agree with those who are unable to recognise any proper sequence of idea [5]

[1] The two Sayings here put together are derived from Clem. Alex. and others : see above.

[2] This saying cited in 2 *Clem.* (like the others which follow, save one), as it occurs in the same verse of Matt. (x. 16) as a saying just above, may well come here : compare also Matt. x. 17, "But beware of men."

[3] Clem. Alex., *Strom.* IV. vi. 41, as cited above.

[4] I.e. when Unity shall reign in all spheres.

[5] To the present writer it seems that the sequence is much the same in kind, if not in degree, as that between the Sayings in the "Two Ways" in our *Didaché*, without the recurrent "Saith Jesus."

running through them. Of course a negative judgment on the point is facilitated by refusal to assign the third papyrus, which obviously contains dialogue, to the same Collection as the other two. And this again usually goes along with refusal to see in the opening line a description of the Sayings as post-resurrectional teaching on a specified occasion. The fact seems to be that this peculiar historical situation, chosen for the re-statement of the Evangelic teaching in terms more suited to later Christian experience than were those of the Synoptic Gospels, exactly explains the twofold character of the Collection as partly historical, partly timeless or mystical. But with this key to our hand, there seems no longer reason for hesitation in regarding the Collection as a gospel of a kind, or indeed in assigning to it the third papyrus fragment, albeit that there the imperfect, "He began to say," appears once (perhaps as ushering in a sequence of sayings), instead of the usual "Saith Jesus" before each Saying or unit of thought. After all, the final appeal must be to the similarity of style, both in form and substance, of the Sayings in this fragment which are parallel with Synoptic matter, not to mention any parallelism in both cases to matter in the *Apoc. of Peter*. The theory of unity of source works easily, once the later nature of the parallel matter in the *Gospel according to the Egyptians* is realised.

In a word, the best working hypothesis is that we have in all three, as also in the citations in 2 Clement and elsewhere, parts of the Alexandrian *Gospel of the Twelve*, as Origen styles it in a belittling reference (as distinct from the Aramaic *Gospel according to the Hebrews* which he was wont to cite)—otherwise the Greek "Gospel according to the Hebrews" known to Clement of Alexandria, and based in part on the Aramaic one. This Greek gospel follows

in its general idea of Jesus' teaching [1] the Gospels of Luke and John, as we see from the Prelude and the less Jewish, more mystic or directly spiritual, form of its address ("Saith Jesus"), and from its contents where they diverge from the Synoptic type. On the other hand, it takes *matter* not only from both Matthew and Luke, but also from the Palestinian or Aramaic *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, as was natural in the Jewish-Christian circle at Alexandria in which it arose, to meet the needs of the Hellenistic, rather than pure Hebrew, genius and outlook of the prevalent Alexandrine Judaism (compare Philo). Certain of that gospel's sayings it transposed out of the Palestinian key into that of the local piety, with its "Wisdom" conception of Divine Revelation and of the medium of its communication to men (e.g. in Baruch iii. 37). The atmosphere of such piety, one or two decades later, is well reproduced in the sermon known as 2 *Clement*, which also shows like dependence on the *Apoc. of Peter*.

As to the Sayings derived from the Aramaic *Gospel according to the Hebrews* (sayings perhaps adopted into local Catechetical instruction), these did not include the one usually taken to be proof of such use, viz. that cited by Clement of Alexandria. This is in fact typically Alexandrine, not Palestinian, and belongs to the idea of the Collection as a whole, its warp and woof, in a way incredible in an extract from a work so different in genius as the Aramaic *Gospel according to the Hebrews*. The Alexandrian Gospel revealed to us by the Oxyrhynchus papyri embodied what it took from it, as well as from other sources, in its own setting of dialogue, where needful to the bringing out of the meaning as its compiler saw it; and the order through-

[1] As also of the conditions under which it was given *in final form*, an idea probably already adopted by the *Apoc. of Peter*, which our gospel uses.

out was one of spiritual sequence, under the historical conditions of utterance which he conceived most suited for the definitive revelation of the "wonderful Sayings" of Jesus, the incarnate Wisdom and Revealer of the Heavenly Father.

These are the prime presuppositions of the above reconstruction of the contents and order of the "Gospel of the Twelve," as current largely among 'Hebrews' or Jewish Christians in Alexandria A.D. 100–120, before the more pronouncedly native *Gospel according to the Egyptians* arose, probably in conscious contrast to it. In very much the same manner, I imagine, the semi-docetic "Gospel of Peter" arose in antithesis to the Palestinian "Gospel of the Hebrews." Be that as it may, my hope is to have shown reason to think that we possess in fact a far larger part of the Collection to which the Oxyrhynchan Sayings belonged than has hitherto been supposed; and that not a few "Agrapha," or vagrant Sayings attributed to Jesus, once had a congenial home within its ample bosom.

VERNON BARTLET.

ST. JOHN VII. 37, 38.

I HAVE read with much interest the articles on the above passage by Professor Rendel Harris and Dr. Burney. Perhaps they and others may not know that an interpretation substantially the same as theirs was given some years ago by the late Dr. E. W. Bullinger. I remember his calling my attention to it in the course of a conversation, and since then I have frequently passed it on as at least a possibility. It now appears in the Companion Bible, which is Dr. Bullinger's work. He specially called my attention to the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of the phrase ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας αὐτοῦ referring to the believer in the light of the word "receive," which implies something *in* him not flowing *from* him. Dr. Bullinger, therefore, interprets the phrase of Christ, not the believer, and considers it a figure of speech (the part for the whole) for "Himself," and he says that the reference is to the Messiah as the Source of all spiritual blessing. The Old Testament texts named in support of this are Isaiah xii. 3; lv. 1; lviii. 11; Ezekiel xlvii. 1; Joel iii. 18; Zechariah xiii. 1; xiv. 1. The passage will therefore run as follows:—

"If any man thirst, let him come unto Me,
and let him drink that believeth on Me.
As the Scripture hath said, 'Out of Him (the Messiah) shall flow rivers of living water.'
But this spake He of the Spirit, which they that believe on Him should receive."

W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS.

THE THEOLOGY OF DR. FORSYTH. (*II.*)

III.

If through His Cross, the climax of His life's work, the cup into which were poured the full riches of His moral action upon the world in God's behalf, Christ has brought real redemption and re-created humanity that in Him it may find its righteousness and its peace, the question of His Person meets us as a problem which we cannot put on one side or treat as indifferent. Soteriology passes into Christology by way, as Forsyth pointed out,[1] of soterology. Christ as Saviour is in one category ; we as saved in another. "Christ is more precious to us by what distinguishes Him from us than by what identifies Him with us." [2] Again and again Forsyth struck this note, so uncongenial to certain types of religious and even Christian thought. His longest and most elaborate antitheses are framed in connexion with it. One of them, opening with precisely that idea which is expressed in the last quotation, in contrast with the findings of liberal theology, fills two pages of *Positive Preaching*.[3] With Patristic theology Forsyth wa not sympathetic, but his own conviction that the Christ who so greatly saves cannot be less than God is one with the religion that was the foundation of Athanasius' theology,

[1] *The Cruciality of the Cross*, p. 25.

[2] *Hibbert Journal*, vi., 3 April, 1908, Art. "The Distinctive Thing in Christian Experience," p. 486.

[3] pp. 327–9.

and he was never likely to underrate Athanasius' achievement.

Forsyth's Christology is to be studied in his Congregational Union Lecture on "The Person and Place of Jesus Christ." The book ought to be far more widely known and deeply studied than seems to be the case. Books dealing with the Christological problem in one or other of its aspects, or even surveying the whole field, are not uncommon; but work of real greatness, work in which one feels that the writer has measured the solemn grandeur of his subject and is trying to treat of it according to its scale, is very rare. It will grow rarer if the present fancy for emphasising, sometimes in an almost noisy manner, the Lord's humanity is allowed to have its way in theology. But apart from all contrasts, Forsyth's book is a great book. He put into it all the best of which he was capable, and the result is something equally impressive as religion and as theology. To a few of its leading ideas I will call attention, but even a long *résumé* would quite fail to do it justice. First, then, I would refer to his handling of the whole issue raised by the concentration upon the Synoptic Gospels, the emphasis laid upon "the religion of Jesus," and the discovery of the essence of Christianity in the teaching of Jesus about the Fatherhood of God and about moral duty. Forsyth's argument is that it is impossible to find the secret of Christ's greatness along this line, that it does not face the full content of Christ's self-consciousness—for instance, His sense of finality, of Himself as God's final revelation, that it omits His atoning work in the Cross, and that it involves us in the conclusion that the Apostles and the Church went very far wrong, wrong with a monstrous wrongness, in their interpretation of Him, so that we have to ask, "Was Christ removed from the groping thought of Peter, Paul and John by a greater gulf than that which parted Him from the

Judaism so fatal to Him ? " [1] Secondly, the treatment of the question of Pre-existence is of great moment, and might well be pondered at a time like the present when controversy is beginning to turn on the implications of that conception. And when Forsyth thinks of Christ's pre-existence, he thinks of it in terms of the Son, and not in terms of the Logos. So did St. Paul, so did St. John, except in the prologue to the Gospel, so did the Council of Nicæa, which deliberately omitted from its creed the word Logos, though it stood in the Creed of Eusebius, on which the conciliar creed was built. Christ was the Son, in time and also in eternity. No belief which comes short of this does justice to what Christ has meant in the experience of the Church, or to the fact that whereas " of no man can it be said that his relation to God constitutes that personality," yet " in the case of Jesus the whole relation to the Father, namely, sonship, did constitute that personality. Think it away and nothing is left." [2] Then, thirdly, the problem of the incarnate life itself is met through the application of the twin notions of kenosis and plerosis. In connexion with the former, Forsyth treads a well-beaten track, firmly but cautiously. He feels the difficulties which confront the traveller, but thinks that they are less along this route than along any other. With regard to Christ's limitations in respect of knowledge, indeed, he does not feel any difficulty. " If He did not know, it was because He consented not to know " ; [3] He was " by His own consent, by His emptying of Himself, limited and wrong on certain points where now, by His grace, we are right. I mean points like the authorship of a psalm, or perhaps the Parousia." [4] But where the treatment is of special interest is in respect of the relationship of Christ's manhood to the possibility of sin. Which is the

[1] p. 148, [2] p. 285. [3] p. 317.
[4] *Hibbert Journal*, X. i., p. 245.

true formula—*Potuit non peccare* or *Non potuit peccare*? [1] Forsyth decides for the second; but what then of the reality of the manhood? What is necessary (this is the answer) is not the possibility of sin, but the possibility and reality of temptation, and as to the reality of the temptation—did Christ know that He could never fail? If He did not know, then as the temptation was real, so was the struggle against it. Forsyth writes as a man aware how great the strain upon thought, and upon more than thought, is at this point. For a moment he writes as a theologian who takes his guidance from the Chalcedonian formula might: "because Christ was true man He could be truly tempted; because He was true God He could not truly sin; but He was not less true man for that." [2] It is a question on which argument can do little for the perplexed mind. I can only say that whatever be thought of his defences, I believe that Forsyth chose the truer of two true positions. The chapter on the "Plerosis or the Self-Fulfilment of Christ" is the most original section of the book. Its importance lies in the fact that here we have a theologian, to whom the reality of Christ's Godhead is essential to Christianity, laying hold on the idea of an "acquired divinity" which has usually been held in sharp contrast to the other doctrine, and using it with most impressive effect as a true part of any complete Christology. Thus Christ "came to be what He always vitally was, by what I have called a process of moral redintegration. He moved by His history *to* a supernal world that He moved in by His nature." [3] The double movement of God to man and of man to God becomes a unity in the Person of Christ by "the mutual involution of the two personal acts or movements supreme in spiritual being, the one distinctive of man, the other distinctive of

[1] *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 301.
[2] p. 302. [3] p. 338.

God." [1] We remember the contrast which Harnack makes in his *History of Dogma* between pneumatic and adoptionist Christology, how he points out that the dogmatic of the Church was to be based upon the former type of thought. Nicæa is as the keystone of an arch. Yet the student of doctrine who sees in the Nicene victory the triumph of the only Christology which does justice to the implications and supports the weight of the New Testament as a whole, must allow, even with the "perfect in respect of the manhood" of Chalcedon before his eyes, that the Ancient Church paid a price for that fine and true insistence upon the reality of the Lord's deity. The Ancient Church was not sufficiently interested in the concrete facts of His human, earthly life; they did not mean to it what, in all reverence but in all truth, we must say, they meant to Him. Through all the great controversies up to and through the uninviting vistas of the Monophysite and Monothelete contentions, the instinct of the Church as a whole was always right. Two natures, two energies, two wills—the dogmatic decision against any one of these positions would have been a disaster. But the instinct was imperfectly applied, and Christian religion, which must live on the Christ who is human, as well as on the Christ who is divine, suffered. With all his opposition to the Liberal picture of, and theology of, Jesus, Forsyth never lost grip on the humanity of Jesus. Here are some highly significant words taken from his discussion of Holman Hunt's picture, "The Shadow of Death": "We never can have a Christ in Art whose divinity is as unmistakeable as His humanity. We have neglected and falsified the humanity in the effort to render such a Christ. Our artistic effort must now, perhaps, be rather to represent the divine Man than the human God. If Art will help us to realise the Man, if imagination will

[1] p. 343.

bring near us, and endear to us, and ennoble for us, the passion and presence of His human life, there are other resources which will keep us in the truth as to His Godhead." [1] That is from an earlier work of his ; but its burden is theologically carried in the last chapter of his dogmatic masterpiece. It is, indeed, a very remarkable fact that Forsyth, who stood so far away from Paul of Samosata and Socinus and Unitarian theologians, did try, with all his powers, to do adequate justice to that reality of the Lord's manhood on which such theologians have insisted. As one of the quotations with which Harnack prefaces the first book of the second part of his great work [2] stand words of Paul of Samosata, bearing on his view of the relation of Jesus to God, which may be thus translated : " No praise attaches to that which is attained by nature, but to that which is attained through the relationship of love high praise is due." What Paul here emphasises, the importance of what is gained, not of what is given, is, though with no surrendering of that other vital side which Paul omits, very near to one element in Forsyth's Christology. So we have such a statement as this : " His relation to God was immediate from the first, and perfect ; but that did not give Him any immunity from the moral law that we must earn our greatest legacies, and appropriate by toil and conflict our best gifts." [3] In his insistence upon the value to Christ Himself of the experiences of His human life Forsyth is in line with Du Bose. But where Forsyth presents no parallel to the American theologian is in the latter's conception of human nature in itself and of the relation of the Logos to it. Forsyth would never have spoken, as Du Bose is willing to, of Jesus Christ as " the natural truth of the incarnation." [4]

[1] *Religion in Recent Art*, p. 195.
[2] Vol. iii., p. 120, in the English translation.
[3] *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 341
[4] *The Ecumenical Councils*, p. 333.

Anything like a speculative metaphysic of human nature was alien to him, and he distrusted the tendencies of the theology which occupied itself therewith.

It is necessary to realise, in connexion with Forsyth's Christology, that the Incarnation *in itself*, the idea of the Son of God made man, especially as presented in the Chalcedonian doctrine of the Two Natures, meant little to him. It was an idea which seemed to him to partake too much of mystic theosophy, and not to pay sufficient heed to the demands of a thoroughly ethicised religion. For him, the way to understand and to interpret the Incarnation was through soteriology. "There is the incarnation which puts us at once at the moral heart of reality—the Son made sin rather than the Word made flesh. The incarnation has no religious value but as the background of the atonement." [1] In the last book of a specifically theological character which he wrote—*The Justification of God*—there is a lengthy criticism of "Chalcedonism." [2] The word meant for him much more than a theory as to the Incarnation, but in so far as it stood for one theory, it seemed to him to depreciate the importance of God's moral action in atonement, and to lay the stress on the notion of the purification of human nature through its assumption by the Son of God. That perils beset this idea is true, also that the reduction of religious emphasis upon the Atonement, which has gone along with an immense stress upon the fact of the Incarnation, possesses many unsatisfactory features. Nevertheless, Forsyth's criticism lacked proportion. The fact of the Incarnation, if fact it be, as Forsyth fully acknowledged, must have a standing and value in its own right. The contrast between "an act largely metaphysical, like the Incarnation" and "the moral Act of Atonement" [3] is not

[1] *Positive Preaching*, p. 182.
[2] pp. 85–94.
[3] Ib. p. 91.

sound. And Forsyth could show, better than most, how great a moral act the Incarnation involved and was. For the Incarnation implied a great act of voluntary self-emptying, an act in which the Son anticipated all the obedience of His earthly life "in the one foregone act that brought Him to earth, the one premundane act of pregnant self-concentration for the carrying out of love's saving purpose within the world." [1] Doubtless the Incarnation looked forward to the Atonement, but an act of this kind has an ethical value of its own. Forsyth might have replied that he was only denying the value of the Incarnation in so far as that meant the juxtaposition of two natures in Christ, and the permeation of the human nature in Christ, and potentially in all men, by the virtue—semi-physically conceived—of the divine nature. But the premundane volition and its result cannot be sharply separated. If Forsyth can say of Christ's living as a finite man that "it was the greatest act of moral freedom ever done. The Godhead that freely made man was never so free as in becoming man," [2] then the idea of the Incarnation, which arises out of the fact of the Incarnation, cannot be lacking in moral worth. There was large reason for Forsyth's reaction from much of the method in Christology which, broadly speaking, was prepared to go near to saying that incarnation itself was redemption, and reverted to the Greek patristic thought which made so much of what can happen to and in a "nature," without proper moral exigency and power of self-criticism, but I think it difficult not to admit that, at this point, Forsyth was over-much dominated by polemical necessities—true necessities, but not the only ones. Anti-Pelagian theologians (whatever form Pelagianism seems to them to be taking) ought always to be on their guard against pressing their case too far in the heat of the battle.

[1] *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 314. [2] Ib. p. 315.

It is no wonder that Forsyth was little interested in the question of the Virgin Birth. It seemed to him to be of doubtful theological importance, and without relevance to the Christian experience of redemption. In *Positive Preaching* [1] he does not answer what he regards as the one theologically-legitimate question with regard to it, "was such a mode of entry into the world indispensable for Christ's work of redemption?" It is more remarkable that, in respect of the Resurrection, he laid no stress upon the empty tomb, though he believed in it. But here too we recognise his lack of interest in physical circumstances, if only justice is done to the full moral reality of what belongs to, is a part of, God's redemptive action.[2] He was concerned not only with Christological dogma, but with its presentation according to the true order of its constituent elements. And with his own account of that order this section may close: "In the order of importance we should go to the world first of all with the Atoning Cross which is the Alpha and Omega of Grace; second, with the resurrection of Christ, which is the emergence into experience of the new life won for us on the Cross; third, with the life, character, teaching and miracles of Christ; fourth, with the pre-existence of Christ, which is a corollary of His Eternal Life, and only after such things with the Virgin Birth, which may or may not be demanded by the rest." [3]

IV.

The distinctive and authoritative thing in Christianity was, for Forsyth, the Gospel. This, as we saw, lay, in his opinion, behind both Bible and Church as the creative power productive of both, and under the control of this primary conviction he worked out his view of what both Bible and Church meant. As to the Bible, we have gathered

[1] pp. 19–21. [2] Ib., pp. 255–8. [3] p. 128 f.

indications of his position. The Bible is no inerrant text-book, and the old method of handling it has broken down. It is no longer possible to make such an identification as "Revelation is the Bible which is the Word of God." The whole subject is treated at length in his article "Revelation and Bible" in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1911. There we have both the negative and the positive sides of his thought. And, perhaps, his meaning is best expressed if one says that he conceived of the Bible as a sacrament, and made a sharp distinction between the outward and visible sign and the inward and spiritual grace. So, to take a sentence from the article referred to, which exhibits his conception on both of its sides, "the Bible is at once a document of man's religion and, more inwardly and deeply, a form of God's Word, and the chief form that we now have; but as it wears a human and historic shape, it is not immune from human weakness, limitation, and error. The Bible is the great sacrament of the Word, wherein the elements may perish if only the Word itself endure."

But the Bible is not the only witness and monument of God's redeeming revelation. There is the Church as well, and one of Forsyth's most characteristic emphases is that which he is continually concerned to lay upon the Church. He could be jealous of Christian preoccupation with the thought of the Kingdom of God, when it went along with an indifference to the place and value of the Church.[1] He fought against the atomic individualism which seemed to him to be so widespread a tendency in the religion of the age, and which, when it brought in the Church at all, brought it in as a religious club or a coterie of like-minded pious people. In its grasp of the Church-idea he realised and respected the strength of the Church of Rome. Great religious issues could be met only by a great Church, "and

[1] See *Positive Preaching*, pp. 75 ff.

when we lose the sense of the Great Church, with its inseparable dogmatic basis, we lose the note of mastery with those commanding issues which, amid all perversion, still gives such a spell to Rome." [1] For him the Church was "the Kingdom of God in the making;" [2] or, and with the religious rather than the ethical interest uppermost, the Church could be interpreted through the notion of collective personality as that society, created by the Gospel, which alone is able to be, what no individual can be, "the *vis-à-vis*, and the bride, of such a universal person as Christ."[3] Hence Forsyth, when he thought of a believer's relation to Christ, thought also of the believer's position in the Church. In all salvation there was something far more than the *nexus* of the individual, *quâ* individual, with the Saviour. Forsyth was full of the conviction (it was among his deepest) that Christ did not die for the redemption of individuals but of a race and a world, and that we do live in a redeemed world, however much has to be done towards the gathering of the fruits of that redemption. "It was a race that Christ redeemed, and not a mere *bouquet* of believers. It was a Church He saved, and not a certain pale of souls. Each soul is saved in a universal and corporate salvation. To be a Christian is not to attach one's salvation to a grand individual, but it is to enter Christ; and to enter Christ is in the same act to enter the Church which is in Christ." [4]

As Forsyth exalted the idea of the Church, so did he exalt the ministry and the sacraments. Whenever he dwelt on Christian institutions, if one may use the last word in the widest sense, and so as to include the Bible, he was ready to strike the sacramental note. For instance, he asks the

[1] *The Principle of Authority*, p. 258.
[2] *Theology in Church and State*, p. 209.
[3] Ib. p. 182.
[4] *Lectures on the Church and the Sacraments*, p. 40.

question, What is the meaning of an effective, a valid ministry ? and he answers : " It means sacramental. That word is my keynote. The ministry is sacramental to the Church as the Church itself is sacramental to the world," and its sacramental work lies in its conveyance of the Gospel, of which it is the " official trustee." [1] So arises his insistence on the sacramental character of preaching, and his fear lest it should be lost, for " to be effective our preaching must be sacramental. It must be an act prolonging the Great Act, mediating it, and conveying it." [2] And as he protested against any view of preaching which cut at the roots of its vital dependence upon and reverberation of and prolongation of the Gospel, so he protested against any view of Baptism and the Lord's Supper which reduced them to mere memorial rites. Whether Zwingli was a " Zwinglian " or not, we know what Zwinglianism has come to stand for, and Forsyth would have none of it. It is very noteworthy how Forsyth conceived of his differences from the Roman and from the memorial view respectively. In a number of points he differed, and differed sharply, from the former: the whole idea of infused grace acting as a regenerating substance within human nature was alien to him ; he believed that it led away from the moral into the subliminal, the theosophic and even the magical, though of this word which he used " with some protest and some reserve " he observed that " it carries associations which I do not wish to suggest, because they would be repudiated by the best of those who cherish the ideas I discard." [3] But his difference, great as it was, was not what one may call a central difference, because Forsyth penetrated behind and beneath all oppositions however deep, and reached a deeper unity in the fact that for the believer in the Mass, as

[1] Ib., p. 125.
[2] *Positive Preaching*, p. 84.
[3] *Lectures*, p. 207.

for himself, the sacrament in its inmost essence and reality meant and proclaimed the Cross, that is, the Christian Gospel. Indeed, he found this sense of the Cross in Roman rather than in Anglican Catholicism, where he found too exclusive an emphasis laid upon "the mystic participation in Christ's person without reference to moral redemption"; and "we cannot call this Catholic off-hand, for it is not the view at the central point of Catholicism—the Mass, with its Agnus Dei." [1] Now, it was this reverberation of the Gospel which he missed in the Zwinglian conception; he held "a mere memorialism to be a more fatal error than the Mass, and a far less lovely"; [2] he pleaded for a riddance "of the idea which has impoverished worship beyond measure, that the act is mainly commemoration. No Church can live on that." [3] Differently from a Roman Catholic theologian, though he construed the idea of an *opus operatum* in the Sacraments, he urged that "there is a certain place for the idea." [4] He would not allow that the Eucharist is sacrificial: "it is not the bloodless sacrifice of the Mass," [5] and he had no place for any conception of a conveyance of grace through the elements, which were for him symbolic in the modern sense, "only as signs." Yet the emphasis he laid upon *action* in the Eucharist brought him to a point where symbolism, in the modern sense, was an inadequate account of the meaning of the sacrament: "The action (of the Church and chiefly of Christ in the Church) is symbolic in the greater and older sense in which the symbol contains and conveys the significate, and is a really sacramental thing. Christ offers anew to us, as He did at the supper, the finished offering which on the Cross He gave to God once for all." [6] It is, indeed, a notable fact how unwilling Forsyth was to be content with mere negations. Take the

[1] Ib., p. 239. [2] Ib., p. viii. [3] Ib., p. 215.
[4] Ib., p. 217. [5] Ib., p. 256. [6] Ib., p. 216.

notion of mystic union with Christ through, not exclusively but particularly, sacramental communion. It was not at all congenial to him, and it would be true to say that he distrusted (I would add, often with good reason) the mystic habit of mind. But he knew that the mystic element must have its place, and to show what that place is he gave the lecture entitled "Communion—The Mystic Note." There the mystic is placed and interpreted through the moral: "the mysticism inseparable from deep religion grows moral because we are placed before the holy and not the solemn only." [1] A mysticism, whether individualistic or sacramental, which obscured the primacy of the moral and the mediation of all blessings through the Cross, came short, in his view, of the character of true religion as revealed in the New Testament. But in the union in that religion of the moral and the redemptive, and in the Christian experience which responded to it and was at home in it, he found room for the mystical element, and was far removed from the anti-mystical bias of such a theologian as Herrmann, with whom, in his emphasis upon the ethical, he had so much in common.

At the same time, with all its suggestiveness, I do not look on *Lectures on the Church and the Sacraments* as among his very best work. Questions arise, particularly as to the Church and its ministry, which call for a more thorough-going and historical treatment than is accorded to them. For instance, if the "Great Church" is, as Forsyth certainly believed it to be, body as well as spirit, it is almost inevitable that one should want to know, "what kind of a body?" And if the ministry has a truly sacramental character, and is the trustee of the Church's Gospel, it is surely difficult to hold that the minister receives no gift from the Church except recognition or licence, so that in

[1] Ib., p. 277. Cf. *The Principle of Authority*, p. 194, "Religion is thus at bottom a moral act in a mystic sphere."

ordination there is the meeting of "the authority of the Spirit in the man, and the recognition of it by the Church." [1] Forsyth was no champion of individualism at any point, no one more than he would have protested against the idea that the call to the ministry was no more than, to use his own words, "by religious sensibility," but for this very reason one desiderates an account of the relation of the Church and the ministry in which a more organic unity is discerned. And as to the Eucharist, his abandoning of, or, at least, indifference to, the idea of the sacrament as heavenly food, which he regards as theosophic, and his method of treating the conception, stands in rather curious relation to the admission that "it is not certain that Paul did not conceive the Sacraments in a theosophic way," [2] that "by John's time the gift (developing an element in Paul ?) had become more corporealised. The flesh of Christ replaces the body of Christ—a vivifying substance or food replaces a person in regenerating action on the moral soul," [3] and that if it helps one to think in this way, "so think, and give God thanks." [4] It is true that he has explanations to give —this aspect, if Paul held it, was not primary for him, "Paul's concepts of modality were not necessarily revelation," [5] and John when he spoke of the flesh and blood meant the personality of Jesus—but, for all that, there is something rather seriously amiss in a constructive treatment of the Eucharist which makes nothing of what is admitted as a possible element in the apostolic interpretation, and which we may presume, both on the basis of Forsyth's implications and from the very definite pages of Dr. H. T. Andrews, incorporated in the volume, in which he handles the Pauline doctrine of the sacraments from the standpoint of New Testament scholarship, to have been

[1] Ib., p. 128. [2] Ib., p. 251. [3] Ib.
[4] Ib., p. 253. [5] Ib.

widespread in the apostolic Church. It is possible to be profoundly sensible of the value of Forsyth's service to institutional Christianity in the grandeur of his Church-idea, in his magnifying of the ministerial office and in his exposition of the sacraments as sacraments of the Gospel, and yet to feel that he allowed his special interests to obscure the need of proportion and completeness.

V.

Forsyth's independence (in the best sense of the word) and power are strikingly exhibited in his eschatology. Most theologians, when they treat of this problem, have much to say concerning the various possibilities which suggest themselves, whether from the text of the Bible or from general considerations, as to the destiny of man. Of this Forsyth has extraordinarily little to say. One has to catch his view from a number, not a large one, of particular hints. That he did not look on death as settling an individual's lot for ever is clear: "Its finality in the *moral* sense leads to all the enormities which we associate with the doctrine of a double predestination." [1] "We are all," he says a little later on, "predestined in love to life sooner or later, *if we will*." Yet, as we should expect, he had clearly sighted the danger in the reaction from belief in eternity of punishment, in that it "has led to dropping the idea of any hell or judgment at all, as if we could cheat judgment by dying." [2] I am not aware that he ever committed himself to universalism as an eschatological theory, though moral progress beyond the grave seemed to him certain, and "there are more conversions on the other side than on this, if the crisis of death opens the eyes as I have said." [3] Accordingly, he insisted strongly on the value of prayer for

[1] *This Life and the Next*, Macmillan, 1918, p. 12.
[2] Ib., p. 19. [3] Ib., p. 42 f.

the dead: "in Christ we cannot be cut off from our dead nor they from us wherever they be. And the contact is in prayer. No converse with the dead is so much of a Christian activity as prayer for them. . . . There is nothing apostolic or evangelical that forbids prayer for them in a communion of saints which death does not rend. It is an impulse of nature which is strengthened by all we know of the movements of grace." [1]

But Forsyth's supreme interest was not in eschatology as generally construed, with its concentration upon the end of human life. In an age which is continually in danger of putting man in the centre and making God the great agent for the realisation of humanity's finest possibilities, he proclaimed the reality of Theodicy, of God's justification of Himself, of ends which God has set before Himself in relation to the world, and which He has already achieved and secured. Any one who wants to probe to the bottom of Forsyth's philosophy of Christianity must take full note of this last-named and quite radical conviction of his. There is an impressive passage in *Faith, Freedom and the Future* [2] which puts us in possession of his mind at this point: "One thing let me make clear, to avert a despotic idea of God's Lordship. It is not the Lordship of a mere imperative idealised, but of a triumphant teleology, the vast Amen. . . . Such is the moral majesty of God—God not as the Eternal Imperative of the conscience but as its everlasting Redeemer. His absolute royalty is founded in His absolute and finished salvation of the whole world. And the centre of majesty has passed, since Calvin, from the decrees of God to His Act, to the foregone establishment in Christ's Cross of a moral Kingdom without end, which is the key and goal of history." Thus the Justification of God is not something to be hoped for or expected in the

[1] Ib., pp. 43, 49. [2] Hodder & Stoughton, 1912, p. 277.

future. Whatever the future holds in store, it can add nothing in principle to that moral settlement of the issues which arise between good and evil in a world of free spirits which has been made in the Cross. The theology of the Atonement is here at work on the grandest scale. "The true theology of the Cross and its atonement is the solution of the world"; there "we have the one perfect, silent and practical confession of God's righteousness, which is the one rightness for what we have come to be, the one right attitude of the world's conscience to God's." "In His Cross, Resurrection and Pentecost, Christ is the Son of God's love *with power*. God's love is the principle and *power* of all being. It is established in Christ everywhere and for ever. Love so universal is also absolute and final. The world is His, whether in maelstrom or volcano, whether it sink to Beelzebub's grossness or rise to Lucifer's pride and culture. The thing is done, it is not to do." [1]

Theodicy is not a popular subject, and in so far as it is handled at all it is apt to take its shape from the supposition that things are so bad that God can be excused only if it is possible to relieve Him of responsibility. So on the one hand we are called upon to help Him as He is doing His best, on the other to find an answer to the question put in a play with a wide vogue—"And who will forgive God?" Forsyth was always challenging this type of thought, its anthropocentrism and its lack of insight into both morals and Christianity, and especially into the meaning of the Cross. He was no expounder of a genial, sunny view of things; he was fully alive to the tragic side of life. But he found the deepest tragedy not in suffering, however poignant, but in the stricken conscience and the fettered will. Among the moderns he found his prophets in such names as Carlyle and Ibsen and Wagner and Kierkegarde.

[1] *The Justification of God*, pp. 125, 174, 171 f.

But he believed that the worst devilries were already smitten with a mortal blow, so that, though they lived on in the world, the world was for ever beyond their capture and control; for God "has the evil, even of such a world as we see, in the hollow of His hand. That is the Christian faith. If His holy way spared not His own Son, i.e. His own Self, that holiness is secured finally for the whole world, with its most cynical immorality, deadly malignity, and cruel frightfulness." [1]

Theodicy means the certainty of the Kingdom of God. The idea of the Kingdom does not hold so obviously prominent a place in Forsyth's writings as it does in a good deal of modern theology. Nevertheless, it emerges in power, especially in connexion with the social and historical implications of the Gospel. And he has much to say about it in his later works, in *The Justification of God*, *The Christian Ethic of War*, and *This Life and the Next*, all written in the stress of the war. The judgment which he saw descending upon civilisation in the war he regarded as the inevitable penalty for the neglect of the Kingdom.[2] And the service of the Kingdom is no merely individual obligation, but "men in nations must serve the Kingdom, and not merely as individuals, groups or Churches; for a nation has a personality of its own," and even war could be "an agent of His Kingdom," [3] which is "the emergence into the life of history, both by growth and crisis, of that saving sovereignty which is the moral power and order of the spiritual world. The coming of the Kingdom is the growth or the inroad of God's Will on earth to be what it always is in peace and glory in Heaven," and "only in the active love and service, not simply of God, but of the Kingdom

[1] *The Justification of God*, p. 154.
[2] Ib., p. 104.
[3] *The Christian Ethic of War*, p. 189.

of God and His Christ, are the full powers of the soul released and its resources plumbed. The Kingdom of God is only another phrase for the energetic fulness of man's eternal life—here or hereafter." [1] But the Kingdom, whose establishment and victory is the concrete manifestation of theodicy, is not essentially a reality round which the hopes and aspirations and endeavours of men may gather: it is already present, won and secured, in the Cross. For Christ was no martyr, even though the greatest, but He "went to the Cross as King of the world," and the Cross "is not only very real but fontal, creative and final for the Kingdom of God to which all history moves. . . . The Cross enacts on an eternal scale the moral principle which is subduing all history at last to itself and its holy love. The judgment *process* in history only unfolds the finality of the Eternal judgment *act* which is in the Cross, to recondense it in the final settlement of all things." [2] By no theologian of our age has a deeper-rooted optimism been expressed.

I have tried to bring into view those elements in Forsyth's theology on which he himself was accustomed to lay the greatest stress. But I am conscious of much which has been omitted for which a place, in any full treatment of that theology, would have to be found—the relationship between holiness and love, the reality of holiness within the Godhead as Holy Spirit leading on to the doctrine of the Trinity, the state of man as involving not merely tragic accidents but universal guilt, the interweaving of Christianity's redemption-motive with great art and great politics. Yet this may be said here: the student who cares to trace out Forsyth's thought on any one of these great matters will find that everything moves round one centre, reverts

[1] *This Life and the Next*, pp. 85, 92.
[2] *The Justification of God*, pp. 154, 189.

to one principle, rests on one bed-rock. There is a true sense in which Forsyth was a man of one idea—the Cross. But that idea, or rather act and fact, was for him so universal and eternal, all-compassing, all-penetrating, all-absorbing, that he was able to combine a great simplicity with a great subtlety and richness, which, if regarded merely as a *tour-de-force*, is amazing. To go abroad, as it has been necessary to do, in the wide fields of his writings, has been to grow still more impressed with the extraordinary fertility and richness of his thought. It is great theology, the theology of one as scientifically competent as Ritschl, as spiritually proficient as Dale. And through it all burns the passion of one inspired by a single motive—the greater glory of God, his Redeemer.

J. K. Mozley.

ONE JOT OR TITTLE.

As surely as the letter Jod
Once cried aloud and spake to God,
So surely shalt thou feel this rod.

LONGFELLOW puts these words in the mouth of the Rabbi in his Miracle Play, without stating whence he got the allusion. Its ultimate source must be the Midrash, where the following story is told :[1] When the Law was given, it contained various enactments, among them some directed specially to the king ; he shall not multiply horses, etc., nor wives, and his heart will not go astray (Deut. xvii. 17). King Solomon arose and criticised God's ruling, saying, Why has God said "He shall not multiply wives"? Clearly in order that his heart may not go astray. I will multiply them and my heart will not go astray. Our Rabbis say : That moment the Yod in *he shall multiply* (YRBH) went up and prostrated itself before God, saying : Almighty, didst Thou not say, *No letter shall be annulled from the Law for ever ?* Lo, Solomon has arisen and annulled me, and to-day may annul one and to-morrow another till the whole Law will be annulled. God said to her : Solomon and a thousand like him shall come to nought, yet no *stroke* of thee shall I annul.

The same story is told in the Palestinian Talmud with a variety.[2] That it was the *Yod* in YRBH which accused Solomon is said to have been the opinion of R. Yeshua b. Levi. Solomon b. Yohai said it was the Law which prostrated itself before God and said : Almighty, Thou hast written in Thy Law : *Every covenant which is annulled in part is annulled entirely.* And lo, Solomon desires to remove

[1] *Exodus Rabbah*, § 6. Many other references are given in the notes in the Vilna edition.

[2] *Sanhedrin*, ii., § 6.

a *yod* from me. God said : Solomon and a thousand like him shall be annulled, but no *word* of thee shall be annulled.

In a third form of the narrative the last clause runs : No *yod* of thee shall be annulled for ever.[1]

It is not quite obvious how by annulling the *yod* of *yarbeh* (he shall multiply) Solomon compassed his object. The explanation offered in the notes to the Midrash is that by the omission of this letter the verb became perfect (*ribbah*) instead of future, when the whole might be rendered, *No, he has multiplied wives and his heart shall not go astray.* Or perhaps the sentence was to be taken interrogatively : *Has he not multiplied wives, yet, etc.*

In the traditions which have been translated the Law is twice quoted for texts which it is not quite easy to find there ; a fact which should make us indulgent towards the inaccuracies of the citations from the Old Testament that are found in the New. Verification in our days is easy with Concordances and Dictionaries ; before the composition of these useful works, and when a Bible consisted of a large number of scrolls, the time and labour required for verification were excessive, whence the operation was not ordinarily performed, and men trusted their memories. Sometimes a very slight lapse of memory rendered a quotation hard to find ; this was long the case with Matthew ii. 23, *He shall be called a Nazarene*, which has recently been located (it would seem with certainty) by a Jewish scholar[2] as Jeremiah xxxi. 6, where the words rendered in the Revised Version *the watchman shall cry* might with different vocalisation of the verb be rendered *they shall be called Nazarenes.* The inaccuracy in the quotation lay simply in substituting singular for plural. The Lewisian Syriac, as usual, comes nearest the original ; the Greek translitera-

[1] *Leviticus Rabbah*, § 19.

[2] H. Hammer, *Traktat vom Samaritanermessias*, Bonn, 1913.

tion which has given so much trouble is probably due to connexion of the quotation with some other texts.

The promise *No letter shall be annulled from thee for ever* may be safely located as Isaiah lv. 13, *a letter for ever shall not be cut off*,[1] probably produced by a slight alteration of the text.

Of these words, altered and interpreted as referring to the Law, the maxim quoted is a paraphrase, and so too is the verse Matthew v. 18, where it is of great interest to find the varieties which occur in the Rabbinic tradition reflected in the versions :

Lewisian Syriac : *Until heaven and earth pass, one yod, letter, shall not pass from the Law till all be.*

Greek (W. and H.) : *Until heaven and earth pass, one yod or one stroke shall not pass from the Law till all be.*

The Syriac combines the forms with *yod* and *letter ;* the Greek the forms with *yod* and *stroke*.[2] In the Syriac it is obvious that there is conflation of two traditions ; either *letter* was first written and *yod* afterwards inserted, or *vice versa*. The question, which of these changes occurred, can be answered with certainty when the original text of Isaiah has been found ; the maxim at its earliest stage had *letter*. In the Greek the *letter* has been quite displaced by the *yod ;* and there is the fresh insertion, *or one stroke*, which may be a various reading or a rhetorical climax. It can be no accident that these varieties come in with the different forms which the narrative about Solomon assumes in the Rabbinic tradition.

Some preacher undertook to demonstrate that no letter of the law was destined to perish, and he found an example in the case of the wise king. There are precepts in Deuteronomy wherein a king is warned not to multiply gold,

[1] With אות לעולם for לאות עולם.
[2] Hebrew קוצה.

horses or wives. Since it was the duty of a king to make a copy of the Law (xvii. 18), Solomon cannot have been ignorant of these precepts, including that against multiplication of wives, where it is implied that such procedure will lead to apostasy. It is not obscurely hinted in 1 Kings xi. 5 that Solomon having violated the precept experienced the consequence which it foretells. It could be shown that Solomon had done no more than omit one *yod* from his copy. Nevertheless the omission did not help him to escape the consequence. His heart went astray as the Law had foretold.

This story, as has been seen, was variously dramatised, probably on the basis of Isaiah lv. 11, *My word that goeth forth out of my mouth shall not return unto me void, but shall accomplish that which I please.* The Law, after Solomon's omission of the *yod*, is supposed to return "empty" (as Gesenius says *re infecta*), and is consoled with the assurance that this is not so ; it has been effective in spite of Solomon's act. Or the word that goeth forth out of the mouth may be thought of as any articulation ; the *yod* can be the complainant. The reply, *no stroke of thee shall perish*, is more appropriate when a single letter is making the complaint. It was then the story of Solomon that introduced the *yod*, whereas the personification of the *yod* introduced the *stroke*.

That this is the correct reconstruction of the genesis of the texts is indicated by the difficulty in the last words of the verse of Matthew, *till all be*. Merx, whose commentary is of great value, supposes these words to mean the same as the preceding clause, *Until heaven and earth pass*, and he regards the two clauses in consequence as doublets, of which one is an interpolation. This view is shown by the Midrash to be erroneous ; *till all be* means till the sanctions accompanying the precepts be realised. A law is regarded

(as we regard laws of nature) as a sequence ; if some act is committed or omitted, a certain consequence will follow. Such sequences are foretold in the Law, and like other laws of nature they are unalterable. Multiplication of wives leads to apostasy. Solomon thought he would prove this sequence false, but it was realised in his case as it would be in others.

It seems clear that the text of Matthew has here been influenced by the Oral Tradition of the Jews ; and indeed such influence appears in our earliest copy, where, as has been seen, the word *yod* has been added to the original *letter*, which in the Greek disappears to make way for another word, also traceable to the Oral Tradition. This phenomenon surprises us less in the Palestinian Syriac, doubtless the work of a convert from Judaism in the seventh century A.D., who went to the Talmud for elucidation of the *mote* in Matthew vii. 3–5.

In the version of the saying adopted by Luke (xvi. 17) the *stroke* has displaced its rivals and survives alone. This indicates that the process of transition began very early, possibly too early to permit of our finding here confusion between Jesus Christ and R. Jesus (afterwards Joshua) b. Levi, whose date is uncertain, but appears to be somewhere in the second century A.D. Otherwise the illustration from Solomon, which led to the introduction of the *yod*, would seem to suit the exegesis of this Rabbi exceedingly well.

In the Third Gospel the saying is brought into connexion with the assertion, also found in Matthew, that the Law and the Prophets had lasted till the time of John the Baptist. In strict logic this need not imply that they lasted no longer, but ordinary usage would justify that inference ; if then they ceased with John the Baptist, how was it possible that the Law would not pass away till the universe came to an

end? The author of the Third Gospel deals with this difficulty by altering the form of the sentence. *It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than that a single stroke of the Law should fall.* This resembles in form the saying (xviii. 25), *It is easier for a camel to enter in through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.* It is there explained that the expression used does not imply that the event will never occur, but only that it is sufficiently rare to be regarded as miraculous. On this analogy the saying about the eternity of the Law can be reconciled with the assertion that it had come to an end with John the Baptist. Its abrogation was a matter of the very greatest difficulty; nevertheless it had come about.

This view of the matter is in harmony with the Pauline theology which is at times reflected in the Third Gospel. The abrogation of the Law is taught with such vehemence in the Pauline Epistles that a tradition according to which Jesus Christ had taught the eternity of the Law could not be admitted. The saying about the rich man suggested the mode whereby the tradition could be brought into harmony with the Pauline doctrine.

In the First Gospel the tendency is to Judaise, and this is accentuated in the Greek translation. Here the saying about the eternity of the Law is prefixed to a series of precepts wherein the new doctrine is contrasted with the old. In some of these precepts it is difficult to avoid the idea of abrogation; e.g. Matthew v. 38, where the old law of retaliation is replaced by that of non-resistance. To prevent this inference being drawn the Evangelist prefixes the assertion that the Law is eternal, and to that the explanation that the precepts which follow do not abrogate the Law, but merely supplement it.

The difficulty of reconciling this statement with the facts, such as the neglect of the food-tabus, has been recognised

since early times, and violent methods have been employed for dealing with it; some of the most violent are those adopted by Merx, whom few are likely to follow. Even his observation that the Lewisian text employs in this passage the Greek word for *law* rather than the technical Syriac for *the Law* seems to lead nowhere; for the Hebrew of the Midrash has *Torah* in its parallel to verse 18, and in verse 17 all the authorities have *and* (or *or*) *the Prophets* after *the Law*, which therefore must mean the *Torah*. There is no reason for suspecting serious mistranslation, and the chief question which arises is whether we should regard these verses as part of the genuine Gospel or as an expression of a view concerning the Saviour's mission which belonged to the Judaising school.

In favour of the latter view we have in the first place the fact that though verse 18 is reproduced by the Third Evangelist, he omits verse 17, and the remaining Gospels reproduce neither. The source of verse 18 has been traced; in its original form, which lies behind our earliest texts, it was a paraphrase of a verse of Isaiah made in a style with which the Oral Tradition familiarises us. Its later forms exhibit the same variations as are to be found in the Rabbinical Tradition; it may even be inserted in the Gospel owing to confusion due to the name of the Rabbi who is said to have used it. But if this doctrine of the eternity of the Law was ascribed to Jesus Christ, it had to be harmonised somehow with those authentic traditions wherein His neglect of the ceremonial Law or His abrogation of Mosaic precepts was recorded. This is apparently effected by verse 17, wherein the attitude of Jesus Christ to the Law is described as that of one who completes, not of one who abrogates.

It is curious that the Talmud contains a version of verse 17 as well as of verse 18, only the former is in Aramaic. It

is quoted in a story told in B. *Sabbath* 116 b. There was a philosopher who had the reputation of taking no bribes, and the Jews wished to bring him into ridicule. A woman demanded of him her share in an inheritance, bringing a golden lamp as a gift. The other party quoted against her a rule, *Where there is a son a daughter shall not inherit.* The philosopher objected that since the Captivity the Law of Moses had been withdrawn and another substituted, containing the rule, *Son and daughter shall inherit jointly.* The next day the other party brought a present of an ass, when the philosopher said that he had got to the end of the volume (i.e. the new Law) wherein was written, *I have not come to take away from the law of Moses, nor have I come to add to the Law of Moses*, and therein was written, *Where there is a son a daughter shall not inherit.* The readings of the quotation vary between *but I have come* and *nor have I come*, of which the latter seems appropriate to the story, though it is further from the text of the Gospel. The persons mentioned in the narrative belong to the first half of the second century, as the lady was the sister of Rabban Gamliel, who had seen the Second Temple.[1] The "philosopher" would seem to be thought of as a Greek employed as arbitrator, who had heard of a New Testament substituted for an Old Testament, but did not distinguish between Jews and Christians, just as Lucian supposes that Christianity was to be learned of the priests and scribes in Palestine.[2] His first quotation may be from Romans viii. 17, *If children, then heirs*, for the word *children* would include both sexes. His second quotation, which he very wrongly places at the "end of the book," is certainly our Matthew v. 17, which might well be used for the doctrine that no enactment of the Torah was to be altered, though fresh enactments were to be introduced.

If, however, there were any reason for thinking that this

[1] *Sefer Yuchassin.* [2] *Peregr.*, § 11.

quotation goes back to an earlier form of the Gospel than any which has been preserved, it would be difficult to avoid reference to Deuteronomy iv. 2 and xiii. 1, where Israel is warned *to add nothing to and to diminish nothing from* the Law. In that case the oldest form of the text would probably have been: *Think not that I am come to destroy the Law; I am come to diminish nothing and to add nothing.* The processes whereby it was transformed into the shape which it assumes in the Syriac and Greek texts have been illustrated in what has preceded. It would agree better with the following verse than the Syriac and Greek tradition, because when the eternity of a text to the letter is maintained, addition is to be excluded no less than subtraction. It would, however, agree less well with the series of precepts that follow, since in them the new doctrine is plainly contrasted with the old. This teaching was in the style of "one who spoke with authority, and not as the scribes," who were accustomed to draw inferences, e.g. the law of inheritance stated above from the scanty rules in Numbers xxvii. 7–11. They would not have ventured to employ the formula, "It was said in old time—but I say unto you."

Those who were unable, like Tertullian, to reconcile the verse with what follows on the supposition that *completing* or *fulfilling* meant explaining, sometimes assigned the word the sense of *realising*. Epiphanius compares with it the words recorded in John v. 46, *Moses wrote concerning me.* According to this the prophecies of the Law were fulfilled by Jesus Christ. The Lewisian reading, *I came not to abrogate but to fulfil them*, somewhat favours this view, as the fulfilling of the Prophets would most naturally mean fulfilling the prophecies. Some texts also introduce the words *and the Prophets* into verse 18, so that *till all be* acquires the sense *till all be fulfilled.* We have seen, however, from the history of verse 18 that this was not precisely its original

signification ; whence Merx may be right in supposing that *and the Prophets* of verse 17 is an interpolation ; it will have been occasioned by the sense given the word *fulfil* in connexion with the realisation of prophecy. Such an interpretation, however, is clearly less suited to what follows than the other (completing), since what is done in the verses that come after is either abrogating the old Law or supplementing it ; realisation of prophecy does not come in.

If this were so, the history of the two texts might be reconstructed as follows. Their oldest form was, *Think not that I have come to abrogate the Law ; I have come neither to take away nor to add. For verily I say unto you, Until heaven and earth pass no letter of the Law shall pass till all be.* The change of the first text into *I have not come to take away but to add* appears in the various readings of the Talmud. This suggests for *till all be* the sense *till it be completed*, whence *to complete* is substituted for *to add*. But since the word chosen for *complete* means also *to fulfil, i.e. to realise*, the words *till all be* are interpreted in the sense of the fulfilment of prophecy, and this leads to the introduction of *and the Prophets* after *the Law*.

All this rests on the supposition that the Talmudic tradition is in this case to be trusted. Ordinarily that supposition would be hazardous ; in this case it has in its favour its agreement with the following verse in Matthew, its suitability to the anecdote in which the Talmud introduces it, and the fact that the personages in that narrative are historical.

The early date of the quotation makes it clear that we could not with Marcion think of the verse as an interpolation in the ordinary sense ; it must form part of the original collection attributed to Matthew. If this work claimed to be an arrangement of traditions wherewith many persons were familiar, the accommodation of different copies to the

forms of the traditions which different readers had heard is an intelligible process ; it is one to which most people are prone. Thus the identity of the saying that no particle of the Law should perish for all time with that current in the Oral Tradition of the Jews was obvious ; some (as we see from the printed collections of the Oral Tradition) had heard it with *letter*, some with *yod*, some with *stroke* ; they had no scruple about inserting in their copies what they supposed to be correct.

The transitions of verse 17 (if the above account is correct) involved much more, and resemble more nearly those from Matthew v. 17 to Luke xvi. 17, of which an explanation has been attempted above. Here there were conflicting theories of the Saviour's mission, and these affected the form wherein recorders and copyists reproduced what were supposed to be His words.

D. S. Margoliouth.

THE ATTITUDE OF GOD TO SIN.

In treating of sin and its forgiveness we must bear well in mind that we are involved in a religious discussion, not one purely moral. Even to raise the question of pardon is to enter a sphere where religious is unmistakably distinguished from ethical experience. Stoicism, to take one example, is chiefly a high type of philosophical ethics, hence the Stoic is not specially troubled by our problem. But wherever specific religion has lived and moved, the reality of Divine pardon has been a matter of life and death.

Otto's remarkable book, *Das Heilige*—the most striking theological work issued in Germany during the war—brings this out in original and arresting fashion. In religion,

he points out, God has always been felt to have the first and the last word. Awe is an absolutely cardinal element in the pious mood. The devotee bends head and heart before the object of worship with a sense of creaturely self-abandonment. Just because the thought of God is realised as the thought of something with heights and depths in it that none can fathom, something that alone is sublime and great, the truth is not that we have religion, but that religion has us. To use Otto's special vocabulary, the Divine or *numinosum* (from *numen*) is immediately known as possessing two vital aspects, the *tremendum* and the *facinosum*, the one evoking godly fear, the other responded to in trustful surrender. The believer, with his sinful heart, is aware that to him God is saying both things, "Depart from Me," and "Come unto Me." The feeling of guilt, far from being incidental, is, in every actual faith known to history, a constitutive part of experimental piety. Thus, while religion is not morality and every attempt to reduce it to terms exclusively or even chiefly moral must fail, it is never apart from morality; there is always morality in it. The sense of obligation to Deity is never absent. And this sense uniformly appears in an indissoluble bond with the two basal feelings of religion—reverence and trust. It points both to the *numen tremendum* and the *numen facinosum*. Believers hear alike the solemn voice that bids them bow and adore, and the still small voice urging them to trust and love. Also they know that in both respects they have come short.

These descriptions read as if they had been taken from Christianity, but in fact they apply to all religions in their measure. The living thought of God (or gods) has invariably been accompanied by the sense that men are beholden to God, socially and individually. This tie is at first conceived as being mainly ritual; the votary's chief duty is to worship.

And, as far back as we can trace the religious tradition, this sense of obligation has had beside it a penitent or foreboding awareness that the obligation has been imperfectly fulfilled. None has ever been able to pay fully the owed honour and service. The Divine claim is so comprehensive, so deep-reaching, that, by man as he is, it cannot be completely met. This failure to implement what is due comes to consciousness as felt sin and guilt; subsequently, and in a more or less intense degree, there is "a certain fearful looking for of judgment." For sin entails punishment, which can be averted by the mercy of heaven and by no other conceivable agency. It is to Divine forbearance and compassion alone, and nowhere else, that men appeal to overlook trespass, cover guilt, and remove fear. Even at the level of nature-religions these things are so; when ethical faiths emerge, the meaning of all is deepened.

In the field of moral religion, where Christianity rules, we find ourselves confronted in a new manner by the absolute distinction of right and wrong. The distinction, it is felt, is one not so much acknowledged or established by God as rather involved in His being what He is; at each point the Divine action is characterised by the presence and operation of inviolable moral principles. God, for the Christian mind, is more than the moral order, the moral law alive; but we cannot conceive of Him at all except as existing in a moral universe and acting under moral conditions. Thus, when He forgives sin, the thing is not done by leaving moral realities behind. He would not be more Divine if He dealt with sin as trivial, merely letting the sinner off; He would cease to be God. The consciousness of being forgiven rests on the presupposition that in the forgiven life something existed at war with the Divine nature, which could not be ignored. The holiness of God

must react upon it with a gravity echoed, not always faintly, by the man's own conscience.

The inconceivable evil of sin, the infinite need for Divine interposition, is revealed by the circumstance that no one ever yet gained the consciousness of pardon just by hard thinking. No great religious biography can be named where a man escaped from the sense of guilt by arguing himself out of it. Sin so exceeds in unworthiness that logic can see no way out. The problem it creates is one which cannot be formulated, much less resolved, by the instrumentality of dialectic. The utmost that bare logical thinking can effect in this region is to certify that God is absolute, that He is inescapable, and that He must infallibly crush the life which takes the path of antagonism to His will. Nevertheless, as Christians know, this very thing which the sinner's conscience, and his logic too, declare to be impossible, actually takes place. The sinner is forgiven. The barriers fall, and the man who had seen no gateway of entrance anywhere passes into the fellowship of God and has the witness within himself that he is the Father's pardoned child. Indeed, the wondering gratitude in which Christian men, as they unload their hearts, often speak of the boon of pardon, bears an indirect testimony to the magnitude of the obstacles which were like to prove insurmountable. When, in adoring praise, the Apostle writes: "Behold, what manner of love the Father has bestowed on us, in letting us be called children of God," in the background of his thought we catch sight of the receding shadow of sin, that awful power with which even God grapples in strife and pain. After the Armistice, when the war was fairly won and our minds were dwelling with quickened feeling on the horrors we had escaped, a *Times* leader-writer quoted with insight two lines from a child's hymn:

None of the ransomed ever knew
How deep were the waters crossed.

The sacrifice of the brave who died—its intensity, its tragedy, its darkness of anguish, all that was undergone in Flanders that the rest might live—this we can never learn. It must always be hid from our eyes. But just this elusive greatness of the sacrifice points to the appalling character of the enemy's power and its menace. Similarly, the thankfulness of forgiven men, as they look back and draw breath as reconciled sons of God, indicates the horror of that sin which would have overwhelmed us but for the love of God. *Nondum considerasti quanti ponderis sit peccatum*, says the interlocutor in Anselm : " You have not yet noted the weight of sin." The words have echoed in the Christian ear, judging all facile theories.

In the next place, we note the obvious but easily forgotten truth that the forgiveness of God involves His prior condemnation. The God of the Bible is such that with Him evil cannot dwell. Psalm xcix. ends with the words, " For the Lord our God is holy," and the final adjective rings through the mind : it is with a holy God that we have to do. Christianity will not have to recast its idea of God as a result of the past eight years. Lord Haig, in his last despatch, declared that this war had brought to light no new principles of strategy ; so the preachers of our new time will continue to proclaim that God is love, and to glory in the thought. But some of us will have to reconsider the meaning of Love. When we look out across Europe, recalling the industrial and international self-worship out of which the war came, we find a new significance in the familiar verse, " Our God is a consuming fire." The Divine love, whatever else it be, is such that it ordains for sin an unspeakable consummation. " Sin, when it is full-grown,

brings forth death "—that is the epitaph on certain pre-war ideals. What does God think of it all? What must He think of it, if He has any thoughts?

Every forgiven man knows part of the answer. He knows that the sin which God pardons He must first condemn. It is no mere helpless metaphor to speak of Him as feeling that intense aversion to evil which is the other side of goodness. His wrath is no illusion. He could not love the right and not be angry with wrong. He is utterly like Jesus Christ, and Christ is shown to us in the Gospels as manifesting an indignation about which there could be no mistake. When this is denied in the name of Christianity, I like to recall an incident in the history of British philosophy which has something very refreshing about it. Dean Mansel had argued that the attributes of God are unknowable by us. We cannot understand what Wisdom, Justice, Mercy, Love are, as they exist in God. The infinite goodness ascribed to Him is not the goodness which we know and love in our fellows, only higher infinitely in degree; it is different in kind and of another quality altogether. John Stuart Mill was roused by this. "Language," he wrote, "has no meaning for the words Just, Merciful, Benevolent, save that in which we predicate them of our fellow-creatures; and unless that is what we intend to express by them, we have no business to employ the words. If in affirming them of God we do not mean to affirm these very qualities, differing only as greater in degree, we are neither philosophically nor morally entitled to affirm them at all." Then he sums up his argument. "If, instead of the 'glad tidings' that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his

government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them: convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures." [1]

This is a passage it is always pleasant to quote, and the moral it yields is plain. We have no right to speak of the *love* of God, unless that term, taken as a compendious description of the highest goodness, means in a loftier degree what it means as applied to our human associates. And should we dream of calling a man good or loving whom we considered incapable of anger at wrong-doing? Surely just here is to be found one of the difficulties felt by earnest, but not perhaps clear-headed people, when they are urged to forgive an injury. They hesitate, because pardon looks like a confession that their anger was reprehensible. But they know, without reasoning, that in the circumstances anger was not only permissible but obligatory. Lack of indignation at wickedness is a sign, not simply of a poor nature, but of positive unlikeness to Jesus Christ. As it has been put: "There are evil things against which our first and surest safeguard is the instinctive reaction of the soul in righteous resentment. The man in whom they evoke no quick repulsion, who is not moved to a sudden heat by them, is dead while he lives. It is not his virtue, but his vice, that he is superior to passion." Unless we sophisticate ourselves with a theory, we all feel this. Intentional

[1] *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (3rd Ed.), pp. 122–4.

discourtesy, the calculated ruin of purity, an act of cruelty to a child—the man is not to be envied who can look on calmly when such things are done. Doubtless, for beings like us it is very hard to be angry, and not sin ; but we must not turn this into a proof of the incompatibility of wrath with Holy Love.

Ritschl, then, did theology an ill turn when he argued that the wrath of God is no present fact, but only a future contingency. It stands, in his view, for God's intention to destroy at last those who persistently reject His love and place themselves, without excuse and without change, in antagonism to His Kingdom. In passing, it may be remarked that if Ritschl dislikes the thought of wrath because of its incongruity with love, there is a difficulty in understanding how it can ever become congruous with it. We ought, therefore, to say not only, No such thing exists as the wrath of God, but, No such thing will ever exist, now or hereafter. On the other hand, if it be conceded that God's wrath will or may be a reality one day, why should it not exist now, provided that its object exists ?

Of course Ritschl has to own that his theory is, at least *prima facie*, out of touch with the Christian mind. Those whom God has appointed to eternal life, he says, can never at any time be objects of His anger ; but they undoubtedly think they are. And this is unavoidable, since their thought is conditioned by time ; in point of fact, however, they are wrong. It may seem as if God were now angry with the sinner, and again at peace with him, but it is only seeming. The familiar hallucination is dispelled by the theologian, who comes in to demonstrate the sheer incompatibility of love and wrath. Anyone can see that Ritschl should be the last person to argue like this. Much of his energy was spent in turning speculative rationalism out of theology and installing in its place the Christian conscious-

ness, fed by the Gospel; and his argument about love and wrath is a plain infidelity to that principle. For Christians feel that both are real in God, the love and the wrath. Indeed, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that it is only when we are not very indignant with our own sin that the indignation of God becomes doubtful. He is the enemy of cruelty, falsehood, uncleanness; He reacts against them with feeling of an absolutely ethical kind; and every philosophical argument used to deny this, on the ground that it involves anthropomorphism, is an equally good argument for denying His love as well. We have only to persist in this line of thought and we shall totally dissipate strong faith in the Living God, whose relations to us are active and personal.

It is occasionally proposed to escape from difficulty by saying that God is angry, not with sinners, but with sin. It certainly would be pedantic to condemn this formula in a sermon, or in fireside talk. We meet with it in Whittier's hymn:—

> Thou judgest us: Thy purity
> Doth all our lusts condemn;
> The love that draws us nearer Thee
> Is hot with wrath to them.

But what is accepted gladly from the poet may none the less need scrutiny. In point of fact, there is no such thing as sin apart from a sinner, any more than pleasure could be real, abstractly or in the air, in separation from a pleased consciousness. The one reality in the case is the sinful person. Moreover, to be angry with a thing is a moral absurdity. The man who kicks spitefully at the stool over which he tripped in the dark has for the moment put his better feelings out of action. Anger, the anger of moral love, is only possible towards moral beings; if, therefore, God is angry at all, it is with sinners that His anger has to do.

To go on to a third point: the sin which God forgives, He has before not merely condemned but punished. This holds true of every sin, and not only of a certain class of sins. All sins are punished by God, and they are punished in order to their being forgiven. The punishment of sin is an essential precondition of reconciliation, whether between God and man or between man and his neighbour; and the denial of this is traceable really to an external or hedonistic view of what punishment is.

We are nowadays familiar with the argument that it is radically unworthy of God to punish human beings, no matter what their guilt. That would amount to making rewards and punishments parts of the Christian religion, with a consequent degradation of its morality. Virtue is its own reward. In reply to this, it must be pointed out that we are now fairly unanimous in regarding human life, in its religious aspect, not, in the language of a former age, as a scene simply of probation, but as a place of education, Now, the educational value of punishment may be, and actually is, enormous. Plenty of educationalists have held that children should not be punished physically; I have never known of any serious teacher who thought they should not be punished at all. As Dean Rashdall has put it: "What parent or schoolmaster would say to a child, 'My good child, enlightened philosophers are agreed that conduct motived by fear of punishment and hope of reward is worthless; therefore henceforth I shall leave you to be guided by your own innate sense of right and wrong. I will not corrupt the purity of your will by threats or promises. Your virtues shall be their own reward: your misdeeds shall never interfere with your pleasures or cause the withdrawal of my favour.' What child would flourish morally under such treatment as this? And yet," he continues, "it would be a very cynical view of human

nature to suppose that the average schoolboy is actuated by no motive higher than selfish hope or fear. He has higher motives, but he requires to be aided in his efforts at self-conquest by lower ones. And after all, most of us are a great deal more like children than it is fashionable among philosophers to believe—at least, in our moments of weakness and strong tempation." Punishment, that is to say, is a part of kindness in dealing with immature characters, and I cannot imagine any one quietly contemplating his own past in the light of faith without the willing confession that repeatedly the fatherly chastisements of God have gone to school him in adhesion to righteousness for its own sake. It is true, the whole conception of Divine punishment has been scouted in the name of Jesus' teaching that from suffering we must not infer the sufferer's sin. But let it not be forgotten that the same Jesus who said : "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents, that he was born blind," said also : "Sin no more, lest a worse thing come upon thee." To ascribe vindictive fury to God is pagan ; to believe that His love corrects our faults by pain is part of Christianity.

Older writers were accustomed to divide the punishments of God into two classes, natural and positive ; and this classification is still influential with popular thought. Natural penalties were defined as flowing from sin by ordinary causation—for example, disease due to habitual intemperance, or loss of reputation owing to a known act of fraud. Positive penalties were such as by their striking and abnormal character led the onlooker to trace them to the direct action of God. But the distinction is quite unreal. All chastisements of sin are positive, in the sense that God wills them ; and the fact that their incidence is mediated by natural causes does not alter this in the least. The system of causation is itself a Divine appoint-

ment. It is an order which, while it is the completest example of law, is never, in any part or at any moment, separated from the living will of God. Men, of course, are tempted to dissociate the penalties of sin from Divine volition because so often they seem to arrive with automatic regularity. They miss God's voice because, in certain spheres, He speaks with a uniformity that makes no distinctions. This, however, does not mean that He is ever indifferent to evil, or inactive with respect of it ; it means that His opposition to evil is so intense that He has actually formed the world on such lines that it infallibly reacts against the wrong-doer.

But we stop on the mere fringe of experience if we speak only of penalties that affect our natural or outward life. The final truth lies deeper. Sin has its punishment in our own soul, in our relations to others, supremely in our relations to God. To begin with our personal life, there is first the stultification of the evil will. In sin we aim at happiness, which by the path of sin we can never reach ; nay, after every fresh effort, we are farther from our goal than ever. Sin, in MacTaggart's phrase, is like drinking sea-water to quench thirst. Again, there is punishment in the growing strength of wrong desire. Each bad choice graves deeper the path of tendency ; each fall is penalised by the added weakness with which men face the next temptation. Again, there is punishment in loss of self-respect. After sinning, we are under the necessity of despising ourselves. Not least among the reprisals of the moral nature of things is the wound left in memory and in our estimate of our own being. Thus when in the parable of the prodigal Jesus is picturing unreserved pardon and acceptance, He touches for a moment on the truth that the wanderer's self-respect is given back to him. " But the father said to his servants, Bring forth the best robe, and put it on him."

The sorest punishment of sin, however, is the sinner's isolation, alike from God and from man. To sin and to break up fellowship are one and the same thing. Whether it be lust or vanity or self-will, sin essentially consists in shutting up our life within the limits of our own ego. We banish ourselves from the company of our fellows and of our Father. Life is contracted into the narrow sphere of self, and the proper and necessary self-affirmation and activity of the individual is perverted to become an absolute standard of value. Just because this self-worship is constitutive of all sin, it follows that the sinner, in proportion as he falls under its power, loses the capacity to escape from self and share the life of others. His ability to have personal fellowship is destroyed. Shadows fall and drape the soul in darkness. All consequences of sin are minor compared with this; those that touch the body hardly count when put beside the penalty of alienation from God and from our neighbour. To lose communion with God is what chiefly matters. Of this, the proof is one simple fact—when a man faces God in Christ, responding to the love manifest in the Cross, he is ready to say, Give me back fellowship with Thyself and with my brother at my side, and other chastisements I will bear in patience.

It follows that the very grace and freeness of Divine pardon must not be turned into an argument for the comparative unimportance of sin. This occasionally is done. It has been contended that the fact that God deems it possible to forgive sin at all nullifies, ultimately, its real gravity. The idea of pardon, that is, is utilised to undermine the idea of sin itself. If this were sound, it would mean that to proclaim the forgiveness of sins was really to tell men that sin is a purely relative thing, which God can and does regard as merely a stage on the way to perfection, or as the unavoidable manifestation of human frailty and

error. Such a dilution of the thought of sin would obviously make forgiveness a superfluity. We have no need to be forgiven for defects which are the natural and appointed elements of finite imperfection.

It is clear, then, that the ideas of forgiveness and sin vary together. If we allow any validity to the conception of Divine pardon, we must own that the pardoned sin is condemnable. It is so in and by itself; it is not merely so in our mistaken view; still less can it be the case, as Schleiermacher's curious theory puts it, that this mistake of ours is encouraged by God in order to prepare us for reconciliation. If we are not to trust our penitential intuition that our sin lies under the Father's judgment, and deserves so to lie, there seems no reason why we should ever trust our minds at all. We know perfectly that we can only receive forgiveness in so far as we have owned our sin *as* sin and not mere misfortune, and we further know that this verdict of ours is an echo or counterpart of the verdict of God Himself. To be offered pardon for any act or abstention which we regarded as innocent would not pacify conscience, but mystify and offend it. By His Gospel for a world of sin, therefore, God declares to us not merely that sin rests under condemnation, but that nothing the sinner can do will ever make it good. It is a thing so real, so dark that only three modes of Divine treatment are possible—to judge it, to bear it, to forgive it freely. All these are present in the great act and experience of God which we call the Atonement.

H. R. Mackintosh.

THE QUEST FOR JOHN THE ELDER.

In dealing with any complicated historical problem, more depends than is usually recognised on the sequence in which the various arguments connected with it are taken up. The only safe rule is to deal with them in the order of their increasing complexity and consequent uncertainty. The neglect of this canon has contributed not a little to the bewildering unsettlement in which some questions of biblical criticism are involved. As Isaac Taylor once asked, "Who shall say how much light would suddenly come in upon the obscurer matters, if once the simpler were taken out of the way?" The Johannine Problem is a case in point. If we begin with the documentary analysis of the Fourth Gospel, or the most controversial and ambiguous of the fragments of Papias, we naturally obstruct our own progress by going into action without having cleared the decks.

The proper point at which to commence the attack on this problem is undoubtedly the Apocalypse—a work in regard to which we possess clearer and better evidence than we have in the case of any other Johannine writing. If, indeed, the Apocalypse is pseudonymous, then we are thrust back again into the darkness at our first step. But none of the factors to which the pseudonymity of Jewish apocalypses was due would operate in the case of this Christian apocalypse. Pseudonymous apocalypses were ascribed to great figures of hoary antiquity; but this one is attributed to John of Asia, whose death in any case could not long have preceded the publication of the book.[1] The name John is not a mere matter of title: it is embodied in the

[1] A. S. Peake, *The Revelation of John*, 41–45; R. H. Charles, *ICC* on *Revelation of St. John*, xxxviii. f.

book itself (i. 1, 4, 9; xxii. 8). Papias, writing about 130 A.D., used and referred to the Apocalypse, and testified to *τὸ ἀξιόπιστον* of it,[1] which he would hardly do unless he believed it to come from its professed author. In Dr. Charles' emphatic language, "there is not a shred of evidence, not even the shadow of a probability, for the hypothesis that the Apocalypse is pseudonymous." The author's name, then, was John.

Nor need we be in much uncertainty as to the date. While it is true that some passages embodied in the book come from the time of Nero or Galba, Irenæus' statement (V. 30. 3), that the revelation was seen *πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς Δομετιανοῦ ἀρχῆς*, is hardly likely to be too low an estimate (for the tendency would be to date the apostolic writings as *early* as possible), and is confirmed by several features in the book itself. Thus we get the period 92–96 A.D. (and there is some ground for fixing upon the actual year 93) as the time when the book was written.[2]

In regard to the identification of the author, the intelligent and well-read Justin, in his *Dialogue* (81; cf. Eus. *HE*, IV. 18. 8) written about 155 A.D., but purporting to record a conversation held in Ephesus some twenty years earlier, represents himself as having then said: *καὶ ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνήρ τις, ᾧ ὄνομα Ἰωάννης, εἷς τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐν ἀποκαλύψει γενομένῃ αὐτῷ χίλια ἔτη ποιήσειν ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ τοὺς τῷ ἡμετέρῳ Χριστῷ πιστεύσαντας προεφήτευσε, κτλ.*—a manifest allusion to Revelation xx. That is to say, Justin, when staying at Ephesus about 135 A.D., believed, doubtless on the authority of the leaders of the Church there, with whom he would naturally be in close

[1] Frag. V. in Funk (cf. Frags. IV., XV., and Iren. V. 30. 1; Harnack, *Chronologie*, i. 337.

[2] Harnack, *Chron.* i. 245 f. (with the note on 246); Moffatt, *LNT*, 503–508. Charles (xxii., cf. xci.–xcvii.) says "about the year 95 A.D."

touch, that the John who wrote the Apocalypse was the Apostle of that name, the son of Zebedee.

This is an early and extremely valuable piece of external evidence, and ought not to be dismissed except on very cogent grounds. Before alluding to the objections raised against it, let us note three important considerations—based on the contents of the book itself—which support it, viz.: (1) the author's eminent rank and authority, natural to an aged and surviving apostle; (2) his vehement and even vengeful character, natural to the "Son of Thunder," who wanted to call down fire from heaven on the inhospitable Samaritan village;[1] and (3) his Jewish point of view, and, in particular, his ungrammatical and Hebraic Greek, natural to one brought up in Galilee.[2]

Of the objections to the apostolic authorship, we may set aside at once that based on the possible claims of the Fourth Gospel to a similar honour, and the acknowledged impossibility (especially if the Apocalypse is dated as late as 93 A.D.) of both works having emanated from the same hand.[3] The character and structure of the Fourth Gospel raise too many questions—and the earliest evidence that the name of John was attached to it is too late (180 A.D.)—to justify us in setting aside Justin's definite statement in regard to the Apocalypse. Other objections have somewhat more weight. The author, for instance, does not claim specifically to be an Apostle; and he speaks of the Apostles in a way that seems to suggest that he was not himself one of them: he sees on

[1] Mc. iii. 17, Lc. ix. 54; cf. Mc. ix. 38, x. 35–41||s. Dr. Moffatt says (*LNT*, 510): "in that case we should have to assume that the rebuke of Jesus produced no impression on one of the two disciples, and that forty years later he was unaffected by what he had heard his Master say." But Jesus' rebuke cannot thus be cited as evidence that John never gave way to vindictiveness or vehemence in after-life.

[2] It is highly significant that Dr. Charles (xxi., xliv.), who rejects the apostolic authorship of Rev., yet considers—on the linguistic and other internal evidence—that its author was a Galilæan.

[3] Moffatt, 509 f.; Peake, *op. cit.* 54–66; Charles, xxix.–xxxii., xxxix. f.

the twelve foundations of the wall of the heavenly Jerusalem "the twelve names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb." [1] But the special dignity and prerogatives of the Twelve were a generally accepted item of belief in the early Church; and we have no reason to suppose that the Twelve themselves did not share it, or were bound to be silent about it, especially in extreme old age! [2] Attention has also been drawn to the absence of personal reminiscences of Jesus and, in particular the employment of *literary* precedents for the delineation of Christ's figure in chapter i.[3] But it has to be remembered that we are without unquestioned information as to how the surviving friends of Jesus thought and spoke of Him long after His death; the presumption is that they would not speak of Him very differently from the average sincere and intelligent Christians around them, and the probably genuine Epistle of Peter confirms this supposition. And further, we cannot confidently set limits to the imaginings of a Christian visionary of the first century.[4] Dr. Peake, who acknowledges the great weight of Justin's evidence, who does not feel the force of the foregoing objections, and who rejects the evidence for the Apostle's early martyrdom, is yet inclined to reject (51 f., 68 f.) the apostolic authorship on the ground of the advanced age to which the author must in that case have attained. But he need not have

[1] Rev. xxi. 14. There is no difficulty over xviii. 20—the only other place where apostles are mentioned: the context suggests that "apostles" is here meant in its alternative sense (cf. *Didaché*) of "travelling preachers." In any case, the phrase is as intelligible on the lips of one of the Twelve as of any one else.

[2] Moffatt, 511; Charles xliii.: with Peake's answer (51).

[3] Moffatt, 511 ("An apocalypse is not a gospel; still, a personal friend is a personal friend," etc.); Charles xliii.

[4] Peake, 48–51. (He touches on and refutes one or two other objections of a similar kind.) It does not seem to be generally realised that this particular objection, in so far as it has any force, holds almost as strongly against *any* personal disciple of Jesus (and therefore against John the Elder, whom many accept as author) as it does against John the Apostle.

been more than eighty-four—by no means an impossible age for active leadership, as we may see by recalling the similar age of Polykarp at his death. Moreover, we have definite evidence that *some* personal disciple of Jesus, named John, survived till the reign of Trajan, i.e., to 98 A.D. at least;[1] and if that is accepted, it is hard to see why the son of Zebedee should not have been the man.

So far, then, we have encountered no serious obstacle in the way of our acceptance of Justin's statement. But we have now to deal with an objection of greater weight than any of those yet mentioned, namely, the evidences for the martyrdom of the Apostle John in Palestine before 70 A.D. These are :—

(1) *The argument from silence.* Dr. Charles speaks (xlv.) of "the silence of ecclesiastical writers down to 180 A.D. as to any residence of John the Apostle in Asia Minor." But this is an exaggeration ; for the words of Justin about the Apocalypse are an indirect attestation of such residence ;[2] and so also are the apocryphal *Acts of John*, which were composed between 130 and 180 A.D.[3] No weight can be laid on the silence of Clemens of Rome when writing to Corinth about 96 A.D. The silence of Ignatius and (if it be so) of Hegesippos tells equally against the perfectly well-attested residence of John the Elder, the disciple of the Lord, in Asia Minor.

(2) *The prophecy of Jesus that both the sons of Zebedee should drink His cup*, i.e. be martyred (Mc. x. 35–40‖)—a prophecy literally fulfilled, as we know from Acts xii. 2,

[1] Iren. II. 22. 5; III. 3. 4 (perhaps on the authority of Papias, Harnack, *Chron.* i. 340 mid.); Eus. *HE*, III. 23. 1, 3 f.; *Chron.* ap. Funk, *Patr. Apost.* i. 370.

[2] Peake, *CINT*, 140. Yet both Dr. Schmiedel and Dr. Charles speak of Justin as one of the silent.

[3] Harnack, *Chron.* ii. 174 f. "An unequivocal second-century witness to the Asia Minor tradition" (M. R. James in *JTS* for July, 1921, p. 389).

in the case of Jacob. This prophecy, it is argued, would not have been recorded had John been still living at the time when the record was written down. But the simple fact that Jesus had uttered it would be quite sufficient to account for its being remembered and recorded, altogether apart from its fulfilment: indeed, if actually spoken by Him, it must have been retained in Christian memories for some twelve years without any fulfilment at all. Whether Jesus would ever have uttered it if it were not destined to be literally fulfilled, is another question, the answer to which will depend somewhat on doctrinal considerations. The present writer would suggest that the words can best be understood, not as expressing an actual prevision of the details of the future, but as the specific application to the two brothers of that more general prospect and challenge of martyrdom, which, at one stage of His ministry, Jesus held out before all His true followers (Mc. viii. 34‖s; Matt. x. 38‖). So understood, the prophecy would not necessarily compel us to believe that John the Apostle died a martyr's death.

(3) *The presumed statement of Papias that Jacob and John were both slain by Jews.* The evidence that Papias said this is not very strong; for one of the two quotations of it, that namely in the Coislinian MS. of Georgios Hamartolos (ninth cent.), is probably derived from the other, viz.: the Epitome based on Philippos of Side (fifth cent.).[1] It is difficult to believe that Irenæus, and still more Eusebius, who both knew Papias' work, were aware that he had made such a statement: both of them would have been bound to contradict it as inconsistent with accepted Church-tradition; and Eusebius would doubtless have appealed to it as a proof of Papias' meagre intellect.[2] If the words are

[1] Funk, *op. cit.* 368 f.
[2] Peak, *CINT*, 145 f., *Revelation*, 52–54.

not a garbled or abbreviated version[1] of something else that Papias said, they may refer to the death of John the Baptist, or to quite conceivable violence on the part of the Jews to the aged John of Ephesus (of the manner of whose death we are otherwise in ignorance), or be merely an incorrect inference from Mc. x. 39.

(4) *The implications of certain other statements in early Christian authors* (Charles xlvi.–xlviii.). Herakleon does not name John among those who had escaped the necessity of public testimony to Christ: but as he says that "many others" besides Matthew, Philip, Thomas, and Levi had so escaped, his omission of John's name cannot be pressed. The *Martyrdom of Andrew*, in which Jacob and John obtain by lot "the east" as their field, is apparently a post-Constantinian document (Harnack, *Chron.* i. 544, cf. ii. 175), and therefore not entitled to weight as against second-century witnesses; but in any case the lot-casting takes place immediately after the Ascension, and thus, like Gal. ii. 9 on which it is probably based, no more contradicts the later residence of John in Asia Minor than the statement that Peter's lot was the circumcision (clearly based on Gal. ii. 7–9) contradicts his later visit to Rome. Clemens of Alexandria's broad statement that the teaching of the Apostles was completed under Nero (*Strom.* VII. 17. 106) is qualified, so far as John is concerned, by the same author's story "about John the Apostle," after his return from Patmos to Ephesus τοῦ τυράννου τελευτήσαντος (*Quis Dives*, 42). Dr. Charles himself supplies the answer to the statements of Chrysostom and Gregorius of Nyssa. Epiphanius' description of John prophesying under Claudius,

[1] Possibly due to a misunderstanding of the word μαρτυρέω. The Coislinian Codex of Georgios quotes Origenes as well as Papias as an authority for John's "martyrdom" (ὅτι μεμαρτύρηκεν Ἰωάννης), whereas Origenes himself simply refers to the banishment to Patmos (*Comm. in Mt.*, t. xvi. 6).

and that of the Muratorian Fragment of John as the predecessor of Paul, are probably mere blunders suggested by the fact that, unlike Paul, John was one of the original Twelve. The allusions to John's martyrdom in *De Rebaptismate* (256 A.D.) and in Aphraates' *De Persecutione* (344 A.D.) could be explained partly as mistaken inferences from Mc. x. 39, and partly from the growing tendency to decorate all heroes of Christian antiquity, in particular the Apostles, with the crown of martyrdom.

(5) *The evidence of early Christian martyrologies and calendars* (Moffatt, 605 f.; Charles, xlviii. f.). These must be discounted, partly on the ground of late date (the oldest of them belongs to 411 A.D.), and partly on that of confusion between the son of Zebedee and the Baptist, but chiefly on account of the tendency just mentioned. It is significant that every single one of the Twelve (except Judas), not excluding even those whom Herakleon declared to have escaped martyrdom, was sooner or later reckoned as a martyr: nay, the more eminent an Apostle was, the more urgent would be his need of martyrly dignity. This tendency should teach us how inadequate as historical evidence is the mere presence of John's name on the martyr-rolls of the fifth and following centuries.

It is hardly, therefore, an exaggeration to say that, with the exception of the doubtful statement of Papias, the evidence for the martyrdom of John, which Dr. Charles (xlix.) regards as now removed "from the sphere of hypothesis into that of reasonably established facts of history," vanishes on close scrutiny into thin air. And whatever one makes of the statement ascribed to Papias, there are too many uncertainties about it to outweigh the almost contemporary evidence of Justin.[1] So far then as the

[1] Justin was in Ephesus about 135 A.D. Papias' work was written about 130: his enquiries had begun as early as 100 A.D.; but whether any

internal and external evidence goes, the balance of probability seems clearly to incline to the view that the Apocalypse is the work of John the son of Zebedee, who was resident in western Asia Minor in the closing decade of the first century. It is only in the light of this well-established conclusion that we can hope to arrive at the truth in regard to the other questions involved in the Johannine problem.

What, for instance, are we to make of the "Elder John" mentioned by Papias? He says: "If then anyone at all came who had followed (*παρηκολουθηκώς*) the Elders, I used to enquire (of them as to) the words of the Elders—what Andrew or Peter had said (*εἶπεν*) or Philip or Thomas or Jacob or John or Matthew or any other of the Lord's disciples, and what Aristion and the Elder John, the Lord's disciples, were (then) saying" (*λέγουσιν*) (Eus. *HE*, III. 39. 4). Needless confusion has been introduced into the interpretation of this passage by assuming that the "Elders" were not the Apostles, but their disciples. The source of this error seems to be that the term "Elders" is used by Irenæus and Eusebius in this latter sense. But it does not follow that it must have meant the same for Papias. "Elders" is a relative term, and will apply to different sets of men when used by speakers of different periods. For Irenæus, Papias himself was an "Elder" (V. 33. 3 and 4). In Papias' case, there is no room for the insertion of an extra generation, besides the "followers," between himself and the Apostles. For it is clear that, when Papias was making his enquiries, at least two of the personal disciples of Jesus were still living—John and Aristion (hence the

information about the martyrdom of John the Apostle was given him as early as that, we have no means of telling. Dr. Charles (xxxvii.) sets Justin aside with the two-edged remark: "A myth can arise in a very few years," and supposes that the evidence for the apostle's early martyrdom was largely suppressed by "the all but universal beliefs of the Church from the earliest ages," i.e., in regard to his residence in Asia Minor.

present *λέγουσιν*). This points to a period about 90–100 A.D. Later than this they would hardly survive: earlier than this, their survival would hardly call for special mention. Now in 90–100 A.D. Papias could have had as much access to disciples of Apostles as he wished: he would not need to go to "followers" of those disciples.[1] In other words, the chronology does not well suit the schema

Apostles
Elders
Followers of Elders
Papias,

but is best satisfied by the briefer series

Apostles (and their generation), i.e. Elders
Followers of Elders
Papias:

and there is nothing either in the Greek of Papias (who does not here use the word "Apostles" at all) or anywhere else to discredit this interpretation. Moreover, it is confirmed by the fact that at least one of the Apostolic generation, viz. John, is called "the Elder": and it is independent of the date we assign to the composition of Papias' work, though the facts (1) that his enquiries were made as early as 100 A.D., (2) that Irenæus considered him an "ancient man" (V. 33. 4, cf. Eus. III. 39. 13), and (3) that Eusebius deals with him under the reign of Trajan,[2] seem to make 125 or 130 A.D.[3] a more probable date than 145-160 A.D.

When Papias then uses the term "the Elders," he means the first generation of Christians—primarily, the Apostles.

[1] We are told that he received one story from the daughters of Philip, who were his contemporaries (Eus. III. 39. 9). Polykarp, who was born in 69 A.D., had intercourse with "many" who had seen the Lord (Iren. III. 3. 4, cf. id. ap. Eus. V. 20. 6).

[2] Cf. Eus. III. 36. 2, where he says that Papias *ἐγνωρίζετο* at the same time as Polykarp.

[3] Not before 117 A.D., for he mentions certain people who survived to the times of Hadrian (Frag. XI. in Funk).

Now although Eusebius (III. 39. 2) says that Papias *in his preface* does not claim to be a hearer and eye-witness of the Apostles, that is simply his own faulty inference from Papias' language (which he proceeds to quote) and from the meaning *Irenæus* gave to the term "Elders." For Papias speaks of *ὅσα ποτὲ παρὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καλῶς ἔμαθον καὶ καλῶς ἐμνημόνευσα* (*ib.* 3)—an expression which certainly implies personal intercourse with "Elders," without, of course, excluding the receipt from them of much supplementary information at second-hand through their "followers" (so Schmiedel in *EB*$_i$ 2507). Moreover Eusebius tells us further that Papias *'Αριστίωνος . . . καὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου 'Ιωάννου αὐτήκοον ἑαυτόν φησι γενέσθαι.*[1] It is therefore unnecessary to challenge the statement of Irenæus, who may quite well have had authority for it other than Papias' writing, that Papias was a "hearer of John," meaning the Apostle (V. 33. 4, cf. 30. 1), perhaps also of other Apostles (II. 22. 5; V. 5. 1; cf. *Ep. Flor.* ap. Eus. V. 20. 4).

Now it has been urged with much confidence that Papias, in speaking of the sources of his information, clearly distinguishes John the Apostle from John the Elder (e.g. Moffatt, *LNT*, 601). But while no one would deny that Papias' Greek is patient of that interpretation, it is certainly just as patient of another. Suppose for a moment—what is by no means inherently unlikely—that Papias wanted to know from the "followers" (*a*) the past utterances of *all* the Apostles, (*b*) the present utterances of the one surviving Apostle, and (*c*) the present utterances of a somewhat

[1] *Ib.* 7 (cf. 14). It is impossible to believe that this definite statement s merely an inference from the fact that Papias often, as Eusebius proceeds to state, quoted them (*ὀνομαστὶ γοῦν πόλλακις αὐτῶν μνημονεύσας, κτλ.*); for (1) the fallacy would be too childish, and (2) *γοῦν* need not mean 'at least' (Chapman, *John the Presbyter*, 28–30). Further, Eusebius himself calls Papias a hearer of John in his *Chronicle* (Pap. Frag. XIV. in Funk)

younger surviving disciple (Aristion), how else would or could he have expressed it than by using the words he did use? And when we add the facts (*a*) that not even the Twelve are called "Apostles" in this passage: they are called "the Lord's disciples"; (*b*) that they are also (as we have seen)—and that in the first place—called "Elders," and (*c*) that the name "the Lord's disciples" is given to Aristion also and to a John who is also called "the Elder," the most natural conclusion seems to be that the two Johns named are one and the same person, who bore the title of "the Elder" κατ' ἐξοχήν, as the one surviving Apostle.[1] Doubt may quite reasonably be felt as to the historical accuracy of certain of the "traditions" which Papias and others give us on the Elder's authority (e.g. as to our Lord's age at the time of His ministry, and as to His words about miraculous fertility in the Messianic age): but such doubt does not call for a rejection of the result we have now reached. Moreover, the Elder's apparent interest in chiliastic eschatology is a further link between him and the Apocalypse.

If the Elder of Papias is the son of Zebedee, several further conclusions follow. Polykarp, though we have no assurance from his own lips that he had met with John *the Apostle*, is yet proved to have done so, and is probably quite rightly described by Irenæus as having been made a disciple and taught by Apostles, and as having received the office of bishop of Smyrna from Apostles (III. 3. 4; similarly Eus. III. 36. 1), and as being able to recall his intercourse with John (by whom Irenæus certainly means the Apostle) and others who had seen the Lord, and the words he had heard from them (Iren. ap. Eus. V. 20. 6). One story

[1] The "Elder" who criticised Mark's chronology (Papias ap. Eus. III. 39. 15) is proved by the context in Eusebius to have been *John* the Elder. Probably no one but an Apostle would have been in a position to improve on Mark in this respect.

in particular, which Polykarp used to tell of this "John the Lord's disciple," viz., his flight from the baths when he found the heretic Kerinthos within (Iren. III. 3. 4), harmonises admirably with the record of the impetuous temper of the "Son of Thunder." It is generally admitted that Irenæus, though he never actually calls the John of Ephesus an Apostle, yet firmly believed him to be the son of Zebedee. Born in Asia Minor about 130 A.D., resident there till early manhood, and a hearer of Polykarp, he was not very likely to be mistaken as to the Elder's identity.[1] His opinion is confirmed by Clemens of Alexandria's story (*Quis Dives*, 42)—*παραδεδομένον*, as he says, *καὶ μνήμῃ πεφυλαγμένον*—of John and the Robber: John is the Apostle, the exile returned from Patmos, and the leader of the Asian churches.

Further, we can without hesitation ascribe at once to the Apostle-Elder the two Epistles known as the Second and Third of John. The writer's title, *ὁ Πρεσβύτερος*, identifies him at once with John the Elder (cf. Charles, xlii. f.); and while the absence of *ὁ Ἀπόστολος*, as in the Apocalypse, is remarkable, it is not a greater difficulty here than there, where it is discounted by good external evidence. The eminent authority and severe and imperious language of the author again recall the vehemence of Zebedee's son and the Apocalyptist. Dr. Charles, it is true, has collected (xxxiv. f., cf. xli. f.) a number of linguistic features in which 2 and 3 John differ from the Apocalypse, but resemble 1 John and still more closely the Fourth Gospel. But this

[1] Dr. Charles (xlix.) discounts his evidence on the grounds that (1) he confuses the two Jacobs [but he was further from Palestine than from Asia Minor, and had never lived there]; (2) he quotes "the Elder" as distinct from John the Lord's disciple [but he quoted several Elders, and it is therefore not to be assumed that "an Elder" or "the Elder in Irenæus must always mean *John* the Elder: see Harnack, *Chron.* i. 333–340 n.]; (3) Eusebius charges him with wrongly representing Papias as a disciple of John [but Eusebius is wrong: see above, pp. 215, 216].

stylistic difference from the Apocalypse could easily be explained by the natural assumption that, as an old man of high rank, the author would employ—in the well-attested manner of Paul (Rom. xvi. 22 ; 2 Thess. iii. 17 ; cf. Gal. vi. 11) and Peter (1 Pet. v. 12)—an amanuensis, whose help was not available when he was in banishment in Patmos and engaged in writing the Apocalypse.[1]

The First Epistle of John is linked with the Second and Third fairly closely by its style,[2] by its tone of authority, and by the external evidence (from Irenæus onwards), and still more closely by the fact that the name " Anti-christ " occurs only in 1 John ii. 18, 22, iv. 3 and 2 John 7 in the New Testament, and in both Epistles bears the same meaning and that different from the later popular one. The language is different from that of the Apocalypse, but the explanation of this would be the same as in the case of the two shorter Epistles. The temper and subject-matter are also somewhat different, but changes in the external fortunes of the Church would account for this. It is significant too that 1 John reflects more clearly than the Fourth Gospel the popular belief in the early parousia of Jesus.[3] The opening words of the Epistle, which are meaningless unless they refer to personal intercourse (a reference to purely spiritual perception being irrelevant : cf. Peake, *CINT*, 193), mark the author definitely as a companion of Jesus. Apart from the language, there is no

[1] Sir F. G. Kenyon, in his *Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament* (31), infers from the nature of the contents that the Apocalypse was written in the author's own hand. It may be that the insertion of *ἀπόστολος* in the address of Peter's epistle was due to the fact that a secretary was penning it for him : we get Peter's more humble self-designation in v. 1—*συμπρεσβύτερος* of the Elders of the churches (a term which incidentally sheds an interesting light on the meaning of *πρεσβύτεροι* in Papias).

[2] Charles *Ilcc.* Note too the emphasis laid in all three on love.

[3] Also 1 John ii. 4, iv. 5, may be an attack on the same sort of libertinism as that censured in the Apocalypse.

difficulty in regarding 1 John as the work of the Apocalyptist and the son of Zebedee.

But we have ventured far enough. We have reached the brink of the problem of the Fourth Gospel, and here we must suspend discussion. The impossibility of the Gospel having come as a whole from the author of the Apocalypse (with which, however, it has points of connexion, Moffatt 501 f., Charles xxxii. ff.), our uncertainties as to its structure, sources, and component documents, its curious combination of historical and unhistorical material, its stylistic and theological links with 1 John, the figure of the Beloved Disciple and his share in the composition of the book, his connexion with "John" and Ephesus in the letter of Polykrates, and his resemblance to John the Apostle as the intimate friend of Jesus and the special companion of Peter—these are some of the leading topics which the problem of the Fourth Gospel calls us to consider. But it must suffice here to urge that this problem can be hopefully approached only after the relatively simpler ones that have been discussed in this paper are disposed of, and to suggest that, if the conclusions here defended are accepted, a solution of the problem of the Gospel might be sought by recognising in it (with most modern critics) the work of several contributors, one of them—the Beloved Disciple—being identified with the Apostle-Elder, and another with his amanuensis, who penned the three Epistles for him.

C. J. Cadoux.

DOES PRAYER COUNT IN A WORLD OF LAW?

Belief in the efficacy of prayer depends in the last resort on prior belief in a controlling fatherly Providence actively at work in the world and free to operate in relation to the petitions and needs of His children. It was so the Scripture writers conceived the God who hears and answers prayer. The forces of nature and the activities of the world and life were viewed as a direct manifestation of His living working. "Bless the Lord, O my soul," said the Psalmist, in that great hymn of nature, Psalm civ. "O Lord, my God, Thou art very great; Thou art clothed with honour and majesty . . . Who stretchest out the heavens like a curtain: . . . Who maketh the clouds His chariot; who walketh upon the wings of the wind. . . . He watereth the hills from His chamber . . . He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man." It was so Jesus Himself represented the case. Nature in all its processes, in its majesty and beauty and wonder, spoke to Him of God, the living God, His heavenly Father; it was shot through with a Presence that disturbed Him with the joy of elevated thoughts. He saw the Father feeding the birds, He saw Him clothing the grass of the field; and He encouraged men to commit themselves prayerfully and trustfully to this beneficent Father-worker with the argument: "Will He not much more clothe and care for you, O ye of little faith?" Even in the presence of the clouds and the darkness He traced the rainbow through the rain, and counselled men to faith in a fatherly Providence without whom not even a sparrow falls to the ground and who makes all things work together if not for immediate happiness yet for ultimate good to those that love Him.

To-day, however, in this scientific age, the idea of law,

of "natural law," has got between us and the Creator. God seems to be pushed away off and back, and tends to be thought of as the Divine artificer who may have made this world at the start, but now stands afar off leaving the machine to run by its own laws. To use the figure of a recent writer, God is represented as "an engineer who started this locomotive of a world, pulled the throttle wide open and then leaped from the cab, leaving the world to run its own unguided course ever since on the rails of law." [1] Men ask accordingly, In a world controlled by law how can prayer count? What are man's petitions over against this vast system of law in the midst of which he finds himself? To expect God to help men and to change things in answer to our prayers is, it is said, unreasonable and presumptuous, inasmuch as it is asking Him to interfere with the established order of the universe; asking, in effect, it has been said, carrying on the figure just quoted, "that the great through traffic of the world be side-tracked in order to give our local train right of way." And not only unreasonable and presumptuous, such a request is in the very nature of things impossible of fulfilment. The realm of nature, it is argued, is a realm of law, fixed, rigid, imviolable. For God to answer prayer, therefore, and to make things happen in the world in answer to prayer, this, it is said, would involve a miraculous intrusion into the established order, a "violation of law" as it is called, and such a thing is irreconcilable with our scientific conception of the universe. If prayer can operate in the world at all, it can operate only, as Professor Tyndall contended in the name of science in the great controversy on this subject waged nearly fifty years ago, in the spiritual region, in the region of the mind and will and character, not in the realm of natural events or outward circumstances. The whole

[1] Quoted in H. E. Fosdick's *The Meaning of Prayer*, p. 94.

tendency of this way of thinking, it is evident, is to minimise or depreciate the place and power of prayer in the world. Prayer is conceived as something mainly inward, or, as it is usually called, subjective, in its influence—if not in the sense that its only effect is the reflex or reflected influence on the man who prays, yet at most in the sense that we may only look to God for such inward answers to prayer as are obtainable through the opening of the mind and will to Divine guidance and enlightenment and strengthening. "Who rises from prayer a better man, his prayer is answered."

This distinction or separation, however, between two realms in prayer, variously described as material and spiritual, objective and subjective, outward and inward, is when examined unwarranted and indefensible. The inner spiritual life, the realm of mind and character, is under law as well as the outer material world; so that if for God to answer prayer for a material benefit is an interference with the established order of material phenomena and its possibility accordingly denied as a violation of law, equally for God to answer prayer for a spiritual benefit must be described as an interference with the established order of spiritual phenomena and its possibility likewise denied as also a violation of law. Further, the material and spiritual realms, the outward and inward, are so vitally inter-connected that if God can operate in the spiritual sphere in answer to prayer, His working on this sphere may have consequences in the other also; so that, in particular, prayer for a material benefit may be answered through an appropriate suggestion produced in the mental or spiritual world leading to changes in the world of outward or material events. The truth is, that the theory which denies the possibility of changes in the outer world in answer to prayer renders the possibility of changes in the inner life in answer to prayer equally incredible. Strictly and logically carried

out, the view in question reduces prayer simply to the attitude of acquiescence or inward submission to God's will as expressed in the laws of His universe and in the circumstances of our life, with the inward effects such an attitude involves, in calming the mind, steadying the will, and strengthening the heart. And if this is all, if these inward or subjective effects represent all the efficacy of prayer, then to pray for anything specific is out of the question, and it is but a short step to the conclusion that there is no necessity to suppose that God has anything directly to do with the matter at all, the results of prayer being only the mind's reaction on itself. Prayer, so far as it affects ourselves, becomes simply a kind of auto-suggestion or self-hypnotism, and so far as it affects others it does so only by way of thought-transference or mental suggestion.

II.

Now—not to dwell on the fact that true prayer is more than petition, even the communion or fellowship of the child-spirit with its Heavenly Father in which fellowship petition for specific things is only one element, and that our attitude in petition should ever be one of submission to the higher will and wisdom of a Heavenly Father, "Not my will but Thine be done"—the view in question with its minimising of petitionary prayer is based on a false conception of nature and of natural law, a conception which is now recognised to be both philosophically and scientifically obsolete. Indeed as we draw close to examine it, we shall see that in this matter of prayer and its relation to law, the saying of Bacon, the father of modern science, is true, that while "a little natural philosophy and the first entrance into it doth dispose the opinion to atheism . . . on the other side, much natural philosophy and wading deep into it will bring about men's minds to religion."

For (1) this system of law which we call nature or the "natural order" is not a rigid closed mechanical system owing its origin at the first, it may be, to Divine creative power, but now a self-enclosed, self-running system bound together by the iron bands of natural law, in the way that the materialistic or semi-materialistic science of the latter half of the nineteenth century tended to represent. That is the conception of it which is at the root of speaking or thinking of God's action in relation to prayer as a miraculous intervention in or violation of the natural order, an intrusion from without into an orderly system which is now independent of Him. Rather it is, as present-day scientific and philosophical thought is increasingly realising and insisting, a living, moving, growing organism, existing only in a spiritual context and controlled and energised for spiritual ends. Science may, for its own purposes, abstract from this spiritual reference, and speak of the world as being "governed by law" or under "the reign of law," but this, it must be remembered, is not strictly exact or accurate thinking. Law of itself has no governing or controlling power. Law is not a being, or entity; it is not a self-acting force or thing. It is simply a formula, descriptive of nature's observed method of behaviour or procedure, a term expressing the observed regularity or uniformity of nature's sequences. It tells us that, so far as man's observation has gone, certain phenomena do invariably follow other phenomena. As Huxley himself put it: "Law means simply a rule which we have always found to hold good, and which we expect always will hold good." [1]

What is meant by speaking of the "reign of law" or of the "uniformity of nature," therefore, is that the world is governed according to law, in the sense that the same cause

[1] *Collected Essays*, vol. i. p. 193, quoted in *Cambridge Theological Essays* (ed. Swete), p. 275.

is found to be invariably or uniformly followed by the same effect, the same antecedents by the same consequents. Properly conceived, and in more definitely Christian phraseology, the principle of the uniformity of nature is the expression of the stability of God's method of working in nature. It is the assertion that the ground-basis of God's government of the world is orderly, that it is by law, by "natural law" if you will. And a ground-basis of law or order is not only the condition and assumption of science; it is the very condition of rational life itself. Without it life would be a chaos; no intelligent rational intercourse on our part with nature or with one another would be possible. We could not forecast results nor set about the accomplishment of orderly purposes in an intelligent way. The very condition of rational life, of intelligent intercourse with nature and with one another, is that the laws of nature are stable and uniform, that they can be relied upon, in the way of the same conditions always producing the same effects. The very order of the world, the "reign of law" or the "uniformity of nature" as it is called by scientists, is thus the substructure, the basal substructure, of a Heavenly Father's working, the fundamental condition of the development of intelligence and rational freedom in His children. As such this system of law which we call the natural order is not a limitation or imprisonment, but a condition of freedom, the basal manifestation or fundamental expression of the working of a Fatherly omnipotence for the sake of rational and spiritual ends with His children. In a word, it is the very "grammar of the love of God," not the operation of an external, mechanical necessity to be accepted with resignation or passive submission.

But (2) in this system of law which we speak of as nature there are different grades or levels, each subject to laws proper to its own order, and descriptive of its own distinctive

or characteristic modes of behaviour or procedure. Three chief grades or levels in this system are usually distinguished, viz. : First, the inorganic or inanimate, commonly called the mechanical, physical order ; Second, the organic or animate, commonly called the biological order ; and Third, the conscious and self-conscious order, the order of intelligence and self-determining personality.[1] In this scale of orders or levels—in this "hierarchy of laws," to use a phrase of Boutroux's—each lower order is not a rigid closed or self-contained system, but open to control or modification because to utilisation, by the order or orders above, the inorganic by the organic, and the inorganic and organic by the conscious and self-conscious. From the point of view of the lower order, the actions of the higher order may appear unnatural or "contrary to nature," a violation of or interference with natural law. From the point of view of the mechanical physical order, for example, the phenomena of organic nature, and much more the phenomena of self-conscious personality and will, may appear as if they contradicted the laws of the lower order. But, as St. Augustine pointed out long ago, this means not that they are really contrary to nature but only "contrary to nature so far as yet known" at the lower level (*non contra naturam, sed contra quam est nota natura*).[2] They would be contrary to nature only if the laws of the lower order were assumed to be final and ultimate for the whole system of nature, instead of being part of a larger whole, means to ends beyond themselves. Nature is "uniform" or "regular," as we have seen, only in the sense that if the same conditions are fulfilled the same results will follow. If the conditions are changed, however, and new and higher forces are introduced with

[1] For our present purpose it is not necessary to distinguish between the conscious and self-conscious orders.

[2] *De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 8.

laws appropriate to themselves, whereby a new order or level of working is brought into existence, the laws of nature at the lower level are not violated or contradicted but rather modified and transcended, their action being controlled and utilised for higher ends.

Now of the fact that this whole system of law which we call nature with its different levels is not, either as a whole or in any of its parts, an iron system in which personality is imprisoned, in the way the materialistic or semi-materialistic science of the past was apt to represent, but rather the instrument and servant of personality, susceptible to the ends of personal life and controllable or directable accordingly—of this we have first-hand knowledge in our own experience. As Carlyle observed in his *Sartor Resartus*, the fundamental evidence of this subjection of the system of nature to ends of personality is that I can freely stretch out my hand. The hand which I stretch out is as much a part of nature and as entirely subject to its laws, to the law of gravitation among others, as rocks or stones or trees. And yet I freely lift it up. The system of laws which we speak of as our bodies, that is to say, we utilise freely for personal ends. It is not that these laws are violated or contravened by being thus made the instrument of personal intelligence and will. So far from that, the very condition of our being able to use them as the instrument of our will is that they are stable and uniform, that they can be depended upon, that they are inviolable indeed in the sense that the same conditions invariably produce the same results. No, it is rather that the working of these laws is taken up and controlled or utilised so as to fulfil the purposes of a higher and larger law.

This being so, nature or the natural order being thus subservient to the purposes of spirit, it follows (3) that the more we learn or discover of the laws of nature the more

controllable or susceptible nature becomes to the ends of personal will. In other words, the more we know of the laws of God's world, the freer we are to accomplish our purposes not in spite of these laws but through and by means of them. To illustrate. An ocean liner with hundreds of lives on board is in imminent peril in mid-Atlantic —rendered helpless and out of control by the angry storm. Once that liner must have been left to its own helplessness or to the limited resources of its own provision. But through the discovery in recent days of more of the system of nature's laws the mind of man has learned to manipulate natural forces in a new way; so that now appeal for help can be sent out by "wireless" across the distances, in answer to which appeal great ships change their courses and hurry to the place of danger. Each new law of nature becomes thus, when discovered, a new instrument of personality, an instrument for the development in new ways of helpful intercourse between persons, and as such a new possibility for man's causing things to happen in a world of law which apart from his action or intervention never would have happened.

Now if man is thus able, and more and more able with his advancing knowledge of nature's laws, to utilise and manipulate these laws for ends of personal worth or value, what shall we say of God, who knows all the laws of nature and in whose hand and leash are all the laws of the world for the realisation of ends of moral and spiritual worth with His children? Who would be so rash as to attempt to set bounds to the possibilities of the working of Him who in His activities in the world is limited not by any obstacles or hindrances outside of Himself as man is, but only by such conditions as proceed from His own character as wise and holy Love, and whom therefore we call our Almighty Heavenly Father? Because Love, Father-Love, is over all,

and because the world has been made for the fellowship of God with His children as its final end and aim—for "the revealing of the Sons of God," to use Paul's phrase (Rom. viii. 19)—there is no place in His world where He may not be found responsive to the needs of His children. To His children's prayers He may respond through the co-ordination of the ordinary laws of nature which are the basal form of the working of His fatherly goodness and power; or over and beyond those laws He may exercise His fatherly Providence in accordance with other laws which are to us as yet unknown and which therefore we call miraculous. But however He does respond—and "no" is sometimes a truer Father's answer than "yes" because better and wiser for His children—the point is, there is no limit to the sphere of God's working in answer to prayer. The natural order is, as we have seen, not an independent entity outside the spiritual order, but the basis and substructure of this order; and God's working through prayer even in relation to the natural order is not a violation of law or a cutting across His orderly working in the world. Rather it is a controlling and co-ordinating of nature's laws for spiritual ends or values, those ends of moral and spiritual personality for which the universe was brought into existence at the first, and for the realisation of which nature itself in its long process of ascending evolution cries out, groaning and travailing thereunto from the beginning until now. Nay, more, inasmuch as the natural order rests on and is sustained by the spiritual order, with a view to the accomplishment of whose ends it exists, prayer, so far from being a violation of nature and natural law, is truly its fulfilment, enabling it to come to itself and realise its true destiny and consummation.

With the misconception of nature and of natural law referred to thus removed there is no ground in reason for

the denial of the efficacy of petitionary prayer and in particular for the limitation of prayer to spiritual benefits in the way proposed. "*Whatsoever* ye desire"—such is the word of the great Expert and Authority in prayer, encouraging us to pray to God for all that concerns the true well being of His children. And this word of Jesus Himself is increasingly supported by the most approved tendencies of present-day science. As witness, for example, the following striking testimony of Sir Oliver Lodge on this matter:—

> "Religious people seem to be losing some of their faith in prayer: they think it scientific not to pray in the sense of simple petition. They may be right; it may be the highest attitude never to ask for anything specific only for acquiescence. If saints tell so, they are doubtless right, but, so far as ordinary science has anything to say to the contrary, a more childlike attitude might turn out truer, more in accordance with the total scheme. . . . Prayer, we have been told, is a mighty engine of achievement; but we have ceased to believe it. Why should we be so incredulous? Even in medicine, for instance, it is not really absurd to suggest that drugs and no prayer may be almost as foolish as prayer and no drugs. . . . The whole truth may be completer and saner than the sectaries draw: more things may be
>
> 'wrought by prayer
> Than this world dreams of.'" [1]

So then, to the question, Does prayer count in a world of law? we would reply: Yes, prayer counts just because the world in which we live is a world of law, and because Love, Father-love, is "Creation's final law." Because this is so, as Dora Greenwell says in one of her essays, "prayer is

[1] *Man and the Universe*, pp. 43–4 (Methuen's Shilling Library).

itself one of these laws, upon whose working God has determined that a certain result shall follow—

> 'An element
> That comes and goes unseen, yet doth effect
> Rare issues by its operance.'" [1]

J. M. Shaw.

JESUS AND BAPTISM.

In the May number of the Expositor an article appeared under the title "Jesus and Baptism," in which Dr. Winstanley "raised questions" in the hope of "stimulating others to attack the difficulty" due to "the contradiction in the matter of baptism between the synoptic and Johannine accounts." In particular, he asked whether modern students of the New Testament can accept the statement that the two Sacraments were "ordained by Christ Himself" without at least demanding some closer definition of what "ordaining" by "Christ" means. Evidently this leads us at once to the heart of the matter. If "ordained by Christ" means that the Sacrament of Baptism was initiated by Christ and was directly ordered by Him as binding on the Church, probably many modern students could not subscribe to the statement. But the same passages in N.T which prevent the acceptance of such a theory, do seem to suggest that in a very real sense Baptism was "ordained by Christ."

Instead of turning at once to any individual passages, let us follow for a moment the familiar track of deduction from the general practice of the early Church. It is certain that Jesus Himself was baptized by John in the Jordan. We know also that some of His earliest disciples were disciples of John; and we may be certain that they too had

[1] *The Power of Prayer*, p. 34 ("Little Books on Religion" Series).

been baptized by him. Further, it is certain that from the earliest days the Christian Church practised an ordinance of baptism. According to Acts ii. 38, Peter, on the day of Pentecost, urged his hearers to be baptized ; and it is added, "they that received his word were baptized." From that day to this the Christian Church has practised baptism.

Now it is difficult to believe that when Peter talked about "baptism" on the day of Pentecost he was referring to anything different in form from the baptism he and the other disciples, and also Jesus Himself, had received at the hand of John, and with which his audience was familiar. The Jews knew about John's baptism ; and this was the baptism to which Peter and his colleagues had submitted. What then was new in the baptism on the day of Pentecost ? This clearly, that it was baptism "in the name of Jesus Christ." No one baptized by John in Jordan had been baptized "in the name of Jesus Christ." The converts who formed the first Church were so baptized. Therefore Christian baptism was not new in form, but it was new in meaning. It gained an entirely fresh significance by its connexion with Jesus Christ.

But it was not only baptism which was changed in meaning between the days of John and the day of Pentecost. Everything had been changed for the apostles by the death and resurrection and ascension of Jesus. Peter's sermon was new. Peter had preached during the lifetime of Jesus. But the sermon Peter preached at Pentecost was quite different in its contents and in its appeal from his sermons when he went on his preaching tours during the ministry of Jesus. The sermon was different because Peter's idea of Jesus was different ; the Gospel was new, and the Kingdom was new, and baptism was new. All had gained fresh significance because they were connected with Jesus and *He* had gained new significance.

Now let us ask whether anything of this new significance was imparted to baptism by Jesus Himself. And to begin with, let us examine the statements of John the Evangelist, to which Dr. Winstanley refers. Is it quite certain that they bear all the meaning which Dr. Winstanley finds in them? Is it not likely, e.g., that having been Himself baptized by John, and His chief disciples having been baptized by John, Jesus would baptize? The work of John cannot be cut off from the work of Jesus. Mark makes the preaching of John "the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ"; and all the other Evangelists (including John) do the same. Jesus was baptized by John because He wished to ally Himself with His forerunner and to make His own work the fulfilment of the Baptist's prophecy. Baptism did not originate with John. It was a rite which John adopted as peculiarly suited to the message he had to proclaim. It would have been strange, therefore, if the Messiah, whilst linking up His ministry with that of the forerunner, had rejected the rite which was its most characteristic feature. The statement in John iii. 22 that "Jesus and His disciples baptized in Judæa near where John was baptizing" seems reasonable. The difficulty is that no mention is made of this fact in the synoptic Gospels. But may it not be that Jesus had to suspend the rite when He went into Galilee? John tells us that Jesus was baptizing before the Baptist was cast into prison (John iii. 24). When the Baptist was imprisoned and then killed by Herod, it may have been both dangerous and misleading to continue a rite which was so closely connected with him. What is the significance of the statement in John iv. 1 and 3, "When the Lord knew how the Pharisees had heard that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John" (this last clause is probably the form of the report as it reached the Pharisees), "He left Judæa and departed again into Galilee"? There is a suggestion

that by baptizing, Jesus was endangering His mission in some way. And there is quite possibly a hint that after leaving Judæa for Galilee He gave up baptizing—especially as comparatively few became His disciples, though crowds listened to His preaching and may have been attracted to Him. In this case both the silence of the Synoptics and the statement in John iii. 22 that Jesus and His disciples baptized in Judæa can be explained. But if Jesus baptized after John had pointed men to Him as the Messiah we should expect that Jesus would make and baptize more disciples than John. May we not go farther and say that the two other statements on this matter are likely? Was not the jealousy on the part of John's disciples very human? And was not John's noble explanation worthy of him? (John iii. 27–30). And, again, is there not a good reason for the statement that "Jesus Himself baptized not, but His disciples"? Paul rejoiced that he had baptized so few in Corinth. This was not because baptism was neglected there; it was because Paul entrusted the work of baptizing to others, whilst he continued to preach. And the time came when he was glad, because people baptized by him might have claimed some special privilege. Would not people baptized by Jesus be likely to attach peculiar value to their baptism as compared with that administered by a disciple? And is not this a sufficient reason for giving the actual work of baptizing to the disciples, though it was entirely true that "Jesus was making the disciples" and might quite naturally be described in the same sentence as "baptizing them." If a missionary writes home that he and his colleagues are "making and baptizing many converts" we should not interpret that as meaning that the rite must have been actually administered by them, and not by any of their helpers. Dr. Winstanley's reference to these sentences seem to strain them somewhat, claiming for them

a literal meaning which cannot be found in the condensed statements of the Gospels.

So then we conclude that Jesus adopted the rite of baptism from John, practising it Himself, at any rate for a time and in Judæa, as people became His disciples. When the Church started on its way, this rite, which John had made familiar and which Jesus Himself had practised, was received as the symbol of Christian discipleship. Professor Kirsopp Lake says: "It is therefore more probable that the origin of Christian baptism is the adoption and adaptation of a Jewish custom than that it was directly and specially instituted by Christ."[1] This sentence certainly requires development. Adoption and adaptation by whom? First of all by John, and then by Jesus, and finally by the Church. John's baptism became Christian baptism when it was "adapted" to Christian conditions by the apostles in accordance with the teaching of Jesus.

This brings us to the critical passage—Matthew xxviii. 19. Professor Kirsopp Lake says that "the cumulative evidence of three lines of criticism [textual, literary, historical] is distinctly against the view that Matthew xxviii. 19 represents the *ipsissima verba* of Christ in instituting Christian baptism."[2] Professor Vernon Bartlet's words are, "There is no real ground for doubting the authenticity of Matthew xxviii. 19 as part of Matthew's Gospel in its final form. But this is far from settling its historicity as a word of Jesus Himself. The clause touching baptism as part of the "discipling" of "all the nations" might easily arise as merely descriptive and directive of the Church's actual practice in the matter, whenever and wherever this Gospel was composed."[3]

Is there not a simpler explanation than either of these

[1] *Encyclo. of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii., p. 381b. [2] *L.c.* p. 380.
[3] *Encyclo. of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii., p. 376.

two suggestions? It is hard to believe that Matthew xxviii. 18–20 offers the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus. Luke's statement (Acts i. 2, 3) that Jesus appeared during forty days and spoke concerning the Kingdom of God implies, what seems evident, that all we have in the Gospels is a very brief and highly condensed summary of the teaching of the Risen Christ. If we may suppose that during the forty days Jesus gave explicit directions about baptism—not an extravagant supposition and one directly supported, not only by Matthew, but also by Mark (xvi. 16), and by Luke (Acts i. 5)—Matthew xxviii. 19 contains the summary of what He said. It is concerned with the significance of the rite under the new conditions. The emphasis is not upon "baptizing" but upon "into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Jesus knew (or directed) that the rite would be continued. But it would have a new meaning. Hitherto it had been a baptism of repentance in relation to the Kingdom of God; i.e., it would be a baptism into the name of God. Now it is to bear a much fuller meaning. As a Christian rite it would be baptism into the name of Christ. It was a symbol of Christian discipleship. But what did Christ's name signify? It declared that God is the Father: that is the name which Christ has made indispensable. Therefore baptism into the name of Christ is baptism into the name of the Father. The other distinctive thing about Christian baptism is emphasized often in N.T., viz., that it is baptism in the Holy Spirit. Therefore the rite as Christian is baptism into the name of the Holy Spirit.

In this way "baptizing them into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit" becomes a summary of Christ's teaching about the significance of the rite in the Christian Church, distinguishing it from the rite as hitherto practised by John and by Jesus. There is no need to treat the words as a formula that must be used. Professor

Bartlet says, "It is unlikely that baptism was a bare rite of confessing a sacred Name, followed by immersion in water. The rite itself had a concrete setting of ethical exhortation and pledging."[1] That "setting" may be indicated by "the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit," as well as by "teaching to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded." Anyhow, the "baptismal formula" in Matthew xxviii. 19 should be interpreted not as a formula to be used at the performance of the rite, but as a formula explanatory of the new significance of the rite in the Christian Church.

And this is the sense in which Jesus Christ "ordained" baptism. He did not order His disciples to adopt a rite with which they were unfamiliar. But He gave to a familiar rite a new and deeper significance. Perhaps that significance was not grasped at once by the apostles. They could not enter by a leap into the amazing heritage laid up for them during "the great forty days." Much that was implicit in the Christian Gospel which then became a glorious reality, could only become explicit gradually as this Gospel met the facts of life and the needs of the world. But just as Jesus gave His disciples the teaching summarised in "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature," or in "Go and make disciples of all the nations," so He gave them the teaching concerning baptism which is summarised in the famous formula "into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Such an "ordination" makes Baptism the sacred possession and the undying obligation of the Church by the Master's own authority. At the same time it leaves the references in John's Gospel to baptism during the ministry of Jesus free from some of those objections to which Dr. Winstanley called attention.

J. E. Roberts.

[1] *L.c.* p. 378a.

HEBREWS IV. 2 AND ROMANS X. 16 ff.

In both these places difficulties have been introduced owing to neglect of the significance of the word *ἀκοή*. In Hebrews iv. 2 the writer, if he has not moved in thought from the generation that failed of Canaan to that which was content to remain in Babylonia, is at all events using the language of the great Prophet of the Exile. With *εὐηγγελισμένοι* and *ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀκοῆς* we are taken from the 95th Psalm to Isaiah lii. 7 and liii. 1, where *ἀκοή* is a thing heard from God to be announced by *εὐαγγελιζόμενοι*. This use of *ἀκοή* was evidently current in ordinary speech, as we see from Sirach xlii. 1 (=xli. 23), *ἀπὸ δευτερώσεως καὶ λόγου ἀκοῆς*, "of repeating and speaking *what thou hast heard*" (R.V.). Of *εὐαγγελίζομαι* some go so far as to say that the force of the *εὖ* evaporated and that the verb came to mean "bear a message." We can at least say that only one who has *listened* can *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*. The articles in *ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀκοῆς* in Heb. iv. 2 are thus wholly intelligible. They refer to that "telling of something heard" which is contained in *εὐηγγελισμένοι ἐσμεν*. Having seen this we can be in no doubt about the reference of *τοῖς ἀκούσασι* in the following clause. That reference is fixed by *τῆς ἀκοῆς*—"Those who heard it" are the Envoys who, before starting out as *εὐαγγελιζόμενοι*, received from God's mouth the message of peace. And, with *τοῖς ἀκούσασι*, thus referring to the Envoys. *συνκεκερασμένους τῇ πίστει τοῖς ἀκούσασι*, "having combined by their faith with those to whom God spake," quite simply describes the fit experience of the *εὐηγγελισμένοι*. So in ii. 3 the writer associates himself with those to whom the salvation, proclaimed first by the Risen Lord, was confirmed by those who received it from His lips (*ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκουσάντων*).

In Romans x, 16 St. Paul quotes the opening words of Isaiah liii., prefixing *Κύριε* with a view to the inference which he is going to draw. He has just said *οὐ πάντες ὑπήκουσαν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ*. To justify the statement he goes on, *Ἡσαίας γὰρ λέγει, Κύριε, τίς ἐπίστευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν*; where *ἀκοή* is of course *the thing heard* by God's Envoys and by them reported to His people, as a *εὐαγγέλιον*. Then, having stressed the proof afforded by these words that faith is awakened by a "report" and that "the report" is mediated by an utterance (or "fiat," *ῥῆμα*) of Christ, he goes on to ask two questions, both bearing upon the amazing fact that a "report," mediated by an utterance of Christ and addressed to faith, has not won universal credence. He first asks *μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν*; "Can it be that they did *not* hear?" Of whom is he speaking? The twice repeated *ἀκοή* supplies the answer. "Is it possible that the Envoys did *not* hear?" Was there, after all, *no ἀκοή*? Was *nothing* heard? Were they speaking "from themselves" (cp. St. John xvi. 13)? If so the astounding fact of rejection is accounted for. But the thing is incredible. God *has* spoken and His Envoys *have* heard, for, as we are taught by the 19th Psalm, the ordinances of the heavens declare, by their ministry to His power and love, that there is a law, a revelation, proceeding from Him with power to restore the soul, make wise the simple, rejoice the heart, and enlighten the eyes. They witness to Him as "the God of glory," the One Source of all-pervading light and warmth in the spiritual as in the natural realm.

Then follows the question (v. 19), "Can it be that Israel did not recognise" such a revelation? "Was God's own people blind and deaf to a message so sure, so clear, so gracious?"

G. H. Whitaker.

HARNACK'S "MARCION"

ADOLF VON HARNACK'S seventieth birthday, which fell on the seventh of last May, was celebrated in his own country with unusual honour. A well known mode of commemoration for such an occasion is the publication of a volume containing articles contributed by scholars who thereby acknowledge themselves to be more or less disciples of the professor concerned; but in this case the book assumed dimensions far beyond the ordinary, swelling to a couple of volumes and embracing no fewer than sixty contributors. Festivities at Harnack's home in Potsdam, such as a torch-light procession of students and the assembling of intimate friends from far and near, also attained to unusual proportions. In pre-war conditions a telegram from the Kaiser would have been the climax, Harnack being a courtier and enjoying marked imperial favour, but, as far as I have observed, this feature did not appear in the proceedings. The learned periodicals did not, however, fail in their tributes, *Die Christliche Welt* devoting an entire issue to the subject and having his labours in the different universities in which he has been active described by those who had there come under his influence and who did not fail to expatiate with enthusiasm on what they owed to their hero.

Perhaps, however, for the world at large the most noteworthy celebration of the eventful year was one contributed by Harnack himself. It is well known that for many years he has been issuing, in collaboration with many scholars, texts of Early Christian writings on a gigantic scale. The

issue for a year might consist of one, two, three or four publications, according to the size of the texts dealt with. First appeared a series of fifteen volumes, and then a second, likewise consisting of fifteen volumes. A third series has almost attained the same dimensions; and, though the fourteenth volume is not yet complete, the fifteenth was published last year in two parts. Whether this third series, being of the same extent as the first and second, is intended to complete the entire work, I am unable to say, but these *Texte und Untersuchungen* certainly form one of the most Herculean undertakings of our time or of any time in the realm of scholarship; and they will remain, apart from Harnack's own numerous works, an imperishable monument of the scholar's industry and of his success in securing colleagues to collaborate with him in the repristination of the relics of antiquity.

The most remarkable fact, however, about volume xlv. is that it is an original work of Harnack's own, on which he has been engaged for many years. Indeed, the story of how it has come into existence belongs to the romance of learning. When he was a student at Dorpat, the place of his birth, there was offered by the University a prize for an essay on the following theme: *Marcionis Doctrina e Tertulliani adversus Marcionem Libris Eruatur et Explicetur*. Having entered the competition, the youthful Harnack won the prize; but, though the authorities recommended the publication of the essay, this did not take place at the time. The subject, however, remained with him and continued to influence his thinking. In fact, he says in the preface to the present work: "Through Marcion I was introduced to the textual criticism of the New Testament, to the oldest Church History, to the conception of history in the school of Baur, and to the problems of Systematic Theology; there could have been

no better introduction." In the present work not a page of the essay remains as it was originally written; yet, he says, there is in it a unity with the first draft which to himself is easily discernible; and, in some ways, this is the summing-up of his lifework.

Marcion is said to have been born about the year 85 A.D., and his activity must have extended over the early decades of the second century. The date of his death is not known. He is generally reckoned as one of the Gnostics, perhaps the most dangerous of them all. But Harnack demonstrates that he had little or nothing to do with Gnosticism, beyond that he may have derived something from one of the Gnostics of the name of Cerdo, and that later Gnostics borrowed not a little from him. He is a thinker by himself, of marked originality; and Harnack is of opinion that, in future works on Church History, he will require to receive the attention which it has been the custom of historians to bestow on Gnosticism. Indeed, so far is the author carried away by his theme as to affirm, that the difference between the Church as it actually became and the Church as it would have been without Marcion is greater than the difference between the Church before and the Church after the Reformation.

Marcion came to Rome from Pontus, a province of the Roman Empire lying on the southern shores of the Black Sea, and he came in a ship of his own, of which he was the master. His father had been the principal man in the congregation in which the son was brought up. The latter left home on account of some disagreement with the father; and there is an old story of some fault of moral character as a reason for the separation. But about this Harnack is sceptical, even suggesting that the rumour about the seduction of a virgin may only have been a way

of saying that he was supposed by the father to be leading the congregation into heresy. He must have been in good circumstances, because he is reported to have given to the poor in the Church at Rome two hundred thousand sesterces. But, when the nature of the sailor-evangelist's teaching became known, his money was returned, and he was expelled from the Church.

It has been usual to assume that, when the expelled man organised a religious body of his own, he copied the organisation and arrangements of the Church; but Harnack inclines to believe the relation of the two bodies to have been the other way, the new leader unfolding such powers of organisation and evangelisation that the Church afterwards copied him. At all events Marcion's Church spread with such rapidity as to become a rival to orthodox Christianity. It penetrated wherever Christianity had gone; and Harnack thinks that there may have been a decade in which the numbers of members in both communions were about equal.

The point, however, at which, in Harnack's opinion, Marcion most displayed the gift of leadership was the perception that a Church could only be built upon the foundation of a revelation; as the Old Testament Church had been built upon the foundation of the Old Testament, so must the new Church be on a New Testament. As yet, however, there was no New Testament, because the task of canonisation had not been carried so far, and none were as yet fully sensible of the indispensability of such a basis on which to work. Marcion has the merit of having perceived this before the orthodox leaders, and, when he looked round for the materials out of which to construct a canon, he fixed on the Gospel of St. Luke and the Epistles of St. Paul as his sufficient Bible. He did not, on the contrary, like the official Church, take over the Old Testa-

ment; and he did not even take over the Gospel of St. Luke or the Epistles of St. Paul without submitting them to a process of editing, which comprised both addition and excision, in accordance with the conception which he had formed of what Christianity was.

This conception he introduced with the exclamation: "Oh wonder of wonders, ecstasy, power and astonishment is it, that one can neither utter anything about the Gospel nor even think anything, nor can it be compared with anything whatever!" This seems to have been the opening sentence of the book in which Marcion published his Gospel to the world, and Harnack quotes it over and over again, as if it had been a chorus to be forever repeated, and he takes it to prove that Marcion had in him the root of the matter, having found in the Gospel an inexpressible secret, this secret being nothing else than the free grace and dying love of the Saviour. To him God was love and nothing else, not a judge or an executioner. He set the Gospel in opposition and contradiction to the law, and would hear nothing of a God who commands or threatens or punishes.

It was for this reason that he did not take over into his new society the Old Testament, because it is full of laws, with punishments attached. Some of its rules for human life might have been good for the Jews, and they might even be good for all men, as long as they are in a natural condition, requiring their life to be regulated by precepts and prohibitions; but the true Christian is above all such dictation; he does not seek salvation by good works of his own, but owes it entirely to the mercy of God and the grace of Christ, and he is instructed by the Spirit within what he ought to do, and does it. It is true that Jesus is represented in the Gospels as acknowledging the Old Testament, and St. Paul is represented as teaching that the law is holy, and the commandment holy and just and

good; but these are the misrepresentations of disciples of Jesus who did not understand their Master and of Judaisers who not only persecuted but falsified St. Paul.

The real reason, however, why the Old Testament is to be rejected is that it was inspired by an inferior Deity. Marcion does not shrink from affirming that the God of the Jewish people was a totally different being from the God of Jesus Christ; and he goes through the Old Testament, with a searching and jealous eye, exposing what appear to him the shortcomings and excesses of this superhuman but subterdivine Being. Even as represented in His own book, Jehovah is cruel, false and self-contradictory. It is astonishing how, at such an early date, all the holes were picked in the Old Testament by this thinker which were to be brought forward in later times by English Deists and rationalistic critics; and a popular lecturer like Bradlaugh or Ingersoll, intent on exposing the frailties and contradictions of the Bible, could have filled his quiver from this source.

This inferior God was not only, however, in the eyes of Marcion, the inspirer of the Old Testament, but also the creator of the physical world; and the creation is worthy of such an author. Many Christian writers have expatiated on the defects and misarrangements of the world, finding the explanation of these in the fact that it is a fallen world; but Marcion traces them to a higher source, finding the explanation in the inferiority of the Being from whom they proceeded. Never was there a more pessimistic disdain of the universe and of ordinary human life than is found in this observer. Instead of dwelling on the beauties of the world and the adaptation of the globe as a place of sojourn for man in his mortal life, Marcion exaggerates all such phenomena as earthquakes, pestilences and diseases; he makes sport of the monsters, the venomous insects and

other objectionable creatures, with which sea and land abound; and, above all, he abhors the process by which man is born into the world and the indignity of the form in which he has to leave it.

Marriage and the birth of children are, therefore, in his system, altogether forbidden, and he is a preacher of the extremest asceticism. There is to be no compromise with the world, which is not only the product of an inferior Deity, but, also, the prey of Satan, to whom it belongs and whose fate it will share.

All this, however, is only the dark background against which to exhibit the light and truth brought to the world by Jesus Christ. The deeper the sin and misery in which humanity is sunk, the more excellent is the mercy by which it is redeemed. Christ did not appear to lead the lost sheep back to the fold of the Shepherd of Israel, but to lead them to an entirely new fold and a new Shepherd. Not only had Israel not known the true God, but their God Himself was unaware of His existence, and their lawgivers and prophets could not foretell His advent. It is to a new, a stranger God that Christ conducts the human race, and it is no wonder that everyone who is led to Him becomes himself a new creature. Old things have passed away, and all things have become new. This exultant consciousness rings out as the keynote of Marcion's Gospel, and with it is connected a hope which maketh not ashamed. It may be true that Marcionites are at present despised and persecuted by the world; but their day is coming, when He in whom they trust will appear again and lead them home to a city which hath foundations.

It might be thought that a religion which forbade marriage and the birth of children could have but a short-lived existence; and, of course, such a belief was closely

connected with the expectation of Christ's Second Coming. When, however, all things continued as they were, no opening of the heavens taking place to let the Deliverer through, it might have been supposed that Marcionitism was doomed to an early extinction. Nevertheless, it survived in comparative vigour down to the fourth century, and some remains of it, in the extreme East, are discernible as late as the tenth century. It entered into combination with other heretical systems, and so imported into its life a certain amount of novelty and variety. It is even said to have been divided into schools and sects, and it produced at least one other teacher of originality and power besides Marcion, namely, Apelles, whom Harnack paints with partiality, making him out to be a good Ritschlian, with no metaphysics, no natural religion and no experience except that of faith in Christ.

Though Marcionitism might thus have appeared a feeble and transitory thing, it was at one time considered so formidable by the orthodox teachers of the Church that they directed against it a great quantity of their heaviest artillery, quoting extensively from Marcion's writings and refuting his exegesis of innumerable texts of Scripture. So abundant are these relics of Marcion's literary remains in other authors that, though his book, entitled *Antitheses*, is lost, Harnack has been able to piece out his system with comparative completeness. He has gone through all the early Christian writers who make any reference to him, collecting all that these have said about him and giving Marcion's interpretation of every text in Scripture on which he has set his stamp. He believes he has been able to show that, in not a few cases, Marcion still supplies the true reading of a text or the true interpretation of a passage, and the orthodox writers often improved their own comprehension of Scripture under the provocation of

his misinterpretations. Of course, if Marcion's book itself should come to light, many a point might be presented in a different aspect; but, apart from this, Harnack has crowded into this monograph all that is likely to be known on the subject, and he has been sustained in his toil by the belief, which has gradually grown on him, that in Marcion we have the most important author between St. Paul and St. Augustine.

The surprise of Harnack's work, however, is its close—like the sting in the tail. Here he raises the question, what Marcion has to teach us. Is the God of the New also the God of the Old Testament? Is the world so evil that there is no hope for its inhabitants from its own science and culture, but only from the salvation provided in Christ for those who acknowledge their lost condition and trust in Christ alone for salvation? Is the Old Testament inspired by the same Spirit as the New and, therefore, worthy to be used along with it as part of the same canon? To the last question Harnack, on his own account, gives a threefold answer. First, in the second century Marcion was premature in separating the Old Testament from the New; at the Reformation Luther missed a chance of doing so, and the omission was fateful to the Church; but from the seventeenth century till the present day it has been becoming more and more evident and urgent that a radical separation must be carried out.

The Church of the first or the second century could not abandon the Old Testament with the apparently contrary example of Christ and St. Paul before its eyes; but it paid the penalty of retaining it in the constantly increasing legalism of the Middle Ages. Luther refrained from seizing his opportunity through affection for certain portions of the Old Testament, especially the Psalms, and Lutheranism

clung to a use of the law not only to arouse the conscience of the unconverted, but to guide the conduct of the regenerate. Nevertheless, Luther took the bold step of ejecting from the canon the Apocrypha, though retaining the apocryphal books as being "good and useful for reading." What he thus did for the Apocrypha, Harnack maintains, ought now to be done for the Old Testament: its books should be acknowledged as "good and useful for reading," but taken out of the canon of Scripture. This conclusion is the result of the critical study of the Bible since the rise of the Deistic opinions in England and their continuation in the Illumination of Germany. In spite of her controversy with the representatives of these movements, the Church has been convinced in her secret mind that many of their contentions are true, and for a hundred years she has been aware that a change must be made. It is only fear that prevents her from making this acknowledgment. But worse than the danger from which she shrinks is that which she is incurring by leaving the public in doubt of what is her actual belief. The principal objections of the democracy to what it regards as Christianity are found in the Old Testament; and the Church will never regain the confidence of the classes which are turning away from her except by the frank communication of her own knowledge.

This outburst on the part of Harnack may occasion surprise, because the subject of the Old Testament can hardly be looked upon as his province, and Old Testament scholars may complain that he is invading their territory. But Troeltsch and others have been saying that, since the War, there has been manifested, even among the learned, a disposition to have their say on all possible subjects, all kinds of remedies being proposed for restoring health to the distracted world. The Old Testament even has

become an object of attack with this in view, on account of its connexion with the Jews, who are supposed by many to be the authors of all the evils of the time, not excluding even the War or the revolutions of various sorts which have followed the War. Delitzsch the younger, professor of Assyriology in Berlin, has avowed this as one of his reasons for a furious attack on the Old Testament, and especially the morality of the Conquest of Canaan, delivered in two volumes issued within the last twelvemonth. Delitzsch has raked together all the faults which critics have found with the writers of the Old Testament and all the objections which infidels have been wont to make against Jehovah and His worshippers and flung them down in a heap before the German public, sore and soured by their recent misfortunes, as if these were the occasion for the world being so out of joint. Harnack does not refer to these lucubrations of his colleague, which have created scandal among all classes; but he apparently follows Delitzsch in accepting all that has been said against the Old Testament and assuming that its inferiority has been fully and finally established. What the Old Testament scholars will say to this remains to be seen, but they have been moved to unusual heat in replying to Delitzsch; and no wonder; for, even if the milder conclusion drawn by Harnack were made out against the books on which they lecture, the stools on which they sit would be withdrawn from beneath their occupants. You could not have chairs of Old Testament literature, if the Old Testament did not form part of the canon of Scripture. Even in the day-schools the teaching of the Old Testament would come to an end. And this would make a vacuum before the New Testament which would vitally affect even its position. Harnack does not appear to have thought out these consequences of his proposal, but it would be a novel and hazardous experiment

to teach in school and college the New Testament in separation from the Old.

It is the more remarkable that Harnack should express himself in terms so unqualified about the success of the destructive criticism of the Old Testament as he has himself so recently vindicated an altogether different attitude towards the criticism of the New Testament. Brought up in the traditions of the Tuebingen School, he was not only, as he still is, an admirer of Baur, as a man and a scholar, but a pretty whole-hearted vendor of his views. Late in life, however, he has emancipated himself from this discipleship and spoken of the Tuebingen-theory as a shipwreck, only a few spars of which are still floating on the sea of learning, where they will soon disappear altogether. According to his later knowledge, the battleground of New Testament criticism is the Acts of the Apostles, and the question is, whether St. Luke, a companion of St. Paul, is the author, and whether the representation of St. Paul is trustworthy. It is well known how, for many years, Sir William Ramsay, in opposition to the whole drift of German criticism, has championed the affirmative answer to these questions; but, in a series of volumes published before the War, Harnack has slowly and reluctantly come to the side of the Scottish scholar and refuted his own earlier opinions. Starting from a study of the "We" passages, which he proves, by the most minute philological comparison, to be from the same author as the rest of the Acts of the Apostles and the Third Gospel, he goes over the whole Book of Acts, proving it to exhibit the marks of historical competence and fidelity, and he ends with the conclusion, that it was written during the two years of St. Paul's imprisonment at Rome with the description of which the book concludes. This is a change of view of the most sweeping kind, because it involves as consequences

that the Gospel of St. Luke was written earlier still, and of course the Gospel of St. Mark, from whom St. Luke excerpts, even earlier, while St. Matthew, also, must have been for the most part written before Acts.[1] Between the Tuebingen-views of the New Testament and what may be called the Wellhausen-views of the Old, there are so many points of resemblance that one who had so recently changed his mind so radically about the one might have been expected to leave open the possibility of a change on a large scale about the other; and, although Harnack has not done so, other scholars will be led by his example to exercise a wholesome scepticism in regard to modes of treating the Old Testament books which have never been applied in the same degree to any other writings under the sun. Radical critics are, indeed, wont to cast the blame on those who have claimed too much for the Old Testament; but they themselves may be roused to revolt by the proposal to throw it out of the Canon of Scripture altogether. At all events the recent procedure of Delitzsch, in taking the extremest of the critics at their word, has called forth violent protest; and it is not unlikely that this cool proposal of Harnack's may have a similar effect. There are not a few who are of opinion that the criticism of the New Testament emanating from the Tuebingen School has done as much to discredit the New Testament as that associated with the name of Wellhausen has done to decanonise the Old Testament, and who would, therefore, contend that the New and the Old Testaments must go down together. But Harnack is the reverse of inclined to acknowledge this, and, therefore, he might have been expected to be more chary of conceding so much to the extreme critics of the Old Testament.

[1] See an article, entitled "A Revolution in New Testament Criticism" in the EXPOSITOR, November, 1920.

At all events he is not likely to find in this country many disposed to follow him in this new departure. To make a spiritual hero out of a man who acknowledged in the God of love no element of righteousness and excluded from divine providence everything like judgment or punishment does not appeal to those who have in their blood any tincture of "the terror of the Lord." The Old Testament has always held a far higher place of honour among the followers of Calvin than among those of Luther. It was on the strong meat of Calvinism that the men were nourished who, in the wake of the Reformation, fought for liberty in Holland and Scotland, who asserted for religion the control of public affairs in England during the Puritan Age, and who laid the foundations of the vast empire of America. It was by the application of the principles of the Old Testament to public life that these achieved their place in history; and, although an element of human infirmity may have cleaved to their interpretations of the Scripture, they were not mistaken in the main drift and substance of the beliefs they had derived from the Old Testament. There are many things in the Old Testament which we would now interpret differently from them, but this is only the natural result of the progress of time and the widening of the outlook in theology as in other spheres of human knowledge. Among other attainments which we have gained since the seventeenth century is the recognition of development in the Scriptures; and, with this in our minds, we are not afraid to face the difficulties of revelation. As Canon Mozley maintained, the test of a progressive revelation is the end, not the beginning. The beginnings from which such a revelation proceeds may be extremely humble and remote; but there is a progress visible all the way, pointing to an issue worthy of God; and, when this is disclosed in the course of history, it justifies and explains all the steps by

which it has been reached. With this clue in our hands we can not only tolerate difficulties in the Old Testament, but see in them evidence of the wisdom and love of the great Revealer, and we certainly will not brook the degradation of books like Job and the Psalms, Isaiah and Hosea to the level of the Apocrypha.

It would be useless, however, to deny that Professor Harnack has given expression to a difficulty with which all the Churches are at present confronted. Voices before his, even in this country, have spoken of the Old Testament as a deadweight, from which the Church must release herself, if she is not to be dragged down and drowned. Even by recent experiences in the Scottish cities it has been brought home to the defenders of the faith how uncertain is the voice of the Church about many questions on which she is liable to be challenged by the man-in-the-street. Among the professors and ministers in all the Churches there are many who can remember the shock it occasioned to their own faith, when the errorlessness of Scripture was called in question by their intelligence, and how painful was the process by which they reconciled themselves to the new situation. The same experience has, however, now to be gone through by classes on lower levels of intelligence and attainment; and it is no wonder that these are likewise sensible of pain and uncertainty. Day-school teachers, especially, among whose duties religious instruction is included, cannot escape from facing the problem, and it may be that the alarming recent decline in the number of Sabbath School teachers is more traceable to this cause than has yet been acknowledged. If, however, those who have adopted the newer views about the Bible are able to affirm honestly that their faith in the divinity of the Word of God is not less, but perhaps greater, than it ever was, this should exert a reassuring influence on the

general mind; and it would be of great assistance in securing this end if those who possess this assurance could agree on some common formula which they could all employ in communicating their own confidence to the public. Coleridge's phrase about that being divine in the Bible which "finds" you, is perhaps too æsthetical. Others would prefer to say that in the diviner portions of Scripture God or the Saviour "meets" you, imparting Himself and taking possession of your personality. I am myself very fond of saying that, the more one reads the Bible, the better one becomes, and that, the better one becomes, the more one reads the Bible. Some would put it in this way—that the words of Christ Himself are the test and the standard for judging all other words in Holy Writ. But the weightiest formula is probably still the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*, the meaning of which is that, when the Holy Spirit is working conviction of sin in the conscience, the words of Scripture about sin come home as the very voice of God, and that, when He is working faith in the heart, the words of Scripture in which the Saviour offers Himself to the sinner are recognised as a divine communication, and so on with the other operations of the Holy Spirit. This was the ground on which the Reformers took their stand, Calvin especially praising this as far superior to any other evidence; and this was the ground on which Professor Robertson Smith took his own stand and taught his Church to take her stand. "If I am asked," he stated, "why I receive Scripture as the Word of God and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer, with all the Fathers of the Protestant Church: Because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God drawing near to man in Christ Jesus, and declaring to us, in Him, His will for our salvation. And this record I know to be true by the witness of His

Spirit in my heart, whereby I am assured that none other than God Himself is able to speak such words to my soul." "So long," he adds, "as we go to Scripture only to find in it God and His redeeming love, mirrored before the eye of faith, we may rest assured, that we shall find living, self-evidencing, infallible truth in every part of it, and that we shall find nothing else."

JAMES STALKER.

THE FACT OF CHRIST AND FAITH IN GOD.

I.

(i) IN dealing with the Person of Christ theology has often made the mistake of beginning with doctrine, and of attempting to force the history into the Procrustes bed of its metaphysics. Without at present discussing the question whether the Greek philosophy assumed in the formula for the person of Christ—the union of the divine and the human nature in one person, or the assumption of human nature by a divine person—be adequate or not to express what the history means for us here and now, we shall attempt, greatly daring, to approach the history without any presuppositions at all. (ii) In dealing with that history we shall not lay stress at all on the fact that a *body* was assumed, as though that were the most important aspect of the Incarnation. It is true that the word itself seems to offer a justification for that emphasis. But the text in John i. 14, "And the Word was made flesh," does not justify any so restricted reference. "Flesh" is used in the New as in the Old Testament not for the body alone, but for the whole man in one of his aspects, as creaturely, weak, perishable. That Jesus had a real body, and not merely an apparent one, as Docetism taught, is the testi-

mony of the Gospels. His was the complete human personality, including the body as the organ for the self-expression and self-communication of the soul or spirit; and His "inner life" was conditioned by His "outer." But the body by itself as such had no special significance or value, and the sacramentarianism which deduces from this text the importance, and even necessity of material channels of grace—whether it be itself true or not—is making an illegitimate use of the word *flesh*. It is with the mental development, the moral character, and the religious experience of Jesus that we are here and now concerned. This limitation is no disadvantage, as that alone is of primary importance. (iii) Accordingly we shall not contrast and oppose, as is sometimes done, the Incarnation and the Atonement, the message of Christmas and the message of Easter, the Greek and the Latin tendencies, as they have been called. I do not prefer Origen to Augustine, or Cyril to Anselm. A comparison of the past history and the present condition of the Greek Orthodox churches and the Roman Catholic Church would not encourage me to revert from Rome to Alexandria for theological guidance. But the antithesis itself is false. The Incarnation is consummated in the Atonement, and the Atonement has its basis in the Incarnation. The Incarnation is the condition of the Atonement, and the Atonement the reason for the Incarnation. God became man, not that man might become God, but that man might be redeemed from sin and reconciled to God. The separation of the Person and the Work of Christ is disastrous to adequate and accurate Christian thought. For Christ realised what He was in what He did, and what He did revealed what He was. To depreciate the teaching, example, and companionship of Jesus in the days of His flesh to exalt His sacrifice on the Cross, is to deprive that sacrifice of the content which

can have any meaning or worth for us. We must so conceive His Person that His Work is its necessary expression, and the Work that His Person is its inevitable source. (iv) It has been only too common a practice to oppose the humanity and the divinity, and to assume that the affirmation of the reality of the one is the denial of the reality of the other. This is due to a false emphasis on the metaphysical difference, instead of the true emphasis on the rational, moral, and spiritual, in one word personal affinity of God and man. When we take the reason for the Incarnation into account in conceiving its nature, we shall not only recognise that the reality of the humanity is possible, but be led to affirm that it is necessary that the question *Cur Deus Homo?* may be properly answered.

II.

Having indicated the standpoint from which I view the subject, and invite you to view it with me, we start together to consider the *reality of the humanity of Christ.* That He had a body and that the inner and the outer life were mutually dependent has already been conceded, and need no longer arrest the progress of our thought. As His was the complete human personality, He thought, felt, and willed as man, and as God under the conditions and with the limitations of a real humanity. Not precisely so conditioned and limited as ours may be, but not so differently from ours as to be essentially different. For a reason that will appear in the course of the discussion, we begin with His liability to temptation, pass on to His limitation of knowledge, and end with His subjection to emotion.

(i) The record of His Temptation at the beginning of the ministry makes it impossible, even for those whose dogmatic conception of the divinity leads them to suspect

any affirmation of the humanity, to deny the liability to temptation, although they so conceive it as to make it only an appearance. At Cæsarea Philippi, as the rebuke of Peter (Matt. xvi. 23) as Satan shows, He was no less tempted; and even in Gethsemane His willing spirit experienced the weakness of the flesh (Matt. xxvi. 41), and He endured His last temptation. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews is justified in affirming that He was "in all points tempted as we are, yet without sin" (iv. 15). If we deny the freedom of His will, and the consequent possibility of His choosing either the right course or the wrong, we make Him a puppet, and not a person, deprive His moral development and consequent character of all substance, and lose altogether the inspiration of His example. Nay, it seems to me that it was necessary that He should learn sympathy with man and obedience to God in so real a moral experience, in order that He might be perfected as Saviour of men from sin. Whatever be the metaphysical difficulties, we must hold fast the moral reality of freedom, choice, temptation.

(*a*) Liability to temptation does not involve, however, any sinfulness of nature, nor that His temptations included such as presuppose moral corruption. The sinless may be tempted as well as the sinful. The old doctrine of original sin and total depravity is now generally discredited. There is no proof that a child is born with an innate tendency to sin, although he is born with the possibility of evil as well as good. Before moral consciousness is awakened, a tendency to evil may have been formed due to the development of animal appetites and natural impulses which conflict with the dictates of conscience before the will has gained control, and also to the influences for evil in the environment. That Jesus was preserved from even such tendency the moral consciousness revealed in the Gospels

would seem to demand; how He was preserved is a much more difficult question to answer. Was it that relation to God which afterwards came into His consciousness as His sense of sonship which consistently with the conditions of personal development counteracted any such tendency? Be that as it may, temptation may be real without any previous tendency to sin.

(*b*) There are temptations it is true that are themselves the results of sin; it is by his self-indulgence that the drunkard has both strengthened the temptation from strong drink as well as weakened his will in resistance. But Jesus' temptations, if we interpret them aright, were not sinful temptations. It was the popular expectations of the Messiahship, and even the desires of His disciples that He had to resist in fulfilling His calling, and He showed His insight into the will of God in discerning these as temptations. In Gethsemane He did not shrink from death itself, but from death in the darkness and desolation, which the cry of desolation reveals (Matt. xxvii. 46); and it was not sinful in the Son to shrink from such interruption of His fellowship with the Father. We may dare to say even that His temptations were worthy of Him, of an elevation to which He alone could rise.

(*c*) That He did not sin does not lessen the reality of the temptation. Not the defeated, but the victor of temptation surely has proved the strain of it to the uttermost, for he has fought to a finish. As the temptation was real, so real is His sympathy with the tempted. It is not necessary to have fallen before temptation to pity the fallen. Sin always blunts the sensibilities, and the sinful neither hate the sin nor love the sinner as the sinless can. Jesus looked on Peter in compassion (Luke xxii. 61); for Judas, the chief priests and elders had only scorn (Matt. xxvii. 4). Just because Jesus did not fall before temptation, He is

"not a high priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities" (Heb. iv. 15).

(ii) Liability to temptation involves limitation of knowledge. God as omniscient "cannot be tempted with evil" (James i. 13); for the strain of temptation lies in the uncertainty of the issue. If a man knew how he was going to choose, would there be any moral reality in his choice? To deny the limitation of knowledge is to make altogether unintelligible the liability to temptation. Those who accept the second must admit the first.

(*a*) There is, however, positive evidence of the limitation of knowledge. When Jesus asked a question of His disciples, He was not feigning ignorance as some of the fathers suggested. Such a comment as John vi. 6 ("This he said to prove him, for he himself knew what he would do") we are justified in regarding as a theological reflexion thrust into a historical record. That He expressed surprise and wonder at faith or unbelief in the disciples or the people is also proof of limitation of knowledge. But two instances, in which Jesus Himself is the witness, may suffice. He confessed ignorance of the time of the fulfilment of His own predictions regarding His Second Advent. "But of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels of heaven, neither the Son, but the Father only" (Matt. xxiv. 36). Surely the climax is intended. That men should not know is not surprising, that angels should not know is surprising, but most surprising of all is that the Son should not know. Did He long for the knowledge that was withheld from Him? Ignorance is implicitly, if not explicitly, confessed in the prayer in Gethsemane, "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt" (Matt. xxvi. 39). It was as He prayed that the knowledge came to Him, "O my Father, if this cannot pass away, except I

drink it, thy will be done" (Matt. xxvi. 42). However the knowledge of these prayers may have been transmitted I do not believe that any disciple can have put such words into the lips of Jesus, unless He uttered them. If as regards what concerned Himself so closely, He was ignorant, how absurd it does seem to maintain that He must have known who wrote the 110th Psalm, or what was the real cause of the disease regarded as demonic possession. On such matters He surely shared only the knowledge of His own time and people. To be in error in such a case is no fault, and does not involve mental defect or moral failure.

(*b*) We may, however, ask, and the Gospel evidence leads us to ask, Were the limits of His knowledge the same as ours? and we are brought to the answer He Himself gave, "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father; and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him" (Matt. xi. 27). The authenticity of such an utterance is not discredited by describing it as a "Johannine block of marble which has strayed into the plain brick structure of the synoptic Gospels"—words I once heard from a Unitarian scholar. For on the one hand it is probable, as Harnack contends, that this saying does belong to the Matthæan *Logia*, if we can use that term, or Q, if we prefer that non-committal symbol for the second source after Mark used by Matthew and Luke. And on the other I hold that much of the Johannine marble can be shown to come from a historical quarry, the reminiscences and reflections of an early disciple. Jesus knew the Father, and could reveal Him. That does not mean that He knew all that the Father was knowing, i.e., that He shared the divine omniscience. He knew, and could reveal, God as Father. For an unbroken communion as Son with God as Father, and

an unclouded revelation of God as Father to men, He had all the necessary moral and spiritual discernment. What knowledge was necessary for Him to live as Son, and to show God as Father, was His from the Father, delivered unto Him by the Father.

(*c*) What insight regarding man, sin, duty, destiny this involved we shall afterwards consider; meanwhile what needs to be shown is that this knowledge of the Father does not, and need not, remove the limitations of knowledge we have already observed. Knowledge of facts in the time-process is acquired by instruction from others or by personal experience of them; it is preserved in the memory, and can more or less accurately be recalled. There is no moral merit in possessing it, unless when the possession is itself a moral obligation. A teacher who does not know what he undertakes to teach is morally blameworthy. Moral excellence does not depend on the amount of such knowledge possessed. Wisdom does not always go with knowledge. King James I. was described as "the most learned fool in Christendom." Wisdom depends on moral and spiritual insight, on the vision of eternal reality, the knowledge of God and His will, and such wisdom is often possessed by those whose knowledge of facts is limited in the extreme degree. A good and godly peasant may be "far ben" (to use the beautiful Scottish phrase) in the things of God. The infallible authority of Jesus as the Revealer of God was not in any way affected by the limitation of His knowledge.

(*d*) We may even affirm that His realisation of His sonship as the perfect type of the sonship to which we are called in Him, required such limitation. He walked with God by faith, not sight. He became the Author and Perfecter of Faith (Heb. xii. 2). Had He possessed all knowledge regarding even His own path and goal, there

would have been no room for that constant dependence in prayer on God for guidance in His way to fulfil His Father's will. It is the Fourth Gospel which lays most stress on the relationship of the Son to the Father as such constant dependence ; and it is such dependence, and not a universal dominion, that is indicated by the context in the words, "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father," for He thanked God for what to another teacher would have been a keen disappointment as it was "well-pleasing in God's sight" (Matt. xi. 25–27).

(iii) Liable to temptation, and limited in knowledge, He was also subject to emotion, pain or pleasure, fear or hope.

(*a*) With the story of Gethsemane and Calvary before our minds, we are prone to think of Him only as "the Man of Sorrows, and acquainted with grief" (Isa. liii. 3). But we must not forget joy was not merely set before Him, that He must have had a joy in His sense of sonship, in His teaching, healing, and saving of men even in His earthly ministry. As He spoke the words of grace, as He went about doing good, it must often have been with gladness of heart. The Gospels even justify us in saying that He was a man of intense emotion. He felt deeply joy or grief, fear or hope. Intense emotion is often selfishness, but His emotion was selfless ; it was for and with others that He felt ; He was easily moved to compassion or sympathy. His tears at the grave of Lazarus and over impenitent Jerusalem, His agony in Gethsemane and His desolation on the Cross are the measure of His sacrifice for the salvation of man ; and had He been less subject to emotion, that sacrifice had not been so great.

(*b*) The reality of His humanity in all these aspects was the necessary condition of His Saviourhood. Only under these limitations could be realised His ransom for many, a complete human experience in a world of struggle, sorrow,

sin, shame, death. He who was rich must needs become poor that we through His poverty might be made rich (2 Cor. viii. 19). He suffered being tempted that He might succour them that are tempted (Heb. ii. 18). "He was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh" that He might condemn "sin in the flesh" (Rom. viii. 3). He was born under the law, that He might "redeem them which were under the law" (Gal. iv. 5). He was made sin for us (i.e., suffered as a sinner might), "who knew no sin, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him" (2 Cor. v. 21). He tasted death for every man (Heb. ii. 9) "that He might deliver all who through fear of death were subject to bondage" (ver. 15). He became a curse for us (endured a death deemed accursed) that He might redeem "us from the curse of the law" on transgressors (Gal. ii. 13). To save man He must become one with man.

III.

Had Jesus, however, been only an ordinary man, He could not have been the Saviour of men. While His resemblance to the race which He redeems was necessary that He might give His life as a ransom, it was not sufficient. It is God alone who can save to the uttermost, even though it must needs be as man. We have already indicated how, in the reality of His manhood, there was that which reached beyond and above man. He was without sin. He knew and revealed the Father. His heart gathered into itself the sorrow of mankind. On each of these much still remains to be said.

(i) Charges have been made against the character and conduct of Jesus, which a moral and spiritual discernment very swiftly disproves, and we need not now pause to consider them. The Gospels present to us sinless perfec-

tion not "faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null," but abounding in virtue and grace, which the imagination even of love and devotion could not have pictured.

(*a*) Most convincing of all is His own attitude to sin. He who even in His earthly life brought men to contrition of heart and confession of sin, never offered for Himself the sacrifice of contrition or confession. In the hour of deepest darkness and dreariest desolation no cry for pardon broke from His lips. Had there been the memory of any past failure, or the consciousness of present fault, any sin hidden from the eyes of men in His own heart, would not such a silence have shown a moral insensibility entirely inconceivable in one who ever showed such moral discernment unless He was and knew Himself sinless? His treatment of sinners would have been arrogant in a fellow-sinner. He claimed to have the right to judge and to forgive. Could He have thought of His life as a ransom (Matt. xx. 28), or His blood as the blood of the new covenant (1 Cor. xi. 25) had the sacrifice He offered been stained or marred by sin? His correction of the rich young ruler (Mark x. 18, "Why callest thou me good? none is good, save one, even God") is no confession of sinfulness, but a refusal to claim the absolute goodness while He was still undergoing His earthly trial, fulfilling His calling for God, not having yet drunk His cup, or been baptized with His baptism of sacrifice; for His sinlessness did not exclude progress in His self-sanctification for His Saviourhood and Lordship.

(*b*) It is not necessary nor possible to describe His moral perfection, His truth, holiness, and grace, the breadth of His sympathy, the depth of His humility, the height of His aspiration and achievement, the length of His constancy, the harmony of strength and sweetness, severity and tenderness, of all that is best in man, woman, or child. He was no colourless moral abstraction, but all the colours

of the moral spectrum blend in the pure white light of His character; and yet are severally shown in the prism of changing circumstances and demands. He never failed or disappointed in regard to the moral need of any situation. He was holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and yet the Friend of outcasts and sinners. The divine perfection as it was realised and revealed in Him was a holiness which in grace imparts itself to the unworthy to recover their worth, sacrifice its means and salvation its end. It is a perfection, not merely self-protective as so much human righteousness has been, but self-communicative, and so marks a new stage of moral progress.

(*c*) The explanation of this sinless perfection is not in heredity or environment, or even individual genius for goodness; it lies where Jesus Himself placed it, in His relation to God as Son to Father. His moral character is the result of His religious consciousness, and that is His alone among all the sons of men.

(ii) We must beware of putting into His religious consciousness the content of the conception of God of philosophical or theological schools. He did not think of God as the Infinite and Absolute, and of Himself as sharing in these attributes. He thought of God as Father, as the holy love which is ever freely giving itself, and of Himself as Son receiving the gifts of that love in entire dependence, humble submission, as well as intimate communion. Whatever He was or taught or wrought was His from the Father. Such a consciousness of His relation to God excluded arrogance, and produced humility. If to fulfil His calling, He had to claim the position and authority among men which this relation gave to Him, it was never to exalt Himself, but to magnify the Father who was in Him revealing Himself to men. He did not preach Himself, but His Father and Himself as Son only as the true and the living way to the Father.

A self-deluded fanatic would not have claimed relation to God with such subordination of Himself. Whatever metaphysical explanation of the possibility of such a religious consciousness may be necessary for doctrine, what history presents to us is a really human personality with for its unique content this sense of Sonship towards God as Father. Our psychology may not be able, as Harnack maintains, to discover the secret of Jesus, how He could and came to think of Himself as Son of God, but that fact the Gospels indubitably attest.

(iii) The relation He claimed with God was the necessary condition of the relation that He offered to men. His religious consciousness which separates Him from men, yet communicates itself to men in His mediatorial function. He brings God to men that He may bring men to God ; He reveals God that He may redeem men. The relation to God that is the secret of His nature becomes the gift of God to men by His grace. As men have sinned, and so have separated themselves from, and opposed themselves to God, the relation cannot be only imparted ; they must be so recovered from sin, and restored by forgiveness to trust and obedience towards God, that the filial relation shall be realised.

(*a*) Through word and deed in His earthly life He did thus recover men from sin to God. He Himself, however, looked forward to the completion of this mediatorial function in the self-sacrifice of His Cross, and Christian experience confirms the saving efficacy of that sacrifice. There men have seen both sin's judgment and God's forgiveness, and have responded in the penitence and faith, which ends distrust and disobedience, and begins the life of the children of God.

(*b*) Who can doubt that it is the intensity of the suffering of the Christ that makes the appeal so potent both in its

exposure of sin, and its assurance of the love of God? Who can doubt that it is the vicariousness of that suffering, that it was for us He so suffered, which increases the potency of the appeal? Had He not been so subject to emotion, had He not been capable of making the sorrows and sufferings of others by His compassion and sympathy so entirely His own, that all the weight of the burden of pain and grief which sin has laid on the race fell on Him, and so in His own experience He fully and truly took our place, would the self-sacrifice have had the saving efficacy it has?

(*c*) Did not the sinless perfection of His moral character, and His religious consciousness of Sonship, enable Him to judge the sin of the race with and for which He was thus suffering to the uttermost, as God judges, and did not that judgment He shared with God intensify the sorrow He shared with men? He knew, as no other has known, both the nature and the consequences of sin; and yet with such a judgment of sin, as in love for sinful man and holy God He so suffered, He imparts to men the forgiveness that reconciles holy God and sinful man in a common love.

(iv) Faith speaks of Him not in the past tense only, but in the present, for He does not belong to past history only, but also to present experience. All that He was, did, and suffered He Himself now imparts to men in His saving grace. Without His Resurrection His sacrifice would have been remembered as the worthiest martyrdom. Because He is risen, lives and reigns, God is in Him still revealing Himself, and redeeming men unto Himself. In His historical personality always and everywhere, the eternal reality of the truth and grace of God is imparted unto men. Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever in His moral character, religious consciousness, and mediatorial function, Son of God and Saviour and Lord of men.

IV.

Such is the *fact of Christ* as with due regard to what modern scholarship has to teach us we may with confidence conceive it—a real humanity, yet so transcending common manhood as to be united with as real divinity. With the metaphysics which may at least partially explain the fact I am not primarily concerned, although a few suggestions may be offered in relief of doubt and aid to faith, but my present interest is this, what the fact of Christ means for faith in God.

(i) As the intellect has rights I do not hold with Ritschl that we can do without a metaphysic of the person of Christ which relates Him to universal and ultimate reality, but neither can I agree that the œcumenical creeds give us a metaphysic which can satisfy our thought, as in it the divine and the human nature are so opposed that the unity of the person remains an assertion and not an explanation; the personality remains a vague abstraction, without definite content. We must start with the conviction of the divine immanence, that God is in all and through all while above all; He is inseparable from His Universe, although not identical with it, because He ever wills its existence and evolution. The evolution of the Universe we must conceive as a progressive revelation of God; dependent as it is at every stage on Him, only gradually are His nature, character and purpose manifested in its progress; matter, life, mind in plant, animal and man are the stages of this self-unfolding of God. In man the development of personality begins in the realisation of the ideals of truth, holiness, blessedness, love which are eternal reality in God, and in the realization of which man can have communion and co-operation with God. Human personality is receptive of, and responsive to, the reality of God. In human history there has been a Godward movement of

man in religion and a manward movement of God in revelation. These movements converge in Jesus Christ as the consummation both of religion and revelation. In Him humanity is so responsive to God, and God so communicative to man that the development of His human personality is a *progressive incarnation* of God; God as God was more manifest in the Crucified on Calvary and the Risen at Bethany than in the babe in Bethlehem. Such a development is no less intelligible than the evolution of the Universe; God is there and all of God at each stage, but shows and gives Himself more and more as the world and man become receptive. In Jesus Christ humanity was so receptive of God, that He is in this world and for us men the complete sufficient divine revelation, "the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance" (Heb. i. 3). He is very God as real man.

(ii) The real man is necessary as He is the type to which the human race as the family of God is to be conformed; the very God is no less necessary, as otherwise we have no certainty that the reality of God is as He has revealed that reality, and that the revelation is final and adequate, and will not be supplemented and superseded by any other. Christianity can claim to have the secret of God, only if God's intimate has divulged it. We must recognise God's handwriting that we may be sure the letter is from Him. What are the evidences that Jesus is the Word as the Son of God?

(*a*) First, what He Himself is in His religious consciousness, confirmed by His moral character and mediatorial function. He was certain that He was the Son of God revealing the Father, and He makes us certain too, because we know He was too wise to err, and too good to lie, and because when we make the venture of faith, experience is its justification. We can stake our all on Him.

(*b*) Secondly, when we have searched all the philosophies and theologies is there any other conception of God which so answers the questions of our minds, meets the demands of our consciences, and fills the needs of our spirits, as does this? Despite all challenges the certainty of the Christian experience is not contradicted, but confirmed by a reasonable, moral, and spiritual interpretation of reality. Even were it not, we trust Christ still.

(iii) What does Christ, so interpreted, and so evidenced, mean for our faith in God?

(*a*) Pantheism, which identifies God with the world, and so with its sin and evil, denies personality and liberty to God and man, and so makes religion and redemption unnecessary and impossible. Deism, on other grounds an inadequate conception, puts God too far off from man. Pluralism, a "freak" philosophy, denies the demand of intellect and conscience alike for unity in ultimate reality, and offers no guarantee of a final harmony of differences and discords. Agnoticism leaves the mind empty and the heart cold.

(*b*) What the spirit of man needs is a God great enough to be the ultimate cause and the final purpose of the world as a security that He is both able and willing to meet every demand that may be made upon Him, and cannot fail and disappoint, and yet a God near enough to man in His nature, character and purpose to be known, trusted and served by man, nay even to be man's fellow-sufferer while man is His fellow-worker. Mr. Wells in his conception recognises the second need, but fails to do justice to the first; and yet it is that which raises God above man, and makes Him the limit of man's thought of reality with no hidden beyond, which assures man that God can do for him what He cannot do himself, what only One can do, above and beyond all that is not He.

(*c*) While it is God as near whom Jesus reveals to us mainly, yet He does not fail to recognise the God who is great enough for every demand. He assumes the ethical monotheism of the prophets ; the description of Our Father as "in heaven," the assertion of His perfection, the illustrations given of His bounty to, and care over bird and flower, the assurance offered that every hair is numbered, that no sparrow falls to the ground without His knowledge, the evidence of His impartial beneficence in sunshine and shower—all these sayings present the Father as Creator, Preserver, and Ruler. Jesus' attitude of dependence, confidence, and submission to the Father springs from faith in the God above and beyond all, whom no inscrutable fate, or ineluctable force can transcend. The absolute faith of Jesus Christ demands as its object not a subordinate, but the supreme deity, and the human faith which would share His certainty and confidence must not stop short at any conception of God lower or narrower than His Father in Heaven.

(iv) What He gives of new content to the conception of God is not His teaching about God alone, far as that excels any other teaching, but His Person and His Work. That in human history there are His moral character as sinless perfection, His religious consciousness as Son of God as Father, His mediatorial function in awakening human penitence and faith and conveying divine grace and forgiveness, in a human personality limited in knowledge, liable to temptation and subject to emotion, demands and justifies a new conception of God.

(*a*) A psalmist may aspire to say of God, "As a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him" (Ps. ciii. 13), and a prophet even excel him in the words: "As one whom his mother comforteth so will I comfort you" (Isa. lxvi. 13), but the tenderness, gentleness,

kindness, mercy, pity, grace of Jesus as He went about among men give us a content for the conception of God as Love which even a father's pity and a mother's comfort could never have given to men. That one who so loved men in all their need, sorrow, suffering, sin, should so have loved God who made and rules all, unless His consciousness was a cruel mockery of Him and through Him of us, is surely final, irrefutable, indubitable evidence that God is love perfect, setting on man an incalculable worth, feeling for man an unmeasured interest (sorrow or joy), and willing for man an inexhaustible good. Whatever challenge the facts of the world and life may offer to the belief in God's goodness, the fact of Jesus can meet the challenge, and justifies the unwavering and unshaken faith in God as love.

(*b*) This love does not hold aloof from those facts which challenge: Jesus on behalf of, and with God's authority, dealt with the facts of sin, sorrow, and death. "Holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, tempted in all points as we are, yet without sin," He judged sin, and forgave the sin He judged, He gave His life as a ransom for man's deliverance, as a sacrifice of the new covenant of grace. The atonement, redemption, reconciliation in Him is love's solution of sin's problem in self-sacrifice, in sorrow and suffering unto death. The question, Why the holy God permitted the entrance, and tolerated the continuance of sin in the world, is answered by the salvation unto God by the sacrifice of God in Christ for the race that had sinned. Instead of destroying the sinners or making them bear the penalty of their sin, God in Christ so makes Himself one in Christ with that race in its sin and the consequences of that sin that He bears its burden on His own heart. The human tragedy of sin is taken up into this divine tragedy for sin; and so ceases to be unresolved tragedy, and becomes the realised triumph of God over sin. And since it is

suffering unto death which is the sacrifice that issues in salvation, the problems of pain and death are no less solved than the problem of sin. If, as the Cross teaches, God in Christ, since the Son knew Himself fulfilling the will of the Father, and giving the absolute proof of His love to the Father, so identifies Himself in love with the whole life and lot of man, as to taste death in all darkness and desolation for man, is there and can there be any pain or grief of man in which God is not the fellow-sufferer ? Because Jesus, one with God and one with man, is Immanuel, God with us, God Himself in all the fulness of His being is Immanuel, God with us. It is not a metaphysical identity of God and world as pantheism teaches, but a personal immanence of love that the Christian revelation offers to us; the Son who is in the bosom of the Father hath so declared Him in passion more than in action even, and in deed more than in word, that those who in faith accept His grace now rest in that bosom, and feel the very pulsings of the heart of God as He sorrows or joys with man.

(*c*) Since the love of God in Christ saves from sin unto God by sacrifice, it is evident that this is God's way, not one of His ways, but the only way. Divine power cannot solve the problem that divine pain has solved. Not by omnipotence but by *omnipatience* (that theology has not yet used that word, and has no equivalent for it, proves that it is not yet fully Christian) does God fulfil His purpose unto men. As men, delivered from sin, must be God's fellow-workers, they must not only choose His end, but also use His means. Love unto self-sacrifice is the only divine way that will lead mankind unto the Heavenly City. Because God has by suffering saved, suffering becomes for the children of God a means of the highest good for themselves and others. If in the hour of our distress and desolation the weak flesh should be tempted to hinder, and rebel

against the willing spirit by regarding the price too high to pay even for the prize of the fellowship of Christ's suffering, the imitation of, nay participation in the sacrifice of God, and should challenge the divine wisdom and goodness in making the way of the Cross the highway for mankind unto God, the response comes from the heart of God Himself. He bears what He lays upon us, and His burden is as immeasurably greater as is His love for all mankind greater than the deepest and widest love we can feel. God and man as fellow-sufferers and fellow-workers, as sharing both the joy which the kingdom brings, and the travail by which it comes—that is the conception of God Jesus gives, that is the faith in God the fact of Jesus brings.

(v) If, on the one hand, we deny the reality of His humanity we sever Him from man, if on the other we deny the reality of His divinity (not as a quality common to Him and other men, but as that which distinguishes Him alone among all men) we sever Him from God, and we must then change the content of our conception of God, and our faith will then have an object which less absolutely and finally meets all our needs as men of God. It is no theological dogmatism, but a religious aspiration for a certitude about God, that can meet the worst challenge the world and life can offer which makes us confess: "Thou, our brother-man, art God, the Son come from the very bosom of the Father, to us children who have strayed, to gather us home." "Thanks be unto God for His unspeakable gift!"

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

PSALMS IN TIMES OF SICKNESS.

In the second line of Psalm cxxvi., in the translations of the Songs of Ascents given in the January number the word "unto" has slipped out, and the line should read:

We were like unto them that dream.

An appreciative correspondent writes: "I have never been able to grasp the sequence of thought in Psalm cxxvii. 3. Does it mean that God's beloved trust in Him, and enjoy their repose, in contrast to the frantic labour and anxiety of those who do not so trust?" I think that what is meant is that it is folly to turn night into day. God has provided rest in sleep for the night, and it is man's wisdom to recognise this and to act upon it.

The same correspondent also asks: "Where did you get the delightful word wakeman (cxxvii. 2)?" This word was very familiar to me in my early days, for the night watchmen of my native city in the north of England were known as wakemen. They used to pass along the market square in the early morning and announce the arrival of the new day.

In the present paper I propose to give translations, preserving the rhythm of the original, of four Psalms, the most natural explanation of whose contents is that they were composed in times of bodily sickness or disease, and of yet another which is a thanksgiving for recovery from illness. For the most part the translations can be left to speak for themselves.

Psalm xxxviii.

1. Rebuke me not, O Lord, in thine anger,
   Neither chasten me in thy hot displeasure;
2. For thine arrows stick fast in me,
   And thine hand presseth me sore.

3. There is no health in my flesh, because of thine indignation,
Neither rest in my bones, because of my sin.
4. For mine iniquities are gone over my head,
Like a heavy burden, too heavy for me to bear.

5. My wounds stink and are corrupt
Because of my foolishness.
6. I am pained, and bowed down greatly:
I go mourning all the day long;
7. For my loins are filled with burning,
And there is no whole part in my flesh.
8. I am faint, and sore bruised,
I have roared for the disquietness of my heart.

9. LORD, all my desire is before thee,
And my groaning from thee is not hidden.
10. My heart panteth, my strength hath failed me:
And the sight of mine eyes, this also is gone.
11. My lovers and friends stand aloof from my plague,
And my kinsmen stand afar off.
12. And they that seek my life lay snares:
And those who desire my hurt speak mischievous things,
And imagine deceits all the day.

13. But I, as a deaf man, hear not:
I am like to a dumb man, who opens not his mouth.
14. I am even as a man that heareth not,
And hath no reproofs in his mouth.

15. But in thee, O LORD, do I hope:
Thou wilt answer, O Lord my God.
16. For I said, Lest they should rejoice over me:
When my foot doth slip, they are magnified against me.

17. For I am ready to halt,
And my sorrow is continually before me.
18. Though I declare mine iniquity,
And am sorry because of my sin,
19. Yet mine enemies live, and are mighty,
And they are many who hate me wrongfully;
20. And they who render evil for good
Are mine adversaries for following the good.

21. Forsake me not, O LORD:
Be not, my God, far from me.
22. Haste thee to be my help,
Thou Lord, who art my salvation.

PSALM XXXIX.

1. I said, I will heed my ways,
   Lest I should sin with my tongue:
   I will keep my mouth with a bridle,
   While the wicked is still before me.

2. I was dumb, and spake nothing,
   I refrained more than was good,
   And thus my sorrow was stirred.

3. My heart was hot within me,
   And while I mused the fire kindled,
   And then I spake with my tongue:—

4. Make me know, O LORD, mine end,
   And the tale of my days what it is:
   Let me know how frail I am.

5. Behold thou hast made my days as handbreadths,
   And mine age before thee is as nothing:
   Surely every man at best is but vanity.

6. Surely man walketh in a vain show,
   Surely on vanity he spends his care:
   He heapeth up, but knoweth not who shall gather it.

7. And now, Lord, for what do I wait?
   My hope is even in thee.
8. Deliver me from all my transgressions:
   Make me not the reproach of the foolish.
9. I was dumb, and opened not my mouth,
   Because it was thy doing.
10. Take thy stroke from off me:
    I am consumed with the blow of thy hand.
11. With rebukes thou dost chasten man for iniquity
    And consumest his beauty like a moth:
    Surely every man is vanity.

12. Hear my prayer, O LORD,
    Give ear unto my cry:
    Hold not thy peace at my tears.
    For I am a stranger with thee,
    A sojourner, like all my fathers.
13. O spare me, that I may recover,
    Before I go hence to be no more.

PSALM XLI.

1. Blessed is he that considereth the poor:
   The LORD will deliver him in the day of evil.
2. The LORD will preserve him and keep him alive, to be blessed upon earth:
   Thou wilt give him not up to the will of his enemies.
3. The LORD will support him on the couch of languishing:
   Thou wilt change for him all his bed in his sickness.
4. Therefore I said, LORD, have mercy upon me:
   Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee.

5. But mine enemies speak me evil:—
   When shall he die, and his name perish?
6. And coming to see me, he speaketh vanity,
   His heart gathereth mischief:
   He goes out, and tells it abroad.

7. Then all that hate me whisper against me:
   Against me do they devise my hurt:—
8. Some horrible thing cleaveth to him,
   And now that he lieth he shall rise no more.
9. Yea, my familiar friend
   (One whom I trusted, and who ate of my bread)
   Hath lifted his heel against me.
10. But thou, O LORD, have mercy and restore me,
    And I shall give them reward.

11. Hereby I know that thou delightest in me,
    When mine enemy doth not triumph over me.
12. Therefore thou upholdest me in my health[1]
    And settest me before thy face for ever.

It always seems to me that this Psalm halts somewhat in the existing translations. It is necessary, I think, in order to make verse 4 connect up with the preceding one, to employ the word "therefore" as a connecting link. It is true that this word does not actually occur in the original, but it is implied in the emphatic personal pronoun "I," which is expressed and not simply contained in the verb. The meaning is: I, this being so, said, LORD, have mercy upon me. The first three verses of the Psalm express confidence in God, who will have mercy on those who

[1] Or "in mine integrity."

have shown mercy. Indeed we might almost sum them up in the Gospel beatitude: "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." Relying on the mercy of God, and appealing to it, the Psalmist in quiet confidence prays: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee."

Then in verse 5 "mine enemies" is emphatic, standing first in the sentence, and not, as is the usual order for subject and verb, after the verb. The insertion of "but" is intended to bring out this emphasis.

In verse 12 we again have the emphatic personal pronoun, but this time it is not the subject. Our translations give us "And as for me," but somehow this does not serve to connect up the verse with the preceding. The copula ו in Hebrew is often equivalent to "therefore" and the emphasis of the personal pronoun is to be explained as carrying us back to the words which have gone before:

> Hereby I know that thou delightest in me,
> When mine enemy doth not triumph over me.

It is I, who know this, and who would see the sign of thy pleasure in me, it is even I whom Thou wilt uphold in my soundness, or health. The Psalmist desires God's favour, and not merely a favour or gift *from* God.

I incline to the rendering "in my health" rather than to "in mine integrity." It seems to me to make better sense.

I have so far omitted verse 13, for it is no part of this particular Psalm, but the doxology concluding the first book of the Psalter:—

> Blessed be the LORD, the God of Israel,
> From everlasting unto everlasting:
> Amen and Amen.

We come now to Psalm lxxxviii., which is about the saddest of all the Psalms. We cannot in the face of verse 13 say

that there is no hope, but the Psalm is indescribably sad throughout. The Psalmist is sick, and nigh to death, and he has no hope beyond the grave. Abaddon, darkness, the land of forgetfulness, these are the terms he employs. He is all alone, in intense darkness, lover and friend removed from him, an abomination even to his acquaintances. In this state he utters a heart-rending cry to his saviour God.

PSALM LXXXVIII.

1. O LORD, my God of salvation,
   I have cried day and night before thee,
2. Let my prayer enter thy presence,
   Incline thine ear to my cry;
3. For my soul is full of troubles,
   And my life draweth nigh unto hell.

4. I am counted with those that are down in the pit,
   I am like to a man without help:
5. Cast off with the dead, like the slain who lie in the grave
   Who are no more remembered by thee,
   And are cut away from thy hand.

6. Thou hast laid me in the lowest pit,
   In places dark, in the deeps.
7. Thy wrath lieth hard upon me,
   Thou hast afflicted me with all thy waves.
8. Thou hast put mine acquaintance far from me,
   Hast made me to them abomination:
   Shut up, I cannot come forth.

9. Mine eye is wasted with affliction,
   I have called on thee daily, O LORD,
   I have spread forth to thee my hands:—
10. Dost thou shew wonders to the dead?
    Shall the shades arise and praise thee?
11. Is thy mercy declared in the grave?
    Or thy faithfulness in Abaddon?
12. Shall thy wonders be known in the dark?
    And thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness?
13. Thus have I cried unto thee, O LORD,
    And in the morning shall my prayer come before thee.

14. Wherefore, O LORD, dost thou cast off my soul,
    And hidest thy face from me?

15. I am afflicted, and from my youth as one like to die,
Thy terrors have I borne with distraction.
16. Thy fierce wrath is gone over me,
Thy terrors have cut me off.
17. They are about me continually like water,
Together they compass me round.
18. Thou hast put far away from me lover and friend,
And those of mine acquaintance into darkness.

By way of relief from the excessive sadness of this last Psalm let us turn in conclusion to another, which is a hymn of thanksgiving for the recovery of health. The author of Psalm xxx. has been nigh to death, and his view of death is as gloomy as is that in Psalm lxxxviii., but he has been delivered and restored to health, and his heart wells over with thanksgiving.

PSALM XXX.

1. I extol thee, O LORD, for thou hast raised me up,
And hast suffered not my foes to rejoice over me.
2. O LORD, my God,
I cried unto thee, and thou hast healed me.
3. Thou, LORD, hast brought up my soul from hell:
Thou hast kept me alive from descending the pit.

4. Sing praise to the LORD, ye saints of his,
And give thanks to his holy name;
5. For his anger is but for a moment,
In his pleasure is life:
Weeping may tarry the night,
But joy cometh in the morning.

6. Now I, in my prosperity,
Had said, I shall never be moved;
7. But thou, LORD, who in thy favour
Hadst made my mountain so strong,
Didst hide thy face, and I was troubled.

8. Unto thee, O LORD, did I cry,
To the LORD I made supplication:—
9. What profit shall be in my blood,
When I go down to the pit?
Shall the dust praise thee?
Shall it declare thy truth?

10. Hear, O LORD, and have mercy upon me,
LORD, be thou my helper.

11. Thou hast turned my mourning to dancing,
Thou hast loosed for me my sackcloth,
And girded me about with gladness;
12. That my glory may sing thee praise, and not be still,
O LORD, my God, I will thank thee for ever.

E. H. ASKWITH.

JESUS THE VILLAGE POET.[1]

As to many others, so to one reader at least, the novel of *John Inglesant* proposed the question: How far is the religious life to be stated in terms of romance? And this possible effect of the book was in its author's mind. When in 1905 Shorthouse's *Life* appeared, it contained a letter of his to Matthew Arnold with the reply. Shorthouse asked Arnold to point out the possibilities of a synthesis of Revelation and Humour. Arnold recognised "notions and aims that in some shape or other have long been present to me and which I should rejoice to satisfy." But he went no further than this. Five years before the *Life* appeared, I ventured to commit to paper a statement of Shorthouse's thesis.[2] "Sufficient justice has not always been done to Jesus as poet, that is to say, to His use of life to bring out what is truly individual, and at the same time universal in it. . . . He sought life out through its least guarded forms in the market, the street, and the tavern in such a way as to offend His more rigid contemporaries; and He detected even in the lowest of the low a spark of the divine." At

[1] An incidental object of this article is to contrast true communism with its caricatures: the communism of grace with the communism of law.

[2] *Soul of a Christian*, p. 167.

the time of writing I was unconscious of my debt to the novel, read long before. But the question which Shorthouse put to Matthew Arnold had already been answered beforehand, and by Jesus Himself. "We piped unto you, and we mourned unto you." Comedy came along with and indeed preceded tragedy.

But we must not misunderstand. Comedy is different from farce, which aims at amusing that laughter which is like the crackling of thorns under a pot. Comedy has wealth enough without robbing so poor a neighbour. For comedy in its fullest sense gathers round the epithalamium and takes the richest and most diverse shapes, right up to "the unexpressive nuptial song" of *Lycidas*. The plots of ancient and modern comedies alike end in a marriage. We are not dealing, therefore, with mere licence. Comedy has its laws not less than tragedy and rises to heights as great as those of tragedy itself. In vindicating, therefore, for the spirit of Jesus the comic genius, so far are we from any derogation that we are extending for Him the range of human praise. For indeed only so does He correspond to the whole tragi-comedy of human life about which Plato speaks in the *Philebus*. Marriage and death, comedy and tragedy, Hamlet and Falstaff, are the two poles of man's existence. The Divine Word has both meanings. Neither can with safety be neglected. And here I find a limitation even in Newman. Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, on the other hand, just because, with all its faults, it exhibits to exaggeration the joyous Kingdom of the Messiah, outweighs the more formal apocalyptic presentations catalogued by Schweizer in the *Quest of the Historical Jesus*.

2. Comedy derived its name, according to Aristotle, from the village song of the Dorians. It is associated, characteristically enough, with the country town or parish, as in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, the *Merry Wives of Wind-*

sor, *She Stoops to Conquer*, because the spirit of comedy can move within the limits which just suffice to display the differences of human temperament. Milton's famous lines :

> Sometimes let gorgeous tragedy
> In sceptred pall come sweeping by,

suggest that tragedy lives at courts and in capital cities. And indeed the later and more developed comedy sometimes prefers the elaborated and polished language of an urban society. But this does not affect our special case. For in the Semitic world, as in the Ireland of only yesterday, the speech of the village, or the cabin, has still the precision which in the industrial world of to-day is maintained with difficulty as a class tradition.

If, on this principle, we divide the books of scripture, we find that the writers of village provenance come mainly from the northern kingdom. In the Old Testament, Hosea and the *Song of Songs* almost certainly come from the North. The other writers are generally from Jerusalem, although the Elohist, with his more naïf ideas of God, is a Northern writer turned to account by the editors of the capital.

The contrast is like that between the provincial Shakespeare, and Milton the Londoner. That Shakespeare should have remained faithful to his little town, and returned there to spend his last days, is in harmony with the venerable tradition that the first appearances of Jesus after the resurrection were in Galilee. At the end the countryman is faithful to the countryside. We might go on to distinguish the Galilean, the country, portions of the New Testament. Assuming that the Fourth Gospel reaches back in some way to the Apostle, we shall group together the Johannine writings, the Apocalypse, and the Catholic epistles. On the town side will be the Pauline corpus with its rabbinic implications, the books of Luke, the Gospel of

Mark (who seems to have lived in Jerusalem), and the first Gospel, closely associated as it was with the church of Jerusalem. That this division is not meaningless may be illustrated for our special purpose in that the note of the marriage song is specially audible on the Galilean side, from the marriage of Cana [1] and the marriage supper of the Lamb to the Love of the Johannine epistle. This is indeed the divine comedy of the New Testament, and, as we shall see, can be traced back to Jesus Himself through—to use Dr. Abbott's phrase—"the passionateness of the Eucharist." [2]

3. Let us follow out the contrast between Jerusalem and Galilee a little further. The contempt of the capital for the man of the province was not less marked in Jerusalem than elsewhere. There is no need to recall the familiar expressions of contempt. But even the Galileans turned. And the writer of the Fourth Gospel expressed this resentment in such a way that he seems almost obsessed by the very name of the Jew, that is, of the man attached to Jerusalem. Yet there is something about the big city which captures the imagination. We like to attach great events to a magnificent stage. But this theatrical sense of fitness warps the judgment. The instinct of Shakespeare, however, turns to the country, "those holy fields, Over whose acres walked those blessed feet." Only in a village can there be the complete economic equilibrium on which alone communism can rest. The American communist societies have grown to a limited scale, beyond which they seem to find an invisible but unbroken barrier. Marxian communism, as embodied in its official exponents, is apparently fatal to large cities, that is, to half of civilised

[1] It is noteworthy how the Hebrew translation of the New Testament uses the vocabulary of the Song of Songs in rendering this episode.

[2] *The Law of the New Kingdom*, p. 377.

mankind. For the larger community always contains traitors, that is to say, persons who increase the misery of the world for a profit which is not always monetary. But for this very reason, the confiict of good and evil is more pronounced in cities, and leads to more violent catastrophes. That Jerusalem killed the prophets, was a byeword. And yet by a strange impulse the prophet who lacked honour from the countryside, was drawn to the capital by an impulse as irresistible as that of the moth towards the flame. It is a great mystery that the world-religions haunt cities : Jerusalem, Rome, Mecca.

Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes.—If material communism is only to be realised in a little town, spiritual communism is incarnate in the big city so long as freedom of life and thought remains.

4. A Jewish prophet, then, was usually a poet whose mind moved towards political issues. Dante, Milton and Blake rather than Shakespeare are in this prophetic succession. But so far as Jesus represented also the comedy as well as the tragedy of life, He belongs to the family of Shakespeare as well as to the prophets. Religious reflection has concentrated itself almost exclusively upon the philosophical and legal contents of tradition to the neglect of what is festive, humorous and beautiful. So far as Jesus was a poet, He includes these delights in His outlook and is more than the rabbi and the prophet. His religion is one of refreshment, and as such He announced it in a little poem.[1]

To those who, like the present writer, are susceptible to the charm [2] of the Christian tradition, rather than to its authority, the question suggests itself whether it may not be possible, by exploring the characteristic charm, also to

[1] Matt xi. 28 ff.

[2] I.e., the reign of grace rather than the reign of law.

recover its authority. *Regem in decore suo videbunt oculi eius.* But beauty has its own laws and cannot be manifested merely by talking about it. Those who do not find it in their own hearts, must seek it. But there are persons through whom it breathes. And they speak with an authority of which they themselves are conscious. In this sense, poetic inspiration is its own warrant. And when the master-poet announces that what he says is of divine authority, we are justified in believing him. We have only Paul's word for his conversations in paradise. But for them his Hymn to Love secures a respectful hearing. While the poet's mind is the mirror of the divine splendour, the theological library, so far as the poetic reference fails, is a weariness to the flesh. And if we ruthlessly cleared out every writer who falls short, by the present measure, we should still be rich enough. The highest criticism is a reasoned admiration, intellectual love. Of the older commentators upon Canticles, Cotton's *Exposition* (1655) reaches the low water-mark of formalism. And yet such work must not blind us to the fiery passion which, hid sometimes behind uncouth shapes, at other times bursts out in letters like those of Rutherford. Herder, who wrote so well of the *Spirit of Hebrew Poetry*, was also the commentator on the Song of Songs.

5. The parables of Jesus have nearly always been expounded as if they were the utterances of a rabbi, and they have been thrust upon the world encumbered with varying morals. If, however, they are regarded as dramatic creations and compared with their proper parallels, they add a great deal to the golden treasure of the world. How far Jesus was familiar with Greek comedy we are unlikely ever to know. But the extraordinary way in which, within the narrow limits of a few sentences, He designs the background of an incident, outlines with a few strokes the

constituent characters until they seem more real than breathing men and women, and with unerring dramatic skill conducts the story to its climax, is delightful enough to be enjoyed sometimes for its own sake. And those artists who without an *arrière pensée* conjure up in their imaginations the scenes and the events so vividly portrayed, are probably nearer the intention of the poet than when we submit these divine utterances to a kind of torture in order to extract from them a meaning not always intended. Is the parable of the Prodigal an allegory of the Gentiles returning and finding in the Jew a carping elder brother? Or is it a picture of the individual penitent? Perhaps the anger of the Scribes and Pharisees detected the former intention. Who shall say? But the mediæval craftsman who embodied the parable in visible form, as in the stained glass of Chartres, was a translator and not an exegete. And this principle holds generally. The Gothic designer and the renaissance artists who followed his tradition, by their lack of the edifying impulse, by their lack of self-consciousness, furnish a pure delight. It would seem that Jesus Himself refused to explain His *contes*. Whatever other reasons there may have been, one may be inferred from what we know of a poet's mind. To explain is sometimes to destroy, for example in the case of a jest. And it is part of our business to find the jester in our Lord. In my head there echoes the musical prose of Heine, the great apologist of the Bible, in which he compares Almighty God to Aristophanes. At any rate Heine laid his laughter as a tribute at the feet of the King of Kings. There can be no harm in offering to the Son of Man an occasional smile. For genuine laughter is content with nothing less than poetic justice. And a true estimate will find that figures in the parables which are often regarded as only mentioned to be condemned, are rather humorous draughts in which

qualities, in themselves good, are marked by a certain excess. The practising Pharisee, the worthy elder brother, the man who did not want to get out of bed, the judge who administered justice rather than be bored, the unjust steward, were not wholly bad. We can, with no great effort, take their point of view. And in them Jesus displayed the impartiality which is the note of the highest dramatic art. But we have only fragments of His work, imperfect as the fragments of Sappho are imperfect. The parables in the evangelists are perhaps but short summaries of tales like those of the Arabian Nights. And we wonder how many such parables died upon the ears of the audience, unrecorded. At any rate, we may be grateful for what has been handed down. In spirit we find ourselves in one of those Galilean companies where after a common meal we settle ourselves, like children of all ages, to hear a story from our divine host as at a marriage feast.

6. It must be admitted indeed that the company in which Jesus found Himself was not always of the best. Using the privilege of translation, we might be led to seek Him to-day sometimes among profiteers and the heroines of certain modern plays. For although comedy and merriment in themselves are good, they are not confined to circles which profess themselves religious.

On the other hand, seriousness has its dangers. An American philanthropist once visited Tolstoy and explained his plans for reforming the loose women and the *roués* of New York. The Russian sage listened and then advised his visitor to begin by taking lessons himself in humility from his intended audience. There is a gleam of light in conviviality, so far as human beings throw off their disguises. To eat together and to drink together, even with their sordid excesses, are a shadow of the eucharist. The restive reader may remind himself of Christmas. The

festival of the Nativity, along with its good cheer, brings the sewing up of rent affections, charity not only towards the poor, and the loss of self in a common emotion of love. In Christmas and her other festivals, the Church caught up the tradition of the Love-feast, just at the moment when the love-feasts broke down. Nor did they break down without a struggle to maintain them. The Council of Gangra (360) pronounced anathema on those who refused to recognise them.[1] We shall now inquire how far the love-feast is to be regarded as an institution founded by Jesus Himself.

7. The typical Jewish festivity was that of marriage. And here there was from the earliest times a religious suggestion. Baal was the husband of the land. This idea was widespread and found expression in the sacred prostitution which accompanied and disfigured so many primitive worships. But when the God of Israel was recognised as a just being, the idea of marriage was not surrendered, but transformed and so retained. "As the bridegroom rejoiceth over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee." [2] Hence the marriage song must often have suggested to a Jew the relation of God to His people. And although it is no longer possible to exhaust the meaning of Canticles by a religious interpretation, the traditional headings of the chapters in the old Bibles need not be altogether turned down as valueless. It is possible to maintain them as a "communist" interpretation; that is, as referring not to an individual, but to the community. (The term "allegorical" is inappropriate. We have seen that the parable of the Prodigal Son may be interpreted either of the individual or the community.) Jesus took the communist significance when He spoke of Himself as the bridegroom of His followers. To this extent the common meals at which He

[1] Möller, *Church History*, p. 269.
[2] Isaiah lxii. 5.

was present must have sometimes owed to Him the character of a marriage feast. This was the greatest miracle of feeding. The common meal was regarded as a love-feast. As such it was the basis of the communion of the earliest Church. And it reassumed this character in the love-feasts of the Moravians and the Methodist Church.

The close association of the festive meal with the marriage feast is seen in the Jewish custom, almost contemporary, of reciting the Song of Songs at banquets, a custom mentioned only to be condemned by Rabbi Akiba.[1] A similar custom is recorded by Lane for the Mohammedans of Cairo, with the alternating reference to a literal and a spiritual significance, Mohammed being the object of affection (the vulgar, however, understanding a literal meaning). In the Ephesians, Paul seems to be directing the procedure of such a festival when He speaks of psalms and hymns and songs. (B. omits " spiritual " before the last word.) We thus see the agapé in the light of an Oriental marriage feast, a connotation presumably fixed by the name " love." This social evening meal seems to have been of a character sufficiently usual not to attract the hostile attention of the Roman government. And yet the agapé was the type of which the marriage supper of the Lamb was the antitype. We may carry this parallel with us back to the miracles of feeding in the Gospel. These are to be regarded as outstanding cases of a familiar occurrence : enlargements of the joyous occasion which turned up whenever Jesus shared in a common meal. " Can the children of the bride-chamber fast, while the bridegroom is with them ? " This same suggestion is represented in the Fourth Gospel as anticipated by the Baptist : " He that hath the bride, is

[1] *Sanhedrin*, Tos., xii., " He who at a banquet renders the Song of Songs in a sing-song way, turning it into a common ditty, has no share in the world to come."

the bridegroom." Jesus was thus both the motive and the master of the revels.

8. And the tradition of the Christian revel has, I think, been handed down in much of the Christian apocrypha. In view of the widespread Oriental custom of story-telling at banquets and also of reciting or reading entertaining books, we may refer with great probability the production of much Jewish and early Christian literature to the demand offered by the festive meeting. There was no cinema then, that monument of the silence of the divine oracles. Instead there was a stream of literature living on the lips and in the ears of human beings. And until the canon was fixed, the poetic fire blazing, here dimly, there with fury, engrossed the attention and kindled the feelings of the company gathered out of an alien world at the love-feast. Only when the canon was taking shape could cases arise like that of the presbyter who composed the Acts of Thekla, and was condemned for writing fiction.

For there is a striking likeness to be found among many of these compositions. They are novels in which the plot turns not upon the marriage of the heroine to an earthly spouse, but upon her consecration to a heavenly spouse. The rejection of an earthly bridegroom for a heavenly one is the *motif* of the plots of the Acts of Thekla, the Acts of Thomas. Now it has been hastily assumed that the intention of the authors of these romances was to attack the marriage relation. But it would be nearer the truth to say that we are dealing with a dramatic problem in which the attempt is made to exhaust the significance of a particular case. And the fault therefore is with the critics who insist upon treating as a universal principle what presents itself in the special circumstance. Where the heavenly bridegroom is believed to be present, there is a fitness in contrasting Him with an earthly bridegroom. This considera-

tion, I venture to think, will restore our perspective. The Jewish novels in which the human marriage is exalted were familiar enough. Ruth, Esther (a secular novel), Tobit, Susanna, are all akin to the Song of Songs. And their survival along with the Christian novels was enough to maintain the balance against those romances which were written with a special reference to the Christian marriage feast.

For it was necessary to protect the heavenly character of the agapæ against those who would reduce them to the ordinary earthly level. Hence the Acts of Thekla and of Thomas are to be set alongside of Paul's injunctions to the Church of Corinth, or the Petrine condemnation: "Men that count it pleasure to revel in the daytime, spots and blemishes, revelling in their love-feasts while they feast with you." Or again in Jude: "These are spots in your love-feasts when they feast with you." Or in the Odes [1] or, rather, Songs of Solomon: "This is the deceiver and the error; and they are alike in the beloved and in his bride, and they lead and corrupt everybody—and they invite many to the banquet and give them to drink of the wine of their intoxication, and remove their wisdom and knowledge."[2] Certainly there is an intoxication of the intellect produced by the wild and whirling use of pretentious words. But, on the other hand, the theological canonist, in his precautions against error, is often over-subtle. And it is safer sometimes to take language in its first and literal sense. With this reservation we can allow also for the profounder meanings of the Songs of Solomon. A point of contact between these songs and the religious novel is found in the song which in the Acts of Thomas is attributed to the apostle. It is addressed to the Church regarded as a bride

[1] The name implies a reference to the Song of Songs.
[2] *Ode* xxxviii.

and resumes many of the characteristic expressions of the Odes of Solomon.

"The Virgin is the daughter of light, on whom there stands and rests the radiance of kings. The vision of her is gorgeous and full of delight. She flashes with brilliant beauty. Her garments are like the flowers of spring. An effluence of sweet odours is spread abroad from them. And on her head is the king established who, with his own ambrosia, feeds them who are established on him. Truth rests upon her head, and it shows a joyful light for her feet."

The group of ideas which furnish the material for these poems is thus to be traced to the mind of Jesus, who, in a quite original way, took the marriage relation with all its possibilities for poetry, gave it an expression which is echoed in the Johannine writings, and still more vividly expressed in the Odes of Solomon and the Song of the Apostle. Jesus thus was the founder of Christian poetry and the literary ancestor not only of the mediæval hymn-writers, but of Spenser, Milton, Wesley,[1] and, strangest of all, Verlaine in his *Sagesse*. Since the days of these earliest and best religious poems, nothing has been written resembling them so closely as the outpourings of the converted Parisian *roué* who could write of prayer:

> Je suis l'unique hôte opportun;
> Je parle au Roi le vrai langage
> Du matin rose et du soir brun.

If the Odes of Solomon breathe the dawn, the evening brown of our smoky cities can still catch from the distant horizon the music of which the secret was whispered by Jesus on the Galilean hills.

FRANK GRANGER.

[1] The poet who wrote the most beautiful line in English religious poetry, *Jesus, Lover of my soul.*

APOCALYPSE AND ATONEMENT.

APOCALYPSE has, for its distinctive note, vision; vision of the unseen state and of the Age to Come. It is usually regarded as being embodied in certain books of later Judaism, from *Daniel* on to *II. Baruch* and *IV. Ezra*. But the peculiar forms of presentation which characterise these books, as well as their distinctive doctrines, have their origin in older canonical writings, especially *Isaiah*, *Ezekiel* and *Joel*. Apocalypse is, thus, a continuation of Hebrew prophecy, and its special function is to develop the ideas of Immortality, the Kingdom and the Messiah. Its apostles were mystics and evangelicals, men of decided though unequal poetic power, and of great religious fervour. Their writings were, of course, inferior to the best works of Hebrew genius. Nevertheless, they were in complete spiritual accord with the greater prophets; and, in respect of those subjects with which they were mainly concerned, they advanced far beyond the level of earlier thought. Their teaching as to the Resurrection, the endless Life and the Messianic Hope, was accepted by early Christianity and is repeated in the Synoptic Gospels, the Epistles of St. Paul and the Apocalypse of St. John. These Jewish mystics may, therefore, be admitted to have had a part in the process of divine revelation; to have been forerunners of the Saviour, preparing the way of the Lord.

It must be allowed that modern Protestant theology has been slow to recognise the debt that we thus owe to these ancient writers, and slow especially to consider seriously the relation of their message to the consciousness and teaching of Jesus. "Liberal" theologians, disliking Apocalypse as an element difficult to reconcile with their theories, have ridiculed its forms, which are often uncouth enough, and

failed to discern the truth which it bore in its tragic heart. Also, a cautious silence as to this subject was commonly observed among conservative scholars, even long after works like *Enoch* and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* had become quite well known. Men went on writing and teaching as if there were no apocalyptic literature of any moment except the *Book of Daniel*, as if there stretched between the Old Testament and the New a barren waste of sand: a long period of silence wherein there was no movement of the revealing Purpose and never an "accent of the Holy Ghost." The credit of compelling theology to face the facts of the matter is due mainly to Johannes Weiss, who published, in 1890, a book on the preaching of Jesus as to the Kingdom of God, which, although it took ten years to pass out of its first edition and has never been translated into English, was fruitful nevertheless in great and important results. It is true that Weiss and his immediate followers created a prejudice against their cause by associating it with extreme positions which have long been discredited; pressing their case too hard and too far; writing sometimes like men who had lost all sense of proportion and were blinded by the light of one idea. Nevertheless, their central contention, that Apocalypse is the key to much of the mind of Jesus, has vindicated itself and stands secure.

The work of Johannes Weiss to which reference has been made[1] is perhaps the one book which, apart from the apocalyptic literature itself, is absolutely indispensable to the student of this subject. To read it is to understand the essential strength of an argument which had many weaknesses of detail and of circumstance. This little volume is, indeed, the product of genius as well as of scholarship: vivid, imaginative, forceful, sincere, and intensely religious. Its faults, however, are easily discerned. For one thing,

[1] *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes.*

Weiss, perhaps, misunderstood to some extent the true meaning of Apocalypse, and did not give sufficient attention to the various elements of teaching contained in its literature. He had not thought himself into the heart of it; he attached undue importance to its mere modes of expression, and especially he dwelt too exclusively on the purely futurist side of its evangel. Thus, he failed to interpret broadly enough the *Enoch* predictions that the Reign of God would be inaugurated immediately and with violence. This foretelling of catastrophe is not found, for instance, in the *Testaments;* it was, therefore, not an essential of Apocalypse. Besides, it applied only to the outward form of the Parousia. Jewish mystics held that the Kingdom was already ideally present, ordained from the foundation of the world, standing serene and beautiful in the heavens.[1] These men lived in the perpetual consciousness of eternal realities, having visions of the Lord, beholding the Heavenly City in hours of revelation. And for minds like these, questions of days and months and years could have little meaning. The Kingdom was always near them, even at the door, and its translation into terms of sense and time was every moment imminent. To this aspect of things Weiss gave but little attention: hence he attributed a literalness and a rigour to the predictions both of Jesus and of the apocalyptic writers which the documents do not warrant. In the same way, he did not sufficiently emphasise the variety of conception as to the future state which is found in the Jewish books[2] and is reflected in the Gospels; with the result that much of his argument misses the mark. Similarly, he under-estimated the ethical character of the Messianic Hope as it is presented by the best of the mystical writers. In their view the essence of the Kingdom-life was righteousness and

[1] *Similitudes of Enoch, passim.*
[2] Cf. the different sections of *I. Enoch.*

peace and likeness to the Lord.[1] And his overlooking of this led Weiss to suggest an opposition between the moral teaching of Jesus and His prophecies of the Coming Age, which in fact had no existence.

But, while these and other criticisms may legitimately be applied to the work of Weiss, it yet remains true that the substance of his contention is valid. It seems beyond reasonable doubt that the mental atmosphere and tradition of the Jewish mystics were the inheritance of Jesus; that He felt at home in their world and spoke their symbolic tongue. Of course, He was conscious of a sonship to God with which Apocalypse had little concern; the spiritual and ethical elements in His teaching were largely independent of His Messianic vocation; His gentle and sympathetic humanity and His tenderness towards the weak and sinful were not the general temper of earlier prophets; and there were things of mystery and divinity in His soul which are fitly set forth in the Gospel of St. John. None the less, He conceived His mission in an eschatological sense; He believed Himself called to establish the Kingdom of God, and He apprehended that Kingdom, not abstractly or in general terms of ethics, but concretely and after the manner of *Enoch*. Throughout His ministry and in His supreme sacrifice He had an End in view, and that End appeared to His eyes in the varied hues and manifold splendours of Apocalypse.

Assuming all this, then, as common ground, and setting aside all debatable matters, let us consider what light apocalyptic study casts upon the subject of Atonement. If Jesus conceived the salvation He was to accomplish under the form of the Kingdom of God, how did He come to accept the Cross as a means towards the accomplishment of His work? If His thought moved largely along the

[1] *I. Enoch* lxxi. 14–17, etc.

lines which we find in the Jewish prophetic books, what significance is He likely to have attached to His own Passion ? On our answer to these questions must depend, in large measure, our doctrine of Atonement.

I.

There can be no doubt that the apocalyptic interpretation of the Synoptic prophecies leads us to emphasise the importance of the Cross in the drama of Redemption. Weiss and Schweitzer both affirm with conviction that Jesus went up to Jerusalem in the last days of His ministry resolved to give His life there as a voluntary sacrifice to the end that the Kingdom of God might come. They could not, indeed, escape this assertion. It is clear that as the Saviour approached the completion of His work the eschatological aspect of that work became more and more the burden of His message. His final teaching centred around the double theme of Triumph and Passion, the Parousia and the Cross. To this closing period belong His prophecies of the Messianic woes, Advent and Judgment; at this time also He began to warn His disciples against certain misconceptions as to the manner in which His vocation was to find complete fulfilment. We may easily conjecture what these misconceptions were. Some of the twelve evidently clung to the crudest form of the Jewish eschatology and expected their Master to restore the Kingdom to Israel, by the aid perhaps of celestial armies, reigning thereafter at Jerusalem in glory greater than Solomon's. Others of them, whose hope was of a more spiritual type, probably anticipated nevertheless that the dominion of Christ would be realised during His lifetime ; that He would suddenly cast aside the garment of His humiliation and appear in the fulness of His majesty while yet He remained upon the

earth; that the Galilean prophet would be transfigured before their eyes into the likeness of the heavenly Son of Man, His mortal frame being transmuted into the spiritual body of the Resurrection. Thoughts like these would be natural and attractive to men imbued with the hopes of national and mystical tradition. But whatever the dreams of the disciples may have been, they were not according to the sovereign mind of Jesus; and His voice broke in upon their thoughts with a note of stern tenderness. He bade His followers understand that He must be made manifest as the Saviour of men from out the mysteries of the eternal world, that He must establish His Kingdom by an appearing from the brightness of the Father's glory, that to this end He must endure the Cross and descend into the regions of the dead. By death He was to attain the life everlasting; by drinking the cup of mortality He was to purchase for His people the inheritance of an incorruptible Redemption. It was not only, or chiefly, by His revelation of the divine nature or by His spiritual teaching, but pre-eminently by the Cross, that He was to secure that perfect and eternal Good which it was the purpose of the Most High to bestow upon the world.

Such, then, is the Synoptic account of the final message of the Redeemer. But the question arises whether Jesus, in thus exalting the Cross as the supreme instrument of salvation, did not depart decisively from apocalyptic modes of thought. Many scholars have maintained that He did. They have urged that the conception of a suffering Christ was entirely alien to the temper of the Enoch prophecies, which presented a picture of the Messiah clothed in the bright garments of victory, and predicted His advent in circumstances of glory and power. Hence they have drawn the conclusion that Calvary cannot be given a place in any eschatological account of the Saviour's work, and that Jesus

when He accepted the cup of death did, by that very act, reject the Messianic hope as hitherto held and taught.

This is a contention the full answer to which will appear when we come to discuss the view of atonement which the Jewish writings suggest. It is enough at this point to say that those books are far from being strangers to the idea of vicarious sacrifice as a means to the coming of the Kingdom. It is true that, except in one doubtful passage in the *Testaments*,[1] they do not speak of a dying and suffering Messiah; but it is to be remembered that they did not think of Him as the Creator of the Kingdom, or as the Agent appointed to make its coming possible, but rather as the Lord of its accomplished life. Moreover, we must not miss the significance of the doctrine contained in the *Testaments* that the Anointed One is to come of the tribe of Levi, the tribe appointed to represent the people before God in sacrificial mediation. It may well be that this prophecy is meant to suggest that the Christ will embody in a complete form the principle that is ideally represented by the priestly service of the Levitic race. Sympathetic students of the *Testaments* will not exclude this possibility, since they know well the profound spiritual intuitions which are found in this wonderful old book, so perplexing, so confused, but so catholic in spirit and so advanced in its

[1] *Test. Benj.* iii. 8. I refer here only to pre-Christian Apoc. If *IV. Ezra* vii. 28–30 be pre-Christian, as is probable, it too must be reckoned with :—"After these (400) years, my Son, the Messiah, shall die," etc. *Daniel* ix. 26, is also interesting. Part, perhaps, of a fragment out of place. Hebrew text corrupt: various readings. R.V. has: "After threescore and five weeks, shall the anointed one be cut off, and shall have nothing." A literal translation of one reading, but meaningless. Theodotion (Vatican LXX, Bos) gives ἐξολοθρευθήσεται χρίσμα, καὶ κρίμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ (note χρίσμα for מָשִׁיחַ). This indicates a reading. (1) early Christian, (2) adopted by Vatican. May be correct. If so, *Dan.* ix. 26, perhaps, suggested *IV. Ezra* vii. 29. Thus, it *may* be Messianic and *may* read: "After threescore and five weeks Messiah shall be cut off, but there shall be (is) no condemnation in His case." But whole passage obscure.

ethical teaching. In any case, the truth that Apocalypse readily took into itself the conception of the Cross is made evident by the *Revelation of St. John* which glorifies "the Lamb that was slain," and discerns that slain Lamb in the centre of glory and power. But it is chiefly to be borne in mind that the position of Jesus was wholly different from that of the earlier prophets. Those seers of the older time had indeed predicted the Kingdom, had dreamed about its glories, had seen in vision its unspeakable splendours; but Jesus believed Himself appointed to bring it down from the heavens and establish it among men. Those others had only spoken about the Messiah; Jesus knew that He *was* the Messiah. Hence the whole matter presented itself to Him from a standpoint which none but He had ever occupied. He stood where no man had stood before. His vocation was solitary and alone, even as it was incomparable alike in its burden and in its glory. He, a man among men, was yet the appointed Minister of the supreme Good. It was His to remove the secular load of humanity, and to break open the eternal doors that the Kingdom might come in. And this calling of Christ was not to be fulfilled by an earthly sovereignty, nor by erecting any Dominion built of corruptible things. On such possibilities as these He had turned His back in the hour of His great temptation. He had adopted once for all the view of the Parousia presented in the *Similitudes of Enoch*; the highest and hardest form of the Messianic hope, involving a spiritual Christ and a spiritual Kingdom. How then was He to discharge His mission? To this question there could be only one answer, and that answer was the Cross. To bring the Kingdom out of eternity He must Himself enter eternity; to possess an universal influence He must pass into the region whence all such influence proceeds. For Jesus to have entertained any other thought than this would have meant the surrender

of His purpose, would have involved a limited and local sovereignty, would have emptied of spirit and life the sacred vision which He carried in His heart. Towards such an End as He had in view, of limitless blessedness, the way lay through the gates of death, a death whose manner was predestined by the power of His foes and by a deeper necessity which His soul discerned. Hence it was that the endurance of the Cross became a part of the work He had set Himself to accomplish. Thus, also, it was that the nearer He came to Calvary the more vividly did He foretell the Kingdom, and the more intensely did He grasp and proclaim that sure and certain hope which was the essence of Apocalypse. His acceptance of death, so far from signifying a surrender of Messianic belief, was the final proof that this belief was of the substance of His soul.

II.

Up to this point, the pathway of thought is fairly direct and clear. We are able at least to conjecture how it came to be that the Passion found a place in the sublime purpose in accordance with which the Redeemer moved towards the establishment of his Kingdom. There remains, however, to be considered the more directly theological aspect of our theme, which has in view the nature of our Lord's sufferings and the light in which He beheld His own atoning sacrifice. It is not enough to say that He was willing to pass through the experience of dying in order that He might enter into immortal victory, to go away that He might come again. This is true, but it is not the whole truth. It does not explain the burden which lay upon His soul as He approached the end, nor His strong crying and tears, nor the thick darkness of Calvary. What meaning are we to attach to this unique and measureless sorrow ? And how did He interpret

to Himself that necessity in virtue of which the Christ ought to suffer in such a way as this ?

In seeking to find such an answer to this question as may be in conformity with Messianic doctrine, we may begin by accepting Weiss's contention that Jesus believed the coming of the Kingdom to be impossible until the unrepented sin of His people was done away, and that therefore He proposed to take upon Himself in sacrificial death the burden of their guilt. We must agree, at least, that the bitterness which the Saviour found in the experience of the Cross was in some way associated with the transgressions of mankind ; there is, indeed, no alternative view to which we can turn. Jesus certainly set His face towards Calvary believing that by His voluntary self-surrender He would gain for men the remission of sin, and so make clear the way for the saving purpose of God. By His submission to death He expected, indeed, to attain His Messianic glory, but the fathomless sorrow which He found in the cup of mortality was the price which He willed to pay for the power to consummate the Kingdom in the world. Yet we have still to ask how it was that He expected the Passion to avail. Why should He have thought that by obedience even unto death He could remove the guilt of humanity ? How did He come to believe that there could be such efficacy in sacrifice ?

If we seek to answer this question on the supposition that the mind of Jesus moved along the line of apocalyptic tradition, we must turn for guidance to the books which embody that tradition. We need not affirm that Jesus knew these writings, though it seems clear that He was acquainted at least with *Enoch* and the *Testaments*. All that we need assume is that the literature in question expressed the thoughts that were commonly held by the school of mystical piety with which our Lord was in evident sympathy. If He shared the Messianic expectations of

that school it is reasonable to suppose that He shared also the more lofty of those beliefs which were dear to its adherents. If, then, we accept the guidance of Apocalypse we find confirmation of the view that Jesus believed His sufferings to have a vicarious value for the remission of sins. We are not, however, constrained to suppose that He regarded His sacrifice as "penal," in the sense of certain theological theories. Nowhere in the Jewish books do we find the idea that the righteous are made the victims of divine anger in the place and room of the wicked. Their doctrine of atonement is not explicitly stated, for there is no systematic divinity in them. But we may easily learn from a study of these writings what the various elements were which together constituted the faith and hope that they enshrine. The apocalyptic conception of individual salvation was that a man should have a place secured for him in the Kingdom of God. But this supreme blessing was not to be obtained, primarily, by the man's own faith or obedience; it was assigned to him by the sovereign will of the Most High, who had appointed his destiny for him "before the world was, from of old." No saying in the Gospels is truer to tradition than "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world."[1] The hope of every individual lay, thus, in the determining grace of the Father who purposed righteously towards a righteous end.[2] But this divine foreordination was not conceived as working to its goal, after the manner of an external fate. The truth of this is clearly shown by the important part in the fulfilment of the spiritual order which is assigned to human agencies, such as the efforts of men after personal holiness, the service rendered to the Lord in the help of the poor, the fatherless and the afflicted, and the unceasing prayers and strivings of the faithful. To

[1] *Matt.* xxv. 34. [2] *Dan.* xii. 1, I. En. xxxix. 8, etc.

these ministries of unselfish devotion the Jewish prophets continually ascribe availing power with God; and it is in these, accordingly, that we discern their conception of atonement. Many as were the forms in which the righteous rendered their effectual service, these all owed their power to their being acts of vicarious sacrifice: they were costly in the spiritual effort involved, and they were done for the sake of others. Very significant, in this regard, is the constant uplifting and glorifying of intercessory prayer which characterises the Jewish books, and especially those of them which had most influence in the time of Jesus. Thus Daniel makes appeal to God for all Israel with "prayer and supplication, with fasting and sack-cloth and ashes."[1] The patriarchs also repeatedly assign their salvation to nothing else than the intercessions of their father[2]; Joseph entreats Jacob to pray for his erring brothers[3]; and Levi is appointed the spiritual mediator for the nation.[4] Judas Maccabeus has a vision of Onias and Jeremiah standing in the heavenly places, invoking the divine blessing on their race; he also causes offering to be made for the sins of the dead.[5] Intercession is declared to be the office of Gabriel, as it is of the blessed in Paradise and of all the angelic host.[6] Moses is described as "the great messenger to the people" and "the advocate appointed to offer prayers on their behalf."[7] In like manner Enoch, on the ground of his intercessions, is called "the Redeemer of the sins of men," or "the Taker-away of our sins."[8] Thus, throughout these writings, intercession is presented as exhibiting the law of all spiritual blessing; the acceptable oblation of patriarchs, prophets, witnesses and all sanctified souls. It is the "reasonable and

[1] *Dan.* ix. 3–19.
[2] *Test. Reub.* i. 7, etc.
[3] *Test. Benj.* iii. 6.
[4] *Test. Reub.* vi. 8.
[5] *II. Macc.* xv. 12 and 14; xii. 45.
[6] *I. En.* xl. 6, xxxix. 5, etc.
[7] *Ass. Mos.* xii. 6.
[8] *II. En.* lxiv. 5.

bloodless sacrifice," constantly offered by the multitude of the redeemed; and to minister it is the highest service of those who stand nearest to the throne.

But apocalypse, in common with the Old Testament, teaches that intercession expresses itself in other and more costly forms than that of spoken prayer; in self-forgetting effort, in the sufferings of martyrs and the obedience unto death of submissive lives and wills. Thus it is said of Levi: "Bow down before his seed, for in our behalf it will die in wars visible and invisible" [1] We find also this prayer of Eleazar before his martyrdom: "Be merciful unto thy people, and let our punishment be a satisfaction in their behalf." "Make my blood their purification and take my soul to ransom their souls." [2] Similarly, another martyr declares: "I, like my brothers, give up body and soul for our fathers' laws, calling on God . . . to let the Almighty's wrath, justly fallen on the whole of our nation, end in me and in my brethren." [3]

Thus, in many ways, in prayer, in acts of service, in fulfilment of law, in faithfulness through trial by fire and by sword, the spirit of vicarious ministry performs its priestly task. These are but differing embodiments of the one sacrificial power; in them is the fountain of hope, by them the sins of men are done away, and through them, therefore, the Kingdom comes.

It is not difficult for us, in some measure, to understand how the religious mind came thus to invest with atoning power the offices of sacrifice; for these are all manifestations of the spirit of love which is the source of most things in our human life that are certainly known to be good.

[1] *Test. Reub.* vi. 12. [2] *IV. Macc.* vi. 28–29.

[3] *II. Macc.* vii. 38. This last passage seems to suggest penal suffering in place of the people. But it does not really do so. Word translated "end" is *στῆναι*.

Whoever gives of the substance of his life for the sake of others, whether in deed or in suffering or in prayer, increases the action of those spiritual forces in which is the hope of the world. God in the beginning created the human race because of the necessity that was in Him to bestow Himself and find Himself in the lives of free spirits. And therefore all who offer the costly treasures of their souls for the blessing of mankind make themselves in their degree like unto God; each in his own fashion fulfils the eternal law of life. They make themselves channels of that divine energy which perpetually re-creates and purifies, makes amends for the sins of the world and does them quite away. This is the conception of vicarious service which, whether consciously or no, underlies all belief in the atoning value of intercession by word and act, that belief which runs like a golden thread through the teachings of the Jewish prophets, and especially those who looked for the kingdom of God.

If, then, we assume that this manner of thought was the inheritance of Jesus, we are helped to understand, not only how He came to accept the Cross, but also how He interpreted to Himself the meaning and effect of His Passion. Throughout His ministry He made plain His faith in the availing grace of self-forgetting prayer, confession and obedience. He did this when He taught His disciples to offer that petition which expresses the burden of all intercession, "Thy Kingdom come"; when He spoke of the grain of wheat which must fall into the ground and die if it would come to fruit;[1] when He said that the Son of Man was come "To give His life a ransom,"[2] and "Whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it";[3] when He declared, at the last Supper, "This is My blood of the covenant which

[1] *John* xii. 24. [2] *Matt.* xx. 28.
[3] *Luke* xvii. 33.

is shed for many," and, "I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God."[1] In all these He proclaimed the law which by life and by death He fulfilled. It was a profoundly true instinct which led St. John the Divine to tell how he saw in his vision that there were presented before the Lamb "golden bowls full of incense which are the prayers of the saints";[2] for he thus associated the Passion of Christ with the interceding of believing souls in all the generations. Who shall say that we belittle the supreme oblation of Calvary if we say that Jesus believed it to be the consummation of immemorial ministries; that by the knowledge of all that God had required of His brethren gone before He interpreted the necessity whereby the Christ must suffer these things and afterwards enter into His glory? His solemn and awful vocation as Master and Lord of the Kingdom laid upon Him the requirement of fulfilling that august condition on which alone, by the will of the Father, the kingdom could appear. Of His lonely spirit it was required that in one act of measureless devotion He should completely affirm, and bring to its appointed end, that costly intercession and offering for sin which saints and angels and martyrs and prophets had sought in diverse manners to present.

Thus far the clue given by Apocalypse will lead us toward an understanding of the love of Christ which passeth knowledge. If there remain something deeper and more wonderful to be discovered, it must be sought by other lights than that of ancient Jewish faith: by the witness of Christian experience, by belief in the Divinity and Incarnation of the Saviour, by adequate thoughts as to His filial communion with God and His headship of the whole human race. But whatever contributions to our doctrine of Atonement may be derived from all these sources, they can be little more

[1] *Mark* xiv. 24–25 (R.V.). [2] *Rev.* v. 8 (R.V.).

than expansions and enrichments of that interpretation of the Cross which springs from the Messianic tradition. The most profound of all our theories of redemption, that of John McLeod Campbell, for instance, centring as it does in the ideas of vicarious repentance and confession and obedience unto death, is in manifest harmony with the type of belief that is suggested by mystical prophecy. And, indeed, there is nothing which can more impress us with a sense of the unique majesty and measureless power of Jesus than the thought that He believed Himself commissioned and enabled to consummate the sacred ordinance of self-surrender, and thus, making an end of sin, to establish the Kingdom. Nor can we conceive of anything higher within the reach of Christ, or more to be desired of God, than the perfect manifestation and accomplishment of that law of love which reveals itself and realises itself in every compassionate ministry, in every unselfish prayer and in all sacrificial service.

J. H. Leckie.

WELCOMING "THE CONTINUING AND PROGRESSING UNVEILING" OF JESUS CHRIST.

It has lately been pointed out that in several of the Epistles of St. Paul there is evidence of the conception "that in the progressive growth and development of a redeemed humanity there was a real fulfilment of the expectation that Christ Himself would return," and that both desire and hope were "weaned from the more material results which had been looked for as bound up with the Return" through an increasing recognition of "the reality and the incomparable value of the spiritual benefit already conferred by Christ."[1]

It may be not untimely to give utterance to a long-cherished conviction that, possibly owing to an early falling off in "the intensity with which the presence of Christ was realised within the fellowship," the emphasis of some crucial words has been shifted from the present to the future, from the ethical and spiritual to the material realm in a degree that has led to a blurring of the Christian message.

I.

Let us begin by thinking of the word "glory" (δόξα). The "glory" of a violet is first of all its capacity for giving forth its particular fragrance, and then the exercise of that capacity. To transfer a violet from a cottage garden to a palace garden is not to "glorify" it. To infuse into a scentless violet all the odours in the world is not to "glorify" it. Its "glory" can "wake up," it can "enter into its glory" only by sending forth the scent for the sending forth of which it was created. We learn this from the words ascribed to our Lord by St. John when He received

[1] See C. Anderson Scott, *The Fellowship of the Spirit* (1921).

the message of the Greeks, (St. John xii. 23 f.). He was on His way to the Cross because He would not "abide by Himself alone," but would "bring forth much fruit." The mysterious life-power in the seed-corn is its "glory"; when that power is released by its "falling into the ground and dying" the seed-corn is "glorified." So is the oil in a lamp when the match has touched the wick. So is a ship when it is launched. Not splendid surroundings but discharge of function constitutes "glory."

So Easter and Pentecost and the seven weeks of the New Creation that came between them were an "Epiphany of the 'glory' . . . of our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Titus ii. 13). From those fifty days onward His effective working has never ceased, the giving forth of Life and Light and Fragrance. His "glory" is felt and seen in lives and characters and communities quickened, sweetened, made "light in the Lord." Every victory, individual or social, over lust or greed or cruelty or falsehood is an "apocalypse," an unveiling, of His "glory." Nor can we imagine any way in which He can be fully unveiled other than by the triumph of the effective working of His Spirit in all for whom He died.

He, the Head, has "entered into His glory," the glory of perfect Saviourhood, and the issue of its exercise is the "glory" of His Body. As His members come, individually and collectively, to be what God created them to be, they are "glorified" in Him and He in them.

II.

"Hope" next claims our attention. Even the Greek word ἐλπίς, outside its biblical use, is largely a hope *held out*, and by no means only a hope cherished. The LXX. use it (mainly in the Psalms and Sapiential Books) to repre-

sent predominantly *mibtâch*. "a ground of confidence," or *tiqvâh*, "a prospect," or *machçeh*, "a refuge." And constantly it is a Person that is our "refuge" or "hope" or "ground of confidence." When Christ is called "our Hope" (1 Tim. i. 1), or "Christ in you" is said to be "the Hope of glory" (Col. i. 27), the use of ἐλπίς is perfectly normal. I suppose many of us can recall turning out ἐλπίς in Bruder and discovering that it did not occur in the Gospels, that in "Acts" its occurrences were in connexion with the Resurrection, and that δόξης was the characteristic genitive following it in the Epistles. "Christ in us" is "the Hope of glory" first of all as our ground of confidence. He is Himself glorified as "the Son of Man" (St. John xiii. 31). He has "suffered these things" and (so) "entered into His glory" (Luke xxiv. 26), like the grain of wheat. And He is "the Hope of glory" as our Prospect, the Hope set before us. In Him we see what God means us to be.

III.

Before we go on to study the verb which describes most precisely the attitude of the Christian, as he stands between the opening and the consummation of the New Creation, towards "the Hope" and "the Glory," it will be well to mark the word ἀποκάλυψις, "revelation" or "unveiling."

Its use in the first Epistle of St. Peter is of great interest. On i. 13, ἐλπίσατε ἐπὶ τὴν φερομένην ὑμῖν χάριν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Dr. Hort writes: "The force of the participle is strictly present. The grace is ever being brought, and being brought in fresh forms, in virtue of the continuing and progressing unveiling of Jesus Christ" (p. 67a). He had already pointed out that "the substantive in connexion with ἐν or εἰς or ἐπί (after ἐλπίζω) with

either dative or accusative is apparently never the object of hope but always its ground." On i. 7, *εὑρεθῇ εἰς ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, he writes: "There is nothing in either this passage or others on the same subject, apart from the figurative language of Thess." (i.e. 2 Thess. i. 7) "to show that the revelation here spoken of is to be limited to a sudden preternatural theophany. It may be a long and varying process, though ending in a climax. Essentially it is simply the removal of the veils which hide the unseen Lord, by whatever means they become withdrawn" (p. 44 f.). Unfortunately we have not Hort's guidance on iv. 13, but it would seem likely that he understood *ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ* not of the climax only but of every marked stage in the long process of the unveiling of our Lord's effective working, of every signal victory of His Body over the forces of evil.

IV.

The need of a word which should express the Christian attitude towards Him who is our Hope of glory and whose glory is being unveiled in us and through us, led to the formation of the verb *ἀπεκδέχομαι* by the prefixing of *ἀπό* to the familiar *ἐκδέχομαι*, which means (*a*) "I receive after or next" (e.g. an enemy's onset, or a father's throne, or a ball at tennis); (*b*) "I stand ready to receive," "I await." Prefixed to verbs of having, taking, receiving and others *ἀπό* adds the idea that the thing received is *the fulness* of something *due or promised* or of an *instalment already given*. We know it in *ἀπέχω* and *ἀπολαμβάνω*. It is our *off* in *pay off* (a debt), *knock off* (runs required), *round off* (a figure to make it symmetrical), *hit off* (of a perfect characterisation). This compound verb *ἀπεκδέχομαι*, occurring in the New Testament (be it noted) only in the present (indicative or

participle), describes the Christian receiving and ever keen to receive *the completing fulness* of that which God *has promised* and of which He has already *given the earnest.* He is confident that He which began the good work in him will perfect it (Phil. i. 6).

The meaning of the verb comes out clearly in a signal passage of the Epistle to the Romans (viii. 18–25). The creation is in alert readiness to receive that unveiling of the sons of God which is to usher in its full glory (v. 19). Christians, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, are awaiting the redemption of the body, which is to complete their investiture as sons of God (v. 23). Hoping for or relying on an unseen gift, it is only by patient waiting on God (*δι' ὑπομονῆς*) that they are on their way to receive its crowning fulness (v. 25).

In this passage St. Paul stops to reflect on the fact that the word *ἐλπίς* testifies to the standing of the believer between the earnest and the complete fulness. "It was," he says, "by the Hope that we were saved." "The Hope of Israel," the looked for Redeemer, came and we welcomed Him and were saved in Him. Yet the very title shews that by that coming He did not cease to be hoped for. He is still "our Hope." This Christian way of speaking of "the Hope" is, as we have seen, in keeping with the usage of the Old Testament.

If we bear this in mind as we turn to Galatians v. 5 we shall not hesitate to render *ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα*, "*We* (Christians are not seeking to be set right by Law, but) by Spirit as an outcome of faith are *welcoming the fulness* of a hope of righteousness," of which we have the sure ground in Christ already made unto us "Righteousness from God" (1 Cor. i. 30). The verb seems to have been suggested to St. Paul's mind in this place by *ἐξεπέσατε* which he has just used of those

who failed or made shipwreck of grace, for ἐκπεσεῖν is the exact antithesis of ἀπεκδέχεσθαι.

Somewhat similarly in Corinthians i. 7 ἀπεκδεχομένους τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ immediately follows ὥστε ὑμᾶς μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ χαρίσματι. The Corinthians *come short* in the exercise of no grace with which they have been " enriched in Christ Jesus " because they are *welcoming the fulness* of the " continuing and progressing " unveiling of Him by the Spirit. And as ἀπεκδεχομένους is called out by ὑστερεῖσθαι going before, so we can hardly doubt that it is that participle which suggests ἕως τέλους in the next clause. Those who by welcoming the *fulness* of His unveiling have confirmed the testimony borne to His enriching grace He will confirm *to the end* or *to the uttermost.*

The two passages which remain to be considered seem to throw light on each other. In Philippians iii. 20 St. Paul says that as the issue of (ἐξ) a commonwealth in the heavens to which we already belong, or of a heavenly citizenship already conferred upon us (ὑπάρχει), we are welcoming the full salvation or victorious energy (σωτῆρα ἀπεκδεχόμεθα) of One who has made Himself responsible for us (κύριον), who means to us all that the name " Jesus " suggests (Ἰησοῦν), whom we own as Messiah (Χριστόν), and that we are sure that He will crown His work of inward transformation by the transfiguring of the body which we have worn in our low estate. Every word implies that only as we glory in and exercise the freedom of the heavenly City can we hail this final transfiguration. We are on our way to receive the fulness (ἀπεκδεχόμεθα) so long as we accept and use its earnest.

In Hebrews ix. 28 we start not from the heavenly citizenship but from the sin-bearing, the breaking-down of the barrier that shut us out from it. And the goal is not our

transfiguration but the sight of Him whom to "see even as He is" involves likeness to Him (1 St. John iii. 2). Here in place of *σωτῆρα ἀπεκδεχόμεθα* we have *τοὺς αὐτὸν ἀπεκδεχομένους εἰς σωτηρίαν* without material difference of meaning. In each case we accept what He has already done for us, and on the basis of that grace bestowed hail Him with open arms as He offers us His victory in all its fulness, even to sin's utter elimination.

G. H. WHITAKER.

THOUGHTS ON RELIGION.[1]

THERE are times in the history of the spiritual life of nations as of individuals when doctrinal formulæ stimulate men to a rare enthusiasm. There are other times when formulæ fall on the mind with the irresponsive silence of autumn leaves on a drifting stream. They seem as unprofitable as a broken string; or as meaningless as the random strokes of a pen. To many the present seems such a time; and those who identify religious experience with doctrinal declarations find themselves in sore perplexity. If we look, however, more closely at human life we shall find that this perplexity rests on a misunderstanding. Men may agree profoundly regarding the conditions of a common human experience and differ greatly regarding the terms in which that experience is expressed. It is a sound instinct which induces men to prefer the reality of an experience to the formulæ adopted at any given time to express it. Overzeal for doctrines tends to obscure the vital issues of religion. Religion does not depend on the discovery of correct formulæ. It does not await the result of the dialectical arguments of theologians and philosophers; nor does it look to the decisions of historical criticism of documentary tradition. If this were so, few men would have a religion worthy of the name; and the majority would obtain their religion at second hand. For most men have a very limited intellectual capacity for un-

[1] Delivered as a Murtle Lecture before the University of Aberdeen, January 15, 1922.

derstanding anything, and least of all for understanding the most difficult of all realities. The value of doctrinal formulæ lies primarily in their social utility: they are aids, but no more than aids, which men adopt, a language which they seek to use, in order to carry on and develop together a common form of experience. The experience is the primary fact, the language and formulæ are secondary. And men agree far more in spirit than ever comes out in expression. To ascertain this common experience we must revert to "the fountain-light of all our day," the "master light of all our seeing." What we must try to discover and lay stress upon at such a time as the present are those universal ways by which all men of spiritual experience, whether poorly or highly endowed in mind, endeavour to break through or to break in upon the august silence of God.

The subject which I wish to consider very shortly may be stated in the form of a question:—Are there any fundamental forms of communion with the Divine which are as enduring as the nature of man, as constant as the nature of the Divine, and which will never fail man in his hour of need?

There is a passage in one of the epistles of the great missionary to the Greeks and Romans in which the fundamental conditions of a religious life are definitely laid down, I think, for all time. He says, in language whose simplicity is apt to conceal the depth of the truth he conveys, that there are three things that last—faith, and hope and love, and that of these three the greatest is love. I wish to suggest that in this sentence we have the best expression of all that the religious life essentially requires for its maintenance, for its satisfaction and for its fulfilment. I think an analysis of the terms he employs will bear this out.

I am not concerned with the connexion of this sentence with the preceding course of his thought in the passage in

which this statement occurs. He is doubtless referring there to charity between man and man : and it is not very clear from the context what relation this has to the terms "faith" and "hope" with which the passage concludes. But with these questions I need not deal. What I wish to establish is that in the religious life proper, that is, in man's communion with the Divine, which is the vital fact in religious experience, these three conditions meet all his wants and are all essential to the complete realisation of this form of human experience.

In order to understand these conditions of religious experience we must keep in mind what men seek to obtain through religion. Communion with the Divine enables man to realise the presence of an eternal Spirit in his life, constant throughout all change, controlling triumphantly in every crisis in experience, and at the same time responsive to the uttermost in man's every hour of need. The primary effect of such communion is felt in the sense of peace in the human soul which nothing finite can disturb, which nothing finite can create, and which, on that account, is beyond all human understanding to explain or explain away, since the human understanding can only claim to grasp what is finite. This sense of peace is the supreme test of the reality and sincerity of religious communion ; and is for that reason the indispensable foundation of any further achievement in the religious life. I say "foundation" because "calm is not all, though calm is well," and is indeed all-important. The religious mind can and generally does rise to higher heights of experience once peace is secured as a basis : but without this nothing further can be gained or accomplished. It is in fact the simplest outcome of the direct communion with the Divine in which the process of religion consists.

Now those three conditions—faith, hope, love—can, I think, be shown to be the forms of communion with the

Divine required by man's spirit in order to cope on the one hand with the disquieting and disturbing facts of ceaseless change, and on the other hand with the restless activity of human nature.

I.

In the first place, man seeks in the religious life to secure and maintain the sense of enduring peace amidst all the manifold changes with which he is confronted throughout his finite experience. But for the all too vivid sense of the instability of finite beings tossed upon the ceaseless tides of change, religion would probably not be necessary; and but for the conscious presence of the Divine as a permanent power we could not surmount and survive the irresistible mutability of things. Change is as necessary as permanence to constitute religious experience. The conscious communion with the one Divine Life, changeless amidst all changes whatsoever, to which our finite being is subjected, enables the individual to share the Divine nature; and by so doing man can maintain a spiritual equipoise in an endlessly changing world. This spiritual equipoise of the individual, this supreme form of self-preservation, is what the religious mind means by peace of soul.

While this communion with the one Divine Spirit amidst the changes of the world engages man's whole spiritual being in order to maintain his peace unbroken and unperturbed, the communion does not in all cases assume the same form. For the changes which make up man's experience are not all of one kind: they are plainly distinguishable into past, future and present. And though these three are doubtless continuous and inseparable, yet man's mental attitude varies according as he views the past in relation to the present and the present in relation to the future. All this profoundly affects the character and manner of his

communion with the Divine, Whose nature is one and changeless throughout all the forms of change. The mode of communion varies according as man seeks the assurance of the presence of the Divine in the ceaseless dependence of the present on the past, in the connexion of the present with the endless future, or in the incessant appearance and disappearance which characterises the living present. Hence it lies in the very nature of temporal change that there should be three distinct ways in which religious experience is realised.

Now Faith is that form of spiritual communion in which man affirms the presence of the Divine in all those changes which had their being in the past, and which now unalterably but incessantly determine the course of the present. Hope is that frame of the religious mind in which man realises by anticipation his union with the Divine life in all the endless future. And Love is that mode of communion with the Divine, in which the very presence of the Divine Spirit is felt and enjoyed as the actuating life of each precious fleeting moment. Let us expand this statement by a brief analysis of some of the more familiar features of these attitudes of the religious life.

If we observe carefully the characteristic conditions under which a man exercises, or is called upon to exercise, religious faith, we shall find in the first place that he always has in mind primarily what *has* happened, the changes which *have* taken place and are now part and parcel of the irretrievable past, whether perplexing or disastrous or paralysing in their effects on his present life. It is when a man feels the foundations of his life undermined that the exercise of faith becomes a necessity for his security. But the peril to the foundations of his life can only come from events that have occurred, not from a future which he cannot anticipate and which in any case has not yet

come into operation. As men so often say, they have faith in spite of appearances being against them : but obviously appearances must *have appeared* before they could be known to be unfavourable. In the second place it is the bearing of the past on the actual circumstances of the present which faith has in view. It is only indirectly concerned with the distant future. Reconciliation with the past for the sake of fulfilling the call of the hour and the day ; holding fast by the continuity of past and present, even in the face of apparent defeat ; sustaining the effort to live despite the recollection of failure ; struggling to redeem the time even because the days have become evil ; rising above and transcending the things that are behind, and pressing on from stage to stage—these are typical of the attitude of faith. Doubtless it is impossible to separate past and future in such a case. But the future is here rather taken for granted than directly regarded for its own sake. While the present is reconciled to the past by a confident sense of continuity in spite of all that has taken place, the future is guaranteed, and is, as it were, left to take care of itself. So far as the future is concerned, faith provides the basis of things hoped for in the future ; it is the security for that which is yet to be, and which is on that account unseen in the present. In the third place, faith is a process of spiritual communion with the Divine Life, a confident assurance continuously maintained that the Divine Spirit, towards which man's spirit is drawn, remains the changeless controller of all that is past and the dominating agency in the present. Such an assurance repeatedly affirmed even in the face of confusion, gives the sense of quietude of spirit—sombre and restrained doubtless, but imperturbable in its strength—which, as already indicated, is the essence of the religious life. Hence men rightly say the safety, or, as it is often called, the "salvation," of the

finite spirit is to be found by faith. Without such faith, the past can become, as for many it often is, a source of overwhelming terror, a resistless impending fate haunting the hours of the present.

We observe, again, that in the case of Hope the mind is fixed not at all on the past and hardly at all on the present, but primarily on the future. The past is what is done and finished, and beyond all further change. We cannot hope for anything that has already taken place. The realm of hope lies in what is as yet unattained, in the sequence of changes that are still to be. Now, for us, the future is certainly as much a part of the whole course of time as either the past or the present. But it has a totally different character. The past we know; the present we realise; but the future is wholly unknown and unrealised. The past is fixed; the present is certain; but the future is quite uncertain and quite indefinite. Hence the unrealised future is quite unique; and we can look towards it as almost in complete separation from the present and the past. Our religious attitude towards it and to the changes which it contains must therefore be unique, and specifically different from our attitude towards the past. Since the future is so different from the past or the present, men can feel themselves cut off from the future altogether,—a state of mind which they cannot adopt in relation to the present and the past. This is the mood of absolute despair. On the other hand they may have enough hold over the future to keep going, and to take an interest in the days ahead. But when men regard the whole future without misgiving, with confidence that every change that is to come will assuredly fulfil the entire claims of the spirit, then we have the frame of mind of Hope in the religious sense. Only to a religious mind is this state possible: for only a spirit in communion with the Divine Spirit, changeless amidst all change, can

feel this complete assurance regarding the changes of the unknown and indefinite future. Without it, the future, because unknown, may appear, as it does to many, crowded with the ghostly shadows of dread which haunt the darkness of the unknown. Out of such hope there necessarily comes peace, and in such hope alone there is safety for the spirit in the future. As the great Apostle put it, we are saved by hope. Hope is thus that form of religious communion in which the soul regards all its future in the light of its union with the Divine Spirit.

Finally, we have a different and equally distinctive attitude towards the time process when the soul is absorbed in the present, oblivious of the past and the future alike. This is possible because, in fact, the present can be taken by itself in mental isolation. There are times in our lives when we cling to the present, as the only important stage of time ; when we feel the future to be an intrusion and put it aside as a disturbance to our lives ; when we seek to forget what has happened ; when we feel and want the present to be all in all, and completely satisfying. The feeling of the moment is everything. Each moment is felt to be eternal. The mind can feel itself to be in perfect equipoise and also at the summit of its desire. Such a frame of mind is that of Love. And it is not merely possible but is only possible in the religious life, when the sense of communion with the Divine is so complete and so concentrated that the soul feels here and now that nothing can disturb its peace, neither things present nor past, nor things to come, neither principalities nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor any element in all creation. This form of communion is a consummate sense of realised union in the present with the one eternal Spirit. It is not felt as a fleeting present. Time itself seems abolished and our experience is felt to be, in Henry Scougal's language, the very "life of God in the

soul of man." Hence the great difference between the concentration on the present as it is experienced in love, and the concentration on the present without love: in the former the present melts into eternity; in the latter the present is often hardened into a veritable obsession. Love alone expresses this experience of the present. For we do not, without qualification, love what is past; we love it with regret that it is gone. And we cannot love without qualification, what is future; we love it with the longing of anticipation. Love is thus that form of communion in which the Divine life is felt to be the actualisation of Itself in the spirit of man; for the Divine life is then felt to be present in its changeless entirety.

II.

I come to the second part of my thesis. I have indicated how these three forms of communion overcome the disquieting effects of change in man's life. I wish now to suggest that they are also states in which we achieve union with the Divine through the main channels of conscious life, and that they thus satisfy the restless activity of human nature.

There are three primary ways in which man becomes conscious of the world around him: first of all by thought,—he thinks about the world and makes it intelligible; secondly by action,—he shapes it by his acts, and makes it conform to his purposes; thirdly by emotion,—he finds pleasure or pain in it and can make it contribute to his enjoyment. Let us consider each of these in turn to see how they stand in relation to religion.

We may remark in passing, without developing the matter in detail, that these three processes of the mind are closely connected with the three modes of change,—past, present and future,—with which we have just been con-

cerned. For thought can only deal satisfactorily with what is finished and completed; in action, the centre of interest lies in the future; while the interest of emotion lies in the immediate present. The full discussion of this observation would, however, take us too far from our subject.

The essential characteristic of the religious life, as we saw, is that it gives the human soul a lively sense of imperturbable repose. Now, in dealing with the finite world, the intellect,—to consider this aspect first,—seeks to reduce finite things to an order which remains at least relatively stable; for it endeavours to express in universal terms, or to connect by law, the detailed facts of experience. But the human intellect does not, and apparently in the nature of the case cannot, create a complete and enduring sense of mental stability. It seems unable to do so for various reasons. (1) The process of reducing the endless range of finite things to intelligible order is a process that takes time; and as the range of finite things apparently cannot be exhausted, the human intellect cannot expect to achieve its task in any finite time. (2) Before the intellect can operate successfully there must be facts given for the intellect to think about. This means that the facts with which the intellect deals must be found in the past or in the present of our experience. But what the future contains is not given to us and cannot be given to us; and consequently the region of the finite world which belongs to the future must remain always unknown. On these and other grounds the sense of complete mental quietude, which men require in religion, cannot be obtained through the intellect. Since, then, the immovable security of the religious life cannot be obtained through the channel of ordinary intellectual activity, either it must be dismissed by the intellect as illusory or the resources of the

spirit must, in the interests of religion, surmount and survive the disquieting activity of the intellect. The first alternative is impossible in the name of religion; and religion is as real an experience as any other form of experience. The second alternative is the only one open to religion. And the security which the religious mind requires, and which the restless activity of the intellect cannot supply, is obtained by the assertion of faith, that the intelligible order sought, but never fully realised, by the intellect is as reliable and unchanging as the Divine Spirit with which the human spirit is in communion.

Looked at in this way we can see at once how men are at peace when they realise by faith what eye hath not seen nor ear heard nor the mind of man conceived. We can understand too how the long-standing conflict between faith and the intellect has arisen, a conflict which has filled volumes of human speculation and pathetically bitter controversy. Sometimes men seek to justify faith by reason, at other times to justify reason by faith, and sometimes to keep the two at endless strife with one another. On this conflict I would make a passing observation. We may admit that reason is of value in the interests of faith; but it seems clear that faith is of far more value in the interests of reason. By reasoning alone men cannot obtain what religion requires and what faith supplies. Science and philosophy cannot satisfy the demands of the religious consciousness, even as regards its elementary conditions. Much effort has been spent in giving arguments or reasons for the existence of the Divine Spirit. These have their use and their value; but no one was ever convinced by these reasons who was not in the first instance of a religious frame of mind, and therefore disposed towards a consciousness of the Divine independently of all reasons. Religion occupies its own place in human experience; it lives and

moves towards its end on conditions and terms which are peculiar to itself. Doubtless if the intellect did or could accomplish completely its task of making the whole finite realm of things utterly and absolutely intelligible, the attitude of faith might be unnecessary: for the mind would not require two ways of obtaining the same result; faith would disappear in sight—in intellectual vision. But this "if," this condition, is one which, so far as we can see, can never cease to qualify our experience. The achievements of the human intellect are indeed immense. Men have arrived at truth, some of it to all appearance beyond the crumbling touch of time. To that extent, the mind is justified in regarding the truths reached by the human intellect as the expression of the enduring nature of things: and religion is justified in claiming such truth as the realisation in human life of the mind of the Divine Spirit, and in regarding science at its best as the perpetual incarnation of the Divine thought in the brain of man. In the highest achievements of thought, science and faith meet on the common ground of truth: hence religion rightly takes Truth, which is the ideal of knowledge, to be an expression of the nature of the Divine, and declares that God is Truth and is indeed all Truth. But the realisation of truth by the human intellect is painfully incomplete. In fact only to faith is complete truth assured, and God alone is Truth. In that sense men grasp in religion by faith that which for the intellect of man must ever remain an unattained ideal.

The second way in which man deals with his world is to act. In knowledge he leaves the world alone, so to say, and lets it speak for itself; he merely tries to find out its meaning. In action he seeks to change it in ways of his own devising. He carries out purposes which are his own and the object of his desire; he transforms nature and human life to suit his own ends, and in so doing finds or

creates his Good. This he has to undertake because he is a living agent competing, co-operating, and struggling to subsist amongst an indefinite variety of beings which are not, to begin with, in harmony with himself, and some of which threaten his very existence. But the life of action can never be finished; it is endless. There always remains something to be done. Each hour, as we say, has its duty. The number of beings or things which man has to control, or bring into harmony with his needs, cannot be exhausted. Each new situation calls for new effort. Indeed, the very fulfilment of one end immediately gives rise to other occasions for renewed activity. This is not merely because seasons change, and generations of men come and go, creating new demands and bringing new claims to be met. Men are not even satisfied with the attainment of their own ends; their ends when attained begin to crumble. Even a whole civilisation itself is unstable, as we have been made painfully aware in recent years. There is therefore no rest to the human spirit along the channel of action. On the contrary, it would seem that by that way lies nothing but restlessness interrupted by stages of temporary accomplishment. We never attain a final end, an end beyond which desire cannot rise. By itself, the life of action can give no guarantee that even the best that we seek to realise will ever be reached. The good that we desire to bring about or attain gleams far ahead of us like an "untravelled country whose margin fades for ever and for ever as we move." If this were all that could be said of it, the pursuit of the good, which our hearts desire and our wills struggle to secure, would be nothing but protracted disappointment. Either, therefore, the good sought by action must lie entirely outside the religious life, for it cannot bring peace: or else the religious mind must adopt an attitude towards the good different from action, and capable of

giving us security in the pursuit of the good. The former alternative is impossible; for there is no escape from the life of action, and religion must lay its account with the restless process of action if stability of spirit is not to be completely overthrown. The second alternative therefore alone remains; and the attitude adopted by religion towards the ceaseless pursuit of the good, consists in regarding the good sought as secured through and guaranteed by the Divine Spirit, which communes with man's spirit and in that sense shares man's nature. Now, to consider that to be *sure* of attainment which can only be realised through a succession of acts stretching forward into an indefinite future, is precisely what constitutes Hope. The religious attitude of hope is thus at once a demand and an anticipation of the triumph of the good. Not that hope holds the good to be already or at any time completely attained. If that were so, there would be no further action required or possible. The triumph of the good means that no obstacles can, in the long run, frustrate the good, and that the succession of good acts forms a single plan of goodness ceaselessly unfolding. The good so far as attained is the partial ratification of a hope whose full realisation can never in the nature of the case be completely fulfilled by man. Hope thus gives the religious mind as a certainty what for action remains always an ideal: and in this certainty there is peace.

The third condition of the human mind is feeling or emotion. Of all the states of the mind this is the most constant and the most absorbing. Few individuals are capable of much thought; and still fewer of prolonged thought. Most individuals are disinclined for the continuous effort which all serious action entails. But all human beings can be captivated by emotion: and, as long as the emotions are sufficiently varied, we show little or no

desire to escape from them. Emotions fill the mood of the moment, and, while they last, seem the most real of all our experiences. They vary almost indefinitely in kind and intensity. The emotional response of man to his environment is as varied in character as the kinds of objects he meets; and the state of our emotions is, in consequence, constantly liable to alteration. Emotions seem almost at the mercy of beings outside; and yet, when emotions arise, they fuse the mind with its object in a manner which no other condition of the mind can do. We seem utterly unable to attribute part of our state to the thing outside and part to ourselves, so completely are the two blended in our state of emotion for the time being.[1]

If we were left to the mercy of the endless variety of things about us, our emotions would be a perpetual source of mental disquiet. With this, however, we can never be finally satisfied. And it can be overcome in only one way. We must adopt an attitude towards the outer world in which we are so blended with it at all points and on all occasions that we feel our complete kinship with it, and can never be disturbed by its strangeness or its overmastering power over us. Such an emotional attitude is impossible towards any particular object or class of objects. Constancy of emotional union is only possible towards an Object which is one and is constant throughout all stages of our contact with things, and yet which embraces and unites all things within Itself. Such a supreme Object of emotion is the Divine Spirit which animates all objects; and such complete emotional kinship with such a Reality, we, for lack of a better name, call Love. A constant state of this kind fulfils to the uttermost all that our emotional nature requires or can accomplish. It does not neces-

[1] For further discussion of this interesting subject reference may be made to the writer's *Studies in Human Nature*, chap. v.

sarily abolish all other emotions, though it certainly cancels some. It blends us completely with the enduring Reality of the world, and yet rises above the transitory things of the world. It secures peace, but peace at a higher level than even quietude and rest of soul : it secures peace which mounts to the level of joy. It is in this sense that love realises in the sphere of religion the fullest emotional state of the mind of man. It supplies the utmost feeling of which man is capable.

Moreover this state does not simply arise independently of ourselves. It may do so, as it does at rare moments in the experience of some : but when it does so arise, it seems to come by chance. It can, however, be sought, if once it has been felt at all. That is to say, we can seek it through our contact with the changing world of objects ; just as truth can be sought or goodness achieved. Not merely do we seek it ; we seek to lay hold of it, and to retain it and even to create it. This is possible, is indeed necessary, because the supreme love embraces within its sweep the whole variety of things and does not exclude any of them. This love, so we may put it, may be sought and found in, as well as through, the changing world of nature and human nature. The way in which it thus appears as, so to say, a mundane presence, is in the shape of Beauty. We may find beauty. We may also seek to create it for ourselves : and we feel that if we could have it to the utmost as our hearts desire, we should be satisfied. But this beauty which we so seek is realised only in finite ways and through finite forms. Beauty in or of the whole realm of things is never completely attained or attainable. It remains an ideal, guiding and controlling us in our attempts to find and to satisfy the supreme love of the Divine in the midst of finite objects. The love of the Divine, as poets and religious men have repeatedly said, makes and finds all

things lovely; and to find or make things lovely is to discover or create beauty. Not that the love of beauty is the same as the love of the Divine. Beauty is not Divinity: it is the expression of the Divine in finite things in such a way as to evoke that love whose supreme object is the Divine. Beauty in finite things is the most vivid way in which love of the Divine can be realised in detail through the world of men. Without this beauty, the love of the Divine would remain an abstraction of the barest kind. In a word, the love which is the attitude of emotional kinship with the Divine, carries with it and within it the love of all finite beings which the Divine animates and sustains. The discovery, the search for or the creation of beauty is the way in which this love finds satisfaction in relation to finite beings, which express the nature of the Divine.

The connexion of the love of the Divine and the love of finite beings is sometimes put in a narrow way. It is said that the love of the Divine must be shown in the love of man; and sometimes it is suggested that the love of man is the only form in which to express the love of the Divine. That the love of the Divine carries with it the love of man is certainly an important truth. Taken, however, as the whole truth or the only way in which the love of the Divine is manifested in relation to finite beings, it is an exaggeration and is incomplete. The religious individual who, in professing to love the Divine, loves but his fellow-men and does not love all finite beings whatsoever,—the splendour of the firmament, the glory of the earth and sea, the inexhaustible insurgence of living forms, the flowers of the field, the beasts of the forest, the birds of the air,—such a religious mind has no full and real experience of the love of the Divine. Real love of the Divine is as all-compassing as sunlight, which does not suffuse the world for man's benefit alone, but awakens, stimulates and illumines

all earthly things. The love of the human may perhaps be regarded as the greatest expression of man's love of the Divine. It is certainly the most uncommon and the most difficult to retain, as every one painfully knows, and being the most difficult it is probably on that account the highest achievement of the love of finite things. But even so it is at best but one way in which that love of finite beings, which emanates from the love of the Divine, is felt and realised.

In these three ways, then, the religious mind, through the attitudes of faith, hope and love, at once utilises and transcends, for the purposes of communion with the Divine, the three primary channels along which man becomes conscious of the world about him. These conditions of the religious life are thus rooted in human nature; and are adequate to cope with its restless activity and to secure in all circumstances and at all times that peace of spirit which is the purpose of the religious life. We have seen too how, from a different point of view, these forms of communion meet the requirements of the spirit when its peace is challenged by the unhalting sequence of temporal changes which make up this changing world. Beyond these modes of communion the religious mind needs nothing: with these it is satisfied for time and for eternity.

III.

It remains to make a few further observations by way of conclusion.

In order to cultivate the religious life there is one way, and only one way, for each individual: he must directly and constantly hold communion with the Divine. All men do so in various ways and in varying degrees of success through the forms of faith in the Divine, hope in the Divine, and love of the Divine. There are of course dif-

ferent aids to the cultivation of these. The procedure of religious instruction, the ritual and ceremonies of churches and of temples, have been designed to help individuals to maintain the religious life. But at best these are aids and supports to what must in the first place and in the last place be a direct and distinctive experience of the individual soul. No one can have his religious experience by proxy; and no one can impart it as a gift. It is a way of life; and the spring of life is from within.

The only knowledge of the Divine which has significance for religion comes through these channels. The practice of the presence of the Divine Spirit in human life precedes all reliable knowledge of the Divine nature. Hence the difference between faith in the Divine and the acceptance of or "belief" in creeds and doctrinal formulæ. The latter are necessarily posterior, both in experience and value, to the primary attitude of communion by faith. Every religious mind must admit the truth of the statement "if any man will do the Divine will he shall know of the doctrine." We do not first arrive at the nature of the Divine by a process of reasoning and then proceed to commune with the Divine. If we had to wait for the results of knowledge before exercising faith, hope and love, religion would never begin, and perhaps would be altogether impossible as an experience. Men sometimes speak as if it were a misfortune that the Divine cannot be brought within the province of scientific knowledge. Such a complaint is due partly to a misunderstanding, partly to a prejudice, an exaggeration of the claims of the mere intellect. Were the Divine known in the sense required by science, we should be able to calculate its movements, define its actions, lay our account with it or even manage it for our ends. But thereby the Divine would have ceased to be within us; it would be entirely outside us, and communion would be

impossible. Those who would commune with the Divine must do so by the way of life: and life is a risk and a venture. Only those find out what its potencies are who take the risk, and who venture their all for what seems most worth while. Such individuals cannot possibly fail; for even if they do not gain all they expect, they gain more by venturing their utmost than by leaving their resources unused; while if they do succeed in the venture, their souls possess the universe.

We should observe, again, that while these three forms of the religious life are all essential, they are not all on the same level. Every one of genuine religious experience is aware that while faith is essentially important for religious life, for without faith it is impossible to commune with the Divine, yet faith does not achieve such complete union with the Divine as love nor even such complete union as hope. For example, faith always implies a struggle with finite obstacles; it is at war with dangers and difficulties and discords that have arisen in the realm of finite experience. Love has no enemies at all in the sphere of finite experience; it is at one with the Divine in all things. And again, because faith implies a struggle, faith may fail under the shock of disaster or adversity. But love never fails and cannot fail, since in Love nothing separates the soul from the Divine. A religious life limited to faith alone will always be found to be narrow and hard, and often sombre to the extent of gloom. Hence it is that religious men are more often separated and divided from one another by their faith. The faiths of the world are as various as the sects, and these are endless. There are said to be, for example, 140 in our own country. But the love of the Divine does not and cannot divide men so.

Similarly faith is possible without any decisive attitude towards the future such as hope expresses. But hope im-

plies faith and is something more than faith. Hope is a distincive attitude towards life resting on and assuming the past which, as we have seen, calls for faith; but it goes further and creates a cheerful conviction regarding the future which for faith is devoid of certainty. Hope awakens definite possibilities for life, which are closed to the eye of faith; it stimulates the imagination, gives an access of strength to the spirit, and is the source of further growth and expectation of well-being. Hence we are told by the poet, when describing an old man rendered cheerful by hope, "to reverence the hope whose vital anxiousness lends the last human interest to his heart." Hope is thus greater than faith because it subsumes faith and does more for the spirit.

In another way, too, hope is at a higher level than faith. Hope in the sphere of religion is not restricted to any definite period of time in the future. It is certain of all the endless future and claims a share in the complete fulfilment of the plan of goodness. Hope unqualified by a definite period of time thus lays claim to the immortality of the spirit; and only hope in the religious sense can do so. Knowledge is unable to demonstrate immortality. The arguments for and against immortality are so evenly balanced that on the basis of knowledge alone it is not possible to come to a decision on the matter. But where knowledge fails, hope succeeds, and succeeds by maintaining that the spirit has an unquestioning hold over all the possible changes in the future, even though the change is the supreme change of state which men call death. Where knowledge is so indecisive in its reasoning, hope is entitled to decide; and knowledge cannot gainsay its decision. Even faith cannot achieve as much as this. Faith would be quite a consistent attitude without any reference to the immortality of the spirit. The language of faith is that of

Job, "though he destroy me yet will I trust him." It is an interesting confirmation of this to note that the earlier religion of the Hebrews,—which was primarily a religion of faith, and remained strongly attached to this fundamental but elementary level of the religious life,—is curiously silent regarding the immortality of the spirit, and seems indeed in certain passages to deny it altogether. Only when religious life rises higher than that of faith and expressly adopts the attitude of hope, do we find great importance and great insistence laid upon the assurance of individual immortality. That is highly significant and remarkable.

But again, love is higher than hope. For love is that form of communion with the Divine which does not seem to call for any reference beyond the glowing joy in the immediate presence of the Divine. It takes immortality for granted; for to share the very life of God is to be here and now immortal. It is the consciousness of eternal life permeating the life in time. In Spinoza's language, the individual's complete love of the Divine is the love of the Divine for Itself; and beyond that there is nothing required or to be asked.

At the same time we observe that these attitudes of the religious life meet different occasions and are called for by different exigencies of life. Hence it is natural that one should be emphasised at one time, another at another; and that one should be emphasised by one individual or people almost to the exclusion of the other attitudes. Sometimes life calls for the exercise of faith when everything else seems to fail. Sometimes, as the poet says, hope is "the paramount duty which heaven lays for his own honour on man's suffering heart." At other times love assumes its all-encompassing sway over the spirit; and for this experience some individuals have a greater aptitude than others. Very few achieve it frequently; and very rarely in human life do we ever find any individual in whom

it is the dominant form of his religious life. The highest experiences are the rarest; and while nearly all men are capable of exercising faith and many of sustaining hope, only a few seem able to rise to the religious level of love. Many human beings are doubtless capable of constant kindness to their fellows, and delight in deeds of beneficence; but this is very different from the love of the Divine and must not be confounded with it.

If we ask how these forms of religion are to be cultivated, there is only one reply: by practice on the one hand, and by companionship with those who have attained and seek to attain what religion can accomplish. Fortunately the literature of religion is rich in possessing the written experiences of the great masters of the religious life. Apart from many of the psalms and the gospel narratives, the religious mind can find the best of what it seeks for its enlightenment in the spiritual communications of Thomas à Kempis or Fénelon in the west, and in the light shed by that bright particular star who still illumines the east—Rhabindranath Tagore.

It seems of paramount importance to emphasise this threefold form of religious experience at this time of terrible perplexity and confusion in the spiritual life of humanity. These forms of communion involve no specific creed; and the religious life cannot wait till creeds are found and framed. They are independent of the obscure and esoteric arguments of theologians and philosophers. They do not await either confirmation or correction from the paralysing uncertainties of historical criticism. They are the forms of the highest religious experience we know. They are natural as human life itself; and they satisfy the irreducible as well as the supreme needs of the human spirit in its perennial communion with the Divine.

J. B. Baillie.

DILEMMA AND THE GOSPELS.

THE New Testament, and in particular that part of it which goes under the special name of Gospel, is a gem with many facets, capable of illumination from many quarters. No one can predict the direction in which the next ray may come to provoke the next sparkle in the jewel. Philology will make it shine, but so will topography. Even a table of elevations on a map of Palestine will become oracular in the hands of G. Adam Smith. So would a table of rainfall. So would any form of human knowledge. Even the tabulation of inaccurate human knowledge, such as we call folk-lore, will often make a better commentary than Westcott on St. John, at least in this sense, that it will give colour to a narrative such as the most subtle of grammarians cannot impart.

Indeed, it is precisely colour that one misses most often in the interpretation of the records ; such notable books as Dr. Glover's *Jesus of History* or Mr. Findlay's *Jesus as they saw Him* are weak at this very point ; they lack the local colour which a pilgrimage or a prolonged residence helps us to catch, and they come short of the humanising element which a knowledge of Oriental folk-lore would often supply. They are still too much of the West and of the twentieth century. Most of us feel that if we could really carry back our portraits of Christ into the first century, the disciples would not recognise Him. They might even ask whether it was Dionysos !

Our efforts to get behind certain strata of knowledge and belief into an earlier stratum often involve us in loss as well as gain ; we put the Synoptics side by side and we find out that Matthew and Luke have both been modifying the language of Mark, that they have given new turns to speech,

and new meanings to situations ; when we have made the necessary discount, it is true that the Markan values have risen in the historical market, but the explorer is checked in his zeal by the thought that, if Matthew and Luke can be proved to have modified and corrected Mark, there is the probability that Mark also may have manipulated his sources, even if we put his ear quite close to the voice of St. Peter. Certainly if he writes twenty-five years after the events, the speculation of an earlier stratum of tradition cannot be illicit.

Let us then say that there must be directions in which we can dig down to an earlier tradition of the Christ than is actually current in the Church. For even if Mark should turn out to be exact as a historian, he must be inexact if he is found to be abbreviated. Arguments that are too rapidly summed up miss the real points at issue ; incidents that are too rapidly photographed will be lacking both in light and shade. The cartoon cannot rank with the painting, if the painting can be found, for in this case the painting preceded the cartoon, a point which does not seem to have presented itself to Dr. Horton, when he wrote what he called *The Cartoons of Mark*. There is one direction which has recently had a ray of light running swiftly along it, the enquiry as to whether Jesus was what we call an anti-Judaist, bent on the abolition of the ancient religion, as well as on its revaluation—one that would nullify Sabbaths, take no part in sacrifices, and do away with the initiatory rites that have come down through the ages. Our gospels speak ambiguously on such points ; they tell us that He was for the law and against the law ; that He said it was unalterable, and was occupied in altering it, right and left, night and day ; that He denounced the people that He preached to, but no ! they say, it was only the Pharisees and their scribal lackeys, and so on. This ambiguity may be historical—in which

case we shall have an *interim* Jesus as well as an *interim* ethic, but, on the other hand, it may be the result of writing history out of the focus of immediate contact with the events. The interpretation may be ambiguous but not the facts.

The question has been brought up by the discovery that amongst the documents of the Apostolic time, there was a collection of Old Testament passages, which ranked for oracles, grouped and graded and annotated, so as to constitute the first Christian *Vade Mecum* of theology, almost before the time when Christian was the mark of a distinct species. It is this *Testimony Book* which has raised for us the question of the anti-Judaism of Jesus ; for in the first place the little book in question is definitely anti-Judaic, and has for its earliest title, perhaps, the name of *Testimonies against the Jews*, and in the next place, quite a number of the *Testimonies* in question can be traced to the lips of our Lord Himself, so that what was anti-Judaism in them becomes anti-Judaism in Him ; in which case we must not any longer slur over those passages in the Gospels which have an anti-Judaic trend. On the contrary we must accentuate them. When we do so, we get new light, not only on the Gospel, but on its central figure ; we can say He thought this, He taught that.

Now these considerations will apply in a peculiar degree to the debates in the Gospel between our Lord and the Rabbis. If we are sure of His anti-Sabbatism (and the existing records make it highly probable that He was anti-Sabbatic), then we can infer that some at least of the anti-Sabbatical arguments of His first disciples will be directly traceable to His own teaching.

We shall also get fresh light on the manner of His debates with the representatives of Judaism. Here is a single characteristic which has never been adequately appreciated.

Both Jesus and His adversaries employ the method of *Dilemma* ; they lay traps for Him, and He invites them to walk into snares which He sets for them. Sometimes they see the snare and slink off ; and sometimes He walks up to the trap and releases it. Perhaps He leaves another trap in its place. The public look on and laugh. They " hear Him gladly," to put it moderately. It is all thoroughly Oriental, for when one talks religion in the East, either then, or now, one does not employ bated breath or affect an undue solemnity. They try and fool Him with tribute money, and He asks them what is the official view of the Ministry of John the Baptist. Such discussions are charged with a sense of reality. Paley's *Evidences* cannot equal them. The humorous element in them is a guarantee of their originality.

Let us now take one of such dilemma stories and examine it more closely ; it shall be one of the more serious of such incidents, as being the background of a miracle, but we think the careful Gospel readers will not miss the sense of gratified humour resulting from the reading.

In Mark iii. 4 we have, at the beginning of our Lord's Ministry, an anti-Sabbatic struggle with the Jewish leaders ; a poor creature who is, for practical purposes, minus a hand, is the immediate occasion of the debate ; he has brought his useless hand with him to meeting on the Sabbath day. Jesus has, by His very goodness, by His " pity joined with power," walked into the trap. If He heals the man, He breaks the Sabbath, which even the *hakim* or wise man must keep ; if He refuses to heal, what becomes of His anti-Sabbatism, and of His healing all that come to Him in faith ? The Gospel relates how the implied dilemma is retorted upon the critics. They are openly challenged to say whether it is correct to kill or to make alive on the Sabbath. There is a thinly-covered dilemma : the Pharisees

walk out of the trap by going out of the meeting! Still, it is not quite clear where the trap lies. Might they not have said, "One must neither kill nor make alive on the Sabbath day"? The fact is the incident is abbreviated, as we suggested above. More than that, it has been obscured, for both Matthew and Luke, in dealing with the Markan incident, miss the point; Luke will write "destroy" for "kill" and Matthew will drop it altogether. We shall see presently that it is the key-word for the understanding of the incident.

In order to get the situation into focus, we must notice in the first place that the miracle in question follows closely on the anti-Sabbatic story of the way the disciples broke the Sabbath by plucking ears of corn; it is one of a series of anti-Sabbatisms. All these anti-Sabbath arguments constitute a series. In the next place, if we are to understand the position, we ourselves must become anti-Sabbatic, and the way to do this is to read the *Testimonies* against the Sabbath in the early Christian writers. We shall soon find out what was in Jesus' mind when He asked the question in the synagogue: the disciples understood what was involved, though we shall probably miss it at first. The point is this: the Pharisees were already committed to the belief that it was lawful to kill on the Sabbath day; first by the fact that Joshua captured Jericho on that day; second by the fact that the Maccabees turned back their enemies on that day. If, then, they deny that this was a right proceeding, they have the nationalist sentiment against them; if they allow that it is right to kill on the Sabbath day, at least for soldiers, the answer is, "then one may kill on the Sabbath, but not save life."

I have in my possession a copy of Dean Burgon's *Plain Commentary on the Gospels*, interleaved by his own hand,

apparently for a second edition. As he comes very near to the inwardness of our Lord's enquiry, and to the discovery of what led up to His question, I will transcribe some sentences. "Our Lord asks them, Is it lawful on the Sabbath . . . to kill? He suggests this alternative, doubtless not without reference to a question which had been by their doctors resolved in the affirmative, by inference from the act of the host which (under Joshua) massacred the inhabitants of Jericho on 'the seventh day.' But the gist of the Divine Speaker has yet to be explained." What Burgon desired in the shape of a further elucidation of our Lord's meaning, is supplied by the *Testimony Book*; he himself suggests a reference to Tertullian, *adv. Judaeos*, c. iv., which is the primitive argument for the Sabbath breakings of Joshua and the Maccabees. The quotations are certainly primitive. For Joshua's doings, we are reminded in Hebrews xi., that the walls of Jericho fell after they had been besieged *for seven days*; the readers knew what that meant. It was a reminder that the Jews knew that certain forms of Sabbath breaking were lawful. An actual summary of such lawful unlawfulnesses is given in a fragment of Victorinus which appears to be a translation of Papias' Comments on the *Book of Testimonies*. Victorinus tells us that the Maccabees were sought to be captured by their enemies on the Sabbath, and that by the very stringency of the Sabbath law, they were forced to evade its severity. Joshua, too, broke the Sabbath law when he sent his trumpeters round the walls of Jericho. We get from the same source another favourite anti-Sabbatism, the case of the child which is circumcised on the eighth day, whether it be on a Sabbath or not; a reference to the Johannine parallel (vii. 22) will show Jesus employing again the method of dilemma, or something very like it; it is asked if a trifling surgical operation is allowable

on the Sabbath, and if it can be accounted unlawful that one should be—

> "Claimed and completed
> And in Christ a man,"

made "every whit whole" on the Sabbath day.

So much is clear from the foregoing that there has been a systematic collection of broken Sabbath laws. Occasionally the point is obscured, as by Mark, in the story of David and Abiathar. Here it is probable that the appeal for the sacred bread, just removed from the table or just placed on it, was made on the Sabbath. It was a point to make that David broke the law as well as Moses. The debaters used to go on and argue that the sun and moon and stars broke the law, by not resting on the Sabbath, a point on which we have written elsewhere.[1]

Let us pass on to another famous dilemma, the one which the Pharisees prepared for Jesus on the question of the payment of the tribute. If He replies that the tribute is to be paid to Cæsar, His own followers, who are Zealots *in esse* or *in posse*, and in any case are ardent nationalists, will disown Him; if He suggests the contrary, His words will be reported to the local Roman authorities. The exact meaning of Jesus' reply ("Show me a penny") has never been clear. Where does God come in? for it is not a question of the temple tax, which Cæsar is taking from God. Apparently, Jesus' reply has been misunderstood. He never replied at all. They offered Him a dilemma, and He refused to be impaled on either horn of it. If we might be allowed to employ conjecture and go behind St. Mark's narrative, on the ground that it has been abbreviated from some longer recitation, we should suggest some such explanation as the following. Jesus asks for a coin: it has on one side of it the reigning emperor, on the other one of the Roman deities,

[1] *Odes of Solomon*, ii. 388.

or a symbol of a divinity. Cæsar and God appear as obverse and reverse. Then *two* questions will follow. Whose image is that? Cæsar's. And whose is this? God's (*or* a god's). Then in that case, Cæsar and God can settle the ownership of the coin between them. The trap was sprung, but it did not catch the game. The story almost necessitates a divine image on the coin with the imperial, if the ownership of the coin was to be challenged or evaded.

It should not be overlooked that there is one particular dilemma in the Gospels which has, perhaps from the earliest times, acquired theological value. We refer to the case where Jesus questions the scribes with reference to the Sonship of the Messiah to David. The scribes, who do not see what is coming, respond readily enough that the Messiah is *Ben David*. How can that be? says Jesus, if David calls him Lord? As we have said, this is a dilemma that has theology written across it. The scribes must either revoke their theory of the Davidic descent of the Messiah (in which case they will have Isaiah frowning upon them, with his rod out of the stem of Jesse, and his branch out of his roots), or else they will have to recognise, as Jesus suggests to them, that Sonship and Lordship may co-exist. I do not spend time in discussing whether this Psalm is rightly referred to David as author; what we are concerned with is the crystallisation of popular theology; there can be no doubt that the 110th Psalm, as popularly understood, has been a potent factor in Christology; it was used to confirm the belief in the Davidic ancestry of Jesus, and in His Messianic authority; and it was made the corner stone in the proof of the doctrine of the Session at the Right Hand of the Father. "Sit on my right hand," etc. Let any one examine the traces of this Psalm in the New Testament, and it will be seen that St. Paul, and the epistle to the Hebrews, are building on this passage. Look at the fifteenth of First Corinthians, with

its reference to the putting of all enemies under the foot of the Messiah, or at the first chapter of Hebrews, where the Psalm is argued from and actually quoted; and you will have to admit the theological dilemma which we were studying. In the supplement to Mark, the credal value is already reached: "He ascended into Heaven and sat at the right hand of God." In the history of doctrine it is not possible to exclude the 110th Psalm from the authorities that are initially quoted for the establishment of belief. And in certain cases we may be reasonably certain that the passages from the Old Testament, which constituted the first Christian armament and artillery, were, to some extent, due to Jesus Himself, not only after His resurrection, as Luke suggests, but even before His passion. It was not the disciples, not even the spirit-filled disciples of Pentecost, who invented the identification of Jesus with the stone that was set at naught of the builders. The value of these considerations will be evident to any thoughtful student of the origins of Christianity.

Returning to the study of dilemma as a popular form of debate between our Lord and His critics and opponents, we have suggested that the instances which we have collected form a chapter in the Christian Evidences. It will be remembered that Schmiedel was misunderstood and attacked for selecting from the Gospels a number of passages, which could not, by any process of manipulation, be made out to be the work of a later age: passages lacking in full theological colour, with regard to the Person or Authority of our Lord, were treated by Schmiedel as primary. He was really trying after evidential value in passages that could not be contradicted, and people did not at first see what he was aiming at. It is something like that with the subject of Dilemma in the Gospels. It discloses itself as primitive matter, and the more certainly as the dilemma is humorous,

as well as popular. We shall find it much easier to believe that our Lord actually healed on the Sabbath a man with a withered hand (not that such a proceeding should cause any serious difficulty), when we have detected the real question at issue between the opposite parties, and watched them manipulating a popular method of debate, in such a way as to make it certain that the debate itself is historical, even if only reported in epitome. May we not expect, after a while at least, to find Historical fitness in the Healing as well as in the successful debate, to recognise the Great Wisdom in the one, and the Great Power in the other, after which the Great Love which goes with the Great Wisdom and the Great Power will not long remain undisclosed; we shall be saying to ourselves that He was

"Full of Pity joined with Power."

RENDEL HARRIS.

A STUDY OF ST. PAUL.

(EPISTLE TO PHILIPPIANS III. 5–18.)

A MAN must be either very conceited or else very humble, who says, as St. Paul says, "Brethren, unite in copying my example." He must either have a very high idea of his own powers, his own infallibility, his own attainments, and be very blind to the excellence of other ways of living than his own, or else he must be so utterly humble, so transcendently lowly that he feels that there is little question of conceit or humility in the matter—he is merged, he is absorbed, he is lost in a great stream of purpose, his whole being is swallowed up in great laws and forces that possess him—he is no longer himself, but Another lives in him. It is no matter of boasting, the standard and the impetus of life both alike are from that Other, and so with the

profoundest self-abasement he says—"Copy my example."

St. Paul has been through that disappointing search for religious satisfaction in external obedience, the minutely careful treading of the narrow path of legalism; he has felt the kindling fire of the persecutor in his heart in defence of the Law's majesty—he has tasted of all its fruits up to disillusionment complete and sincere. The Law is now to him but a shadow, a transitory page in history, the zeal it kindled is a life-long shame in his memory, the righteousness it could give is but refuse in comparison with something else—something so grand and all-satisfying that everything he could do, or try, or pride himself on must in contrast with it be put on the "loss" side and no longer on the credit side of the ledger.

He had been through it all, the search that is all-important for any serious man. The machine for attaining rightness with God had been skilfully fashioned: there seemed no possible mistake in its mechanism. Tradition, personal vanity, the precision and exactitude that correspond with much else to the elemental foundations of human nature—they were all in the machine. And suddenly it had stopped. In the twinkling of an eye it had run down. It had all become as nothing—righteousness, standard, precision, privilege, vanity, zeal, tradition. In its place was a humbled man taking righteousness from God, not claiming it, a lowly scholar in a new and despised school, hoping—O wonderful contrast to all that went before!—to get to know Christ and the power of His resurrection and the fellowship of His sufferings more perfectly—hoping that if he grew like Christ in His death he might attain to the resurrection from the dead. One who after years of unexampled loyalty to the Vision seen on the Damascus Road, still hesitated amid his memories of witness, imprisonment, scourging, buffets and labours—to say more than that he was just

"pressing on" in the hope of laying hold of the reality, for the obtaining of which Christ Jesus had laid hold of him. Here was no standard measured out in feet and inches, no set of rules and precise formulæ of life, but a Vision infinite in its height and beauty, dazzling in its glory, overwhelming in its vast claim and prophecy; here was something lying before St. Paul that he could not outline in words, save that it was to know Christ, and the purpose which He had in calling him, a purpose that lay still indistinct in the future, but revealed itself more and more, better and better, in the steps that led up to it, in each of which there was as it were a participation in the glory of the final purpose.

But all the way—self-abasement and self-distrust. The course that has been run so far and so bravely is no attainment, it is not worth a prize, it had better be forgotten. "Forgetting those things that are behind, I press towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."

Such is the view of life that St. Paul recommends. It is one that it is difficult for us to hold to with consistency. We love the pleasures of memory, and it is common experience that past attainments have a tendency to grow, and past failures to shrink as we look back upon them. And the present—it is so sure and fast a foothold for the moment—must we disregard it and not stay for self-congratulation, but still haste on to a prize that ever lies beyond? And "the fellowship of suffering": growing like Christ in His Death! Is there not a secret cry in us that we would receive the boon without sharing the likeness, or grasp it as something magical that should descend and transform us without the bitterness of conflict and the pain? And "the righteousness which is of God by faith"—is it quite the status that we want in God's sight, to have something showered upon us in utter disregard of our own

earning, something from God and not from ourselves, something at first only in ourselves as a possibility and then transformed into reality as we live believing it? Would we not rather have some comfortable attainments of our own, duly recognised and entered to our account in God's book, something we could add to day by day, little by little, and at last, when our turn comes to leave the scene, carry with us in modest triumph into God's nearer presence?

These are hard truths St. Paul treats of here; these practical rather than doctrinal things—they are the truths that make the real distinction between Christianity and heathenism. Alas! we have much heathenism still in our Christianity! We must then, in so far as our Christianity is mature, take a certain view of life directly opposed to the heathen view. Its root-conceptions lie bare before us in the soul of St. Paul as he reveals himself in this passage. They seem briefly to be these: (1) A radically new standard of value in human character and attainment. (2) A shifting of attention from the past and the present to something only partially imagined, yet to come. (3) The direct connexion of that future with the present and the past, bound to them as it will be by one divine stream of purpose, so that "we must order our lives by the standard we have already reached."

1. The standard of value is simply Christ's development of Himself in us. That is all we are worth in the sight of God. All our worth, all our value, or "*rightness*" is simply Christ. First, faith sincerely and humbly takes it as true that we, each in our several littleness, are indeed "laid hold" of by Christ in God's sight. Then obedience, experience, work, life build strong foundations on the assumption. Their stability is the proof of what was assumed; so life and experience are the test of God's original gift of grace; and the standard from step to step

is simply agreement with the pattern of Christ. In its development the human self contributes, but directly that human self begins to claim any value beyond that of being the lowly medium of the showing forth of the Divine Life its value is cancelled. For all "rightness" is simply the goodness of Christ in which we envelop ourselves. Let us not shrink from the thought. It does not mean that individuality will have no value. Christ, the Word of God, includes all individuals, and all individuals come to their best only in Him. Each human excellence must have its root and flower alike in Him, and in Him its eternal preservation.

2. And next, Christians must not look back, but only forward. Our point of view is changed. Life is no static thing that rests and counts its gain. It is a great rushing force pressing onward ever, and its stages in themselves are only good as stages towards the end. So the sculptor thinks not of each day's achievement as a thing to be dwelt on. The perfect statue, the thing aimed at, is the only thing he cares to think about, and how each day's work tends to the ideal.

3. So we are led to the last conception. There is a great Ideal, and it surpasses all possible approaches to it in value, it makes good all mistakes, it crowns all glories; yet, since it is the final and complete flower of one eternal purpose, each earnest moment of life as it passes has its worth in relation to it: life is one continuous whole: it is uniform, it is of a piece: what we have done in Christ is the earnest of what we shall do better in Christ, and that again will be the anticipation of something better done and more supremely felt beyond. "We must order our lives by the standard we have already reached." We must not expect miraculous leaps, only continuous progression. Nothing in the soul any more than in nature stands inde-

pendent of its antecedent and its consequent. Towards the goal we must all press, "our limbs well knit, and all our bodies light"; but the track we race on is the track we have ever raced on. We must trust what has been developed in us, we must build on it, we must make use of it, and not falsely think that at the end some great magical change will beat down all the long and patient development and substitute a new thing in its place. The finished thing will have in it hidden each forward step. It will be the last glorious term of a uniformly rising series.

But lastly: what can we contribute ourselves? It is surely no automatic unfolding of a divine life, this religion in the soul. No! The purpose is above and beyond our conception—the call august and high; but for success the whole human will, thought and desire must be involved. That pressing to the mark, that straining every nerve, that hope to lay hold, that aim to know Christ, that mingling of doubt and certainty which sends St. Paul forward—that is the will of St. Paul grasping its own responsibility for itself, humble in its inclusion in Christ, yet aware that even in Christ it is possible for it to strain onward or stand still. The motive force of human nature, the primal energy that God has allowed to become self-conscious, personal, in it—that will-power becomes most really itself in striving more completely to submit itself to the Divine Will, more really to model itself on God's pattern.

So we who grasp Christ first as "our righteousness" (the basis of our "rightness") must step by step strive to make Him actual in our lives, never thinking we have attained or are already perfect even in Him, but forgetting success and failure alike, strain on and press forward "to gain at last the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." The prize of no self-won victory, but the crown

of ever more complete submission to the great purpose which claims for its own complete triumph the utmost, intensest and most earnest fervour of each created will.

W. J. Ferrar.

THE PREACHING OF CHRYSOSTOM.

Antioch in Syria is one of the ancient Christian cities strangely neglected by the Church of to-day. Its strongly entrenched position, its large and cosmopolitan population, its busy commercial life, and its importance as the gateway of the West into Asia, made it the covetous desire of the contending powers of the time. Its abiding claim to remembrance is that it was the cradle of Gentile Christianity. By whom the first little band of believers was gathered together we do not know. No apostle laid his hands on these evangelists, but there, most significantly the name Christian was first fastened on the believers. Among its teachers there were some of the most revered names of the New Testament, and from that Christian community there went forth first two missionaries into the regions beyond. St. Luke is believed by some to have been a native of Antioch, and there St. Simeon Stylites kept his stern vigil on his isolating pillar, and young Chrysostom, in his boyhood, may have looked up in wonder and admiration at the lonely ascetic.

In this Antioch, John, so well known by his descriptive name of Chrysostom, the golden-mouthed, was born in 347. His mother, Anthusa, worthy to be named with Monica the mother of Augustine, and Nonna the mother of Gregory Nazianzen, widowed in her twentieth year, devoted her life to the training of her boy. As he approached manhood he resolved to study law under Libanius, the notable teacher of rhetoric at the time, but in his twenty-third year he

passed through a decisive spiritual change, was baptized, and became a public reader of the scripture. With a characteristic impulsiveness, confirmed by a strange shrinking from the work of the active ministry, he joined a company of monks, allured by the devotion and discipline of the cloister. His defence of his persistent disinclination to become a preacher is somewhat questionable, yet the fact of his shrinking from its strain is significant. In 381, in his thirty-fourth year, he became assured that the monastic life was not the highest, or the purest, or the bravest, and he confessed that in his choice of it he had been motived by self-will. He was ordained as deacon and presbyter, and for seventeen years fulfilled an impassioned ministry in Antioch. His insight into Christian truth, his devotion and his courage, as much as his eloquence, made him the foremost man of his time. He was induced, almost compelled, to transfer his ministry to Constantinople. For six years he was the dominant moral force in that metropolis. But a man who fulfils this function will make himself enemies. His popularity rouses the depreciation, and even the slander, of his fellows. The scourge of the prophet does not win his favour with those who feel its lash. Luxury and licentiousness abounded. The city was full of profiteers on the one hand, and of an idle pleasure-loving populace on the other. The life of the court he declared could be paralleled by that of Herod and Herodias. Around him there were corrupt and corrupting priests. While the people gave him a constant reverence, his enemies sat in the seat of power. He was banished from the city, but the people compelled the authorities to bring him back. He was banished a second time, again on a false charge, to a far-distant village in the bleak and inhospitable region east of the Euxine, and there, in his sixtieth year, he died.

There is no contemporary biography of Chrysostom.

But in that there is no great loss. Contemporary biography is too often a compound of greasy adulation, and sometimes an envious and cynical exposure. But he has revealed himself. In his letters, of which 240 are extant, in his commentaries and homilies, in his controversies—and few things are more revealing of a man's mind and temper than his conduct in a controversy—and in his memorable sayings, he discloses his inner spirit. In *The Priesthood*, which is really a homiletic treatise, but might be called the Confessions of Chrysostom, we find his face looking out upon us from every page. We may think of him as a swarthy Syrian, athletic in build, with dark flashing eyes, and a power of dramatic gesture. We know that he was endowed with a voice of singular strength and melody, whose tones were heard with perfect ease by all who sat under the vast dome of St. Sophia. He was a man of that rare combination of the sanguine-choleric temperament. He was sensitive, emotional, impulsive, and, like all such men, frank and sunny, with a quick understanding of the mind and mood of those he addressed. Yet he was also intense, quickly kindled, and strangely unbending in his attitude, and always fierce in his moral anger. He was a master both of the word of moving appeal and of the word that smites without mercy. Every reader of his homilies understands why he was adored for his eloquence. Luther has said that it was "gilded" rather than golden. But mere tinsel could not have held men's minds for a quarter of a century. Newman is a finer and juster judge, when he declares, "Its highest quality lay in its unaffectedness. His unrivalled charm, as that of every really eloquent man, lay in his singleness of purpose, his fixed grasp of his aim, his noble earnestness." We understand why Newman, with some daring, confesses his indifference to many of the saints of the Roman calendar, and declares that of all the

great spirits of the early centuries, the man he most desired to have known was Chrysostom.

What was this man in his essential power? He was a preacher, and a preacher to his times. As we look at him steadfastly we can discern the features of every preacher to his times. To begin with, he was a preacher with a distinctive and intense message. He was not a theologian, but he had a theology. There are to-day, as there always have been, cheap talkers who scoff at theology, and can be found advising young preachers to turn their backs on theology. As a rule these men never had any theology to turn their backs upon, and their failure in the ministry, from which they are eager to escape, is largely due to this pitiable shallowness. All the great preachers have been men with a message, which was the clear, convincing and convicting proclamation of the supreme Christian truths in the language of their own time. At the head of that great succession there stands Paul, and Paul was both master of doctrine, and model of preacher to Chrysostom. "How comes it," he asks, "that throughout the whole world Paul's name is much on every one's lips? How comes it that not merely among ourselves, but also among Jews and Greeks, he is admired beyond all men? Is it not because of this excellence of his epistles? For by this, not only among the faithful of his day, but among all those who should believe until the coming of Christ, he has been and he will be a source of profit, and will never cease to be, so long as the human race remains. His writings fortify the Churches like a wall of adamant; and like some noble champion he stands even now in the midst, leading captive every thought unto the obedience of Christ, and casting down reasonings, and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God. This he does by those wonderful epistles so full of divine wisdom."

The theology of Chrysostom was that now known as Antiochene. It was distinguished from Alexandrine in this, that it was practical rather than speculative. The testing doctrine of the time, and perhaps of all time, was the Person of Christ. Chrysostom laid stress upon the real humanity of the Lord. He may be said to have held the Kenotic theory of Christ's humiliation in his insistence that Christ was tempted in all points like as we are, because of His richly-veined humanity. To this he was led partly by a reaction against those who proclaimed a doctrine of the Deity of Christ which bleaches Him of his real humanity. Yet on the other hand he was quick to denounce "the wild teaching of Valentinus and Marcion," and to speak of "the madness and distortion of Sabellius," and to deplore "the ravings of Arius" with an even stronger note of protest against "the heresy of Paul of Samosata." In a fine sentence which should never be forgotten he warns men against "falling away from the sound faith by departing from the golden mean in the doctrine of Christ the Lord."

But Chrysostom was not only a whole-hearted believer in Christ as the Son of Man and the Master of disciples. He was a mystic, and like all mystics he had an absorbing sense of the presence of the risen Lord, and of the power of that presence. That he discloses in his conception of the Lord's Supper, where he imports more than the Reformers would have sanctioned. He gives an account of its celebration which seems to show that he regarded the elements as more than symbols, or "creatures of bread and wine," as they are described in the Thirty-Nine Articles. Yet his language is no more than reminiscent of what has been heard, if it be not heard still, at a Scottish Highland Communion, when a preacher of a mystical mood, with a Celtic imagination, caught up into the third heaven of ecstasy, looks upon the bread and wine with a spell-bound awe, and

touches them with an adoring sense of the Real Presence of Christ in the sacrament. That attitude of mind to Christ led Chrysostom to lay stress upon the living personality of Christ and the all-compelling power of the Holy Spirit.

His theology determined his message, but its form was conditioned by his method. He was a master in the exposition of the Scriptures. He paid no deference to Rome, and did not acknowledge any pre-eminence on the part of the Roman bishop. When he refers to Peter he does not even name him, but quotes him "as another of the apostolic company." He sought authority for his message in what he significantly described as "the Word." There lay his power with the common people, and in maintaining that power he expounded almost the whole field of the Scriptures. A list of his writings would fill a page in the catalogue of a library. He was not a keen-eyed grammarian, and not always a careful exegete, but as to the broad truth, the moral purpose, and the spiritual dynamic of the Scriptures he was never uncertain and seldom astray. Some of his homilies show marks of haste, at which no one will wonder who realises the incessant strain of his ministry. Others have come down to us only through the scrolls of the shorthand reporters of the time. But in his more careful discourses, and especially in his commentaries on Genesis and the Psalms, in the Old Testament, and in Matthew, Romans, and the two epistles to Corinth, in the New, every preacher will find him illuminating and nobly human, and on some of those dull days, when nothing seems worth saying, quickening to both mind and heart. Such a master of the Scriptures cannot help preaching to his time.

As notable is the truth that he was a preacher of righteousness. Richard Baxter has suggested that there are three kinds of preachers. One is the apologetic preacher,

set for the defence of the Gospel. The other is the doctrinal preacher, undertaking the exposition of its ruling truths. The third is the evangelist who proclaims the Gospel call. He might have added a fourth and, perhaps unwittingly, drawn his own portrait. That fourth is the man who looks out upon his own time with keen insight and passionate desire, and proclaims the imperative of righteousness. That is where Chrysostom stands supreme. He was living in a time when the Christian faith was becoming dominant, but the Christian ethic had not secured men's devotion. The Gospel had not done much to purify the morals, or soften the manners, of the men of Antioch. Writing his homilies with his eyes looking out on the world around him, he drew a picture of the life of his time. Its fraudulent commerce; its love of pleasure in the gardens of Daphne, that suburb of Antioch where wealth was purveying an unblushing immorality; its engrossment in games until, as to-day, the news of the victors were chief items of intelligence; its luxury and greed and envy, and all the course and current of that fast and frivolous life which rouses the passions, are described in his rebukes and appeals. Take two selections from his arresting exhortations—one addressed to his fellow-ministers, the other to the youth whom he saw in the streets of Antioch. "The minister approaches God as if he were entrusted with the whole world, and were the father of all men, praying that wars everywhere may cease, that tumults may end, begging for peace and prosperity, and a speedy release from all ills, public or private, that threaten any man. He must, so far, surpass those for whom he intercedes in all qualities that are right. And when he invokes the Holy Spirit, and offers that awful sacrifice, and keeps on touching the common Master of us all, tell me, where shall we rank him? What purity and piety shall we demand of him? Consider how spotless

should those hands be that are charged with these matters, how holy the lips which pour forth these words! From whom shall we look for purer and holier soul than his who is to receive this great spirit?" His appeal to young men to keep themselves pure, is even more vivid and more direct. "He who has need and is subject to temptation which can defile him will fall, unless he use unceasing self-denial, and much vigilance to keep his soul unsullied by these forces. He finds enough to disturb his spirit—unless it be hardened against them by austere self-control—in beautiful faces, delicate movements, affected gait, voluptuous tones, pencilled eyebrows, painted cheeks, plaited tresses, dyed hair, costly raiment, ornaments of gold, rich stones, sweet-smelling perfumes, and all else that some womenkind study." There we have the preacher of righteousness, the Puritan before the word was coined.

Yet Chrysostom would not play the part of the politician or social reformer. It was not for want of courage to assume the rôle. He scourges the profligate court, the venal ministry, the pleasure-seeking nobility, the scheming of the ecclesiastic, and the hypocrisy of the monks. But no one can glean his political opinions, or declare to which faction he belonged. The distinctive proof of this is to be found in his twenty-one sermons on *The Statues* preached at the zenith of his power. A revolutionary mob, incensed at the taxation imposed on Antioch, broke out in violence. They wrecked a number of public buildings, assailed the memorials set up in honour of popular heroes, and, in one daring act of rebellion, threw down the statues of the emperor and the empress. Stern reprisals were ordered, and the citizens of Antioch trembled for fear of the penalty for the insurrection. Chrysostom assembled the people, preaching every day for three weeks and proclaimed where the path of a patient and unfaltering righteousness lay. He

refused to take a side or become a partisan, but he brought in a new mind among the people, called the most ruthless and reckless to a repentance for the wrong, and averted the wrath of the authorities. That is the message and the manner of preaching it which are never out of date. The preacher's function, from his vantage ground, is not to become a partisan in politics, or the advocate of any system of industry, not to adopt the tone of the platform or the appeal of the hustings, but to proclaim that righteousness exalteth a nation, and to be fearless in what conflicts with the mind of Christ.

One other feature, which might be set down as supreme, was his passion for souls. No man had a greater devotion to the Christian message, or a more entire consecration to the good cause of the Christian Church. Few preachers have had higher ideals of human life, or clearer convictions as to the necessity of moral and spiritual renewal. But through it all, and especially, through his keen sense of the haunting perils and temptations of the Christian ministry, there beats this passion for souls. Again and again he calls upon his fellow-ministers not to desire vainglory, or to love applause, or to cherish envy and jealousy of each other, or to indulge in depreciation, and, most of all, not to be disloyal to the doctrine of Christ. The most clamant reason is always the fear lest the souls of simple folk should be endangered. When speaking of the evil one ignorant and unworthy preacher may do to the people, he closes his appeal with the sentence, "Such a storm enters their souls, that the evil ends in utter shipwreck. How awful is the ruin! How fierce the fire which is heaped on his head for every one of these souls that perish!"

There is no greater need than that scrupulous and sensitive passion to-day. Much of our modern preaching is, as Bushnell said, "light and shallow" because it lacks this

controlling impulse. There are some who think themselves under the obligation to mock at the great truths and solemn convictions which have quickened men's faith and enlightened their consciences in time past. There are others whose topics are as trivial as the gossip of a club, whose titles suggest an attempt to catch itching ears, or to pander to a prurient curiosity. There are others who introduce their political convictions and outline their social programmes inspired by a confessed belief that material well-being is the most urgent need of the times. There are others who fail to realise the forces behind not only the unrest, but the revolt against the Christian ideal, who do not deal with the great facts of the sin and the sorrow of men. The call to repent has no urgency on their lips. "He preaches up to the times," said Leighton, "who preaches up to Christ and to eternity." That was finely said, but Parker set it more simply, and more fittingly, "He preaches to the times who preaches to broken hearts."

W. M. Clow.

THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION ACCORDING TO THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

It is proposed in this article to draw out the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews as to the creative function of Christ. This is a point to which attention has not hitherto been drawn, so far as I am aware. To those who accept the conclusion to which the Holy Spirit guided the Church, the question is a merely academic one; but, in any case, the doctrinal implications of *Hebrews* are interesting as indicative of the conceptions of one of the great thinkers of the Apostolic Church.

The Catholic faith on this point is expressed in the Nicene

Creed, where it is said in reference to the Son of God, "By whom all things came into being" (*δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο*). This clause of the Creed is in accordance with Holy Scripture. The wording is in close agreement with *John* i. 3; and the same preposition, *διά*, is also used in the similar statements of 1 *Corinthians* viii. 6 and *Colossians* i. 16.

It may be asked, Whence did these two writers get this particular element in their doctrine of the Christ?

Not from anything that He Himself is recorded to have said. But they were led to this expression of doctrine, under the illumination of the Holy Spirit, by combining with our Lord's own claims to Messiahship and pre-existence the Alexandrian synthesis of Hebrew and Greek speculation as to the origin of things which had been thought out by Philo; the conception of the divine Wisdom or Word, as the instrumental cause of Creation.

It is unnecessary to say more on a subject with which all students of theology are familiar. But a word may be added as to why St. Paul and St. John added this element to the Church's doctrine of the Christ. This philosophical determination of the Apostolic Church was forced upon it by the speculations of Gnosticism, which maintained that matter is eternal and essentially evil; a notion fundamentally subversive of Christianity.

It cannot be too often repeated that God's revelation of Himself to man is practical, and takes no account of academic questions, matters, that is, which do not affect conduct. Consequently, the references to the Creation in the Old Testament are little more than repetitions, with more or less emphasis, of the statement with which *Genesis* opens: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Our Lord, during His earthly ministry, taught on the basis of the revelation "spoken in the prophets," which, again, was moral and practical. The consideration

of the relation of the Christ to the universe—His cosmic status—could not arise until after His resurrection and ascension; nor could it become of urgent importance until Christian thought had come into actual contact and conflict with the theosophic speculations which were fashionable among the "intellectuals" of the first century.

We find the supernaturalness of our Lord's Person expressed very simply in the first Christian sermon: "God hath made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom ye crucified" (*Acts* ii. 36), or in the preacher's parenthetical mark to Cornelius and his friends: "He is Lord of all" (*Acts* x. 36). Meditation on the implications of these simple statements led men to ask, What is the relation of Christ the Lord to God? and, Has He any connexion with the origination of "all things" of which He is Lord? Humanity naturally comes first in the inquiry; and it was first perceived that Christ is the "one mediator between God and men." This suggested a similar mediatorial function of Christ in relation to the rest of creation. It was natural and inevitable that the Christ of the Church should take up His abode in the house already built and made ready for Him by Alexandrian thought. The Jewish-Greek conception of the creative Word was, in fact, like an empty house, swept and garnished; it was cold, devoid of personality; whereas the Word, as set forth by St. John, "became flesh, and tabernacled among us . . . He came unto his own"; He is a Person, "full of grace and truth."

The passages from the writings of St. Paul and St. John on which is based the Church's belief in the creative function of Christ have been already mentioned. There are in *Hebrews* one or two statements on the same subject; and these, when carefully examined, seem to point to a conception of our Lord's part in creation somewhat different from that enunciated in *Paul* and *John*. They reflect,

in fact, a less advanced Christology. The date of *Hebrews* is probably earlier than the year 70 A.D., and therefore many years earlier than that of the Fourth Gospel; but it is probably later than *Ephesians* and *Colossians*, and certainly later than *First Corinthians*. It is not here suggested that the author of *Hebrews* was consciously modifying the Pauline conception of Christ as Creator; but he was certainly an independent thinker.

He makes a distinction between *all things* and *the worlds* (*οἱ αἰῶνες*); and he restricts the originating function of Christ to *the worlds*. He does not employ the term *cosmos* in this connexion; but he would, probably, have accepted St. John's statement (i. 10) that "the cosmos came into being through Christ," and St. Paul's declaration (*Col.* i. 16) that "*in* Christ were all things created." But according to *Hebrews*, God the Father alone is the originator of *all things*. Thus, in ii. 10 we read, "It became him [the Father] for whom (*δι' ὅν*) are all things, and through whom (*δι' οὗ*) are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings." And the language of iii. 2, 3 is even more emphatic, where Christ is stated to have built (*or* established) the house (i.e. the *αἰών* or possibly the *cosmos*) in which Moses is a faithful servant; "but he that built all things is God."

On the other hand, while the Son, as the ideal man (see ii. 7) is "the heir of all things" and "the upholder of all things" (i. 2, 3), He did not originate them; He was the agent of the Father in the "making" of the worlds (i. 2). A similar conception underlies xi. 3: "By faith we understand that the worlds have been framed by the word of God." Here the Greek for *word* is *ῥῆμα*, not *λόγος*; yet it is difficult not to feel that the writer had in his mind the familiar conception of the creative word of God. In his

time λόγος had not yet become a technical term in Christian theology.

What, then, does *Hebrews* mean by *the worlds*, as distinct from *all things*? Westcott's note here is very helpful. He observes that αἰῶνες is not merely the plural of αἰών, *periods of time*, but "*the sum of the periods of time*, including all that is manifested in and through them." He adds, "This sense [of αἰών] appears first in *Ecclesiastes* iii. 11 (*He hath set the world* [σύμπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα] *in their heart*) answering to the corresponding use of עוֹלָם, which is first found there. The plural עולמים is found with this sense in later Jewish writers." Westcott gives a reference to *Wisdom* xiii. 9, where τὸν αἰῶνα is rendered *the course of things* in E.V. He adds, "The universe may be regarded either in its actual constitution as a whole (ὁ κόσμος), or as an order which exists through time developed in successive stages." And so ὁ αἰών—the age—is one part of the whole development, and οἱ αἰῶνες is the sum of the parts, the universe of phenomena from the beginning until now. The only other place of the New Testament in which this use of αἰῶνες is found is 1 *Timothy* i. 17, "the King of the ages," not "the King eternal," as in E.V. It may be added that in the Jewish forms of thanksgiving, public and private, מֶלֶךְ הָעוֹלָם constantly occurs.

The existence of "things" of some sort may be conceived of as prior to the orderly arrangement of them. And this is what *Genesis* is trying to express when it says, "The earth was waste and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep: and the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."

On the other hand, "the heaven," in the sense of the special abode of God, is a part of "the worlds." This may be inferred from two passages taken together. In i. 10, the author applies to Christ words addressed in Psalm cii.

to Jehovah: "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands." And ix. 11, 23, the heavens, the heavenly things (*τὰ ἐπουράνια*) are classed among created things: they are "a greater and more perfect tabernacle . . . not of *this* creation."

In reference to the passage from Psalm cii., just cited, it is to be noted that when a man quotes the words of another, he uses the quotation as the most felicitous form in which to express his own notion. It is not open to us to distinguish between the doctrinal implications of a passage and the beliefs of the man who quotes it. In this case, we are justified in holding that *Hebrews* here identifies Christ with the Jehovah whom the Psalmist addressed.

It would seem, then, that if the author of *Hebrews* were pressed to give a precise account of his conception of the sequence things originated from the eternal Father, he would say that, after the generation of the unique Firstborn Son, God the Father made "all things" *in* the Son (cf. *Col.* i. 16); and then the Son, as agent of the Father, made "the worlds," the universe of phenomena, which includes the heaven as well as the earth.

It ought to be unnecessary to add that, in iii. 1, the parenthetical clause, *πιστὸν ὄντα τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτόν*, is rightly rendered in the E.V., "Jesus; who was faithful to him that *appointed* him, as also was Moses." The author of this epistle was steeped in the language of the LXX and here his use of *ποιεῖν* in the sense of *appoint* is an echo of 1 *Samuel* xii. 6, "It is the Lord that appointed Moses and Aaron," where both the Hebrew and the LXX (*ὁ ποιήσας τὸν Μωυσῆν*) use *made* in the sense of *appointed*.

And now two questions naturally present themselves: How are we to account for this discrepancy in a point of abstract theology between *Hebrews*, on the one hand, and

Paul and *John* on the other? And again, Ought this discrepancy to be allowed to affect the expression of our belief? that is, Are we to delete from the Creed the clause "By whom all things were made" because the statement is not supported by *Hebrews*?

In answer to the first query, we observe that study of the New Testament makes it plain that what *Hebrews* itself says about God's method of revealing Himself—"by divers portions and in divers manners"—before Christ came, is equally true of the Church's apprehension—as reflected in the New Testament—of the final revelation of God in Christ. It could not be otherwise. Man's apprehension of truth of all kinds is gradual, and also partial, from moment to moment. It is not considered good art if a painter reproduces on his canvas with equal clearness everything that lies before his face. In point of fact, the artist sees in precise detail the object only on which his gaze is fixed; all that is elsewhere in the field of vision is subordinate, and is not seen by the painter's eye as it is seen by a photographic camera; it is more or less blurred.

In the New Testament, the expression of each writer's Christology is affected by the immediate purpose of his writing. This could easily be exemplified from the epistles of St. Paul. Thus, the thought which was chiefly in St. Paul's mind when writing *First Corinthians* was the real humanity of our Lord, as an argument against the Corinthian error as to the resurrection of the dead. This accounts for the remarkable expression of the subordination of the Son to the Father in 1 *Corinthians* iii. 23, xi. 3, xv. 28 (see Expositor for July, 1900).

A similar phenomenon meets us in *Hebrews*. "The chief point" in this writer's mind is this: "We have such a high priest, who sat down on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens" (viii. 1, 2). The high priest-

hood of Jesus implies His real humanity. And one cause of the exceeding preciousness of *Hebrews* to Christians of all ages lies in the fact that it gives a more complete account of our Lord's humanity—His fellow-feeling with man—than does any other epistle of the New Testament. Now when the eye of the mind is fixed intently upon the humanity of our Lord, the fact of His divinity is likely to fall somewhat into the background; and the Catholic doctrine of the subordination of the Son to the Father is likely to find more emphatic expression than when one is thinking primarily of His Godhead. In this connexion it is significant that the human name *Jesus* (without the definite article) occurs as many times (9) in *Hebrews* as it does in St. Paul's epistles.

In answer to the second question, we have to note that the Creed of the Church, originally, was not compiled from any literature, no matter how sacred, but was the expression of a living experience. And, in later times, it was a synthesis —made under the guidance of the Holy Spirit—of *all* the statements on doctrines made by *all* the teachers of the Church, given through the living voice, or preserved in the written Word. So that there is no cause for stumbling if we find here and there—even in the New Testament itself—expressions of truth that are not as adequate as those in which the divinely guided Church finally found satisfaction.

In any case, the central fact of the Christian revelation is that "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners." As practical people we hold our present relationships to the Son of God as He *is* to be the only thing that matters. And this relationship cannot be affected by speculations, or even disclosures, as to what He did, or did not do, in a past the nature of which we cannot conceive, conditions to which the categories of Time and Place have no relation.

NEWPORT J. D. WHITE.

NEW TRANSLATIONS FOR CONJUNCTIONS IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

While I was making an intensive study of *οὖν* in the papyri and the New Testament, the results of which are published in the Expositor, September, 1921, I found evidence for new meanings for other conjunctions. Recently I have made a careful study of these words as used in the New Testament. I have pursued the inductive method in arriving at my conclusions, studying the conjunctions in their contexts, and finally seeking to confirm my conclusions by the translations that others have given the same words.

Ἀλλά.

This conjunction, besides being translated in the R.V. regularly as adverbative by such words as "but" or "howbeit," is translated a few times by "yea." Cf. Luke xvi. 21; John xvi. 2; 1 Corinthians iv. 3; 2 Corinthians i. 9; vii. 11. It is my conviction that "yea" is not necessarily always the best translation for *ἀλλά* when it is confirmatory or emphatic, and it should be translated as emphatic several times where it is rendered as adverbative in the R.V.[1] In 1 Corinthians iv. 15 "certainly" fits the context very well: "For though ye have ten thousand tutors in Christ, ye *certainly* do not have many fathers." It has the same significance in 1 Corinthians ix. 2: "If I am not an apostle to others, I most *certainly* am to you." Its emphatic force may be brought out by the words "in fact" in Acts xix. 2: "And they said to him: *In fact* we have not even heard whether there is a Holy Spirit"; likewise, in Ephesians v. 24, "*In fact* as the church is subject to Christ, so also let wives be to their husbands"; also in 1 Corinthians

[1] Robertson, *Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, page 1186.

iii. 3, "*In fact* not even now are ye able, for ye are still carnal." With this compare 1 Corinthians iv. 3. Other places where it seems emphatic to me are John iv. 23; vii. 27; viii. 26; 2 Corinthians i. 13; iii. 15; Philippians iii. 8.

Ἄρα.

This is uniformly translated as inferential in the R.V. by such words as *therefore, then, so,* excepting when it occurs in a conditional clause, when it a few times is translated "haply," "perchance" or "perhaps." The latter translation is really emphatic for it emphasises the uncertainty of the issue.

There is abundant evidence in the New Testament and other Greek literature to establish the fact that this conjunction often has the function of an emphatic particle. And I do not believe there is any real necessity for having a circumflex accent on the word when it begins a question. For when we give it an emphatic translation in such cases it throws increased light on that particular sentence and fits the context exactly. Cf. Acts viii. 30, "*Ἆρα γε γινώσκεις ἃ ἀναγινώσκεις*; Do you *really* understand what you are reading?"

Herodotus used it as emphatic, as the following sentence proves: [1] "*Ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν ἄρα τὸν ἄνδρα, δεύτερα λέγει ἡ γυνὴ τάδε.* But since she did not *really* persuade her husband the woman spoke a second time as follows." J. Bond and A. S. Walpole translate it "really" in their *Lucian Selections.* And examples from the papyri in which it is emphatic are quoted in *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament* by Moulton and Milligan. In one of these they translate it "indeed." Besides the examples they give there is another in Papyri Oxy. I. no. 113: 28.

In Acts xii. 18, where *ἄρα* is not translated at all in the

[1] G. S. Farnell, *Tales from Herodotus,* p. 14.

R.V., it certainly is not inferential, but is effective and helpful at once when considered as intensive or emphatic: "What *really* became of Peter?" There are three words that express fairly well its emphatic uses. They are *indeed*, *certainly*, *really*, but the last is perhaps the best. In Matthew xviii. 1 we can see the value of such a translation: "Who is *really* greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven?" Likewise in Luke xii. 42, "And the Lord said, Who is *really* the faithful, and wise steward?" Notice particularly 1 Corinthians xv. 15, "*εἴπερ ἄρα νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται*, if the dead are not *really* raised." Other places where it may be emphatic are: Matthew vii. 20; Acts viii. 22; xi. 18; 2 Corinthians i. 17; Hebrews xii. 8.

Γάρ.

That this conjunction is generally causal or illative in significance in the New Testament may be taken for granted. But that it may also be explanatory and emphatic there is considerable likelihood. Kühner has given the best summary of its uses that I have found. "*Γάρ* may express: (*a*) a *ground* or *reason*, (*b*) an *explanation*, (*c*) a *confirmation* or *assurance*; and hence it may be translated, (*a*) by *for*, (*b*) *that is, for example*, (*c*) *indeed, certainly*." [1] But the only variation from a causal translation that I have found in the R.V. is in Romans xv. 27 and Acts xvi. 37, where it is translated respectively "yea" and "verily."

Liddell and Scott quote an example of the explanatory use of *γάρ* and translate it *now*. Dr. A. T. Robertson in his grammar cites Matthew xix. 12; Mark v. 42; xvi. 4; Luke xi. 30; xviii. 32 as places where it should be regarded as explanatory. But the last two references read better, it seems to me, when considered as emphatic and translated by *in fact*.

[1] *Grammar of the Greek Language*, p. 512.

Following are passages where an explanatory translation is suggested by the contexts. Luke xiv. 27–28, "Whosoever doth not bear his own cross, and come after me, cannot be my disciple. *For example*, which of you desiring to build a tower," etc. Our word *now* fits most passages under this category better than *for example*. 1 Corinthians xi. 6–7, "But if it is a shame to a woman to be shorn or shaven, let her be veiled. *Now*, a man indeed ought not to have his head veiled, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God." 1 Corinthians x. 1, "*Now*, I would not, brethren, have you ignorant." Likewise in John iv. 8, 44; Acts xiii. 36; xviii. 3; xix. 37; xx. 16; 1 Corinthians xi. 19; 2 Corinthians i. 12.

I shall merely indicate the evidence for *γάρ* as emphatic. Liddell and Scott treated it as such: "*φησὶ γὰρ οὖν*—yes, of course he says so." "*φάμεν γὰρ δή*—yes, certainly we say so"; "*ἀλλὰ γάρ*—but really, certainly." Blass,[1] suggests "yes, in truth," "indeed" as suggestive equivalents, and S. G. Green[2] suggests "yes" and "why."

Notice the use of it in Matthew xxvii. 23: "They all say, let him be crucified. And he said, *Indeed* (or *why*), what evil hath he done?" Also Acts iv. 16, "*τί ποιήσωμεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τούτοις; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ γνωστὸν σημεῖον γέγονεν δι' αὐτῶν πᾶσιν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν Ἰερουσαλὴμ φανερόν.* What shall we do to these men? that a *very* notable miracle indeed hath been wrought through them, is manifest to all that dwell in Jerusalem." The R.V. does not attempt to translate it in Acts viii. 31, where an emphatic word used with the optative tense expresses the utter hopelessness the eunuch felt with reference to understanding that passage of Scripture. In answer to the query whether he understood what he was reading, he responds, "How *indeed* can I except

[1] *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, p. 274.
[2] *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament*, p. 347.

some one shall guide me ? " References to similar uses are : Acts iv. 34 ; xviii. 3 ; xix. 35 ; 1 Corinthians v. 3 ; xi. 22 ; 2 Timothy ii. 7.

Καί.

This conjunction, which is by far the most common in the New Testament, is hard to understand on the part of the casual Greek student because it is capable of so many diversified meanings. It is used merely as a mechanical connective by the New Testament writers many times and it is left for the reader to determine which possible translation best suits the sentence in which it occurs. The ordinary Greek man, as the papyri records reveal, had but few conjunctions in his vocabulary and *καί* was the main one. This was true of the New Testament writers also.

Take our word *and* for instance. It is certainly greatly overworked by the average English-speaking man. Robert P. Utter, in a magazine article on this question, says : " There are perhaps between one and two hundred words in English primarily used as connectives. Of these you use *and*, *but* and *because*—and how many more ? Most of us have from three to six connectives in our working vocabulary to express from a hundred to a hundred and fifty shades of meaning." Classical Greek writers had used a large number of Greek particles, but not so with the *κοινή* writers—rather they made the few they used serve in numerous ways.

Three generally accepted meanings for *καί* are, as transitional, *and*, as adjunctive, *also*, and, as ascensive, *even*. But these meanings do not cover all its uses in the New Testament. There ought to be two other classifications, I believe, namely, adversative and emphatic.

For its use as adversative I need merely call attention to some places where it is already translated as such in the

R.V. by the words *and yet:* John vii. 19 ; xvi. 32 ; xx. 29 ; Acts x. 28 ; 2 Corinthians vi. 9. Dr. A. T. Robertson in his grammar, page 1182, mentions this adversative use : " It is common to find καί where it has to bear the content 'and yet.'. . . . In Luke xii. 24 καί is almost equal to ἀλλά, that is, the context makes contrast." And he suggests several passages where it should be translated as such. The words *however* and *but* are just as good if not better than *and yet* in several passages where the context clearly calls for an adversative connective. Take, for instance, Acts vii. 5, " And he gave him none inheritance in it, no, not so much as to set his foot on : *but* he promised that he would give it to him in possession." And Mark iv. 16–17, " Who, when they have heard the word, straightway receive it with joy ; *but* they have no root in themselves." Cf. also Matthew vii. 23 ; Luke x. 24 ; xiii. 17 ; Acts vii. 10 ; xvi. 7 ; xviii. 17 ; 1 Thessalonians ii. 18 ; Revelation ii. 21.

Now, with reference to καί as emphatic. What grammarians call the ascensive use should, in my opinion, be widened in scope and called intensive or emphatic, and should be translated by several emphatic words such as *indeed*, *verily*, *really*, *in fact*, *yea*, *certainly*, etc., instead of merely by the one word *even*. The word *even* will not suit every context when καί is ascensive or emphatic. Why limit the translation to but one stereotyped word ? Because the translators were averse to giving any other translation to καί than those current, they did not attempt to translate it a part of the time in the R.V. (Neither have Grenfell and Hunt always translated it in their volumes of papyri.) For instance in John xx. 30 ; Luke iii. 18, and in Philippians iii. 8, where it is used with emphatic words it is not translated. Cf. also Acts xxii. 28 ; xxvii. 9 ; 1 Corinthians xii. 13.

But in 2 Corinthians xi. 1 and Philippians iv. 10, in spite of that aversion, we have *indeed*, and in Matthew x. 30 we

have *very* as equivalents for *καί*. The translators made a good beginning in these places that needs to be carried out to its proper conclusions. In 1 Corinthians xiv. 19 the thought is clearer when this word is considered emphatic: "Howbeit in the church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that I might *really* instruct others, than ten thousand words in a tongue." Colossians iv. 4, "To speak the mystery of Christ for which *in fact* I am in bonds." Cf. 1 Thessalonians ii. 13, 19; Philippians iv. 15; Colossians iii. 8; Acts xxii. 28. In these references it seems to have the effect of intensifying the personal pronoun.[1] Cf. also Luke iii. 9, 18; x. 29; xi. 18; 2 Corinthians iv. 3, 10, 11.

The combination *καὶ γάρ* has long been considered as emphatic or ascensive in some of its uses in classical Greek as well as in the New Testament. Liddell and Scott and the grammarians Blass and Green affirm this. And in *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*[2] this example and accompanying translation occur: "*καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ὅλος διαπονοῦμαι εἰ Ἕλενος χαλκοὺς ἀπόλεσεν.* I am quite upset at Helenos' loss of the money." And in the R.V. these conjunctions are translated either *for indeed* or *for verily* in Acts xix. 40; 2 Corinthians iii. 10; v. 2, 4; 1 Thessalonians iii. 4; iv. 10. This combination may be elliptic at times, but it very likely has emphatic force in many other passages also besides the above ones. Cf. Luke xxii. 37; 1 Corinthians xii. 13; xiv. 8; 2 Corinthians vii. 5.

If the foregoing suggestions and conclusions are true even in part, the possibilities for a more accurate understanding of the Scriptures has been indicated. With the increasing flood of light coming upon first-century Greek through the papyri and inscriptions, the study of the Greek New Testament affords unprecendented opportuni-

[1] For papyri references see *Greek Papyri*, by G. Milligan, pp. 8, 32, 57.
[2] By J. H. Moulton and George Milligan.

ties for understanding the glorious message and the deep mystery contained in the Gospel. As we come to understand it better, may we also learn to love and to serve our Saviour with ever increasing loyalty and zeal.

J. R. Mantey.

THE SO-CALLED "POPULAR RELIGION OF ISRAEL."

The Second Main Problem of Old Testament Religious History.

The expression "people's religion" or "popular religion" is a phrase which recurs fairly often in the latest scientific writings on the history of religion. But it has more than one meaning. It was formerly employed for the most part to denote the religion of a separate nationality. In this sense it was used in A. Kuenen's well-known Hibbert Lectures on *National Religion and World-Religion*, and in Kautzsch's article on the religion of Israel, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible.*[1]

More important is the second sense in which the expression "popular religion" is now commonly used. The words are taken to imply the religious ideas and practices which derive their origin, as experience has shown, from a religious instinct in the masses of the people and a popular conception of the world. In that sense we speak, e.g., of the popular religion of the Greeks. To that belonged, among other rituals, the worship of Dionysos. The people's religion of Greece was proclaimed, as with herald's trumpet, by great poets like Homer and Hesiod. Justly did Herodotus say:

[1] Extra-Volume (1904), p. 612 ff. Note the words, "The barriers of national religion are here (in Deutero-Isaiah) completely burst."

"These two gave gods to the Greeks" (ii. 53). Sculptors and painters, whose art had been quickened by the popular religion, brought a tribute of profound gratitude to the source of their inspiration. For in the second great period of Hellenic religious history "ideal figures filled the imagination of the worshipper under the influence of art."[1] We see that in the rise of the popular Hellenic religion the keen sense of beauty with which, beyond all dispute, the Greek race was peculiarly dowered, exercised an unmistakable influence.

There is no difference of opinion as to the importance of the part played in Israel's history by the people's religion in its *first* or national sense. Should a place of high importance be assigned in that history to the words in their *second* meaning? An affirmative answer is given in not a few of the latest works on Hebrew Religion. The late Canon Cheyne represented that view very clearly in one of his books.[2] Various Dutch and German writers accept the same theory,[3] but in several of the more recent books of American scholars[4] I have found hardly the slightest trace of the idea. What is the right answer to this important question? In the pages which follow I shall attempt to discover the best way towards a solution of the problem.

I.

A Possible Definition of the Idea, "the popular religion of Israel."

The Archimedian Δός μοι, ποῦ στῶ lies in the following fact, to which the Old Testament bears uniform witness,

[1] O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, § 259.

[2] Cheyne, *The Two Religions of Israel* (1911).

[3] Wildeboer, *Jahvedienst und Volksreligion* (1899); Stade, *Biblische Theologie des A.T.* (1905); Ed. Meyer, *Der Papyrusfund von Elefantine* (1912), p. 40; Kittel, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, ii. (1917), pp. 124, 128, etc.

[4] George A. Barton, *The Religion of Israel* (1918); and Albert C. Knudson, *The Religious Teaching of the Old Testament* (1919), p. 35.

that the people of Israel had knowledge of religious and moral principles, whose maintenance caused the heart to rejoice and whose violation was to their souls a cause of sorrow. There was in Israel a religious and moral ideal whose guardians felt themselves at one with the best of the nation's earlier representatives, while those who condemned it were regarded as traitors to the highest cultural possession of their race. This peculiar possession of Israel in the realm of religion and morals was the faith which had been inherited from the fathers, and laid down in the most ancient legal writings ; and which was therefore the *rightful* or *legitimate* religion of that people. *That was the religion which was founded in the time of Abraham* (Gen. xii. 1 f. ; Joshua xxiv. 2 f.). For although the Mosaic age gleamed as if with noontide splendour in the memory of the Israelites, they had not forgotten that day-dawn in which the earliest representative of their own distinctive type of religion and morality stepped forth into the light of history.

And is not the historic certainty of that lawful religion of Israel strikingly confirmed by many narratives about the persons who yielded to it whole-hearted obedience ? Let us think first of Joshua's confession : "As for *me* and *my* house, we will serve the Lord" (Josh. xxiv. 15). Remember, again, how Gideon destroyed the altar of Baal and built an altar to the Lord (Judges vi. 26 f.). And chiefly let us recall how Eli, when the news reached him that the Ark of God was taken, had a stroke and gave up the ghost (1 Sam. iv. 18). Nor can we refuse a thought of gratitude and admiration to Eli's daughter-in-law, who on hearing of the same sad event, could give no other name to the infant whose birth was costing her own life than Ichabod, "No honour," therefore "Shame" (vers. 19–22). Think again of the "seven thousand," who amidst the worst persecution of

the true religion of Israel remained faithful to the Lord (1 Kings xix. 18).

But it is necessary that we should frame a *picture* of that lawful religion of Israel, so that we may have a positive standard by which to judge whether this or that manifestation in the field of religion and morals belonged to the true religion of Israel or not. What is the specific religious-moral ideal of Israel, which shines out upon us from the sources ?

The *nature* of Israel's distinctive religion lies in the fact to which the sources bear unanimous testimony, that Abraham was honoured as the holder of a special relationship to God. This actually *is* the true religion of Israel : *the specific connexion with God which was granted to this race for its own education and at long last for the blessing of all mankind.* For we read in a source which is now regarded by the majority of critics as the earliest, this divine message to Abraham : "In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed." [1] The historic importance of the Bible rests on this specific connexion with God which the Bible-religion sets forth, and not on monotheism, as recent writers have argued.[2]

The following *distinct characteristics* of this religion are reflected in the sources : *first*, the certainty of possessing a *true prophetic order*. This carries with it the consciousness of standing in a certain relation to that background of world-history which was closed as regards ordinary concerns.

The *second* characteristic is the conviction that there existed a spiritual Being who *did not originate from the world-process* and had no connexion with a "theogony," as was the case with the Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, etc. This leads us, *thirdly*, to the idea of *monotheism*, which lay at least in embryo in the universal future designed for that religion of redemption which began with Abraham

[1] Gen. xii. 3*b*, and so five times in the first Book of the Bible.
[2] Delitzsch, *Babel und Bibel*, i. 44, and many others.

(Gen. xii. 3*b*).[1] The *fourth* factor of this religion is the principle of *spirituality in its worship*. This appears in Abraham's history, in which we find not the slightest trace of any image of God, and also in the prohibition of idolatry, which is actually the second commandment of the decalogue.[2] As a *fifth* feature there is the *holiness* of God, that is to say, His elevation above all that is profane, and especially above everything of an immoral nature. What a radiant personality as compared to the gods of Babylon![3]

Sixthly, there is a deep feeling for the connexion between human guilt and human misery. It is very noteworthy that Babylonian literature has no parallel to the Hebrew representation of the first wrong-doing of the human race (Gen. iii. 1 ff.).

We add, *seventhly*, the parallel fact that in pictures of the future in the Old Testament religion *redemption from the guilt of sin* is a most prominent characteristic (Micah vii. 19; Jer. xxxi. 34*b*, etc.).

Eighthly, and lastly, we must not forget the *lofty moral consciousness* which dwelt in the leading minds of Israel. We can trace it already in the words of Abraham: "I thought, Surely the fear of God is not in this place," and with its absence there would, he thought, be no morality with a basis in religion (Gen. xx. 11 Elohist). We may recall those words of Princess Tamar: "They do not so in Israel" (2 Sam. xiii. 12).[4]

To an *eight-rayed* star we may then compare that religion

[1] How exalted this religion was, on that account alone, above the multitude of divine figures which meet us, e.g., at the beginning of the Babylonian creation-epos (Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament* (1919), p. 3 f.).

[2] This will be established in my *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (1922), §§ 43 and 79, where all the newest attacks are refuted.

[3] In connexion with these we read, "They drink to intoxication, swell out their bodies," etc. *Creation-Epos.*, Table III., lines 135–137, and on the love-affairs of the goddess Ischtar we have the testimony of the Gilgamesch Epos Tablet vi. col. 1 (Rogers, loc. cit., p. 85 f.).

[4] My *Theologie des A.T.* (1922) gives other citations, pp. 24, 29.

which is acknowledged as the *rightful* faith in all the sources of the religious history of Israel.

But did there not exist, also, side by side with this lawful religion, certain ideas and customs in the race which might be defined as a *different religion*?

The historians of Israel, with frankness, although with sorrow, have given an affirmative answer to this question. It was never their habit, as has been often asserted in recent years, to paint their pictures "on a golden ground." On the contrary, it is a very important characteristic of the Hebrew historical writers that even in the case of persons who for other reasons deserved high praise, such as, e.g., David and Solomon, no attempt is made to hush up their faults. The love of truth which is so manifest in the Old Testament historians displays itself in the absence of any attempt to maintain that the whole nation always adhered to the same religion. Rather do their records indicate a long series of religious notions and practices to which smaller or larger groups in Israel yielded homage, *thus departing from the lawful worship* of their race. These various shades in the religious conceptions and practices to which sections of the people, now larger, now smaller, addicted themselves unlawfully in ancient Israel, may be best set forth in the following six groups which run parallel to the convictions and principles of the rightful faith of Israel as summed up in the preceding paragraphs.

First, as regards the source of religious knowledge, many sought to draw information from that kind of "Divinatio" which, according to Cicero,[1] was based on the application of a theory or of certain rules.

This kind of search for God is *wizardry*, many sorts of which are forbidden in Hebrew literature, as e.g., in Leviticus

[1] Cicero, *De divinatione*, i. 18: *Duo genera divinationum esse dixerunt: unum, quod particeps esset artis; alterum, quod arte careret.*

xix. 31, consultation of the spirits of the dead, who were supposed to have returned from Hades (the so-called ghosts). But the second of the two kinds of "Divinatio" which is marked out by Cicero (loc. cit.) was practised in many branches of the Hebrew race. I mean the kind of prophecy which drew its information, e.g. from dreams (Jer. xxiii. 25, etc.), and which meets us distinctly for the first time in that scene in which 400 prophets appeared in the name of Jahve,[1] but really took their message from the mouth of Ahab. *Secondly*, there were many Israelites whose inclinations led them towards *magic*. That was strictly forbidden in the ancient book of the covenant (Exodus xxii. 18), and only the charming of serpents counted as neutral ground (Jer. viii. 17, etc.), perhaps because it had proved itself of practical utility, as it is employed to-day in the East for the capture and destruction of snakes. In the *third* place, the worship of false gods presents itself to our view and passes before us in long procession (Lev. xvii. 7, etc.). But let us turn our glance from this aberration, which is forbidden in the first precept of the decalogue, to a *fourth* kind of religious conduct, which is condemned immediately afterwards in the same fundamental law. That is the inclination of mankind to represent the spiritual under material forms, and in consequence to picture to itself the godhead by sculptured images or paintings. Since these symbolic forms may very easily themselves take the place of the divinity, there arises *idolatry*, and the struggle against it is protracted through most *periods* of Israel's history (Gen. xxxv. 4; Ex. xx. 4 f.; xxxii. 9 ff., etc.). A *fifth* kind of false religion consists in a fearful and detestable class of practices in worship. I mean the offering of *human sacrifices*, above which the rightful

[1] 1 Kings xxii. 11 f., 24, "Thus saith the Lord" is overlooked in Brown-Driver-Briggs, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1906), p. 612*a*, where these prophets are described as belonging to Baal.

religion of Israel was exalted from the beginning (Gen. xxii. 12, etc.), and *temple-prostitution*, against which indignant protests are raised (Deut. xxiii. 18, etc.). As a *sixth* feature in the character of this false religion we find a *wrong expectation as regards the future*. For many circles in Israel expected indeed from their God the defeat of foreign enemies of the divine kingdom, but they did *not* expect a judgment upon those within Israel who were enemies of the cause of God. To that class belonged the prophets whom the people called "its wise men" (Isa. xxix. 10, 14), and who painted the horizon of the future in the rosy colours of good fortune, crying "Peace, peace" (Jer. vi. 14, etc.).

All the acknowledged sources of Israel's history are agreed in regarding these six modes of thought and action as *breaches of the peculiar religion of that people*. Against these six kinds of religious theory and practice we find in all the law-books of Israel not only strong protests, but also threats of open punishment (Deut. xiii. 1 ff., etc.).

There is nothing that actually prevents us from summing up these six tendencies of religious thought and conduct under the general definition, "*The popular religion of Israel.*" For it was "the people" which at Sinai assembled against Aaron and compelled him to make a symbol of the God who had brought them out of Egypt, and who should henceforth go before them (Exod. xxxii. 1*b*, 4*b*). Further, we may deduce from Isaiah xxix. 10, 14, that "this people" called the rivals of the Old Testament prophets "its wise men," and the majority of Israel are very frequently (Jer. ii. 13, etc.) blamed for unfaithfulness to their God. In such facts some support may be found for the *possibility* of designating these six kinds of religious opinion or behaviour as "the popular religion of Israel." But this foundation is insecure, and moreover, there are three errors into which we should be led by the use of that descriptive title.

It leaves the ground open, in the first place, to the *erroneous assumption* that it was only the general mass of the people who indulged in these practices. Yet they were regarded favourably, as we know, by representatives of the higher classes. We need only refer to the popular prophets and to the kings who introduced, e.g., idolatry and image worship (Solomon, Jeroboam I., Ahab, Manasseh, and others).

In the next place, by the use of this title the Old Testament judgment with regard to these practices becomes *blurred*. For according to the Old Testament these practices were "disobedience to the voice of the Lord" (Exod. xix. 5 f.), or forgetfulness of the covenant which the Lord had made with Israel (Deut. vi. 12, etc.), or apostasy from the holy God of Israel (Isa. i. 2*b*, 4*b*). And lastly, the expression "The popular religion" obscures the main characteristic of that mode of worship. For the modern title entirely obliterates the fact that it rested on *ingratitude* and *infidelity* to the old Saviour-God (Exod. xv. 1 ff.).

The title should therefore be avoided, and my own custom is, when I cannot escape using it, at least to choose the expression, "the so-called popular religion of Israel," and I define it as the sum total of those religious conceptions and practices, *against which a protest is always raised* in the Old Testament.

The adverb "always" is included in the definition on the following grounds. There are in the Old Testament religious practices which are partly enjoined and partly disapproved. We have an example of this in the case of fasting, which is commanded in Leviticus xvi. 29, etc., but in the prophetic books is in various places set aside. For we read, e.g., in Isaiah lviii. 6, "Is not this the fast that I (Jahve) have chosen (i.e. that I prefer), to loose the bands of wickedness?" [1] But fasting did not cease to be part of

[1] Cf. Zech. vii. 5; viii. 19; Joel ii. 13, "Rend your hearts and not your garments!"

the lawful religion of Israel because of these prophetic utterances. We have, on the contrary, merely an illustration of the fact that this rightful religion underwent an inward development. Can it be denied that the Divine message to Israel through the prophets had advanced by progressive stages? If proof were required for this gradual evolution we might point at once to the following fact: In the conception of the Divine Being in the patriarchal religion the idea of power is pressed into the foreground by the use of the Divine name El-schaddaj (Gen. xvii. 1, etc.),[1] while in the age of Moses, instead of that name for the Deity we have "Jahve," which means "the eternal, the unchanging, the faithful one" (Exod. vi. 2 f.), and also "the holy One of Israel" (Isa. i. 4*b*, etc.). From various instances it will be possible to show that the legitimate religion of Israel passed through an evolutionary process as regards its laws, i.e. became deepened or spiritualised; and also that its promises had their gaze directed towards ever loftier mountain-summits, where the dawn-light heralded the rising of the Sun of Righteousness, with healing in his wings.[2] But just because these are facts of history, we must hold firmly by the principle which I have established from the sources, that the so-called popular religion of Israel includes only ideas and practices in the religious sphere which are *rejected in all parts of the canonical literature of this people.*

II.

A non-permissible extension of the idea of the so-called popular religion of Israel.

Certain writers of the present day are by no means satis-

[1] To this correspond such expressions as "the fear of Isaac" (Gen. xxxi. 42, 53), and "The mighty God of Jacob" (xlix. 24).

[2] This evolution of Old Testament religion is illustrated in detail in my *Theologie des A. T.*, §§ 27–35 and 95.

fied, however, with the mere possibility of a popular religion of Israel having existed on the lines suggested above. They go further, and build up a religion of a different kind. It is founded on utterances of the Old Testament which *are not condemned* in the text. Kittel and A. Jeremias have been specially busy in the attempt to carry out this new enterprise.[1] But (1) What justification is there for placing *such* utterances of the Old Testament in *opposition* to the *rightful* religion of Israel, and stamping them as a "popular religion"? Such an assumption is wholly *unwarranted*.

(*a*) For not those portions of the Old Testament alone which owe their origin to known prophets, but the other portions also, were composed by representatives of the lawful religion of Israel. Even the historians, poets, and thinkers or wise men of Israel, whose books are incorporated in the canonical literature of the race, were friends of its *legally established* religion. The older narrators, to begin with, whose testimony is of special importance in this investigation, desired to represent *the* religion, i.e. the rightfully constituted religion of their nation. They mentioned Abraham and Moses as the authors and furtherers of that true religion. They drew up the admittedly oldest bodies of Hebrew laws[2] and sharply blamed every breach of that form of Israel's religion of which Moses had been the mediator.

With what impressive sternness did these annalists war against the falling away of numbers of the people to the worship of Baal Pe'-ôr (Num. xxv. 1 ff.)! How firmly these historicans protested against the worship of Jahve in the image of the golden calf (Exod. xxxii. 9)! How fre-

[1] Kittel, in his *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, 3rd edition, vol. ii. (1917), pp. 124, 127, and A. Jeremias in *Das A. T. im Lichte des alten Orients*, 3rd edition (1916), p. 648.

[2] The decalogue (Ex. xx. 2–17), the Elohistic book of the covenant (xx. 22–23, 33), the Jahvistic book of the covenant (xxxiv. 10–26), and so on.

quently did they describe the setting up of two small bulls as symbols of the eternal God as "the sin of Jeroboam" (1 Kings xiii. 34; xiv. 16, etc.)! How accurately they defined the Baal-worship introduced by Ahab as the worst degree of apostasy from the rightfully established religion of Israel (1 Kings xvi. 31, etc.)! How keenly conscious these historians were of the character of their people's true religion, and of all that offended against it!

The principle laid down already in this article in accordance with the sources, must therefore be accepted as the only sound one. We can include in the so-called popular religion of Israel only such conceptions and modes of conduct in the religious sphere *against which a protest is raised in the whole normative literature of Israel.* The newest theory, according to which *uncondemned* utterances of the Old Testament books may be brought together to form a so-called popular religion, has *even thus far, no justification in fact.*

(*b*) But in the case of every factor which has been assigned in recent writings to the popular religion of Israel, we must inquire whether it is really to be found in those passages which are cited in its support, and (*c*) whether it possesses such a religious and moral quality that it could not, on that ground, have any place in a Divine prophetic religion.

(2) Let us therefore examine, from the three standpoints now to be indicated, the various characteristics which have been attributed, by recent critics, to the "popular religion" of Israel.

(*a*) In the *first* place these writers count as popular religion the conception of Jahve as a God who is "limited to his own country."[1] They rely mainly for proof on the saying of Jephthah in Judges xi. 24, in which the god of the Amorites is treated as an actually existing being, and on

[1] Kittel, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel,* vol. ii. (1917), p. 463.

that account the God of the Old Testament religion is regarded as a merely national god. But these critics [1] are blind to verse 27, in which Jahve is described as "*the Judge*," who will pronounce upon the claims of the Amorites among others. In Judges xi. 24 ff. there is a definite assertion, therefore, of the superiority of that God whom the narrator of the Jephthah story worshipped. To Him is ascribed the rank of Judge of all men, as Jahve was pronounced "the Judge of all the earth" in the Jahvistic passage, Genesis xviii. 25 ("Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"). Therefore we cannot deduce from Judges xi. 24 ff. that the narrator regarded his God as a merely national deity.

Another passage on which these critics rely is 1 Samuel xxvi. 19*b* *β*. According to this verse, when David was obliged to flee to the Philistines he mourned because it was said to him, "Go, serve other gods." We are meant to gather from this passage, it would seem, that the historian who wrote it regarded the God of Israel as a "local or tribal deity." This view has been widely accepted,[2] but the following point is overlooked. The dwelling-place of God must not be mistaken for the place of His self-manifestation. Long before the time of David the people of Israel had learned by experience that the God who had revealed Himself to them was not bound to any earthly place. For the Divine Being who revealed Himself to Moses at Horeb saved His people at the Red Sea from the pursuing enemy, and in Canaan also had proved Himself their delivering God. According to the Song of Deborah, which is admitted by all to be one of the ancient sources, the stars in their

[1] Including G. F. Moore in the *International Critical Commentary*, and Budde in the *Kurzgefassten Kommentar* on this passage, and Kittel loc. cit., besides others.

[2] H. P. Smith remarks in the *International Critical Commentary in loc.*, "The inheritance of Yahweh is the territory of Israel," and many other writers agree with him.

courses fought for the cause of Jahve (Judges v. 20); and as in the historical Books of Israel, whose antiquity is not disputed, Jahve appears from heaven (Gen. xi. 5, J., etc.), we have no evidence which would warrant the opinion that *heaven* had not long before the age of David been recognised in Israel as the *dwelling-place* of Jahve. The people had behind them in memory such experiences as the *descent* of the Lord on Sinai (Exod. xix. 18), and His revelation of Himself in the Tabernacle during the desert-wandering, and afterwards at Shiloh. For that reason they called the land of promise "the House of God" (Hosea viii. 1, ix 15; Zech. ix. 8), and they came quite naturally to regard the land of Jahve's people as the actual country in which the Divine presence was manifested.[1] This accounts for the sorrow of David when he was banished from the soil which the God whose throne was in heaven had honoured with His especial presence.

We see, then, that this first assertion with reference to a new position of the so-called popular religion of Israel has no foundation in the passages cited in its support, when these are examined, in accordance with the true method of interpretation[2] in their immediate and remoter context. And a further point has to be added. Not only are there dozens of passages in the earliest books of the Old Testament in which the God of the Mosaic and prophetic religion is recognised as the creator of the world and the preserver and ruler of all nations,[3] but a general view of things must have its place in the estimate. For how could the people of Israel, if its then rightful religion had no other god to proclaim but a limited local deity, have won that position in the

[1] This important point is further elucidated in my *Theologie des A.T.* (1922), p. 126 f.

[2] My *Hermeneutik des A.T.* with special examination of modern problems (1916), p. 76 f.

[3] Genesis ii. 4*b*., J., etc.; viii. 22, J, etc.; xi. 7, J, etc.

history of religion, which they have actually attained? Wellhausen was constrained to admit more than once in print, that he could give no satisfactory answer to the question "Why, e.g., Chemosh of Moab had not become the God of righteousness and the creator of heaven and earth!" [1] But the men who represented the true religion of Israel *were able to give that satisfying answer*, and as the oldest of the prophetic writers recognised Jahve as the director of human destinies, who, e.g., had led the Philistines out of Caphtor (Crete) (Amos ix. 7), and himself rested on an earlier knowledge of this truth, we have sure warrant for this conclusion only, that the ancient prophetic religion of Israel received from its very cradle the power to become both a monotheistic and a universal faith (Gen. xii. 3*b*). The incomparable might of Jahve, as displayed at the Red Sea (Exod. xv. 11; xviii. 11), helped to confirm the belief in His unique character and at last in His Divine Unity.

(*b*) In the second place it is maintained with regard to a so-called popular religion of Israel, that the *moral* side of its conception of God was imperfect. Supporters of this view claim that they prove it in various ways. The chief paths which have recently been struck out with this goal as objective are the following:

(*a*) Jahve has of late been frequently conceived of as "a weather god," and here is the argument on which this notion is based.[2] We are told that this interpretation "best explains the terrible character which often expressed itself in outbursts of nature, of the Jahve of the Mosaic and post-Mosaic tradition." In accordance with that idea men thought that Jahve manifested himself as a devouring fire (Exod. ix. 3, etc.), and "that in expressing his existence he was sometimes dependent on stormy moods and wild

[1] Wellhausen, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 4 (1906), p. 15.
[2] E.g. Kittel, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, vol. ii. (1917), p. 463.

outbreaks of passion." But apart from the fact that in Exodus ix. 3 there is no allusion to fire, flames and fire are often mentioned as forms of manifestation under which the Divine Spirit reveals itself, and is it then so absolutely unthinkable that in the vibrations which emanate from the Divine Spirit a supernatural fire should flame forth (Isa. lx. 1, 19), just as the earthly light is borne to us on ether-waves? Surely not, for Hamlet said rightly—

> There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

In any case the modes *of manifestation* chosen by the Divine Being who disclosed Himself to men for the purpose of revelation are matters wholly different from the *nature* of His Being, and it is none the less a mistake to confuse them because many writers have in recent years fallen into this error.[1] If logic had not saved them from confounding the two things they might have been warned by the narrative of the Divine manifestation to Elijah at Horeb (1 Kings xix. 11 f.). For in that passage we are repeatedly told "Jahve was not *in* the wind, not *in* the earthquake, and not *in* the fire." But we do not read anywhere "Jahve was *not the* wind, or *the* fire." The God of the Old Testament religion stands everywhere behind and *above* nature, but He is *not a part of nature.*

Along with the modern notion, with which we have dealt above, that the God of the Mosaic religion was conceived of as a storm-god, we may examine also another idea of recent origin, that the God of the Israelitish *popular religion* was carried into battle "in the Ark," and that when the Ark was borne through the land, "the people" were obliged to draw back in reverence, lest they should "come too near to that God who was like a devouring fire, and

[1] Their names and the passages in their works may be found in my *Theologie des A.T.*, pp. 132, 169.

should thus expose themselves to some terrible misfortune." Thus it happened to the people of Beth-Shemesh (1 Sam. vi. 19 f.), and in after times to others (2 Sam. vi. 6–10).[1] But these assumptions, which are current in our own day, are defective in one small particular. They are not true. For the Ark of the Covenant was placed by the Philistines on a cart (1 Sam. vi. 11) without any catastrophe befalling them. Nor did the Levites who took down the ark from the cart (ver. 15) suffer any ill result. So we see that a certain group of modern Old Testament commentators are making a wholly futile attempt when they seek to prove that the Ark exercised a "magical" influence, which destroyed, *without reference to their special religious tenets*, those men who dared to approach it too closely.

But is it not stated that in Beth-Shemesh "70 men and 50,000 men" were smitten, "because they had looked into the ark of the Lord" (1 Sam. vi. 19)? We remark first that an exaggeration of the figures has crept into this passage, for in the original we have the single inclusive figure, as in the whole of ancient Hebrew literature, in which the smaller figure, without "and," is placed before the larger.[2]

In the second place the text speaks not of fear or awe, but of "looking into" the ark, and this expression suggests, according to its common use (Gen. xxxiv. 1, etc.), a curious and staring examination of the ark, which was naturally carried out in a profane spirit. The narrator has therefore in his mind an *impious* action, an insult committed against religious feeling, as the cause of the death of a number of persons. This view of the text is the only explanation which fits the case. The facts as we find them in 2 Samuel

[1] Stade, *Biblische Theologie des A.T.*, vol. i., § 34, and others.

[2] This is proved by a comparison of all the figures of the Old Testament in my *Historisch-Kritischen Lehrgebäude der hbr. Spr.* vol. ii., p. 223.

vi. 6–10 were of a similar nature. For in that passage we do not read that "the" men who approached the ark of the covenant were slain as by a galvanic battery. The house of Obed-Edom, to whose custody the ark was committed, actually received a blessing (v. 11 f.). The person who was killed on that occasion had irreligiously supposed that *he* was the man who must protect the ark.

The ancient narrative, as we see, knows nothing of the wide-spread modern assumption that the God Jahve, who was bound up with the ark of the covenant, made the men who approached him, without regard to their piety or impiety, the victims of his power or of his caprice. Modern critics were the first to suggest that the God of an alleged *popular religion* of Israel was *a natural force which was liable to volcanic outbursts.*

Ed. König.

(*To be concluded.*)

THE SO-CALLED "POPULAR RELIGION OF ISRAEL" (Concluded).

(*β*) BUT some of the newer writers believe that from many other passages of the Old Testament they can prove that the conception of the Deity which prevailed in the alleged popular religion of Israel was a *non-ethical* idea. They fancy they can discover in the character of this divinity an unjust partiality and a blindly raging anger.

In the *first* place, the non-moral nature of Jahve is supposed to have revealed itself in *envy* as against man. But in Genesis iii. 22*b*, the words, "lest he put forth his hand and take of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever," should be completed by a preceding clause, "we must prevent" (such a thing occurring).

It was a penal judgment of God which hindered the human race from creating for itself an immortal existence on earth. The insertion of the words "It is to be feared lest" is an obvious injustice to the Jahvistic narrator, who regarded his God as One who showered upon men a multitude of blessings.[1] Equally fanciful is the suggestion of "envy" as the motive which caused the Divine Judge to punish the disobedience of his subjects (iii. 23 f.). And certain writers [2] completely misconceive the view of the Divine Being held by the narrator of Genesis xi. 1–9, who looked up to his God as world-creator and universal judge

[1] vii. 16*b*, "And the Lord shut him in."

[2] Cf. my *Kommentar zur Genesis* (1919), in loc.

(vi. 5 ff.; ii. 4*b* ff.) when they attribute to him the thought that his God intervened in human affairs out of "fear" lest he might lose some of his "power." Those who would interpolate such notions into the early narratives are *dragging down* the faith in God which these ancient writers held from the moral into the physical sphere.

We note in the *second* place that the idea of Israel as God's *chosen people* is frequently used to suggest the non-moral nature of the God of the Hebrew "popular religion." [1] But how, we ask at the outset, can the idea of choice be suggested as a characteristic of the "popular religion" of Israel? That idea does indeed govern the *rightfully established* religion of the Hebrew race. How, then, is it possible to deduce from the Divine choosing of Israel the idea that the God of that race was on a sub-moral level? The fundamental law of *an equal balance between rights and duties* [2] was enforced with noteworthy strictness towards Israel. How clearly we see this also from passages in the oldest prophetic writer! For scarcely has Amos said to Israel in the name of his God: "I have chosen you alone out of all the families on earth as my people," when he adds immediately, "Therefore will I punish you for all your misdeeds."

The people of Israel had no smoother destiny than other nations. We find that in their history rejoicing over the special relationship of their race with God is often drowned in the grief caused by the fact that Israel's religious unfaithfulness had called down a grave penalty inflicted by God. To sum up, the impartial student is constrained to accept the following verdict. The plan, by which a new path in

[1] See especially Kittel in *Judenfeindschaft oder Gotteslästerung?* (1914), p. 34 f.

[2] Wisdom vi. 7, "For the man of low estate may be pardoned in mercy, but mighty men shall be searched out mightily." Luke xii. 48, "To whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required."

the history of salvation was opened up by the call of Abraham, was conceived by the Divine Ruler with a grace and wisdom which demand our deepest reverence. The true religion was destined to take root in a nursery (cf. Isa. v. 1–7) and to grow into a mighty tree, before it was transplanted into the wider world of nations where it must bid defiance to all the storms of human civilisation.

In the third place, many recent writers believe they can establish the non-moral character of the God of an alleged popular religion of early Israel, by pointing to various passages in which we read of the Divine *anger*. These passages, in their opinion, indicate that the wrath of Jahve burst forth without any definite cause, and therefore resembled a capricious ill-humour or the foaming of stormy sea-waves. Therefore we find sentences like these in their writings: "Jahve is a mighty, incalculable being," [1] or "Jahve is like an oriental ruler, who chooses and rejects his favourites according to his caprice," [2] or, "Jahve has his outbursts of rage just as men have; his wrath breaks forth occasionally without any particular cause, or at least any cause that we can discern." [3] It is high time indeed that we should inquire how far such statements are justified.

Examples of such a wrath without motive are discovered by these writers first of all in the two passages, 1 Samuel vi. 19 f., and 2 Samuel vi. 6 f., with which I have dealt above, but the main proof for such "unmoral" anger is supposed to lie in 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 ff. A recent commentator on that passage says: "The narrator assumed that Jahve provoked King David to sin, and thus we have a confirmation of the Latin saying, 'Whom the gods wish to ruin they first drive mad.' In fact, Jahve incited David to

[1] Stade, *Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments*, i. (1905), § 31, 1.
[2] Meinhold, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes* (1916), p. 23.
[3] Kittel, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, ii. (1917), p. 296.

evil." [1] But what are the true facts about 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 ff. ?

In that passage we read, "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them,[2] saying, Go number Israel and Judah." From this numbering of the people, as we know, there resulted heavy guilt for David, and a terrible misfortune for his people. But did not Jahve's wrath actually precede the human sin ? No, for the currently accepted affirmative reply to this question is due to the neglect of two parts of the text. Neither the expression, "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled," nor the words "against Israel" are allowed for in the interpretation of the passage which is now usually accepted. The words in 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 carry this meaning : The divine anger which was aroused against Israel, to which people David belonged, showed itself in action, as already mentioned in the reference to a famine in xxi. 1, so here again on the occasion of the census of Israel undertaken by David, and in the calamity which befell David and Israel after that event. Let us look at the separate parts of 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 ff. in order.

The usual meaning of the word "anger" leads us to conclude that the divine anger against Israel (the people and David) there mentioned was caused by Israel's wrong-doing. For when "anger" is mentioned, we naturally think—unless decisive proof to the contrary is given—of a reaction against some kind of conduct which, in the view of the one whose anger is aroused, was contrary to duty, and so un-moral. But it is not only the customary use of the word "anger" in human affairs which contradicts the

[1] Kittel, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, vol. ii. (1917), p. 463.

[2] The translation "in eis" (Vulg.), "among them" (Luther), is wrong. The correct rendering is given, e.g., by H. P. Smith in *I.C.C.* "against them."

latest interpretation of the expression "anger" as it occurs in 2 Samuel xxiv. 1. There is another point which has not been noticed. Even in earlier times Israel traced back the wrath of the divine being to its cause in some wrong-doing on their own part, and they sought to appease him by intercessions and sacrifices.[1]

Passages from these older writings are sufficient in themselves to prove that there is no justification for regarding anger, when attributed to a personality,[2] as a physical process, like the eruption of a volcano.

But in that reference to anger (the word which forms the subject of the sentence in 2 Samuel xxiv. 1), is it quite impossible to prove that the true meaning is "a righteous reaction against the wrongdoing of someone"? Our opponents think so, because of the *mode in which that anger realised itself in action*. They have this in mind when they say that, according to 2 Samuel xxiv. 1, "Jahve incites the man who has incurred his wrath to a presumptuous act, in order that the guilty one may afterwards incur punishment."[3] But the facts are very different, as I proceed to show.

As the wrath of Jahve, which had been kindled at an earlier date against Israel, manifested itself in the sending of a famine on that people (xxi. 1), so the continuing anger of Jahve expressed itself in the fact that he provoked David, who belonged to the race of Israel, and was therefore with them an object of the Divine displeasure, *against them* (Israel),[4] so that he undertook to number the people. The meaning

[1] Gen. xviii. 20 f., 30 J; Ex. xxxii. 11 f. JE; Josh. vii. 1, 11.

[2] Jahve is admitted to be a personality even by e.g. Knudson, *The Religious Teaching of the Old Testament* (1919), p. 50 f.

[3] It is thus that Kittel, ii., p. 296 f., expresses the view now widely accepted.

[4] Such inner separation between Israel and its rulers is often met with (Isa. iii. 12, etc.).

is that this wrath, which was about to proceed to inflict punishment, caused the king, as the result of a wrong ambition *of his own*, to conceive a wrong idea. The purpose of his plan was by finding out the number of the population through a census to lay the foundation of a standing army which might serve him in offensive wars. This was in entire contradiction to the task rightfully belonging to a king of Jahve's people. The correctness of our view, that the decision to number the people must be regarded as the result of a *personal* ambition of David, may be established by certain words in the text, *which have been neglected by recent critics*. The words are those of verse 10*a*, "And David's heart smote him after he had numbered the people." He was therefore fully conscious, as he definitely says in verse 10*b*, that the measure he had carried out was a breach of his duty as king of *this* nation, for the ideal of Israel's king was that he should feel himself merely the representative of the heavenly ruler of the Israelitish race, whose task it was to aid in carrying out the plan of His *Divine* kingdom. A further proof lies in the fact that a prophet was commissioned (vers. 11–13) to reprove the king for his wrongdoing and to announce his punishment.[1]

But the Divine wrath actually punished the rest of the people along with David. Must we accept the view so widely held nowadays that an innocent victim was plunged into misfortune? No; this charge against God rests in the main on neglect of the statement in the text, that the Divine wrath continued to be kindled *against Israel*, and that there was a cause for the punishment inflicted on the people (xxiv. 1*a*, *b*). The use of the census as the instrument by which the penalty was inflicted may be understood

[1] According to the modern view of 2 Sam. xxiv. 1, the prophet Gad would have had to threaten punishment for a sin which *God* had caused in David.

as meaning that the king was made ashamed of his *own* wrong act by the sight of the calamity called down upon his people in connexion with his deed. Through this shame and remorse he was to be cured for the future of his wrong tendency to restrict the freedom of his people, and to embark on a policy of conquest.

The divine purpose in associating the numbering of the people with the penalty inflicted upon them was fully attained in the case of David. For the narrative tells us that David himself pleaded with God for mercy on his people (v. 14*b*).

There is a complete misapprehension of historic reality, when the act of Divine wrath carried out in 2 Samuel xxiv. is represented as a deed which "a moral God" would not commit (Kittel). Is there any justification for quoting 1 Chronicles xxi. 1 in support of that idea? The common explanation is that according to 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 "Jahve himself" provoked King David to number the people, but in the parallel passage "Satan"; [1] and it is added that in earlier times in Israel "evil itself was regarded as coming within the all-embracing sphere of divine activity." [2] But as the preceding argument has proved that these assumptions cannot be founded on 2 Samuel xxiv. 1, neither can they be proved from Amos iii. 6,[3] where evil is regarded as a means of education or as the rod of divine chastisement. The same thing applies to 2 Chronicles xxi. 1. For the relationship between the two passages should be understood as follows:

In 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 and all similar passages (Judges ix

[1] e.g. Curtis says in the *I.C.C.* on 1 Chron. xxi. 1, "The Chronicler desired to remove the offence caused by the statement that Yahweh was the direct instigator of an act portrayed as sinful."

[2] Kittel in the *Exegetischen Handbuch*, on Isa. xlv. 7.

[3] And other passages, all of which are examined in my *Theologie des A.T.*, p. 239.

23, etc.), the meaning, in the first place, is simply that God worked in such a way as that human sin *brought its own penal consequences*. And secondly, it is a mistake to ascribe this idea to the so-called popular religion of Israel.[1] The error is proved by the fact that this very working of God, by which human sin brings its own penal consequences, is distinctly proclaimed in Isaiah vi. 9 f. It is an error, I remark thirdly, to explain 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 as if "Jahve himself" were the subject of the sentence, and even as objectively viewed this is not without importance. For the words of the passage read, "And the wrath of Jahve continued to burn against Israel" (2 Sam. xxiv. 1), but these words are replaced in 1 Chronicles xxi. 1 by "And Satan stood up against Israel" (Eng. Ver. xxii. 1). Therefore the *wrath* of Jahve in this later passage is replaced by an intermediate being, as in the later post-prophetic age divine rewards, to a much greater extent than at an earlier period, are represented as transmitted through angels. The doctrine of these intermediate beings was very widely accepted in later times.[2] And it is certainly not without interest that the Hebrew word for "anger" ('Aph), which we find in 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 and elsewhere, was employed later on as a personification,[3] and that is not very unlike the replacement of "anger" by "adversary" in 1 Chronicles xxi. 1. We see then from all this that the comparison of 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 with 1 Chronicles xxi. 1 yields nothing whatever in support of the theory that the *anger* of Jahve mentioned in the former passage was a non-moral form of divine activity.

[1] As is done, e.g., by Kittel, *Judenfeindschaft*, etc., p. 56.

[2] In my *Theologie des A.T.*, § 63 treats of this "transcendentalisation of God."

[3] According to the Bab. Nedarîm, xxxii.*a*, 'Aph, "anger," and Chema, "burning wrath," came as ministers of vengeance to Moses in the inn because of the neglect of circumcision (Ex. iv. 24).

I think I have shown in the preceding argument with sufficient clearness that the title "popular religion of Israel," which recent writers have introduced into the history of that race, is not only entirely misleading as a form of expression, but is wholly without justification in the sources. For certain passages in the Old Testament books which are introduced without unfavourable comment cannot in any way be regarded as forming part of a "popular religion of Israel," and the other passages in these books, which have recently been brought together in order that they may be marked as belonging to the *popular religion*, bear a very different meaning in the original.

III.

An unjust estimate of the cultural value of the so-called popular religion of Israel.

Many modern Old Testament critics have not even been satisfied with the zealous efforts indicated in the preceding pages to create a great and splendid position for this "popular religion." They have advanced a step further. Numerous efforts have been made by them to establish for this "popular religion"—the creation of their own fancy—a high importance and a shining rank in the history of civilisation. In pursuit of this aim, these writers ascribe to the popular religion a remarkable place, as I shall show, in the intellectual development of Israel and of the human race as a whole.

1. They represent the popular religion of Israel as the *seed-plot* out of which grew the higher religion of that people.

But (*a*) was the so-called popular religion in any way the *negative* point of departure of the Old Testament religion? Some writers are inclined to give an affirmative answer to this question on the assumption that "the great prophets

were enemies of civilisation." [1] On this idea is based that assertion which we find in some recent publications that the "Bedouin-ideal" was the parent of the prophetic religion of Israel.[2] But this opinion finds no support in the sources. Did not the first patriarch pitch his tent near towns such as, e.g., the capital of the king of the Philistines (Gen. xx. 1 ff.) ? Did not the patriarchs carry on agricultural labours, build houses, and drink wine ? [3] Are not admiring glances cast at the rings and bracelets destined for Isaac's bride (Gen. xxiv. 22 ff.) ? Is the cultivation of the arts forbidden anywhere in the Old Testament ? No (Ex. xxxi. 3; Ps. xlv. 9, etc.); it is only the degenerate use of these arts which is hateful (Amos iii. 15, etc.). Elijah took refuge in solitude only when he was in imminent danger of death (1 Kings xvii. 3 ff.), and no prophet defended the three principles of the true Bedouin : Build no houses, sow no fields, plant no vineyards (Jer. xxxv. 7).

Even in the pictures of the future blessed age we find the words : "And they shall sit every man under his vine" (Micah iv. 4, etc.). Therefore there was only a contrast between the principles of the Bedouins, as followed by the Rechabites, and the prophetic religion of Israel ; *there was no causal connexion.*

(*b*) Was the Old Testament religion the *positive* fruit of the Israelite national genius ? This question has often of late been answered in the affirmative by those who put the people of Israel on precisely the same level as the Semites as a whole and apply to Israel the theory of Renan that the Semites reached the idea of *monotheism* through a peculiar concentration of thought.[4] But we reply in the first place

[1] G. Wildeboer, *Jahvedienst und Volksreligion in Israel*, p. 31.

[2] See especially Budde, and so on to Edwin Albert in the *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1913), p. 19.

[3] Gen. xxvi. 12 ; xxxvii. 7 ; xxxiii. 17 ; xxxviii. 11 ; xxvii. 25.

[4] Renan, *Études d'histoire religieuse*, 3rd edition, p. 66.

that no Semitic tribe possessed a monotheistic religion, for even among the Edomites there are proofs of three gods, Hadal, Ba'al and Kaush.[1] And secondly the patriarchal religion of Israel in especial was not a product of the national gifts and disposition. The acceptance of such a theory is made impossible by a peculiar characteristic in the religious history of Israel, to which sufficient attention has not yet been given. It consists in the frequent efforts made by large sections of the people to sever themselves from the religion of their fathers. How thrilling, e.g., is the complaint: "Go to the west and go to the east, and see if there hath been such a thing!" (Jer. ii. 10–13). See first, that is to say, whether any other nation has surrendered its gods, and next whether any other race, like Israel, has changed a precious religious possession for one which was of no value. "Hath a nation changed their gods, which yet are no gods, but my people have changed their glory for that which doth not profit." Other ancient peoples turned only in the later period of unbelief to a mixed religious worship (Syncretism). In Israel, on the other hand, we have constantly before us the spectacle of a people which even during the period of unbroken religious faith rejected the God of their fathers, and leaned towards other cults. This peculiar phenomenon can be fully explained only by the fact that the ideals of Old Testament religion contradicted the natural tendencies of Israel. It follows then that the so-called popular religion, with its soothsaying, its idol-worship and its image-worship, was indeed a product of the natural inclinations of Israel, but the Old Testament religion was at the opposite pole from this "popular religion," *and not its daughter.*[2]

[1] Gen. xxxvi. 38 f.; *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek,* ii. 20 f., 148 f.; κοζέ in Josephus, *Antiquitates,* xv. 7, 9.

[2] So keen a critic as A. Kuenen has made this admission: "The religion of the prophets cannot with any fairness be called national; it was much

(*c*) A distinct shade of that newer opinion which has been examined above is the suggestion that the Old Testament prophets were "spokesmen of Israel's national genius." [1] What a stupid misunderstanding of the facts! We can hardly imagine a sharper contrast than that which separated the prophets whom the people called "its wise men" (Isa. xxix. 10, 14), from the prophetic line of whom the Divine voice says in Jeremiah vii. 25: "Since the day that your fathers came forth out of the land of Israel unto this day I have sent unto you all the prophets, who are *my* servants." Failure to understand so clear a contrast as this is possible only to critics who allow themselves to talk about the religious history of Israel, but refuse the trouble necessary for a careful study of the distinction between the two classes of prophets. The essential factors of this distinction may be set out as follows:

(*α*) The popular prophets are men who follow their own spirit (Ezek. xiii. 3), i.e. who allow themselves to be guided by their own ambitions. (*β*) They follow that which they have not seen (xiii. 3), i.e. they rely upon visions which they have imagined for themselves. They draw their wisdom also from dreams, for they say, "I have dreamed, I have dreamed" (Jer. xxiii. 25, etc.). In a word, they have derived the content of their teachings from their own mental workshops, for they give forth "the deceit of their own heart"; i.e. the fantastic images of their own imagination form the subject of their discourse (v. 26). They are, therefore, "prophets that prophesy out of their own hearts" (Ezek. xiii. 2, etc.). Writers who, in spite of all this, regard the *opponents* of these "people's prophets" as "spokesmen of Israel's national genius," disregard with careless inatten-

more than that. It came not from Israel, but from God." (*National Religion*, etc., p. 92.)

[1] Friedrich Delitzsch, *Die grosse Täuschung*. Part II. (1921), p. 26.

tion the utterances of the Old Testament prophets, and ignore especially the plaintive "woe-passages" of Isaiah, in which the prophet holds up to shame all sophistical perversions and all self-delusion (v. 20 f.). There is, unfortunately, a well-marked tendency among many modern writers on the religious history of Israel to ignore the sources of that history, and to build up a structure which has no other foundation than their own fancy and prejudice.

(*d*) But can it be said that the higher religion of Israel proceeded at least *relatively* from the "popular religion"? Some would have us think so, for they claim that "Jahveism *borrowed* many things from the popular faith."[1] But the offering of sacrifices, which is mentioned (loc. cit.) as the first of these borrowed goods, could only by a mistaken "appearance of justification" be regarded as a factor of the "popular religion." For sacrifice was the involuntary expression of the human heart when it was moved by thankfulness or by the longing for peace with God.[2] This feature of the universal religion of mankind was taken into the circle of its ideas by the distinctive religion of Israel, since that religion was in no sense so limited as to dread any point of contact with the common piety of mankind, and the means by which the spirit of worship had found expression.[3] The same holds good of prayer, that spontaneous mode of intercourse between the human soul and the Divine sphere; and also of blessing, the building of altars, and so forth. Even if the Nature-feasts in gratitude for the beginning and the successful ingathering of the harvest were still celebrated in the legitimate religion of Israel, it is a mistake

[1] Wildeboer, *Jahvedienst und Volksreligion*, p. 33.

[2] A criticism of modern theories on the origin and idea of sacrifice will be found in my *Theologie des A.T.* (1922), § 86.

[3] On tolerance in the age of the patriarchs cf. Gen. xii. 6, and the passages collected in my commentary on that verse.

to regard these as "a loan from the popular religion."[1] Such gratitude to the Giver of the fruits of the field sprang directly also from the rightful religion of Israel. The adherents of that faith also spoke of "the field which Jahve hath blessed" (Gen. xxvii. 27; Deut. vii. 13, etc.).

We see then that neither negatively nor positively, neither absolutely nor even relatively, was the so-called popular religion the mother of the Old Testament religion. By a baseless attempt to establish the contrary recent critics have sought in vain to enhance the importance of the "popular religion of Israel."

2. There is, however, one more way in which some recent writers have tried to assign a high rank to the so-called "popular religion."

(*a*) They go so far as not only to deny the peculiar religion of Abraham, but to designate the religion which was derived from the "priest" Moses through priests as the "popular religion of Israel"; and they represent the "popular religion" as the *only* religion of ancient Israel.[2] But this theory is in total contradiction to the historic consciousness of Israel. For not only was that consciousness as a whole so clear that it distinguished a pre-Mosaic period from the age of Moses, but it represented with the utmost distinctness the religion of Abraham as separated by its inherent greatness from the popular religion.[3] And further, Moses was regarded in the general consciousness of Israel as a "prophet," and the mediator of a new stage of the revealed religion of the race.[4] The present inclination to regard Moses as a "priest"[5] is one of the symptoms of that

[1] Wildeboer, loc. cit., p. 35.

[2] Ed. Meyer, *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine* (1912), p. 41 and others.

[3] Gen. xii. 1; xx. 7; xxxi. 5 ff.; Josh. xxiv. 2 f.

[4] Ex. iii. 1 ff.; Deut. xviii. 15; Hosea xii. 16; Jer. vii. 25, etc.

[5] Ed. Meyer, loc. cit., as Deborah, who is called a prophetess in Judges

modern tendency I have mentioned above to build up, apart from the sources, a new structure on one's own ideas and assumptions. Even the Jahvistic narrator is erroneously described in the work I have quoted as a representative of the popular religion. For this historian, too, regarded the Mosaic religion as founded on a prophetic experience of Moses (Exod. iii. 2 f., 7 f.). He too defines the worship of the golden calf as an act of perversity (xxxii. 7 ff.). Thus he protests most clearly and decidedly against a main part of that religion which *might* be named the popular religion (*see* above under Part I.). The failure to distinguish between the lines of Israel's religious development which are clearly separated from each other in the sources is a fundamental error in many recent works on the history of that people.

(*b*) But there are unhappily yet other indications of this modern eagerness to assign to the "popular religion of Israel" a high place in the religious development of that people, and in the records of ancient civilisation as a whole. The most important of these attempts may be thus briefly set forth.

In the first place, Hezekiah's defence of the prophetic religion in opposition to the "popular" belief (2 Kings xviii. 4) is supposed to have been the work of a "reform party" (Ed. Meyer, p. 48), and Josiah's intervention (xxiii. 1 ff.) in favour of the sole worship of Jahve is described as an "innovation" (p. 52). From such expressions we are clearly meant to assume that the "reformers" were not, as the original sense of the word implies, restorers of the old and true religion, men who gave back to their people the genuine faith of Moses and the prophets, but merely the setters-up of a *new* kind of religion. How entirely such

iv. 4 is called a "priestess," by Kautzsch in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, vol. v., p. 651*b*.

critics misconceive the prophets of the eighth century, and the men who followed their teaching!

Amos *began* his message by representing Jahve as the self-evident God of Israel, a fact which has been strangely neglected by some recent writers! Hosea appealed simply for loyalty to that religion which had been founded in the youth of his race, when Jahve led them by the hand of Moses out of their captivity in Egypt (xi. 1; xii. 14). Both prophets appealed to ancient legal sanctions.[1] How could lawgiver and accuser have been combined in the same person! In a word, these men wished, in the first place, to be *restorers*, but not innovators. So it was with all those Israelites who trod the path marked out for them by these prophets. But in writings of our own day the fight against polytheism which once more received official favour under Manasseh (*ca.* 696–641), as we see from 2 Kings xxi. 1 ff., is pronounced an "innovation."[2] The historical sources are simply trodden under foot! For if there is any principle which stands forth clear and distinct from the ancient religion of Moses and the prophets it is that of worship due from man to the One Eternal God. Can we not hear the echo of that teaching in the Song of Deborah (Judges v. 11), which is admittedly an ancient document, and in the story of Gideon, who won the honourable title Jerubbaal, because he had stood up for Jahve? Yet there are writers of the present day who use the word "innovation" to describe the defence of that principle in later times!

In the second place, this religion, which is supposed to have been introduced at a later stage, is not only treated in contemptuous language as "an innovation," but is even regarded as a *less important* kind of worship in comparison

[1] Amos ii. 4; Hosea iv. 6; viii. 12.

[2] By Steuernagel, among others, *Einleitung ins A.T.* (1912), p. 260.

with the popular religion. For when reference is made to King Josiah's struggle against the religious regulations of Manasseh, we are scornfully reminded that Josiah "came to the throne as a boy" (Ed. Meyer, p. 50). What careless reading of the text is here disclosed! For how does the circumstance of Josiah's youth at the time of his accession explain the fact that *eighteen years* later he identified himself with the efforts of this alleged "reform-party"? And the high valuation which is placed on the "popular religion" of Israel in the passage to which I have referred has against it the facts of the history of civilisation in its wider compass. For the popular religion which such authors seek to patronise is proved to be of minor importance in the spiritual development of mankind by the mere fact that its adherents often inclined towards an orgiastic, degenerate type of worship, which included even temple-prostitution (Hosea iv. 10–13, etc.). The true religion of Israel, on the contrary, represents the victory of mankind over polytheism and image-worship, sexual differentiation of the deity, and so forth. It seems hardly possible that any difference of opinion should exist as to whether this victory implies an ascent to a higher stage of human civilisation! The depreciation of the religious stage attained by the prophetic religion of Israel is, moreover, all the more unjust because it is in direct contradiction to the view which is held, e.g., about the religious achievement of Zarathustra. What high praise is accorded to him, because he "cleared the thoughts of the ancient Iranic religion, broadened it out to a world-embracing association and, above all, deepened and spiritualised it from the ethical standpoint." [1] We may surely grant at least this much to the leaders of Israel who as heralds of God achieved far more in relation to the true "popular religion" of their race, that they desired to lead their people upward on the

[1] H. Oldenberg in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i., iii. 1 (1906), p. 81.

open stairway of the spirit. We must not rob these men of the honour which belongs to them because they stood high above polytheism, idolatry, astrology (Jer. x. 2, etc.), and temple-prostitution. It is time that our modern critics ceased taking the part of those who sank to a far lower level!

There is a third fact which illustrates the singular tendency of some recent writers to put a high value on the "popular religion." In defence of that religion, these critics excuse the defection of Manasseh to the gods of Assyria and Babylonia, and they say, "If Jahve in the long run had not shown himself more powerful than the gods of Ashur, was it not obviously the right thing to give him his dismissal?"[1] But to present such conduct as right for *Israelites* could only be possible if they are credited with extreme shortsightedness in their judgment of Divine world-government. On the ground of Israel's historic experience, men like Samuel were lifted high above the thought that a national defeat must be traced to the weakness of the old Saviour-God. Misfortunes, in their view, came as punishments, and as means of divine discipline and education (1 Sam. vii. 1 ff.); and so they remained faithful to the God of their fathers. My remarks on Kittel's words, above cited, might be repeated as regards the following sentence: "It is a matter of course that Manasseh rendered divine worship also to the chief gods of Assyria."[2] In such words (1) the ancient commandment—"Thou shalt have no other gods besides Me"—is simply set aside, and (2) it is taken as a matter of course that a man should *break faith* with his God. On the same principle it would seem a perfectly natural thing that

[1] These almost incredible words will be found in Kittel's article "Manasseh," in the *Protestantischen Realenzyklopädie*, 3rd edition, vol. xii., p. 15.

[2] Meinhold, *Einführung in das Alte Testament* (1919), p. 155.

a Christian living under heathen rule should deny his Saviour! Oh no, all praise be to you, valiant martyrs of the time of Manasseh, the Maccabees, and ages following!

It has been my painful duty to show, in the preceding article, that the so-called popular religion of Israel is playing a very unfortunate part in the newer interpretation of the Old Testament. Not only is it built up for the most part out of erroneous material, but its cultural value has been greatly over-estimated, and from that mistake has arisen the attempt to place it above the prophetic religion. I venture to hope that this exposition may help to clear away the darkness which supporters of the so-called popular religion of Israel have spread over the religious history of that people.

Ed. König.

A RULING FROM "FIRST PETER."

"In the same way, you wives must be submissive to your husbands, so that even those who will not believe the Word may be won over without a word by the behaviour of their wives, when they see how chaste and reverent you are."—*Dr. Moffatt's translation.*

It would be a great step could we free ourselves from the idea that the Bible, and especially the New Testament, deals with things merely that happened long ago, and in a far-off country, things certainly which cannot be of the same importance to us who know so much that they did not know —who make use of locomotives and the telephone and the airship! And so, although we are all jealous, and very properly jealous, of any departure in public worship from the dignity of the accepted version, and hesitate to disturb the influence of memory and association, still, it is very much to be desired that the meaning of the New Testament could be brought home to us all more closely. One feels this most strongly when he is reading from Holy Scripture a chapter like this in 1 Peter, which deals with matters of personal behaviour. The very quaintness of the language is apt to encourage us to suppose that in a sense it is not to be taken quite literally; that if any one were really to speak seriously to us about such a matter as our daily way of living, he would drop that remoteness and superfineness, and would call things by their proper names. And so we are able to listen to the reading of the Scriptures, and one like myself is even able to read them smoothly and calmly and with none of the uneasiness or shame which they ought to provoke, because, once more, we have heard the passage many a time, and though perhaps the first time we heard it we did feel that it was rather bold and was certainly very true, still, even then, this quaintness—and how when we

give a thing a name we cease thinking about it!—this quaintness helped to turn the edge of the blade, and next time we heard the same passage, we had grown quite accustomed to it and were even on the lookout for its archaic and difficult way of putting things. And yet the fact is, that there is no section of Holy Scripture which read aloud and understood should leave us as it found us: as we listen we ought to be aroused to something—to gratitude, or to fear, or to indignation, or to shame.

The mere reading of this letter is enough to bring home to us the circumstances in which it was written; and the mood at the moment of sensitive and responsible minds in the Church. It would be wrong to say that it is a sad little letter; but it is only the truth to say that it is a very grave and tender one. You would call it a quiet letter. But quietness is not always a sign of weakness or fear. Beneath the surface there is in this letter a firmness and, at the last pinch if it should come, a resource which in the long run will wear out its enemies. A hammer may strike a patient anvil day in and day out for years, and yet one day it is the hammer not the anvil that breaks. Still, it is evident that the Church has had a shaking, and that for the time being she has withdrawn within herself, falling back from the face of the world upon her own private faith and obedience and her own supernatural motives. There is no boasting, no pride, no very robust confidence that the world is likely to change its ways. What then is the Church to do, at such a time, and when the world presents such an aspect? This First Epistle of St. Peter is the answer which an Apostle gave to the Church of his day; it is, I believe, the very answer to the same question in our own day.

One might put the wisdom and guidance given here in a few sentences. It is as though the writer had said: "This is no time for loud or rhetorical speech. It is no time for

arguments or disputations to prove that we are right and the world is wrong. It may be that no good would come even if a prophet arose and fulminated against the sin and madness of the time. Besides, the Lord has not given us a prophet; and this must mean that the heart of the people has waxed gross so that they would not hear a prophet were he to lift up his voice. It may be that things are beyond the stage when a people can see God and be afraid. What then are we to do in such a world and in the midst of such surroundings?" And his answer is simply this: "We are to become the very best people that we can become. In the very matters on which the world has grown slack, we must again become severe and strict. Perhaps we were wrong in supposing that what outsiders needed in order to join us was some kind of argument that ours is the only honourable way. Perhaps there we had forgotten that when our Lord came to earth He did not argue with men, certainly not with hostile or cynical or frankly worldly men; all that He asked of the world wherewith to save it was a Cross whereon to die. We had forgotten that, we had forgotten that the only way even to rebuke the world is to show the world some finer thing. When God wants to put away the darkness, He does not denounce the darkness; He causes the Sun to rise."

Such precisely is our function in the world; to be as lights shining in a dark place. As the world grows worse we must grow better. If it be true as Sir Oliver Lodge has observed that men to-day are not worrying about their sins, we must worry all the more about ours. As the world grows coarser, we must grow finer; and on the great matters on which it has ceased to think, we must think the more steadily, lest they perish from the earth. In short, we whom the world looks upon as the representatives of the Christian way must take a new hold of our responsibility

to Him whose name we carry. Outsiders may still remain outside: that after all is their business. They may not like our soberness and the clean happiness which is all that we permit ourselves. Over all that we have no control. But there is one thing which is within our control; we can so conduct ourselves that it will not be in the power of those who are outside our communion to despise us, or to disrespect us. They may not have the courage to confess that the very existence of people like us troubles or rebukes or secretly attracts them; but we certainly ought so to live that they shall never have occasion to jeer at us, and thus to get over a secret uneasiness which the presence of finely-mannered people produces in those who are living as far as they can from the shadow of God.

Let us be known as good workmen, good masters, good servants. Even on matters on which we might be justified in taking no interest—matters of public order and obedience to constituted authority, let us be known as people who are on the side of fairness and are opposed to violence or sedition. Let us so acquit ourselves when life brings us into relation with the outside world and with those who are opposed to us, or who dislike us, that even they shall have no handle or excuse for taking action against us and thus making life more harsh.

For there is little doubt that when this letter was written the Church was passing through one of its bitter times. Perhaps it was Nero, perhaps Domitian, perhaps Trajan who had let loose the powers of the world upon Christians. And this was how those good people behaved, from whose endurance we have inherited whatever moral compunction still intervenes to save the human race.

But it was not only persecution that was threatening that little community which like a frail barque was bearing through troubled waters the finer fortunes of the soul.

For the letter is full of other and more intimate dangers. There were homes where the husband was Christian and the wife pagan. And homes where the wife was Christian and the husband pagan. Now, for practical purposes, it is simply the truth to say that whenever we cease to be Christian we become pagan: so that even in our own day people are either Christian or pagan. For to be pagan is to be natural, and this ends in human beings becoming more natural than it is natural for them to be; and to be Christian is at least to be standing on guard against the encroachments of the natural man. Well, I say there were homes where one was Christian and the other pagan. It would seem that at the time when this letter was written it was the wife for the most part who was Christian. From this fact I incline to conclude that the letter belongs to an early date when Christianity was not more than one or two generations old. For we know that later when Christianity had spread and the Church had become populous and strong—in the course, that is to say, of another eighty to a hundred years, men and women married within the Church, "in the Lord"—the only really tolerable arrangement as one sees when one gives his mind for even a moment to what marriage involves. But at the first it could not be otherwise than that a home might be divided—the one having already become a Christian the other not yet.

On this delicate and fundamental matter the Epistle speaks with a beautiful tenderness, offering in those far-off days the only recommendations which with all our knowledge will ever secure our homes from bitterness or coldness or failure; the only principles also which if they are heartily and lovingly embraced, will make the Christian home everywhere an unanswerable protagonist for Christ. For soon or late the controversy over the Christian faith comes to invade the Christian home; and any coldness on the

part of Christians to their *faith* is registered almost from the beginning in the temperature of their home. Christianity —though it never made the claim—is the true religion of the hearth.

And what are this good man's recommendations? They are very simple.

Speaking to a Christian wife whose husband in matters of religion is not of her way of thinking—to use the phrase—the apostle in effect says: do not make that difference between you a bone of contention. Little good comes of discussion. Christianity is an entire way of life; and goodness is the very sign of it. Be such a wife to your husband, that he will have daily reason to bless whatever it is that makes you what you are. He may reject the message or teaching of Christ. Well even so, do not take that too much to heart. It is not your business to make him a Christian; that is God's business, though He may make use of you.

And then he goes on to say something very human and far-seeing. He says in effect: do not play down to what is low and pagan in your husband, as the pagan women do. It is right that you should be attractive: God who made the flowers loves beauty. But there are heavy languorous flowers, to breathe which is to swoon and to lose one's manhood. There are other flowers of a simple beauty, for which a man thanks God, when he comes upon them; for they stimulate his best manhood, and make him eager for life's tasks. And so do not you help your husband down, but help him up.

* * * * *

To a man who, having become a Christian, is married to a woman not yet Christian, or frankly pagan, the writer uses words which though they are on the surface different, are in their spirit and intention precisely the same. "Ye husbands,

in like manner dwell with your wives "—don't cast them off. Don't say, now that I am a Christian, and she remains a pagan, we cannot dwell together. "Ye husbands, dwell together," stand by one another. Surely your wife is different from all others: and if she is the mother of your children, surely that settles your loyalty for ever. "Ye husbands in like manner dwell together with your wives, according to knowledge, giving honour unto the woman as unto the weaker vessel."

At this point no good woman in our own day need be offended. The words embody no patronage or superiority. The good man who wrote them is simply meaning something which is permanently true and is meaning something which was even terribly true in his own day. For surely it is no disparagement to suggest that a true woman, in the complete fulfilment of her life, is weaker physically than is a man. This weakness is the price of her greatness and divinity, even as the greatness of God is not that He created worlds but that for His sake Christ died upon the Cross.

But the thing precisely which the Apostle is pointing to is something which in those days was terribly true. For in those days a woman had no rights. The devout Jew gave God thanks in public that he was born not a woman. The circumstance which the hostile Jews took hold of at the beginning and upon it built their low insinuations concerning Christian ritual and worship was just this circumstance that from the beginning her sex was never a barrier to a woman's standing alongside a man in the fellowship of Christ.

And so, it is something very tender and beautiful for it is something chivalrous that this epistle asks of every Christian man, who may have a pagan wife. For what he says in effect is: "Stand by her. She has no rights before the Law. She has none to defend her if you do not defend her. She has sorrows and fears, which the outside world never con-

siders, but which we consider; for we Christians must be the friends of all who are in pain. Therefore, stand by her. And remember this too, that you are heirs together of the grace of life. Life passes, all things pass; and nothing remains but the spirit with which we met our life and bore its contradictions."

Such is the breath of this fragment from a deep and early time. I do not know what feelings have come to readers as I have been trying to represent its ideas and principles. I know the feeling that is in my own heart as I conclude. It is this: we talk and talk about our problems, about the haggard and threatening days that are about us and may be in front. But if I could be sure that we who belong to the Christian Church were even now ready to take this quiet and unviolent bit of writing to heart, if I could believe that here and there and everywhere up and down the world, we who are publicly held to be Christian were ready now to practise this plain goodness, I should feel that once again as on the Stormy Sea of Galilee the Voice of Jesus was in the air, and that it was now only a question of days when there would be the beginning of a great calm—not the calm in which men sin and life rots, but the calm in which men bend at the oars and because of their high spirits seem to themselves to reach "immediately" the other side.

* * * * *

For not in the earthquake or in the fire or in the mighty rushing wind is the presence of God and the healing of the nations; but in the still small voice; in

> "... the unassuming things that hold
> A silent station in this beauteous world."

JOHN A. HUTTON.

PAUL THE PAGAN.

Exegesis and criticism in days gone by have had much to say concerning the versatility of Paul, and have loved to dwell upon the different aspects of his many-sided personality. We have known Paul the Jew, Paul the Pharisee, Paul the Christian, and Paul the Protestant, but it has been reserved for the twentieth century to discover that none of these designations represents what was fundamental in the Apostle's life and character, and that the only title which brings to the surface what he was in the depth of his being is Paul the Pagan.

Astonishing as this statement may appear to be it none the less summarises and brings to a definite point what a very prolific and vigorous type of criticism that is current in our day contends to be the real essence of Paul's religion and teaching.

Germany, through Bousset, Brückner, Böhlig, Heitmüller and Reitzenstein; France, through Loisy; the United States, through Lake and Jackson; and Canada through Morgan (to mention only the most prominent representatives of this critical school), have all contributed in varying degrees to the chorus of voices which acclaim the discovery of Paul the pagan. It will be noticed that British scholarship has neither part nor parcel in this remarkable achievement, although in justice to the United States and Canada it should be remembered that Lake, Jackson and Morgan were ours at no very distant dates and have only "gone out from us."

This new Paul, if somewhat alien to the conceptions we have been accustomed to cherish and exceedingly difficult to understand, is nevertheless decidedly interesting, and is all the more interesting because in the whole realm of

history he is the only personage who has left a deep impress upon the world who, when his outlook and teaching are rightly understood, is the complete and perfect antithesis to what he himself claimed to be !

In every letter of his that has been handed down to posterity, if we except 1 and 2 *Thessalonians*, he is careful to designate himself " the Apostle of Jesus Christ," or " the bond-servant of Jesus Christ," or " the prisoner of Jesus Christ," but we now learn that in thus relating himself so intimately to the Founder of Christianity he completely misapprehended his true position and function, and that he ought to have called himself " the Apostle of Hellenism " or " the slave of paganism." That this is not an unjust or untrue estimate of the considered views of this particular group of scholars is quite manifest from a study of the literature put forth by its constituent members. It is true that no single individual can be saddled with all the vagaries associated with the group as a whole, but the fundamental standpoint of the group is, as a matter of fact, shared by every one of its members, and it is exceedingly difficult to trace any distinction in principle between them.

What this critical estimate of Paulinism when summarised endows us with is a body of presumably Christian doctrine in which there is to be found practically no trace of any relationship to Jesus Christ or of any inheritance from the primitive Apostolic Church, and an expression of belief which is bereft of any original contribution on the part of the Apostle himself with his matchless insight and experience. Pauline Christianity, according to this view, is completely divorced from the historical Jesus and His teaching, and is a mere syncretism composed of elements which are in practically every instance borrowed from pagan religion.

" Paul the pagan " truly reigns supreme and has effectually driven every rival from the field !

And yet before we accept as gospel this new revelation, so revolutionary and so far-reaching in its consequences, with its claim that what was fundamental in that wonderful personality which moved the world was his appreciation and utilisation of pagan religion in its manifold character, there is one vital question that I wish to propound, a question to which I have failed to find a satisfactory reply in the writings of any scholar associated with this particular school of thought. Until this point has been disposed of I am strongly inclined to write "Not proven" over the theory which has been put forth by its sponsors with so much confidence and so great a display of learning.

My question would take the following form: What do we gather from the writings and utterances of St. Paul to have been his fundamental attitude towards paganism?

Upon the answer we find ourselves able to give to this query depends the soundness or the radical weakness of that estimate of Paulinism which we have outlined in the preceding pages, and in the remainder of this paper I propose to enquire, in the light of the Pauline Epistles and other contemporary literature, what the nature of the answer is likely to be.

But before we embark upon our examination of what St. Paul's own utterances reveal concerning his outlook upon paganism there is a preliminary consideration of a more general character which must first be taken into account, because it will materially assist us in creating the right atmosphere in which the subject of St. Paul's attitude towards paganism has to be discussed and will also supply the lines along which the discussion has to be conducted. St. Paul was a Jew and a Pharisee, and we will, therefore, preface our enquiry into his personal attitude with a preliminary question of a wider scope. Is it possible or even probable that a Jew, who was also a Pharisee as well

as a member of the Diaspora, could have been so fundamentally influenced in his religious thought and practice by contemporary paganism as the type of criticism with which we are dealing postulates in the case of St. Paul ?

We will consider first of all the extent to which Judaism, and more especially the Judaism of the Diaspora, was influenced by the Hellenistic world with its wide variety of religious factors. It will be readily granted that the Jew, in spite of his exclusiveness and national limitations, did not entirely keep clear of the strong currents of religious speculation and superstition which streamed from many quarters into the world in which he was placed, and that under the pressure of the spirit of the age a narrow, ritualistic, and sacrificial religion opened wide its gates, made its appeal to humanity as a whole, and definitely proclaimed its mission to become a world-religion. To effect this the more easily Judaism abandoned its linguistic isolation, adopted the *κοινή*, the *lingua franca* of the age, had its Scriptures translated into that language, and used it in its social and religious intercourse. It borrowed freely from the surrounding nations and religions such conceptions and ideas as commended themselves to its judgment, including philosophical speculations, systems of cosmology, beliefs in angels and demons, and it even condescended to the lower strata of the popular belief which concerned itself with superstition, magic and sorcery.

This statement, however, is a closer description of the Jew of the Diaspora than of the Pharisaic Jew of Palestine, who showed himself to be considerably less sensitive to influences from outside than his more cosmopolitan brother. But even in the case of the Judaism of the Diaspora it still remains true that upon all that concerned the Jew and the Jewish faith fundamentally, upon all that made the Jew

what he really was, an alien in a world that was not his own, paganism was entirely without effect. There were three factors which definitely separated the Jew from the world around him : his belief in the One God, who alone is to be worshipped, his claim to be specially related to God by covenant, and his unconquerable faith in the divine source and authority of his Law and Scriptures. Paganism might act upon the periphery of later Judaism, but it never penetrated to the centre and never touched the heart of the Jew's religion. In the matter of his belief in the One God, while Greek philosophers taught a pale monotheism and yet dallied with the naturalistic gods of popular belief, and while every religious cult in the Hellenistic world was content with placing its god as one among many in an all-embracing pantheon, the Jew was adamant on this point, rejected all attempts at compromise, proudly proclaimed the Lord Jehovah as God of all and every other god as false and evil, and patiently endured the scorn and hatred of an indignant world rather than abate a jot of the claim which was dearer to him than life itself.

If his monotheism was the very foundation of the Jew's religious faith, his confidence that the nation of the Jews was God's chosen people, the heir to all the blessings of the covenant and the object of God's special care and providence was hardly less vital. His views on this matter may have been considerably broadened by his contact with a wider world than his own, so that he was now prepared to recognise that the God of Israel was also the God and Ruler of all men, and to acknowledge that the righteous from all nations were to have a place in the Kingdom in which God was to rule without question or hindrance, but even in the approach to and establishment of this Kingdom the nation of the Jews was to hold a central and privileged position. The Jew was to be the

instrument in God's hands to bring the world to His feet, and in His glorious Kingdom it was Israel that was to occupy the thrones in the near neighbourhood of God Himself. No universalistic tendency, strong as it was in that age, touched the core of what was ever the proudest boast and privilege of the Jew, viz., that he alone was a son of Abraham.

On the same plane as the other two postulates, and expressed perhaps with still stronger vehemence, was his firm conviction of the divine origin and authority of the Law in its widest sense, including not only the Law as contained in Scripture, but also a tradition element of infinite variety. On this point, again, Judaism was absolutely immovable. It might dream dreams of becoming a world-wide religion, it might direct all its activities to the enhancement of propaganda, it might compass sea and land to make one proselyte, but it would never concede one single requirement of the ceremonial law or abandon one single custom or usage which separated the Jew from other men for the sake of winning adherents or of rendering Judaism attractive to those who found in Jewish morality and doctrine much that was worthy of admiration. It preferred to fail lamentably in the very purpose it had set before itself, that of becoming a religion of humanity, rather than depart from the strictest following of what it held to be divine in origin and nature and a vital factor in its own religious life.

It is clear, therefore, that in all that was fundamental and essential Judaism remained completely impervious to both the general spirit of the age and to the special influences which operated with such a powerful effect upon other Eastern religions, and this, to say the very least, suggests that what was true of the Jewish nation as a whole and even of the Jew of the Diaspora with his broader outlook

and its more tolerant atmosphere would also be true of St. Paul.

But we can produce, in the person of Philo, a concrete example of the power of the Hellenistic Jew to withstand the disintegrating force of alien ideas, which speaks with even greater conviction than the witness of the Judaism of the Diaspora as a whole.

Philo remains the one Jew who attempted to harmonise systematically Jewish and Greek thought. In all that concerned his outward life he appears as a pure Greek, and to the public at large he was a Greek philosopher and very little more. His literary style and terminology followed Greek patterns, his technical apparatus was that of the Stoa, and even in his treatment of Scripture his method of interpretation was Greek and not Jewish, while his most characteristic doctrine, that of the *Logos*, was derived directly from Greek sources. He exhibits in his writings clear traces of the influence of every spiritual and intellectual force operating in the world in which he lived. The transcendentalism of God, so characteristic of later Greek philosophy as a whole, the psychology of Plato, the Dualism of Persia, Gnostic ideas of the evil of matter, the emphasis upon ecstasy as the highest method of approach to the Divine, so familiar in every Mystery Religion, these and many other elements he held in common with the Hellenistic religious world as a whole, affording clear proof of his sensitiveness to his environment and showing how far he was removed from the normal Jew of his day. The impression of the gulf which separated him from even the wider Judaism of the Diaspora is deepened when we recollect how slight was his influence upon his co-religionists and how soon he was disowned by his own nation, and when we realise that it was his vogue in the Christian Church and not his place in later Judaism that explains the importance

he still retains in the history of religion. And yet Philo, in spite of all that was outwardly Greek and un-Jewish in his character, remained a Jew in the core of his being. Neither Greek philosophy nor Gnostic speculations nor Oriental mysticism had power to transform what was fundamentally Jewish in his belief. His interests, unlike those of the normal Greek, who was mainly concerned with logic and metaphysics, were essentially religious and moral. Greek philosophy might lead him to regard God as inaccessible and incomprehensible, but the God whom he worshipped was not the mere intellectual abstraction of Greek speculation, but a living reality and the highest object of man's adoration and service. Plato may enlist his admiration and remain for him a sacred personality, but it is Moses who occupies the place of honour among the great ones of the world. Moses is the bearer of divine revelation in comparison with whom all other prophets and wise men are but pale shadows. He is high-priest, prophet, king and law-giver, whose writings are absolutely authoritative and contain deep mysterious wisdom in every line and letter.

For Philo Israel is the priest and prophet among the nations of the world and the glory of the future is to be its inheritance. And again the Law is holy, unchangeable and eternal, and is to be held fast even in its literal requirements, because it hath both a body and a soul and the two are essential.

Philo's real Jewish character was never revealed more clearly than when in his old age he headed a deputation of his countrymen to Rome, where he pleaded his nation's cause before the reigning Emperor, Caius.

It is quite clear, therefore, that, even in the case of one who was so far removed from the ordinary Jew as Philo was, the unconquerable instincts of the nation and religion

were never overcome. To all that was fundamental in Judaism, belief in the One God, pride in the privileged position of Israel as God's chosen people, and reverence for the Law Philo proved as true and faithful as the strictest Pharisee of Palestine.

All *a priori* considerations based upon what we know of the ultimate failure of paganism to modify fundamentally the Judaism of the Diaspora as a whole or that of the most typical Hellenistic Jew known to history lead, therefore, to the conviction that it is most improbable that Paul, the Jew and Pharisee, was influenced by his pagan environment to anything like the degree that is assumed by the type of criticism with which we are dealing. A study of what we know of the Apostle's upbringing and surroundings also serves to strengthen this conviction.

The problem of what was the dominant factor in St. Paul's personality, whether Judaism or Hellenism, has been vigorously discussed in recent years and has produced a variety of opinions, ranging from that of Schweitzer, who sees in him the Jew, pure and simple, to that of modern Jewish scholars like Friedländer and Montefiore, who refuse to recognise in Paul a true representative of orthodox Judaism and place him among the renegades from the faith of his fathers. The truth here, as in so many other disputed questions, lies probably somewhere midway between these two extremes. That he was a Jew in all that was fundamental in his being and thought is generally accepted by those who approach the subject free from prejudice and preconceived ideas. It was his Judaism that defined his individuality, and it was what he had learnt in the synagogue at Tarsus and in the school of Gamaliel that constituted the mould in which his thinking was formed and the basis of what we term Pauline theology. But this does not imply that he was not sensitive to his environment or that he

remained entirely impervious to the social and intellectual atmosphere in which he moved during the early years of his life. A powerful, virile, and active mind like that of Paul could not remain dead to the world of culture, morality and religion in which he found himself, and his writings exhibit clear evidence that he was interested in the daily life and public activity of the pagan community around him. Whether he received a specifically Greek education is difficult to decide. A great Pauline authority like Sir William Ramsay strongly contends that the Apostle and his teaching are wholly inexplicable without an education in Greek philosophy (*Cities of St. Paul*, p. 287), and that some of the most prominent factors in his teaching, such as his emphasis on freedom and on the need of education, are to be traced directly to his Greek training. The late Dr. James Adam, in his admirable lectures on *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, also claims for St. Paul a wide knowledge of Plato and his writings and postulates an intimate relation between some Pauline ideas and the teaching of Plato on similar subjects. It is doubtful, however, whether we are justified in attributing to the Apostle a definite training in Greek philosophy, or even in that special form of it, Stoicism, with which he shows the clearest signs of familiarity. He is acquainted with the leading ideas of that system, and has a sufficient knowledge of them to be able to use them as a means of approach to a cultured Greek audience as at Athens. He has also some acquaintance with the Greek poets, and quotes them on one or two occasions, but his writings as a whole do not give the impression that Greek thought and learning had left a deep mark on him or that he had been engaged in any specific study of Greek literature. His acquaintance with them is exactly what we might expect that to be of an intellectual and vigorous mind, living in a community

where Greek philosophy was much in the air and often a subject of discussion by the man in the street who had become familiar with it through the lectures of the wandering preacher often found in the public squares of every Hellenistic city. That he had anything more than a casual knowledge of the pagan religions and cults as they existed in Tarsus is improbable, although here again he could not remain entirely impervious to the religious atmosphere in which he spent many years of his life. As a Jew of the Diaspora and the native of a city in which the Jews occupied a position of privilege he was not so obstinately hostile to paganism in all its aspects as the Jew of Palestine, and was tolerant enough to be able to recognise in Greek morality at its best much that evoked his admiration and respect, and in the law and orderly government of Imperial Rome elements that commanded his loyalty and gratitude. And yet the very fact that he was a Jew would prove an insuperable barrier to any real share in pagan life or any true sympathy with pagan ideals as a whole. It is one of the best established canons of history that environment does not destroy or radically modify national or racial fundamental features, and the Jew of the present day affords the strongest confirmation of the essential truth of the canon. If I may be forgiven a personal illustration, I may state that although I have spent more than two-thirds of my life among entirely English surroundings I still remain in all that is of real moment a Welshman, and shall so remain to the end of my days.

If our estimate of the dominating element in the personality of Paul be correct, and if he remained, in spite of his pagan environment and intercourse with the world, a Jew, then the analogies we have quoted and the experience of history tell strongly against any wide-embracing or profound modification of his basal ideas as the result of his

contact with paganism. But it may be objected here that it is not Paul the Jew, but Paul the Christian, that is in question here, and that what may be deemed impossible or improbable in the case of the Jew may be neither the one nor the other in the case of a Jew who became a Christian. I hope, however, to be able to show that this objection has no real validity and that the factor which differentiated the Apostle from the normal Jew, who still remained a Jew, was not that paganism was able to accomplish in his case what it entirely failed to effect in the case of the latter, but what was inherent in the Christianity which Paul adopted. To put the matter concisely, St. Paul's universalism and his living sympathy with man everywhere and in all the departments of his life arose not from his appreciation of and subjection to paganism, but out of his conviction that Jesus of Nazareth was the Saviour of the world. The influences asserted to have exercised such an overwhelming effect upon St. Paul as practically to convert the Christianity that he inherited into a new religion were present in their full force and operating both upon Judaism as a whole and upon Philo in particular, and yet they failed dismally to modify what was fundamentally and specifically Jewish in either case. Jewish monotheism, Jewish particularism, and Jewish egotism and national pride retained their full vigour and strength in spite of all the denationalising and disintegrating forces of the age. Why should they have been more successful in the case of Paul, the Jew and Pharisee ?

It is true that Judaism aimed with all the zeal at its command to become a world-religion, but steadfastly refused to abandon any jot of its inheritance in order to attain its object, while St. Paul was inspired by a similar mission to conquer the world for Christ, and readily sacrificed much that the Jew obstinately adhered to in order to fulfil

his mission. But I contend that this difference in policy was not due to the fact that Paul surrendered to paganism while the Jew kept his flag flying, but because the inherent character of the religion that he preached made any other course impossible. What the Jew refused to do in response to the challenge of the heathen world Paul would have equally declined, had not the very spirit of Christianity implied a breadth and universalism which far transcended the particularistic narrowness of Judaism. It was the universalism inherent in the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the all-embracing scope of the redemption wrought in Christ that led Paul to see its wonderful capacity to satisfy every true spiritual desire and yearning of the human soul and so to assimilate to itself all that was best in religion, wherever it was found, and it was this vision of the message of Christianity to mankind as a whole that conquered the Hellenistic world, and not the incorporation within itself of pagan elements alien to its own spirit, as our critics assert. The doctrines of Christianity that we specially associate with St. Paul, in the promulgation of which he played the most prominent part, such as the doctrines of the Divinity of Christ, the world-embracing scope of His redemptive power, the spiritual gifts mediated through the sacraments, the mystical union between Christ and the believer, were not principles introduced extraneously into his Christian faith that it might conform to the religious atmosphere prevalent in the pagan world and secure for itself a ready acceptance in that world, but original constituents in Christianity itself from the very beginning of its existence. What St. Paul did for the Christianity he inherited from the primitive Church was to realise how fully this comprehended every religious idea of any real worth current in the pagan religions and how completely it met and satisfied every desire and longing that were

clamant in that pagan sphere. In short, the pagan world had no creative influence upon Pauline Christianity, and all that it achieved was to reveal to the exponents of the religion of Jesus Christ the illimitable and priceless treasures it contained as a religion destined to save humanity in its widest range, and to give to the Church, in the shape of a language intelligible to the world as a whole, a medium of expression, whereby it was able to make the widest appeal to the thought and yearnings of the age. The one substantial debt of the Christian Church in Pauline days to pagan learning and religion consisted in the fact that these supplied it with the language and literary forms with which it could most easily make its approach to the Hellenistic world, and this is a debt which the Church has not been slow to acknowledge or to appraise at its full value.

We shall now proceed to enquire what light the Apostle's own writings throw upon his attitude towards paganism, and, incidentally, to establish the contention that he was not fundamentally or even substantially influenced by pagan religious forms and practices.

(*a*) The most complete statement of St. Paul's estimate of the pagan world is found in *Romans* i., where he enunciates the view that there did exist in the world from the beginning a real perception of God, of His nature, and of His relation to man. By the right application of the faculties bestowed upon him to the study of God's work both in the material universe and in himself man was placed in a position to comprehend the power and divinity of God. But by the deliberate action of man himself the right development of this natural conception of God was prevented, so that he became blinded to the knowledge that was well within his reach. His lawless fancy invented divinities of its own, who left him a prey to his unbridled passions and eventually led him to endow even the gods that he worshipped with his

own degrading lusts and vices. The consequences of this process of deterioration was that God abandoned the self-blinded world and allowed it to continue its downward career unchecked, so that it became the willing victim of that appalling catalogue of passions, natural and unnatural, with which *Romans* i. closes.

Some authorities hesitate to accept the Apostle's dark-coloured description of pagan morality as a perfectly accurate picture of the situation as it really existed. Deissmann, in particular, maintains that this unfavourable impression of the pagan world is based only upon a partial and one-sided view, and that much of the literature from which it is derived reflects the morality of one section of the community, that of the upper and governing classes. He grants, however, that the Apostle's description is true as far as it is an expression of his knowledge of the corruption existing in great cities like Rome and Antioch, but he protests that recent discoveries, in the shape of papyri and ostraka, testify that among the great masses of the people, and more especially in the country districts, many were leading useful, hard-working and honest lives, and that an intimate family feeling and ties of real friendship were a conspicuous element of domestic life among the poor, while there existed, at least among the lower strata of population in the Græco-Roman world, a deep and earnest sense of religion combined with much that made for decency and order. But even if Deissmann's picture be a correct representation of the real situation, and there is no sound reason for distrusting its essential truth, it does not affect the point at issue, because what we are concerned with is Paul's knowledge of pagan life and the impression that this knowledge is likely to have produced upon him, and even Deissmann admits that the Apostle's gloomy outlook is completely justified as far as that world and life were known to him.

If we are to understand St. Paul's view of the pagan world aright we have to bear in mind that for him pagan religion, in its widest range, was completely vitiated by one definite element which constituted its very heart as a living system. At the root of his estimate of paganism and explaining his abhorrence of it lay his hatred of idolatry and his inborn conviction of its fatal influence upon pagan life in general. In his view of the essential absurdity of idol-worship and of its degrading and disintegrating effect upon thought and morality the Apostle was at one with the best minds of the age, but the Greek philosopher's contempt for idolatry was, in the main, a matter of abstract opinion and was based on his perception of the intellectual aberration involved in it. But St. Paul abhorred idolatry with all the hatred at his command and saw in it the worst enemy of mankind because he had studied its actual results in the world around him. "For him it was a system without any redeeming feature, degraded and wholly degrading, leading to a distortion of the whole life of the individual and of society, falsifying the political situation, making the whole fabric of the State unhealthy and the life and thought of the individual diseased and decadent, and so rendering paganism as a whole unequal to the task of reforming and regenerating mankind."

The attitude of the Apostle towards this inherent curse of paganism may be illustrated by many statements scattered throughout the Epistles. It had its root in man's folly and it blossomed forth into the foulest moral and social corruption (Rom. i. 23, 24). Its practical effect was to deprive mankind of all hope and to transform God's world (κόσμος) into a godless chaos (Ephes. ii. 12). Of its terrible harvest of licentiousness we have a telling description in many a catalogue of the vices which disfigured pagan life (Rom. i. 23–32, Ephes. iv. 19, Col. iii. 5, 6, 1 Thess. v. 4–7).

The Apostle's mood as he looks out upon this world with its idolatry and the unspeakable misery, both intellectual and moral, that was its natural fruit, is one of intense sadness. For him it was a world that had completely lost its way, and that because it deliberately blinded itself to the signs which God had placed in order to guide it in the right direction and lead it ultimately to Himself.

(*b*) In *Galatians*, and in *Colossians*, where the implications and hints of the former Epistle are worked out to their fullest capacity, we have another and a different estimate of paganism. The Colossian heresy, in spite of its Jewish colouring and the presence within it of some Jewish elements, was pagan in its origin and in its essence, and the Apostle's mordant criticism of that heresy provides us with an admirable illustration of how he regarded paganism when it was put forth as a well-defined system of religion and philosophy and set up as a rival to Christianity.

At the root of his criticism lies the conception that the pagan world was a world in bondage, enslaved by hosts of evil powers which exercised a malignant and irresistible influence upon the life of man and reducing that life to a condition of impotence and hopelessness. This conception finds expression in such phrases as "Ye were in bondage to them which by nature are no gods"; "the weak and beggarly elements whereunto ye desire to be in bondage" (Gal. iv. 8, 9); "If ye died with Christ from the elements of the world" (Col. ii. 20), and in the many passages in which he enumerates the various spiritual powers which once dominated the old world but have now been dethroned by the death of Christ, as e.g. Rom. viii. 38, Ephes. i. 21, iii. 10, vi. 12, Col. ii. 15.

This immaturity of the pagan world is further emphasised by the Apostle's stern reprobation of the theory of "mediators." It is this aspect of pagan thought that is

remorselessly condemned in *Colossians*. The centre and core of the heretical movement at Colossæ was the cult of angels, the postulating of an elaborate system of angelic beings, under various designations filling the void between God, regarded as transcendent, inaccessible and inconceivable, and His creation, and the Epistle is, in the main, a most convincing exposure of this fundamental perversion.

What is most marked in *Colossians* is the Apostle's utter *contempt* for this pagan heresy, not only in respect of its central factor, the worship of angels, but also of all its subsidiary factors.

Its much-vaunted philosophy was "a vain deceit" without any real meaning or content, purely verbal and external, and never penetrating below the surface to the hidden nature of God (ii. 8). The asceticism which it inculcated was false in principle and hopelessly ineffective (ii. 23), and, what is more significant still, the visions to which the heretics attached such importance are dismissed with a gesture of scorn and ridicule. The recent discovery of an inscription from the sanctuary of Apollos at Klaros, in which the word *ἐνεβάτευσεν* occurs, shows that this refers to the final act in the ceremonial of the Mysteries, and consequently when the Apostle in ii. 18 speaks of *ἃ ἑώρακεν ἐμβατεύων, εἰκῇ φυσιούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νοὸς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*—"taking his stand on what he has seen (in the Mysteries), vainly puffed up by his unspiritual mind," he is explicitly condemning what was the most fundamental claim of the Mystery Religions, that union with the divine was attainable through visions and mystic ritual. And yet this is the very quarter from which, according to the "Paul the pagan" theory, the Apostle derived most of the characteristic elements in his Christian teaching!

If *Colossians* reveals one thing more clearly than another it is that when St. Paul meets with paganism in the guise

of a well-defined and concrete religious entity he repudiates it with all the scorn and ridicule at his command.

(*c*) It is true, however, that his estimate of paganism does not always remain on the extremely low level that we have outlined above. In *Romans* ii. 14 f. and vii. 25 we have a striking recognition of good and noble conduct on the part of heathen which is remarkable in a Jew, who as a rule recognised no merit in the good deeds of paganism unless they were accompanied by a definite desire for admission to the privileges of Judaism. For St. Paul heathen virtues were not splendid vices, but the product of the inner law speaking in the heart and a testimony to the working of a right conscience. Later on in the same epistle, where in viii. 19–22 he speaks of the " earnest expectation of the creation waiting for the revealing of the sons of God," he seems to be expressing the view that even out of this evil heathen world good will come.

But it is in *Philippians* iv. 8 that we find the noblest illustration of the Apostle's sensitiveness to the higher aspirations of those whom he strove to win for his own faith. There is not in the whole of classical literature a more sympathetic picture of pagan ideals than that which St. Paul places before the Philippian Christians. He would have them understand that all goodness does not lie within their own circle, in such a sense as to lead them to ignore the goodness that lies outside them in the pagan world and its civic life. For him goodness is goodness, truth is truth, and righteousness is righteousness, wherever these are found. Therefore they are to take account of such virtues as the truth and sincerity which were the glory of the Persian, and of that love for truth in thought which was the great aim of the Greek philosopher, of the sense of awe and reverence associated with pagan religion in its highest manifestation, of the momentous importance attached to

law, justice and good government in the Roman Empire, of the deep conception of the need of purity emphasised in many of the Mysteries, of the appreciation of the beautiful so characteristic of Greek life as a whole and, in general, of all that was admirable and praiseworthy in pagan life and religion at their loftiest levels.

And yet with all this we are bound to recognise the restraint that he exercised in this matter in view of the Hebraist and the Christian that were in him. He closes his remarkable eulogy on pagan virtues with a clear indication that they stood on a lower spiritual plane than his own. The Philippians are to reckon with all that was noble in pagan life, to weigh and appraise it at its full value, but transcending all pagan qualities, even at their best, are the Christian graces, love, peace, joy, longsuffering and humility, as these are exemplified in his own person. These are to be the true factors operating in the life of the Christian. And further, it would also seem that when the Apostle takes a broad view of the pre-Christian world as a whole he divides it into two definite sections, which we may term the world of light and the world of darkness. Judaism may represent a period of tutelage, of comparative immaturity, and of an incomplete revelation of God and His purposes, but yet the Jew dwelt in the light as far as that light was available before the coming of Christ. The Jew only reached the level which was occupied at all times by paganism when he obstinately persisted in regarding the light in which he dwelt as the fulness of the light of God and refused to accept the complete revelation and illumination which God bestowed in Christ. The heathen, on the other hand, was definitely and at all times a dweller in the darkness.

It is also clear that whatever measure of appreciation of and sympathy with pagan ideals St. Paul possesses it is directed towards the ideal and not towards the form in

which the ideal is expressed. He can speak with a real understanding of the pagan search for God and of his yearning for nobler things, but for every religious form and mode of worship which has developed out of that longing and search he has nothing but the most absolute contempt. Their "gods many and lords many" have no reality and are "no gods." The divinities they worship are dead in contrast to the "living God." The sacrifices they offer are offered to demons, and whatever fellowship there may be in what they regard as sacraments and mystic rites is a fellowship with demons. But it is not to pagan *ideals* as such that the Apostle is indebted for his doctrines and practices, according to the theory we are discussing, but to the manifold religious forms in which those ideals found concrete expression, to the mythological conceptions of their gods and redeemers, to the process of initiation by which they deemed themselves to realise union with the divine, to the lustrations and sacred meals associated with their ritual, in short, to the whole apparatus of the pagan cult in its outward manifestations. To summarise, St. Paul is charged with having borrowed and appropriated some of the most distinctive and essential elements in the Gospel that he preached from a source for which he has such a withering contempt that he all but exhausts his vocabulary in his search for language which shall adequately express that feeling. We contend, therefore, that Christianity, as represented and preached by St. Paul, is not the outcome of pagan influences to any appreciable degree, and for the following reasons :—

1. Hellenistic Judaism as a whole, and as represented by its most extreme type, Philo, was not affected by its environment in its essential beliefs, in its monotheism, in its view of the supremacy of the Law or in its unbounded trust in the privileged position of the Jew before God.

It is less than probable, therefore, that St. Paul would have allowed his fundamental faith to be transformed by forces which had proved hopelessly ineffective in the case of Judaism as a whole. There was doubtless a development in Pauline as compared with primitive Christianity, but it was not due to the action of Hellenistic religious influences, but to the unequalled insight by which the Apostle was enabled to bring to the light of day what was inherent in Christ and in His Gospel, and to the opportunity given him by a wider world than that of the original Apostles to find an adequate field for the expression of his faith.

2. The Apostle's own estimate of paganism as a whole, as testified by his writings, and more particularly his attitude of complete contempt towards the religious forms in which pagan ideals found concrete expression, rules out of the field any substantial influence of paganism upon his thought and belief.

MAURICE JONES.

Note.—I would strongly recommend the James Sprunt Lectures on *The Origin of St. Paul's Religion*, by the Rev. J. G. Machen, D.D. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), as the most complete exposure of the "Paul the Pagan" perversion.

NAZARETH.

In the New Testament there are two titles given to our Lord which appear to be related to one another. He is sometimes called Nazoræan (*Ναζωραῖος*), and sometimes Nazarene (*Ναζαρηνός*) ; and each of these titles is commonly held to express the fact that His early life was spent in a small Galilean town of the name of Nazareth or Nazara. The Gospel of Matthew puts it this way ; it says that Joseph on his return from the flight into Egypt with the Mother and Child, withdrew from Judæa into Galilee and came and settled in a city named Nazareth ; in order that the word spoken by the prophet might be fulfilled that " he shall be called a Nazoræan." The difficulty caused by the statement is well known : it is not easy to identify the prophetical testimony which is quoted in the Gospel ; nor is it easy to see how Nazoræan can mean an inhabitant of Nazareth. There is, however, no doubt that the Evangelist made an identification of a title of the Messiah which he found somewhere, with a place-adjective according to which Jesus was to live in Nazareth. The philology may be inaccurate ; the intention is obvious ; either the Messiah, bearing a certain name, has been found in a certain place ; or the place, being the known residence of Jesus, has been sought and found in the ancient Scriptures.

With the other title there is less difficulty. The Synoptic tradition agrees with the belief that Jesus was in a real sense of Nazareth, but asserts that He left the place at the beginning of His ministry, and settled on the shore of the Lake of Galilee ; He was held to have fulfilled another prophecy in making His dwelling there ; for was it not said that " the Land of Zebulon and the land of Naphtali, on the sea-road, on the other side of Jordan, the people sitting

in darkness saw a great light, and to those sitting in the region and the shadow of death light dawned" (Isaiah viii. 23, ix. 1). But although Jesus left the town on the hills for the town by the Lake, He never lost the appellation Nazarene; Capernaum found Him no alternative title; He was still the man from Nazareth.

If Nazarene does not mean that He came from Nazareth, we shall have to find some other explanation; but it does not mean that the New Testament knows any other; and the objection which has been raised that the town of Nazareth is not mentioned in the Talmud can hardly have any weight against the evangelical tradition. The real difficulty is our own poverty, not the poverty of the Talmud; for until we come to Luke's account of the inception of our Lord's ministry, we know next to nothing of what went on in Nazareth. The brief summary in Mark vi. (and in Matt. xiii.) refers to His speaking in the Synagogue, when on a visit to His native place, but does not say that it was in Nazareth, though that appears to be intended. Luke has greatly expanded the incident. A single scene, then, described with the freshness and vividness of an onlooker, by an expert historian, is all our material for Nazarene history: so that it is not surprising if critics have, occasionally, looked askance at the incident, and wondered where Luke picked it up and if it was trustworthy story-telling. M. Renan, indeed, had no such hesitations: he began his *Vie de Jésus* with the statement that Jesus was born at Nazareth; that is, he erased the story of the Nativity in Bethlehem, and put the historical stress upon the life (including the birth) in Nazareth. Modern students are more suspicious—some of them, at least. They agree with Renan in rejecting the birth-stories, but they try to find a birthplace as well as a home for our Lord in Capernaum, or in some neighbouring town on the Lake, so that for them

the historical descent from the highland village to the Lake has no historical value.

It will be seen that a great deal depends on our estimate of the fourth chapter of Luke, with its account of the opening of our Lord's Ministry in the Synagogue at Nazareth. So it is to this account that we turn to see whether under the critical microscope it acquires reality, and if the lights and shades of the narration come out upon inspection.

The first thing that modern research has brought out is that it is possible to expand the narration, which is necessarily only a summary of what was done and said, and is consequently in danger of those abrupt transitions to which a rapid summary is subject. For example, the Gospel shows us clearly that there was a good deal of *amour propre* among the Nazarenes: they were offended at having heard of miracles done elsewhere by their fellow-citizen. Why does He go healing and preaching to other towns, and at other doors than His own, local jealousy was beginning to enquire? This attitude of mind was promptly challenged by Jesus; "I know," said he, "that you want to throw at me the proverb about the physician who was told to heal himself, but I tell you that no prophet is acceptable in his native place."

Now there is something of discontinuity in this little speech; it jumps from an unsuccessful physician to an unappreciated prophet, without any parallel between the two, unless we like to say that every prophet in the East is a *hakim* or medicine man as well. Precisely at this point comes to our aid a fragment from the *Sayings of Jesus* of the Oxyrhyncus discovery, in which we read that

> A prophet is not acceptable in his own country,
> Nor does a physician perform cures upon his own relatives.

Evidently the complete saying underlies the Lucan narration, and when we restore it, the discontinuity of the story

disappears. The unappreciated prophet and the unsuccessful physician are both in the speech of Jesus ; the latter was omitted by Luke, on professional grounds, much in the same way as, in working over the Markan account of the healing of a woman with a long-standing trouble, he omits Mark's reference to what the woman had suffered at the hands of the doctors (Luke viii. 43 sqq.).

But may we not go one step further and restore another line to the speech of Jesus, something like this ?

> You will be no doubt saying to me,
> (Prophet, preach at home) ;
> Physician, heal thyself ;
> But I say unto you,
> No prophet is acceptable in his native place,
> Nor does a physician do cures on his own relatives.

It will be admitted, at all events, that the discovery of the Oxyrhyncus *Sayings* has made the narrative in Luke much more vivid, and taken us one step behind the evangelist towards the actual events. That is clear gain on the side of reality.

Now let us pass on to another discovery, which will throw even more light on the Nazareth incident. One of the great gains to modern Biblical and quasi-Biblical literature, is the discovery of the beautiful hymns which pass under the name of the *Odes of Solomon*, and, amongst the various elucidations which have been made of these hymns, without doubt the most important discovery is this, that in a number of cases the author is versifying or paraphrasing the Targum, or popular interpretation of the Old Testament which was in use in the Synagogue. The most striking of all these paraphrases is the versification of the sixty-first chapter of Isaiah.

In the seventeenth Ode of Solomon there is a splendid passage, in which Christ is the speaker, who tells how He has opened all doors, broken all bonds and released all

prisoners ; the recitation of these mighty deeds provokes at the end of the Ode a rapturous doxology, " Glory to thee, our Head, the Lord Messiah." Here are some of the stanzas to which we refer :

(Christ speaks).
He who knew and brought me up
Is the Most High in all His perfection ;
And He glorified me by His kindness,
And raised my thought to the height of His truth.
And from thence He gave me the way of His steps ;
And I opened the doors that were closed.
. . . . . .
Nothing appeared closed to me ;
Because I was the opening of everything.
And I went towards all my bondsmen to loose them :
That I might not leave any man bound or binding.

It is not difficult to see that there is a certain analogy between this hymn and the language of the 61st of Isaiah, in which the Messiah speaks of being sent for the opening of prison-doors (or of blind eyes) and for the release of captives and bondsmen. A general reference, however, would leave much of the hymn unexplained ; it would not, for example, tell us why the Messiah speaks of being " brought up " or " reared " by the Most High. When, however, we turn to the Targum on Isaiah, we find that the interpreter who puts the prophecy into popular speech, begins like this :

The Prophet said :
The spirit of prophecy from before Jahveh Elohim is upon me :
Because Jahveh *reared me* for the evangelisation of poor men ;
He sent me for the comfort of the broken in heart ;
To announce freedom for the captives,
And to those that are bound (to say) Appear in the Light.

Here, then, we have the statement of the Odist as to the " bringing up " or " rearing " of the Messiah. We need not hesitate to say that the Odist has been working over the

Targum. Probably he has used the Hebrew text as well, but his use of the Targum is certain.

The real point that we have to notice is, that this very Targum must have been read in the Synagogue on the occasion to which Luke refers. Without it, the great majority of the people in the Synagogue would not have understood the lesson for the day at all. If any one should say that the lesson was read in Targum and not in Hebrew, he would be nearer to the truth than a person who said it was read in Hebrew without a Targum, for we may be sure that in a Northern congregation the Targum was read. It was only a choice between the Targum and the Septuagint. Luke gives us the equivalent passage from the Septuagint, a composite passage, from two separate strains of Isaiah, but he betrays the knowledge of the Targum in his opening sentence by saying that

> He came to Nazareth where he had been "*reared.*"

And this allusion to the "rearing" of the Messiah is probably taken from the Targum.[1] So Luke had the Targum before him, and we may remove the passage which he quotes from the Septuagint, and put it in a footnote, and replace it in the text by the text of the Targum. When we do that the whole incident acquires luminosity. We have lost, indeed, the reference to the Anointing of the Messiah, but we have replaced the Messiah by the Prophet, and we see that the Prophet, as such, is the key to the narration that follows. Jesus refers to Himself as the Prophet, when he says that the Scripture is fulfilled to-day in your ears; He refers to Himself as the unacceptable Prophet in the remarks about Prophet-physician; He announces Himself as Prophet to the Gentiles by bringing forward references

[1] We must reserve the possibility that Luke's "Nazareth where he was reared" is a substitute for the "native-place" of Mark, so as to safeguard the birth in Bethlehem.

to the non-Jewish missions of Elijah and Elisha. All of this is in direct line with the opening sentence. We are, therefore, justified in saying that, by the restoration of the Targum to the place of honour, the whole incident has gained in luminosity. We add this new fact to the *Saying of Jesus* from Oxyrhyncus, and suggest that we are dealing with a real event, which Luke has slightly modified and a good deal abbreviated.

Before passing away from the *Ode* and the involved Targum, we may observe that we can now explain why the Odist says that " from thence (the Lord) gave me the way of His steps," i.e., set me following Him and imitating Him. For it was written in the Psalms that

> The Lord loveth the prisoners :
> The Lord openeth (the eyes of) the blind.
> (Ps. cxlvi. 8.)

Thus there is a coincidence in function between the Messiah of the prophecy and Jahveh of the Psalms. Or, as the Fourth Gospel would say, " Whatsoever things the Father doeth, these the Son doeth also."

We come now to a more difficult matter. We have brought the Targum and the Targumist on the scene, and we cannot dismiss them without some closer examination. We recognised the employment of the Targum by means of a single change : the phrase that " the Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because the Lord hath *anointed me* " was replaced in the Targum by the statement that " the Spirit of prophecy from before the Lord God is upon me, because the Lord hath *reared me*." The change is a striking one, and it is not an accidental variation, it reveals the mentality of the Interpreter. We shall find, upon examination, that it is characteristic and occurs elsewhere. For example, when the Targumist was at work upon Isaiah xlii. 6, he came to translate the passage in which the Servant (the Messiah)

is addressed by the Lord in the terms, "I, the Lord, have called thee in righteousness . . . to open the blind eyes, etc." (the passage is an anticipative parallel of the 61st chapter), he gives us the following paraphrase:

> I, the Lord have *brought thee up* (*or reared thee*) in the Truth.

Here we see again the characteristic word *reared*; it is substituted for another Hebrew word; we may recognise the Targumist by it. And now an important point comes into view: the Targumist has imported the very same word into his rendering of the opening verses of the eleventh chapter of Isaiah; we are familiar with them in the form

> There shall come a rod out of the stem of Jesse,
> And a branch (*netzer*) shall come out of his roots.

This Messianic passage the Targum presents in the following manner:

> There shall come a King from the sons of Jesse,
> And the Messiah from his sons' sons shall be *reared*.

Here we have the very same expression as before, and it is certainly from the same Targumist, for in the next verse he says that "the spirit of prophecy from before the Lord shall dwell upon him (*or* light upon him)," which is almost exactly his translation in the sixty-first chapter. We were certainly justified in saying that it was characteristic of the Targum to say that the Messiah had been *reared by* God. The Messiah who is thus brought up is declared to be of Davidic ancestry, and of royal and prophetical character, and the name Messiah is definitely substituted for the Hebrew word *netzer* or *branch*. It is, then, the *netzer* that is reared by God. And now we find ourselves in a difficulty. We have acquired a Targumic conscience in order to explain what went on at Nazareth, and we find that, from this very point of view, unless we have entirely misunderstood St. Luke and his sources, we have arrived at the statement

that the *Netzer* came to *Nazareth*. It is difficult to explain this, except by saying that the name Nazareth has been formed as a denominative to *Netzer*, and that it means *Branch-town*. This would explain at once what Matthew meant when he said that he came to live in Branch-town because the Scripture said he should be called Branch. We may imagine that Matthew was working from the headline of a Testimony Book, which ran thus :

That the Messiah shall be called Netzer;

followed by the proof-text in Isaiah xi. 1. But in the case before us, will not Nazareth as a town disappear from the history and from the geography, and so the Targum will justify the silence of the Talmud ? That is the problem that lies before us, and it is not an easy one to resolve. For we have certainly shown that the account in the fourth chapter of Luke has become increasingly vivid and real by the criticism that we turned upon it. We can hardly put out the light gained after we have shown that the story has become definitely and increasingly luminous. A stay of judgement seems to be called for. Perhaps there is an explaining factor which is eluding our observation. " Wait and see " may be good criticism, provided we do not wait too long. It is certainly to be desired that some of these historical perplexities should not remain much longer in the field of view.

There is no doubt that the first generations of Christians had something important to say about the Netzer of the prophets, and the evidence that they connected Netzer with Nazareth on the one hand, and with Jesus on the other is significant. Justin Martyr has, amongst his special titles of Jesus, the name ἄνθος, the Flower ; scholars know that this is Old Testament horticulture ; it comes from Isaiah's garden ; in the language of the Septuagint it is the transla-

tion of Netzer in Isaiah xi. 1, and was, probably, transferred from the Greek text to that of a collection of *Testimonies*. The use of ἄνθος for Christ is a beautiful mistranslation of Netzer into Greek picture-language, where the Messianic "Branch" would convey little meaning. But the Flower has the Branch behind it, and the careful reader of the prophet will notice that the famous oracles which Jesus read in the synagogue at Nazareth are immediately preceded (with only a single intervening verse) by a reference to the "Branch of my planting, the work of my hands, (whereby) I shall be glorified" (Isa. lx. 21). Is that collocation accidental? Does Nazareth really mean Flower-town?

The perplexity in which we find ourselves is one which invaded the mind of the greatest of the early historical critics of the Church. Theodore of Mopsuestia seems to have known that there is some connexion between Netzer and Nazareth. In a recently published tract which Dr. Mingana has found among the treasures of the Rylands Library, we have the following interrogation and reply on the part of Theodore.[1]

What is the meaning of the words "Nazarenes," "Nazarenis," and "Nazareth"?

The word Nazarene is of Hebraic origin. The prophet Isaiah says, "And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a *Netzer* out of his roots" (Isa. xi. 1). Again he says, "And the Netzer which I have planted, the work of my hands, will be glorified" (Isa. lx. 21). The meaning of *Netzer* is "new" (!) The prophet did not call the teaching of our Lord by this name because it was "novel," but because God was to clothe Himself with a body from the Virgin without marriage in a "novel" way.

[1] *Synopsis of Christian Doctrine* according to *Theodore of Mopsuestia*: Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Vol. 5, Nos. 3 and 4, 1919. Substantially the same passage of Theodore will be found in the *Commentary* of 'Isho'dad on Matthew ii. 23.

That is why the prophet called it " new." Our Lord was called " Nazarene," i.e. from Nazareth, because He was *brought up* in the Nazareth of Galilee, and Nazareth of Galilee is called the " new " of Galilee, which is interpreted as referring to the Torah and the New Testament.

The editor of this passage was unable to resolve the problem which Theodore here presents to us, nor could he justify the etymology, nor find a Nazareth elsewhere than in Galilee. We share his perplexity. It is clear that Theodore has connected " Netzer " with " Nazareth," and that he has noticed the occurrence of the Messianic word in the sixtieth chapter of Isaiah.

As we have said above, these considerations call for a stay of critical judgement : more light is needed on these cross-lights from the Targum. That means that the study of the Targum itself needs to be commenced, if for no other reason, at least for the reason that the Targums are the common hand-book both of Jews and Christians in the first period. Moreover, we have seen, in our enquiry, that the Nazareth incident, up to a certain point, has gained in luminosity. If we can make quite sure of it, we can gain ground also in regard to our Lord's mission and teaching ; for it is precisely at this point that Jesus is anti-Judaic and almost universalist ; He is on the verge of declaring Himself to be a prophet to the Gentiles. This is precisely the direction in which we want further information. If we can prove Jesus to be anti-Judaist, or at least pro-ethnic, we shall have gone further into the secret of His self-consciousness than the exegetes have yet reached. There, for the present, we suspend our enquiry.

Rendel Harris.

ST. PAUL AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

Considering the conflict which has been raging of late over this Article of our Belief, it is of the utmost interest to investigate quietly the exact nature of St. Paul's teaching on the subject. Of course this is to be found in the fifteenth chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians, and especially in verses 42–54 of that chapter: "So also is the resurrection of the dead: He (*i.e.*, the dead man[1]) is sown in (having) corruption, he is raised in (having) incorruption; he is sown in (having) dishonour, he is raised in (having) glory; he is sown in (having) weakness, he is raised in (having) power; he is sown a natural body, he is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body. So also is it written: The first man Adam became a living soul, the last Adam a life-giving spirit. However, the spiritual is not first, but the natural; then the spiritual. The first man is from earth, earthy; the second man is from heaven. As is the earthy, so also are the earthy; and as is the heavenly, so also are the heavenly; and as we have worn the image of the earthy, we shall also wear the image of the heavenly. Now this I assert, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does corruption inherit incorruption. Behold I tell you a mystery (secret): we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. . . . For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."

Before examining the nature of the "body," let us try to ascertain the meaning of *σπείρεται*. The "sowing"

[1] Cf. verse 35: "How are the dead men raised? (*πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροί;*)" This shows that *ὁ νεκρός* is the subject of *ἐγείρεται*, and if so of *σπείρεται* too.

has very generally, as, for instance, in *The International Critical Commentary*, been taken to signify burial. But is this the true sense? And does it not rather point to birth than burial? Thus, in verse 36, it is said: "That which thou sowest is not made alive, unless it have died"; where the death evidently follows the sowing. It is the same in John xii. 24: "Except the grain of corn have fallen into the earth and died, it abides by itself; but if it have died, it bears much fruit." Where, if burial were meant, it would be more natural to say, "Have died and been buried," than, "Have been buried and died."[1] Again, the elucidation of *σῶμα ψυχικόν* by the extract from Scripture (Gen. ii. 7), "The first man Adam became a living soul (*ψυχήν*)," points back, not to burial, but to creation and birth. Cf. Cic. *Leg.* i. 8, 24: "We were not aimlessly nor casually sown (born) and created (*sati et creati sumus*)." And this is confirmed by the sentence that soon follows, "The first man is of the earth, earthy," again from Genesis ii. 7, and applying to man's creation. As in life, not in death, we have worn the image of the earthy (man), so at resurrection we shall wear the image of the heavenly (Man).

Other arguments tend to the same result. The Greek *σπείρειν*, like the Latin *serere*, is commonly used of birth. The relation of sowing to burial is rather derived from our own usage than from that of the Jews. Why, before stating, "So is the resurrection of the dead: He is sown in corruption, he is raised in incorruption," has the Apostle said, "There are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial, but one is the glory of the celestial, another that of the terrestrial," unless this mention of the earthly and the heavenly is intended to illustrate the earthly and the heavenly life of the dead man? Moreover, "corruption" or "decay," "dishonour" or "disgrace," "weakness" or "infirmity,"

[1] This, however, is not a very cogent argument.

are all marks of man in his present life, and are his at birth, whereas they are inapt to a corpse. Cf. Plato *Rep.* 546A : "To everything that is born there is corruption or decay (*γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν*)." Arist. *Gen. Corr.* ii. 1, 2 : "To all organically constituted substances there is birth and decay (*γένεσις καὶ φθορά*)." Romans viii. 21 : "Creation itself shall be freed from the bondage of corruption (*φθορᾶς*) into the freedom of glory (*δόξης*)." Again, if, as I imagine, "dishonour" or "disgrace" means the loss of privilege and the punishment due to the Fall, cf. Plato *Rep.* 492D (*Polit.* 309A) : "Think you not they punish the disobedient with disgraces (*ἀτιμίαις*) and fines and deaths?" In Philippians iii. 21, "The body of humiliation" is contrasted with "the body of glory." As for "weakness" or "infirmity," it is as little applicable to an inanimate corpse, as is the "natural or animal body." If burial is intended, all these attributes must denote the man at (and before) death, rather than the dead man. But they best describe his history from birth to resurrection. And the real contrast suggested in the statement considered may be taken to lie between the present earthly life and the risen life hereafter.

It must, however, be admitted, *au contraire*, that most interpreters take the side of *Burial*. St. Chrysostom, for instance, in his comments on the passage, does so, and explains *ἀτιμία* to signify the "ugliness" that attaches to a corpse. But perhaps the earliest interpretation in this direction is found in St. Clement's First Epistle to the Corinthians (§ 24), which I give in Lightfoot's translation : "Let us understand, dearly beloved, how the Master continually showeth unto us the resurrection that shall be hereafter ; whereof He made the Lord Jesus Christ the firstfruit, when He raised Him from the dead. Let us behold, dearly beloved, the resurrection which happeneth at its

proper season. Day and night show unto us the resurrection. The night falleth asleep, and day ariseth ; the day departeth and night cometh on. Let us mark the fruits, how and in what manner the sowing taketh place. The sower goeth forth, and casteth into the earth each of the seeds ; and these falling into the earth dry and bare decay (dissolve) : then out of this decay (dissolution) the mightiness of the Master's providence raiseth them up, and from being one they increase manifold and bear fruit." Here there is no doubt about burial, and so it must be left to every student of St. Paul to form his own conclusions on a somewhat difficult subject.[1]

We now come to the real *crux* of the passage, what is meant by a natural body and a spiritual body ? In an Easter sermon delivered some years ago by Canon Streeter on the Resurrection of the Body were the words : " By spiritual we usually understand the antithesis to bodily. It is almost as if he (St. Paul) had said an unbodily body. At least he must mean an immaterial body." And Bishop Gore, in *The Religion of the Church*, writes that " we may believe that a spiritual body, not of flesh and blood, is being prepared for us." " This is certainly what St. Paul believed," is the comment of Dean Inge, in a review of the above work. Such is the misconception entertained by many of the Apostle's meaning. What it really is can only be discovered by an inquiry into the use of both *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός* elsewhere, when it will be found that both have almost, if not quite, invariably to do with character and not with construction.

Both terms are occasionally in classical writings opposed

[1] It is said to be a tenet of the Orthodox Greek Church that the soul is not finally divorced from the body after death for forty days—the term of Christ's sojourn upon earth after His resurrection. If this was St. Paul's belief as well, the difficulty about assigning the words, " It is sown a natural body," to the time of burial would at once vanish.

to *σωματικός*, "bodily." Thus Arist. *Eth. N.* iii. 10. 2: "Let the pleasures pertaining to the soul and to the body (*αἱ ψυχικαί καὶ αἱ σωματικαί ἡδοναί*) be distinguished; for example, love of honour, love of pleasures (these being psychic)." Polyb. viii. 12. 9: "Having gained possession of much abundance, and acquired large opportunity of indulgence in every kind of desire, neither as regards their bodily (*σωματικήν*) force were they lessened thereby, nor as regards the impulses of their souls (*ψυχικὰς ὁρμάς*) did they practise anything unjust or immoral." IV. Maccabees i. 32: "Of the desires some pertain to the soul, some to the body (*αἱ μέν εἰσι ψυχικαί, αἱ δὲ σωματικαί*); and of both reason appears to be master." Again, Plut. *De Sanit. Præc.* 14 (ii. 129c): "The movements of the soul (*ψυχῆς*) shew the body (*σῶμα*) to have a dangerous tendency to disease. . . . And men become irascible in their tempers . . . Wherefore it is well to observe whom these things befall and to remember that, if there be no spiritual (*πνευματικόν*), there is a bodily (*σωματικόν*) cause calling for a lowering or tempering of the diet." Cf. Anth. Pal. viii. 76: "May your reward be . . . to obtain pious children of a spiritual character (*πνευματικῶν*)." 175: "We instituted festal meetings of a spiritual character (*πνευματικὰς συνόδους*) in honour of our prize-winners (martyrs)." It is plain in all the above examples that both terms, *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός*, are entirely concerned with character.

With St. Paul "spiritual" is not antithetic to "bodily," but sometimes to "fleshly, carnal" (*σαρκικός, σάρκινος*), sometimes to "natural" (*ψυχικός*); and again it is not texture, but character, that is denoted by the contrasted terms.

(1) The term *πνευματικός* often occurs without any contrast whatever, simply meaning "spiritual," "of a spiritual

character." Thus in Romans, 1 Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, we hear of "a spiritual gift," and "spiritual gifts"; of "spiritual meat" and "spiritual drink," and "a spiritual rock"; of "spiritual blessing," "spiritual songs," "the spiritual forces of wickedness," "spiritual understanding." So too in 1 Peter ii. 5, of "a spiritual house," and "spiritual sacrifices." In all which places the character of the objects to which the term is annexed is manifestly intended.

(2) It is contrasted with *σαρκικός*, or, according to other MSS., *σάρκινος*. Thus Romans vii. 14: "We know that the Law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold into subjection to sin." xv. 27: "If the Gentiles shared in their spiritual things, they owe it also to minister to them in things of a carnal character." 1 Corinthians ix. 11: "If we sowed to you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things?" iii. 1: "I was not able to speak to you as to spiritual persons, but (only) as to carnal persons, as to Christian babes." Cf. xiv. 37: "If anyone seems to be a prophet or spiritually endowed (*πνευματικός*), let him recognise *or* acknowledge that the things I write to you are the commandments of the Lord." Galatians vi. 1: "If a man be caught in any trespass, do ye who are spiritual (*οἱ πνευματικοί*) reform such an one in a spirit of meekness." Here spiritual and carnal character are contrasted, just as elsewhere spirit (*πνεῦμα*) and flesh (*σάρξ*).

(3) Lastly, *πνευματικός* is opposed to *ψυχικός*, "spiritual" to "natural." So 1 Corinthians ii. 13–15: "Which things we utter . . . comparing spiritual things with spiritual. Now a natural man (*ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος*) does not receive the things of the Spirit of God; for they are folly to him, and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually scrutinised. But the spiritual man (*ὁ πνευματικός*) scrutinises all things, but himself is scrutinised by none."

Here we are evidently shown the man of natural parts or aptitudes, and the man of spiritual powers or capacities. The same appears in Jude 19: "These are they who schismatize, men of natural parts, devoid of Spirit (*ψυχικοὶ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*)." Cf. James iii. 17: "This wisdom is not one that descends from above, but earthly, natural *or* animal (*ψυχική*), devilish." Where the import is that it is such as pertains to the natural man before he is illumined with wisdom from on high.

Such then being the case universally, or at all events throughout the New Testament, we cannot but feel that in the passage under examination, "natural" and "spiritual," as applied to the "body," can have nothing to do with its material or immaterial structure. but describe moral character and capacities, just as the terms used in that earlier chapter of the same Epistle (ii. 13–15) above quoted.

This sends us back to the consideration of *σῶμα*. For "body," as matter, hardly admits of moral character being ascribed to it. And we note that, in St. Paul, "body" may stand, not merely for the material part of the man, but for his whole sentient organisation, and corresponds, as it often does in classical writings, to the "person," "being," "self." Thus, in 1 Corinthians iii. 16, vi. 19, we have first: "Know ye not that *ye* are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" and then: "Know ye not that *your body* is the temple of the Holy Spirit, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?" Here yourselves and your bodies are identified, and, as we should expect from the indwelling of the Spirit, the body represents the entire personality. Again, in Philippians iii. 21, Jesus Christ is one day going to "transfigure our body of humiliation into conformity with His body of glory." Where neither humiliation nor glory suits the mere material body, but is well adapted to the person or self. Cf. ii. 8: "Being

found in fashion as a man, He humbled *or* humiliated *Himself* (ἑαυτόν)."

The elucidation which is added confirms what has been said: "He is sown a person of soul-capacity, he is raised a person of spirit-capacity. . . . So also saith Scripture (Gen. ii. 7), "The first man Adam became a living soul, the last Adam became a life-giving Spirit."[1] Here we have the Adam of the Creation and the Adam of the Resurrection. And as the progenitors, so are the descendants. A man inherits from the first Adam by generation his soul powers and properties, he inherits from the second Adam by impartment his spirit powers and properties. The psychic life is transmitted at birth, the pneumatic life is bestowed at resurrection.[2] The natural precedes, the spiritual succeeds. But, in neither case has the term to do with construction, but with character.

So far we have seen that the "body" signifies something ampler than the mere material body, and applies to the whole person. There is still, however, the material body to be considered. What about it at the Resurrection? Does it remain material, or is it changed in structure as its owner is changed in character and capacity? Does it survive, or is it extinguished or superseded? The Apostle next addresses himself to this question, and in so doing returns to Genesis ii. 7. "The first man," he says, "is out of the earth, earthy, of earthy consistency ('racy of the soil'). The second man is out of heaven." And "As we have worn the image of the earthy, so shall we wear the image of the heavenly." Like Adam, we possess in this life, and carry to the grave, a material body. But, he asserts, "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,

[1] The latter clause appears to be St. Paul's own comment.

[2] That ζωοποιοῦν refers to the Resurrection is seen from ver. 22, Rom. viii. 11, 1 Peter iii. 18, John v. 21.

nor does corruption *or* decay," *i.e.*, that which corrupts *or* decays (see ver. 42),[1] "inherit incorruption." Here "flesh and blood" may either mean mortal man, man *qua* mortal (Gal. i. 1b, Eph. vi. 12, Matt. xvi. 17), or the material body (Heb. ii. 14). Perhaps, inheritance of the kingdom of God consorts best with a personal subject. In the latter case, the idea is repeated, after the manner of poetical parallelism, in "corruption *or* decay"; that which corrupts or decays being, according to the ancients, matter, and so here the material body. This belongs only to the present life.

For, he continues, "we shall all be changed. . . . For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." Where that which is corruptible and mortal is not the dead corpse, but that which is liable to decay and death, but has not yet reached that stage; and this again takes our thoughts away from the actual grave to the earthly life, and its issue in the heavenly life.

The old perishable organism, which ends in an inanimate corpse, will be cast aside and superseded by a new organism, which is liable neither to decay nor to death, and so, since corruption belongs to matter, will by the nature of the case be immaterial. And the risen man will be in St. Paul's view a person of spiritual character and of immaterial essence, and, so in all ways, like the angels and their Lord, adapted to the heavenly life. Throughout, we may observe in conclusion, the Apostle is evidently thinking and speaking of the Resurrection of the just.

WILLIAM SPICER WOOD.

[1] "Corruption" or "decay" might also signify that which is corrupt or decayed.

PERFECT TENSE IGNORED IN MATTHEW XVI. 19, XVIII. 18 AND JOHN XX. 23.

My attention was called recently to the possible mi-translation of the tense in Matthew xvi. 19 and xviii. 18 by Dr. J. P. Greene, president of William Jewell College of Liberty, Missouri. He suggested, "*shall be bound in heaven* is future perfect. Why not render, *shall have been bound?* That is, if you proceed according to Christ's directions, you will decide to do just what God has already decided to do :—will be led to act in accordance with the will of God!" A careful study of the meaning of the perfect tense and its uses in the New Testament has convinced me that Dr. J. P. Greene is right.

Dr. A. T. Robertson has concisely defined the function of the perfect in Greek, on page 823 of his grammar, as "the continuance of perfected or completed action." Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, page 48, says, "The perfect participle in all its uses represents an action as already finished at the time of its leading verb." And on page 21 of the same volume says with reference to the future perfect, "The future perfect denotes that an action will be *already finished* at some future time. It is thus a perfect transferred to the future." All Greek grammarians whom I have consulted hold to this interpretation of the perfect tense.

In Matthew xvi. 19 and xviii. 18 the future perfect middle is used, *ἔσται δεδεμένον . . . ἔσται λελυμένον*, and the normal translation in accordance with the regular Greek usage would be, *Whatever you bind on earth shall have been bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall have been loosed in heaven.* The current English translations

render this future perfect middle as if it were a future passive form. The future passive form, *λυθήσεται*, is found in 2 Peter iii. 10, 12 and Revelation xx. 7, so it was in current use in case Matthew wanted to say what its use would imply.

It was a happy surprise to me to find upon examining John xx. 23, which speaks of similar unprecedented authority being conferred on the disciples, that the perfect tense is used twice in it. *Λάβετε πνεῦμα ἅγιον. ἄν τινων ἀφῆτε τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἀφέωνται αὐτοῖς· ἄν τινων κρατῆτε κεκράτηνται.* There is considerable variation in the MSS. readings regarding *ἀφίημι*, but Westcott and Hort, and Nestle, prefer the perfect, which makes the tense agree with *κεκράτηνται*, balancing the sentence perfectly. These past perfects are rendered in the English versions as if they were present middle forms—respectively, *are forgiven* and *are retained*. But they are translated as perfects in the German Bible. The use of the perfect implies that the sins that have been forgiven remain forgiven and those that have been retained remain retained.

It seems mysterious and strange to me that our translators have mistranslated the perfect tense in these verses. And it is surprising that only one of the commentators of all our standard critical commentaries has noticed the meaning of the perfect in these verses. I refer to Rev. A. Carr in the *Cambridge Greek Testament* (*St. Matthew*), who comments thus: "Observe carefully the force of the perfect *ἀφέωνται* and *κεκράτηνται*, 'whosesoever sins ye shall remit, they have been remitted.' Your spiritual *σύνεσις* will enable you to recognise and ratify the divine judgment on offending persons. So here note the future perfect *ἔσται δεδεμένον*, your decision will have been anticipated in heaven."

The key to understanding John xx. 23 seems to be the

introductory statement, *Receive the Holy Spirit.* There certainly is no statement in the New Testament purporting that any person or church forgave sins as Jesus did, or in behalf of God. But through the presence of Heaven's representative upon earth, Christ has provided the way for genuine Christians to determine whom God has forgiven. It is their privilege to merely ratify what God has already done. Therefore church members should be in such vital union with Christ and so led of the Holy Spirit that they will be able to recognise genuine Christians by their words and life. And they should be so responsive to the will and ideals of Christ, the Head of the Church, that they will allow only those that they consider regenerated to become church members. Paul's question was, *Did ye receive the Holy Spirit when ye believed?* (Acts xix. 2). Only such church members are fit subjects to rightly represent Christ's life and teaching.

J. R. Mantey.

INDEX.

PAGE

Rev. E. H. Askwith, D.D.
The Song of Ascents 69
Psalms in Times of Sickness 278

Rev. Professor B. W. Bacon, D.D.
Jesus' "Native Place" in John 41

Professor J. B. Baillie, M.A., D.Phil.
Thoughts on Religion 321

Rev. Professor Vernon Bartlet, D.D.
The Oxyrhynchus "Sayings of Jesus" in a New Light 136

Rev. Professor C. J. Cadoux, M.A., B.D.
The Quest for John the Elder 206

Rev. Principal W. M. Clow, D.D.
The Preaching of Chrysostom 359

Rev. W. J. Ferrar, M.A.
The Stoic and the Christian 110
A Study of St. Paul 353

Rev. Principal A. E. Garvie, D.D.
The Fact of Christ and Faith in God 257

Professor Frank Granger, Litt.D.
Jesus the Village Poet 285

Professor Rendel Harris, Litt.D., LL.D.
The First Tatian Reading in the Greek New Testament. . 120
Dilemma and the Gospels 344
Nazareth 450

Rev. John A. Hutton, D.D.
A Ruling from "First Peter" 420

Rev. Maurice Jones, D.D.
Paul the Pagan 428

Rev. Professor Ed. König, D.D.
The So-Called "Popular Religion of Israel" . . 383, 401

Rev. J. H. Leckie, D.D.
Apocalypse and Atonement 298

Rev. J. G. McKenzie, M.A., B.D.
Theology and the Social Gospel 46

PAGE

Rev. Professor H. R. Mackintosh, D.D.
The Place of Forgiveness in Christianity . . . 17
The Attitude of God to Sin 192

Professor J. R. Mantey, Th.D.
New Translations for Conjunctions in the New Testament 376
Perfect Tense Ignored in Matthew xvi. 19, xviii. 18, and John xx. 23 470

Professor D. S. Margoliouth, Litt.D.
One Jot or Tittle 182

Rev. Professor James Moffatt, D.D., Litt.D.
The Story of the Farmer and His Man 1

Rev. J. K. Mozley, M.A., B.D.
The Theology of Dr. Forsyth 81, 161

John B. Naish, B.Litt., B.D.
The Fourth Gospel and the Sacraments 53

Rev. J. E. Roberts, M.A., D.D.
Jesus and Baptism 232

Rev. Professor A. T. Robertson, Litt.D., D.D.
Matthew the Business Man in the Ministry . . . 99

Rev. Professor J. M. Shaw, D.D.
Does Prayer Count in a World of Law? 221

Professor A. Souter, Litt.D.
The Importance of the Latin Versions for the Textual Criticism of the New Testament 129

Rev. Professor James Stalker, D.D.
Harnack's "Marcion" 241

Rev. W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D.
St. John vii. 37, 38 160

Rev. G. H. Whitaker, M.A.
"Of the Household": Is the Reading Correct? . . 76
Hebrew iv. 2 and Romans x. 16 ff. 239
Welcoming "The Continuing and Progressing Unveiling" of Jesus Christ 314

Rev. Professor Newport J. D. White, D.D.
The Doctrine of Creation according to the Epistle to the Hebrews 368

Rev. Canon R. Winterbotham, M.A.
The City of Refuge 32

Rev. W. Spicer Wood, M.A.
St. Paul and the Resurrection of the Body . . . 461

INDEX TO SUBJECTS.

PAGE

Apocalypse and Atonement . . 298
Ascents, The Song of 69
Attitude of God to Sin, The . . 192
Baptism, Jesus and 232
Christ, The Fact of, and Faith in God 257
Christian, The Stoic and the . 110
Chrysostom, The Preaching of . 359
City of Refuge, The 32
Conjunctions in the New Testament, New Translations for . 376
Dilemma and the Gospels . . 344
Doctrine of Creation according to the Epistle to the Hebrews, The 368
Does Prayer Count in a World of Law? 221
Fact of Christ and Faith in God, The 257
Farmer and His Man, The Story of the 1
"First Peter," A Ruling from . . 420
First Tatian Reading in the Greek New Testament, The . . . 120
Forgiveness, The place of in Christianity. 17
Forsyth, Dr., The Theology of 81, 161
Fourth Gospel and the Sacraments, The 53
Harnack's "Marcion" . . . 241
Hebrews iv. 2 and Romans x. 16 ff. 239
Importance of the Latin Versions for the Textual Criticism of the New Testament, The . . . 129
Jesus and Baptism 232
Jesus, the Village Poet . . . 285
Jesus' "Native Place" in John . 41
John the Elder, The Quest for . . 206
"Marcion," Harnack's . . . 241
Matthew the Business Man in the Ministry 99
Matthew xvi. 19 and xviii. 18, Perfect Tense ignored in . . 470

PAGE

Nazareth 450
New Translations for Conjunctions in the New Testament . 376
"Of the Household": Is the Reading Correct? 76
One Jot or Tittle 182
Oxyrhynchus "Sayings of Jesus," in a New Light, The . . . 136
Paul the Pagan 428
Perfect Tense Ignored in Matthew xvi. 19, xviii. 18, and John xx. 23 470
Place of Forgiveness in Christianity, The 17
"Popular Religion of Israel," The So-Called 383, 401
Prayer, Does it Count in a World of Law? 221
Preaching of Chrysostom, The . 359
Psalms in Times of Sickness, The . 278
Quest for John the Elder, The . 206
Resurrection of the Body, St. Paul and the 461
Romans x. 16 ff. and Hebrews iv. 2 239
Ruling from "First Peter," A . . 420
Sacraments, The Fourth Gospel and the 53
St. John vii. 37, 38 160
St. John xx. 23 470
St. Paul and the Resurrection of the Body 461
St. Paul, A Study of 353
Song of Ascents, The 69
Stoic and the Christian, The . . 110
Story of the Farmer and His Man, The 1
Theology and the Social Gospel . 46
Theology of Dr. Forsyth, The 81, 161
Thoughts on Religion 321
Welcoming "The Continuing and Progressing Unveiling" of Jesus Christ 314

INDEX TO TEXTS.

	PAGE
Gen. xiii. 25	395
xxxiv. 1	399
Lev. xvi. 29	391
Num. xxxv. 9–32	32
1 Sam. vi. 19	399
xii. 6	373
2 Sam. xiii. 12	387
Ps. xxx.	284
xxxviii., xxxix., xli.	278
lxxxviii.	283
cii. 1	372
ciii. 13	274
civ. 1 ff.	221
cxx.–cxxxiv.	69–75
Eccles. iii. 11	372
Isa. xliv. 22, 23	27
lv. 11	185
lviii. 6	391
lxvi. 13	274
Joel ii. 13	391
Matt. v. 10	142, 156
vi. 33	154, 155
vii. 6	155
vii. 21	154
vii. 26	154
ix. 11	104
ix. 13	105
x. 16	155, 156
x. 32	156
xi. 25–27	265
xii. 50	154
xvi. 23	3
xvi. 26	154
xvii. 25, 26, 27	123, 124
Matt. xviii. 1	378
xxvi. 39	262
xxvi. 42	263
xxvii. 23	379
Mark iii. 4	347
iv. 16, 17	381
iv. 24	156
xiv. 24–25	312
Luke v. 32	105
vi. 46, 49	154
viii. 18	156
viii. 21	154
xi. 5	12
xi. 52	155
xii. 8	156
xii. 22–31	155
xii. 37	16
xii. 42	378
xii. 49	150
xiii. 26	154
xiii. 49	156
xiv. 27, 28	379
xvi. 10, 12, 13, 31	154
xvii. 2	2
xvii. 4	5
xvii. 5	9
xvii. 6	10
John i. 10	371
i. 14	257
i. 41	45
i. 48	45
iv. 44	41
vi. 6	262
vi. 53–54	62
vi. 66–71	64
viii. 23	61
John x. 18	64
x. 16	64
Acts ii. 36	370
iv. 16	379
vii. 5	381
x. 36	370
xix. 2	376
Rom. v. 1	37
viii. 1	37
viii. 3	266
x. 16	239
1 Cor. i. 7	319
iii. 3	377
iv. 15	376
ix. 2	376
x. 1	379
xi. 6, 7	379
xiv. 19	382
xv. 15	378
Gal. v. 5	318
Eph. v. 24	376
Col. i. 16	371
iv. 4	382
Heb. i. 10	372
ii. 7	371
ii. 10	371
ii. 15	266
iii. 2, 3	371
iv. 2	239
viii. 1, 2	374
ix. 11, 23	373
x. 19–25	58
xi. 3	371
1 Pet. i. 7	317
i. 13	316
Rev. v. 8	312

Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner, Frome and London

GTU Library
3 2400 00276 5745

DATE DUE

FEB 15 2000	
FEB 23 2000	
GAYLORD	PRINTED IN U.S.A.